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Story  of  the  Nations 

A  Series  of  Historical  Studies  intended  to  present  in 
graphic  narratives  the  stories  of  the  different 
nations  that  havf  attained  prominence  in  history. 


In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  national 
life  is  distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and 
noteworthy  periods  and  episodes  are  presented  for 
the  reader  in  their  philosophical  relations  to  each 
other  as  well  as  to  universal  history. 


12°,  Illustrated,  cloth,  each  .  .  $1.50 
Half  Leather,  each  ....  $1.75 
Nos.  62  and  following  Nos.  .  net  $1.35 
Each  ....  (By  mail)  $1.50 
Half  leather,  gilt  top,  each         .       net  $1.60 

(By  mail)  $1.75 


FOR  FULL  LIST  SEE  END  OF  THIS  VOLUME 


PARTHIA 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS 


PARTHIA 


BY 
GEORGE  RAWL1NSON,  M.A.,  F.R.G.S. 

LATE    CAMDEN    PROFESSOR   OF    ANCIENT    HISTORY    IN   THE    UNIVERSITY    OF   OXFORD 

CORRESPONDING    MEMBER   OF   THE    ROYAL    ACADEMY    OF   TURIN;    AUTHOR 

OF    "THE    FIVE    GREAT    MONARCHIES   OF   THE   ANCIENT   EASTERN 

WORLD,"    "THE    STORY   OF   ANCIENT  EGYPT,"    ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

LONDON:  T.  FISHER  UNWIN 
1903 

49566 


COPYRIGHT,    1893 

By   G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

Entered  at  Stationers'  Hall,  London 

By  T.  Fisher  Unwin 


Electrotyped,  Printed,  and  Bound  by 

Ubc  IRnicfccrbocfcer  press,  mew  HJorfc 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 


' 


CONTENTS. 


Geographical — Parthia    Proper,    and    the    Par- 
thian Empire       ......       1-26 

Dimensions  of  Parthia  Proper,  i,  2 — General  character  of  the 
region,  2,  3 — Rivers,  valleys,  and  mountain  tracts,  3,  4 — 
Climate,  5 — Products,  6- Countries  included  in  the  Parthian 
Empire — Hyrcania,  6,  7 — Territory  of  the  Mardi,  8,  9 — Media 
Rhagiana,  9,  10 — Western  Bactria,  10,  11 — Media  Magna, 
11-13 — Elam  or  Susiana,  13,  14 — Babylonia,  14,  15 — Persia, 
15-17 — Assyria,  17,  18— Eastern  Bactria,  18,  19 — Margiana, 
19 — Aria,  20 — Drangiana  or  Sarangia,  20,  21 — Sacastana,  21 — 
Arachosia,  21 — Sngartia,  21,  22 — Chorasmia,  22 — Mesopo- 
tamia Proper,  22,  23 — Media  Atropatene,  24— Armenia,  24, 
25-  -Dimensions  of  the  Empire,  25-   Boundaries  ,25,  26. 


II. 

Ethnographical — Turanian    Character    of    the 

Parthian  People         .....     27-35 

First  appearance  of  the  Parthians  in  history,  27 — Connection 
with  the  Persians,  and  supposed  Arian  character,  27,  28 — ■ 
Statements  of  ancient  writers,  Arrinn,  Trogus  Pompeius, 
Strabo,  28-30 — Close  connection  with  the  nomadic  races  of 
Central  Asia,  30,31 — These  races  Turanian,  31,  32 — Turanian 
character  of  the  Parthian  names,  32 — Their  physical  and  mental 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

type,  Turanian,  32-34 — Resemblance  of  the  Parthians  to  the 
Accadians,  Mongols,  and  Turks,  34,  35— Their  other  con- 
geners, 35. 

III. 

Condition  of  Western  Asia  in  the  Third  Cen- 
tury b.c. — Origin  of  the  Parthian  State.     36-62 

Disruption  of  the  Empire  of  Alexander,  36,  $"] — Formation 
of  the  Four  Great  Monarchies,  37 — Kingdom  of  the  Seleu- 
cidae,  37-39 — Mistaken  policy  of  the  Seleucid  princes — Trans- 
fer of  capital  to  Antioch,  39,  40— Entanglement  in  Western 
wars,  40 — Weak  organisation  of  the  kingdom,  41,  42 — Atten- 
tion concentrated  on  the  West — Commencement  of  disorders, 
43,  44 — Weak  character  of  the  second  Antiochus,  44 — Ex- 
amples of  successful  revolt,  44,  45 — Revolt  of  Bactria,  45, 
46— Revolt  of  Parthia,  47-49— The  first  Arsaces,  50— The 
first  Tiridates,  50,  51 — Ptolemy  Euergetes  and  Seleucus  II., 
52,  53 — Tiridates  occupies  Hyrcania,  53 — His  war  with 
Seleucus,  53-56 — His  new  capital,  57 — Accession  of  Arta- 
banus  I.,  58 — His  war  with  Antiochus  the  Great,  59-61  — 
Peaceful  reign  of  Priapatius,  61 — Reign  of  Phraates  I. — Con- 
quest of  Media  Rhagiana,  62. 


IV. 

First  Period  of  Extensive  Conquest — Reign  of 

Mithridates  1 63-76 

Accession  of  Mithridates  I.,  63 — His  physiognomy  and  cha- 
racter, 63,  64 — Condition  of  Western  Asia  at  his  accession, 
64-68 — Attack  of  Mithridates  on  Western  Bactria,  69 — War 
with  Eupator,  69,  70 — Conquest  of  Media  Magna,  70 — Re- 
volt and  reduction  of  Hyrcania,  71— Conquest  of  Elymais, 
71,  72 — Submission  of  Babylonia  and  Persia,  72,  73 — War 
with  Heliocles,  and  conquest  of  Eastern  Bactria,  73,  74 — War 
with  Demetrius  II.  of  Syria,  74,  75 — Capture  of  Demetrius, 
and  death  of  Mithridates,  76. 


CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE 
V. 

Governmental     System     of     Mithridates     I. — 

Laws  and  Institutions       ....     77—90 

Origin  of  Parthian  society  :  Tribes,  Chieftains,  Great  Chief  or 
Monarch,  77,  78 — Power  of  the  chieftains — The  Two  Coun- 
cils: the  "Sophi, "  the  "Magi,"  78— The  Surena  or  Com- 
mander-in-chief, 79 — Power  of  the  monarch,  79,  80 — Govern- 
ment of  the  provinces  by  Vitaxre  or  subject  kings,  80,  81 — 
Semi-independence  of  the  Greek  cities,  81,  82 — Position  of 
the  Jewish  communities,  82,  83 — Organisation  of  the  Parthian 
Court,  83,  84 — Titles  assumed  by  the  monarch  :  his  dress,  84, 
85 — Migrations  of  the  Court,  86,  87 — Pomp  and  grandeur  of 
the  nobles,  87,  88 — Rudeness  of  the  mass  of  the  people,  88, 
S9 — Mithridates  J.  as  organiser,  89,  90. 

VI. 

Last  Struggle  with   Syria — Defeat  and  Death 

of  Antiochus  Sidetes       .         .         .         .91-103 

Accession  of  Phraates  II.  :  War  threatens  with  Syria,  91,  92 
— Inaction  of  Phraates,  93 — Parthia  invaded  by  Antiochus 
Sidetes,  94 — Size  of  his  army,  94,  95 — Force  collected  to  meet 
him,  95 — Equipment  of  the  Syrians,  95,  96 — Advance  of 
Phraates,  followed  by  three  Syrian  victories,  96,  97 — Despe- 
rate position  of  Phraates,  97 — He  sends  Demetrius  to  stir  up 
revolt  in  Syria,  97,  98 — Goes  into  winter  quarters,  98 — Plans 
a  massacre  of  the  invaders,  99— Negotiates  with  Sidetes,  99, 
100 — Great  rising— Battle  and  massacre,  100,  101 — Death  of 
Sidetes,  101 — Rapid  decline  of  Syria,  101,  102 — Proceedings 
of  Phraates,  102,  103. 

VIL 

Pressure  of  the  Northern  Nomads  upon  Parthia 
— Scythic  Wars  of  Phraates  II.  and  Arta- 
banus  II.    .  104-116 

Frequency  of  barbaric  inroads  from  the  North,  104,  105 — 
Character  of  such  inroads,  105,  106 — Constant  danger  to 
Parthia  from  the  Trans-Oxianinn  region,   106 — Great  move- 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

ment  among  the  Northern  Asiatic  hordes  at  this  period  :  the 
Yue-chi,  the  Su,  106-108 — Inroads  of  the  Scyths  into  Bactria 
and  Ariana,  108,  109 — Occupation  of  Sacastana,  and  lodg- 
ment in  Cabul,  109— Settlement  in  India,  no — Principal 
tribes  of  the  Scythians,  no — Character  of  their  barbarism, 
no,  in — Danger  which  threatened  Western  Asia,  m-113 — 
Scythian  War  of  Phraates  II.,  113,  114 — Accession  of  Arta- 
banus  II.,  114 — His  war  with  the  Tochari,  115 — His  death, 
116. 

VIII. 

mlthridates    ii.    and    the    nomads — war    with 

Armenia — First  Contact  with  Rome      .   117-131 

Accession  of  Mithridates  II. :  Meagre  accounts  of  his  reign, 
117 — Mithridates  checks  the  advance  of  the  Scyths,  118 — 
Takes  territory  from  them  in  Bactria,  118,  119 — Crushes  the 
revolt  of  Hymerus,  119 — Attacks  Armenia,  119 — Dimens;ons 
and  physical  character  of  Armenia,  119-121 — Character  of  the 
Armenian  people,  121,  122—  Previous  history  of  the  country, 
122,  123 — Armenia  under  the  Persians,  123,  124 — Conquered 
by  Alexander  the  Great,  124— Revolts  from  Antiochus  III., 
124 — Wars  of  the  Armenians  with  the  Syrians,  124,  125 — 
War  of  Mithridates  II.  with  Ortoadistus,  125,  126 — First  con- 
tact of  Parthia  with  Rome,  126 — Previous  relations  of  Rome 
with  Asia,  126-129 — Mithridates  II.  sends  an  embassy  to 
Sulla,  129 — Establishes  a  friendly  understanding,  130 — Loses 
territory  to  Tigranes  :  Dies,  130— His  appearance  and  cha- 
racter, 130,  131. 

IX. 

Dark  Permd  of  Parthian  History — Accession  of 

Sanairikces — Phraates  III.  and  Pompey  132-146 

Civil  war  in  Parthia  :  Time  of  general  disturbance,  132 — ■ 
Struggle  of  Rome  with  Mithridates  of  Pontus,  133,  Con- 
quests of  Tigranes,  133,  134 — Accession  of  Sanatroeces  to  the 
Parthian  throne,  135 — His  policy  of  abste  >tion,  126 — Sana- 
troeces succeeded  by  Phraates  III.  :  Overtures  made  to  him  by 
Pompey  lead  to  an  alliance,  136-138 — War  between  Phraates 
and  Tigranes,  138,  139 — Settlement  of  the  East  by  Pompey  : 
Discontent  of  Phraates,   139,  140 — Phraates  comes  to  terms 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE 

with  Tigranes,  141,  142 — He  is  murdered  by  his  sons,  143 — 
Short  reign  of  Mithridates  III.,  144,  145 — Accession  of  his 
brother,  Orodes. 

X. 

Great  Expedition  of  Crassus  against  Parthia, 
and  its  Failure — Retaliatory  Raid  of 
Pacorus      147-184 

Antecedents  of  Crassus,  147,  148 — His  appointment  to  the 
Prefecture  "f  Syria,  149 — His  wild  ambition,  149,  150 — He 
starts  for  the  East,  and  reaches  Antioch,  150,  151 — Prepara- 
tions made  to  meet  him  by  Orodes,  151,  152 — Crassus  wastes 
time  in  plundering  expeditions,  152,  153 — Holds  a  conference 
with  Artavasdes,  153,  154 — Receives  an  embassy  from  Orodes, 
and  insults  him,  154,  155 — Resolves  on  an  invasion,  156 — 
Possible  lines  of  route,  156,  157 — Line  of  the  Euphrates 
chosen,  but  given  up  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Osrhoenian 
sheikh,  Abgarus,  157,  158 — March  begun  through  Mesopo- 
tamia, 158 — Disposal  of  his  forces  made  by  Orodes,  158-160 
— The  Surena's  army  :  the  light  horse,  the  heavy  horse,  161, 
162 — Disadvantages  under  which  the  Romans  laboured,  162- 
164 — Treachery  of  Abgarus,  164,  165 — Meeting  of  the  two 
armies,  165,  166 — Parthian  tactics  and  great  Roman  loss,  166, 
167 — Charge  made  by  Publius  Crassus,  167 — Its  failure  and 
his  death,  168 — Renewed  attack  on  the  main  army,  168,  169 — 
Retreat  of  the  Romans  during  the  night,  169,  170 — Carrhse 
renched,  but  retreat  continued,  170,  171 — More  fighting  at 
Sinnaca,  171 — Conference,  and  death  of  Crassus,  172,  173 — 
Estimate  of  the  Roman  loss,  174 — Causes  of  the  failure  of 
Crassus,  174-176 — Treatment  of  the  body  of  Crassus,  177 — 
Farcical  ceremony  at  Seleucia,  177,  178 — Slight  effect  of  the 
disaster,  178.  179 — Death  of  the  Surena,  180,  181 — Raid  of 
Pacorus,  181-183 — Pacorus  recalled  by  Orodes,  184. 

XI. 

Second  War  of  Parthia  with  Rome — Parthian 
Invasion  of  Syria,  Palestine,  and  Asia 
Minor         .......  185-202 

Negotiations  between  Orodes  and  Pompey,  185-187 — Julius 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Caesar  in  the  East,  187,  188 — His  supposed  intention  of  invad- 
ing Parthia,  188  — His  death,  189 —  Parthia's  part  in  the  War 
of  the  "  Liberators,"  189,  190 — The  situation  after  the  Battle 
of  Philippi,  190,  191 — Orodes  determines  to  invade  the  Roman 
territory,  191 — Great  invasion  under  Pacorus  and  Labienus, 
191,  192 — Fall  of  Antioch,  192  —  Reduction  of  Syria,  Phoe- 
nicia, and  Palestine  :  Parthian  occupation  of  Jerusalem,  193 
— Asia  Minor  overrun  by  Labienus,  193,  194 — Turn  of  the 
tide  :  Successes  of  Ventidius,  194-196  — Renewed  attack  by 
Pacorus,  106 — His  defeat  by  Ventidius,  and  death,  197 — 
Final  failure  of  the  invasion,  198 — Reflections  on  this  first 
period  of  struggle,  198-200 — Grief  of  Orodes  at  the  death  of 
Pacorus,  200 — His  abdication  in  favour  of  Phraates  IV.,  201 
— His  death  and  character,  201,  202. 

XII. 

Expedition  of  Mark  Antony  against  Parthia 
— its  Failure — War  between  Parthia  and 
Media  ......*.  203-218 

Accession  of  Phraates  IV.,  203 — His  cruelties,  204 — Intrigues 
of  Monneses  with  Antony,  204-206 — Re-olve  of  Antony  to 
attack  Parthia,  206,  207 — His  preparations,  207 — His  junction 
with  Artavasdes,  and  attack  on  Media  Atropatene,  208 — The 
march  to  I'raaspa,  209 — The  siege,  209-21 1 — Commencement 
of  the  retreat,  211 — Antony's  heavy  losses,  212,  213 — Quarrel 
of  Phraates  with  the  Median  subject-king,  213,  214 — Alliance 
between  that  king  and  Antony,  214 — Antony  seizes  the  person 
of  Artava?des,  and  occupies  Armenia,  215 — Arranges  matters 
with  the  Median  king  and  quits  Asia,  216,  217 — Phraates 
recovers  Media  Atropatene,  and  Armenia  regains  her  indepen- 
dence, 217 — Result  of  the  expedition  of  Antony  favourable, 
rather  than  the  reverse,  to  Parthia,  218. 

XIII. 

Internal  Troubles  in  Parthia — Her  Relations 

with  Rome  under  Augustus  and  Tiberius  219-245 

Troubles  in  Parthia  :  Revolt  of  Tiridates,  219 — Negotiations 
between  Phraates  IV.  and  Augustus,  220,  221 — Later  years  of 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

PAGE 

Phraates,  221,  222 — He  sends  four  of  his  sons  to  Rome,  222, 
223 — Revolution  in  Armenia,  223,  224 — Phraates  takes  Ar- 
mena  under  his  protection,  224,  225 — Caius  sent  by  Augustus 
to  settle  the  affairs  of  the  East,  225,  226 — Revolution  in 
Parthia  :  Phraates  murdered  and  throne  seized  by  Phraataces, 
226 — Negotiations  between  Phraataces  and  Augustus,  227, 
228 — Conference  between  Caius  and  Phraataces  :  Submission 
of  the  latter,  228,  229 — Difficult  position  of  Phraataces : 
his  deposition  by  his  subjects,  229,  230 — Short  reign  of 
Orodes  II.,  230 — Accession  of  Vonones,  230,  231 — His  vic- 
tory over  the  pretender,  Artabanus,  232,  233 — His  later  for- 
tunes, 233,  234 — Reign  of  Artabanus  III.  :  Visit  of  Ger- 
manicus  to  the  East,  234-236 — Peaceful  interval,  236,  237 — 
Ambition  of  Artabanus  :  he  occupies  Armenia,  237 — Tiberius 
stirs  up  fresh  troubles  in  Parthia,  238-241 — Flight  of  Artabanus 
to  Hyrcania,  241 — Tiridates  III.  made  king  by  the  Romans, 
241,  242 — Return  of  Artabanus  and  expulsion  of  Tiridates, 
243,244 — Peace  concluded  between  Artabanus  and  Rome,  245. 

XIV. 

ASINAI      AND      ANIT.AI — An      EPISODE     OF      PARTHIAN 

History      .......  246-256 

Important  Tewish  element  in  the  population  of  Parthia,  246, 
247 — Freedom  allowed  the  Jewish  communities,  247,  248 — 
Early  history  of  Asinai  and  Anilai,  248 — Their  first  successes  : 
Asinai  made  satrap  of  Babylon,  249 — Fresh  outbreak  on  the 
part  of  Anilai,  249,  250 — He  supersedes  his  brother  as  satrap, 
250 — Anilai's  misgovernment,  250 — His  quarrel  with  Mithri- 
dates,  and  cruel  treatment  of  him,  250,  251 — Mithridates  re- 
venges himself:  Defeat  and  death  of  Anilai,  251,  252 — Attack 
on  the  Jewish  population  of  Babylon,  252,  253 — Flight  to 
Seleucia,  253 — Massacres  of  Jews  in  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon, 
254 — Reflections  on  the  occurrences,  254-256. 

XV. 

End  of  the  Reign  of  Artabanus  III. — Gotarzes 

and  his  Rivals 257-269 

Further  troubles  in  Parthia — Death  of  Artabanus,  257,  258 — 
Revolt  of  Seleucia,  258,  259 — Succession   disputed  between 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

his  sons — Vardanes  and  Gotarzes — First  reign  of  Gotarzes, 
259 — Gotarzes  driven  from  his  throne  by  Vardanes,  260— Ar- 
rangement made  between  the  brothers,  261 — Quarrel  of  Var- 
danes with  Izates,  261,  262 — Gotarzes  attacks  Vardanes,  but 
without  success,  262, 263 — Vardanes  murdered  by  his  subjects, 
263 — Second  reign  of  Gotarzes:  discontent  01  the  Parthians 
with  his  government,  263,  264 — Appearance  of  a  pretender  in 
the  person  of  Meherdates,  264 — Support  lent  him  by  the 
Roman  Emperor,  Claudius,  264,265 — Invasion  of  Meherdates, 
and  its  failure,  265-267 — Monument  set  up  by  Gotarzes  to 
commemorate  his  victory,  267,  268 — Death  of  Gotarzes,  and 
decline  of  Parthia  under  him,  268,  269. 


XVI. 
Parthia    in    the   Time    of    Nero — Vologases    I. 

AND    CORBULO        ......    270-290 

Two-months'  reign  of  Vonones  II.  and  accession  of  Volo- 
gases I.,  270 — His  brothers,  Pacorus  and  Tiridates,  271 — His 
first  attempt  upon  Armenia  fails,  272,  273 — His  quarrel  with 
Izates,  273,  274 — His  Scythian  war,  274 — His  second  attack 
on  Armenia  succeeds  :  Tiridates  established  there  as  king,  274, 
275 — Rome  threatens  war,  but  at  first  only  negotiates,  275- 
277 — Civil  war  for  three  years  between  Vologases  and  his  son, 
Vardanes  II.,  277 — Negotiations  between  Vologases  and  Cor- 
bulo,  278 — Corbulo  recovers  Armenia  and  dismembers  it,  279 
— Vologases  occupied  in  Hyrcania,  279,  280 — War  with  Rome 
renewed  :  Campaign  of  a.d.  62,  281,  282 — Arrival  of  Paetus 
in  the  East  :  his  relations  with  Corbulo,  282-284 — Successes 
of  Vologases  against  Partus,  284,  285 — Re-establishment  of 
Tiridates  in  Armenia,  285 — "  Eirenicon  "  proposed  by  Volo- 
gases to  Nero,  285,286 — "Eirenicon"  accepted,  and  peace 
made,  286,  287 — Journey  of  Tiridates  to  Kome,  and  his  in- 
vestiture by  Nero  with  the  crown  of  Armenia,  287-290. 

XVII. 

Vologases    I.    and    Vespasian— Pacorus    II.    and 

Decebalus  of  Dacia  ....  291-298 

Little  light   thrown  on  Parthian  history  by  Roman  writers  for 


CONTENTS.  XV 

PAGE 

the  next  fifty  years,  291,  292 — Friendly  relations  of  Vologases 
I.  with  Vespasian  and  Titus,  292 — Attempt  made  by  Pectus  to 
trouble  the  relations  fails,  292-294 — Invasion  of  Parthia  by 
the  Alans  ;  application  to  Rome  for  aid  refused  ;  coolness 
between  the  two  powers,  294-296 — Accession  to  the  throne  of 
Pacorus  II.,  296  —  Negotiations  between  Pacorus  and  the 
Dacian  monarch,  Decebalus,  297,  298 — Pacorus  troubled  by  a 
pretender,  named  Artabanus,  298. 


XVIII. 

Chosroes  and  Trajan — Trajan's  Asiatic  Con- 
quests— Relinquishment  of  these  Conquests 
by  Hadrian        ......   299-317 

Accession  of  Chosroes  :  Trajan's  designs  against  the  East, 
299-302 — His  march  to  the  Euphrates,  and  seizure  of  Partha- 
masiris,  302-304 — Armenia  made  a  Roman  province,  305 — 
Parthia  invaded  by  Trajan :  Mesopotamia  conquered,  and 
made  a  province,  305,  306— Advance  from  Nisibis  to  the 
Tigris,  and  passage  of  the  Tigris,  307,  308 — Conquest  of 
Adiabene,  308 — Fall  of  Hatra  and  Babylon  ;  submission  of 
Ctesiphon,  309 — Trajan's  pleasure  voyage,  310 — Revolts  in 
his  rear,  310,  311 — His  retreat,  repulse  at  Hatra,  and  death, 
312,  313 — Trajan's  conquests  relinquished  by  Hadrian,  313, 
314 — Friendly  relations  between  Chosroes  and  Hadrian,  315 
— Later  years  of  Chosroes,  316 — Troubles  caused  him  by 
Pretenders,  317. 

XIX. 

Vologases   II.    and   Antoninus   Pius — Vologases 

III.  and  Verus  .         .         .         .         .  318-330 

Accession  of  Vologases  II.,  318 — Alanic  war,  319  — Hadrian 
and  Pharasmanes,  319,  320 — Vologases  II.  and  Antoninus, 
320,  321 — Reign  of  Vologases  III.  ;  he  invades  Armenia,  322 
—Defeats  Severianus  and  attacks  Syria,  323 — Verus  sent  to 
the  East :  Armenia  recovered,  324 — Great  expedition  of  Avi- 
dius  Cassius,  325-327 — Results  of  the  expedition,  327,  328 — 
Later  years  of  Vologases  III.  :  His  relations  with  Marcus 
Aurelius  and  Commodus,  328-330. 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

XX. 

PAGE 

VOLOGASES  IV.  AND  SEVERUS  ....  33I~345 

Reign  of  Vologases  IV.:  Death  of  Commodus,  331,  332 — 
Pretensions  of  Pescennius  Niger  :  His  struggle  with  Severus, 
332-334 — Mesopotamian  expedition  of  Severus,  335,  336 — 
His  recall  to  the  West  :  Parthian  successes  in  his  absence,  236, 
337 — Great  expedition  of  Severus  against  Parthia,  337-339— 
Sack  of  Ctesiphon,  339 — Return  of  Severus  through  Meso- 
potamia ;  .Siege  of  Hatra,  340-343 — Failure  of  the  siege,  343, 
344 — General  results  of  the  expedition,  344,  345. 

XXI. 

Artabanus  V.   and   Caracallus — The   Last  War 

with  Rome — Defeat  of  Macrinus  .         .  346-357 

Parthian  throne  disputed  between  Artabanus  and  his  brother, 
Vologases  ;  Artabanus  holds  the  Western  provinces,  346,  347 
— Mad  project  of  Caracallus,  347,  348 — His  negotiations  with 
Artabanus,  348-350  —His  peaceful  journey  to  Ctesiphon,  and 
Festive  Meeting  with  the  Parthian  monarch,  350,  351 — His 
cruel  massacre  of  the  unarmed  multitude,  352— His  violation 
of  the  Parthian  Royal  sepulchres,  352,  353 — His  lion-hunting, 
353 — His  murder  by  his  guards,  354 — Difficulties  of  his  suc- 
cessor, Macrinus,  354,  355 — Three  days'  fight  at  Nisibis,  355, 
356 — Macrinus  forced  to  purchase  a  peace,  357. 

XXII. 

Revolt     of    the     Persians — Downfall    of    the 

Parthian  Empire 358-37° 

Tendency  of  the  Parthian  Empire  to  disintegration,  358,  359 
— Frequency  of  revolts,  359,  360 — Grounds  of  the  general 
discontent,  360-362 — Special  grievances  alleged  by  the  Per- 
sians, 363,  364 — Other  probable  causes  of  dissatisfaction,  364, 
365 — Revolt  of  Persia,  and  struggle  between  Artabanus  and 
Artaxerxes ;  Artabanus  defeated  and  slain,  366,  367 — Last 
efforts  of  Artavasdes,  367,  368 — Duration  and  character  of  the 
Parthian  Empire,  368-370. 


"?R  a"  ~a- 


CONTENTS.  XV11 

XXIII. 

PAGE 

Parthian  Art,  Religion,  and  Customs         .  372-419 

Parthian  architecture,  372,  373 — Buildings  at  Al  Hadhr,  or 
Hatra,  373-383— Architectural  fragments  at  Warka,  383-385 
— Parthian  fictile  art,  385-388— Parthian  aesthetic  art,  389 — 
Parthian  reliefs,  389-393 — General  estimate  of  their  art,  393, 
394 — Parthian  religion,  394-396 — Customs  in  war,  396-404 
— Customs  in  peace,  404-407 — Seclusion  of  women,  407 — 
State  and  pomp  of  the  king,  408-410 — Power  of  the  nobles, 
410-413 — Ordinary  Parthian  food,  413 — Degree  of  civilisation, 
414-418 — General  survey,  418,  419. 

Appendix 420 

Index 421 


LIST   OF    ILLUSTRATIONS. 


ROCK    SCULPTURE    OF    GOTARZES    AT    BEHISTUN 

MAP   OF    PARTHIAN    EMPIRE 

COIN    OF    TIRIDATES    I. 

COIN    OF    ARTABANUS    I. 

COIN    OF    PRIAPATIUS 

COIN    OF    MITHRIDATES    I. 

COIN    OF   PHRAATES    II. 

COIN    OF    ARTABANUS    II. 

COIN    OF    MITHRIDATES    II. 

COIN    OF    SANATRGECES 

COIN    OF    MITHRIDATES    III 

COIN    OF    ORODES    I.  . 

COIN    OF    PACORUS    I. 

COIN    OF    PHRAATES    IV. 

COIN    OF    TIRIDATES    II. 

COIN    OF    PHRAATACES    AND    MUSA 

COIN    OF    ORODES    II. 

COIN    OF    VONONES    I. 

COIN    OF    ARTABANUS    III 

COIN    OF    VARDANES    I. 

COIN    OF   GOTARZES    . 


Frontispiece 
facing  p.    i 

5° 
58 
61 

63 
9i 

"5 

130 

135 

144 

J51 
1S1 

204 

220 

227 

230 

232 

260 
263 


XX 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


COIN    OF    VOLOGASES    I. 

COIN    OF    VARDANES    II.       . 

COIN    OF    PACORUS    II. 

COIN    OF   ARTABANUS    IV.    . 

COIN    OF   CHOSROES    . 

COINS    OF   VOLOGASES    II.  . 

COIN    OF    MITHRIDATES    IV. 

COIN    OF    ARTABANUS    IV.     . 

COIN    OF    VOLOGASES    III.     . 

COIN    OF   VOLOGASES    IV.      . 

COIN    OF   VOLOGASES    V. 

COIN    OF    ARTABANUS   V.      . 

COIN    OF   ARTAVASDES 

MAP   OF    PARTHIA    PROPER 

GROUND    PLAN    OF   THE   CITY    OF    AL    HADHR 

PLAN    OF    THE    PALACE-TEMPLE    OK    HATRA 

FRIEZE    IN    THE    PALACE-TEMPLE    OF    HATRA 

STONES    OF   ARCHIVOLTS       .... 

PILASTER    AT    HATRA,    WITH    CORNICE    AND   CAPITAL 

PROPOSED    RESTORATION    OF    THE    HATKA    BUILDING 

ARCHITECTURAL    FRAGMENTS    AT    WARKA 

PARTHIAN    JUGS    AND    JARS 

PARTHIAN    SLIPPER-COFFIN 

PARTHIAN    PERSONAL    ORNAMENTS 

PARTHIAN    HELMET     .... 

ORDINARY    DRESS   OF    PARTHIAN    MONARCH 

COIN    OF     KAMNASCIRAS       .... 


THE  STORY  OF  PARTHIA. 


GEOGRAPHICAL — PARTHIA     PROPER, 
PARTHIAN    EMPIRE. 


AND     THE 


PARTHIA  Proper,  the  earliest  home  (so  far  as  our 
knowledge  extends)  of  the  Parthian  people,  was,  like 
Persia  Proper  and  Macedonia  Proper,  a  tract  of  some- 
what scanty  dimensions.  From  the  south-eastern 
corner  of  the  Caspian  Sea  there  extends,  in  a  direc- 
tion a  little  south  of  east,  a  narrowish  mountain 
region,  connected  at  one  extremity  with  the  lofty 
Elburz  range,  w  lich  skirts  the  Caspian  on  the  south, 
and,  at  the  other,  with  the  Paropamisus,  or  Hindu 
Kush.  On  eithe  side,  northwards  and  southwards, 
stretch  for  hundreds  of  miles  extensive  sandy  or 
gravelly  deserts,  that  to  the  north  known  as  the 
desert  of  Khorasan  or  Khiva,  and  that  to  the  south 
as  the  Great  Salt  Desert  of  Iran.  Between  these  is 
a  comparatively  rich  and  productive  tract,  reaching 
from  the  fifty-fourth  to  the  sixty-first  meridian,  a 
distance  of  some  seven  degrees,  or  about  three  hun- 
dred miles,  with  a  breadth  varying  from  two  to  three 
degrees,    and    averaging     about    one    hundred    and 


2   PARTHIA    PROPER,    AND    THE   PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

seventy  miles.  This  region,  in  the  earliest  times  of 
which  we  have  any  distinct  historical  knowledge,  was 
parcelled  out  into  two  countries,  belonging  to  two 
different  peoples,  and  known  respectively  as  Parthia 
and  Hyrcania.  The  exact  line  of  demarcation  which 
separated  the  two,  it  is  impossible  to  trace  ;  but  there 
is  sufficient  proof,  that,  while  Hyrcania  lay  towards 
the  north  and  west,  the  Parthians  held  the  districts 
towards  the  east  and  south.  The  valleys  of  the  Ettrek 
and  the  Gurghan  belonged  to  the  former,  while  the 
regions  south  and  east  of  these  valleys,  the  skirt  of 
the  southern  mountains  from  Damaghan  to  Shebri- 
No,  and  the  valleys  of  the  Tejend  and  the  river  of 
Nishapur,  constituted  the  country  of  the  latter. 

If  the  limits  of  Parthia  Proper  be  thus  defined,  it 
will  have  corresponded  nearly  to  the  modern  Persian 
province  of  Khorasan — that  is  to  say,  it  will  have 
extended  from  about  Damaghan  (long.  540  20')  upon 
the  west  to  the  Heri-rud,  or  river  of  Herat,  upon  the 
east,  and  have  comprised  the  modern  districts  of 
Damaghan,  Shah-rud,  Sebzawar,  Nishapur,  Meshed, 
Tersheez,  and  Shebri-No.  Its  length  from  east  to 
west  will  have  been  about  three  hundred  miles,  and 
its  average  width  about  a  hundred  or  a  hundred  and 
twenty.  It  will  have  contained  an  area  of  about 
33,000  square  miles,  being  thus  about  equal  in  size 
to  Ireland,  Bavaria,  or  St.  Domingo. 

The  general  character  of  the  region  is,  as  has  been 
observed,  rich  and  productive.  The  mountain  forma- 
tion consists  of  four  or  five  distinct  ranges,  having 
between  them  latitudinal  valleys,  with  glens  trans- 
verse  to  their  courses.     The   valleys  arc   often   well 


SIZE   AND   CHARACTER    OF   PARTHIA    PROPER.     3 

wooded  ;  the  flat  ground  at  the  foot  of  the  outer 
ranges  of  hills  is  fertile  ;  water  abounds  ;  and  the 
streams  gradually  collect  into  rivers  which  are  of  a 
considerable  size.  Of  these  the  principal  are  the 
Tejend,  or  river  of  Meshed,  and  the  river  of  Nishapur. 
The  Tejend  rises  from  several  sources  in  the  central 
mountain  range,  anciently  known  as  Labus  or  Labuta, 
and  now  as  Alatagh,  and  runs  with  a  course  con- 
siderably south  of  east,  past  Meshed,  to  a  point 
a  little  beyond  the  sixtieth  meridian,  where  it  de- 
flects towards  the  left,  and  runs  east  and  a  little 
north  of  east  to  the  Heri-rud.  Having  absorbed  the 
Heri-rud,  it  makes  a  second,  and  still  sharper,  turn  to 
the  left,  and  flows  with  a  northerly  and  north-westerly 
course  past  Sarrakhs — now  a  Russian  post — along  the 
foot  of  the  northern  Parthian  range,  now  known  as 
'the  Hills  of  the  Kurds,"  to  a  marsh,  in  which  it  is 
swallowed  up,  between  the  fifty-seventh  and  fifty- 
eighth  parallels.  The  river  of  Nishapur  is  a  smaller 
stream.  It  rises  from  the  mountains  which  on  three 
sides  enclose  that  city,  and  flows  southwards  and 
south-westwards  towards  the  Iranian  desert.  At  times 
the  water  is  entirely  absorbed  in  the  irrigation  of  the 
fertile  plain  immediately  south  of  Nishapur,  but  the 
channel  is  always  traceable,  past  Tersheez  into  the 
desert,  and  in  some  seasons  it  carries  a  certain  quan- 
tity of  water  into  that  parched  and  arid  region. 

The  valleys  of  these  two  streams  are  among  the 
most  fertile  and  productive  portions  of  the  entire 
territory  ;  but  anciently  the  tract  which  was  most 
valued,  and  which  supported  the  largest  population, 
seem  to  have  been  that  which  is  now  known   as  the 


4    PARTHTA    PROPER,   AND    THE    PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

"  Atak,"  or"  Skirt  " — the  low  cultivable  country  at  the 
foot  of  the  southern  hills,  intervening  between  them 
and  the  desert.  Along  this  whole  region,  from  Dama- 
ghan  to  Tersheez,  the  mountains  send  down  a  con- 
tinued succession  of  rills,  rivulets,  and  rivers,  which 
make  it  easy,  at  the  expenditure  of  a  little  care  and 
labour,  to  carry  the  life-giving  element  to  a  distance 
of  four  or  five  miles  from  their  base.  Some  hus- 
banding of  the  water  may  be  needed,  together  with 
the  creation  of  a  system  of  reservoirs  and  kanats,  or 
underground  channels  ;  but,  if  these  be  provided,  the 
return  is  ample.  The  abundant  remains  of  large 
cities,  crumbled  into  dust,  along  the  entire  "  Atak  "  is 
a  sufficient  indication  of  the  beneficence  of  nature  in 
this  tract  of  country,  if  it  be  only  seconded  by  a  fair 
amount  of  human  industry  and  skill. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  mountain  tracts,  of  which 
the  country  so  largely  consists,  offer  a  strong  contrast 
to  the  valleys  of  the  main  streams,  and  to  the  southern 
strip  of  territory.  They  are  for  the  most  part  barren 
and  rugged,  very  scantily  supplied  with  timber,  and 
only  in  places  capable  of  furnishing  a  tolerable  pas- 
turage to  flocks  and  herds.  This  is  the  more  remark- 
able, as  they  do  not  attain  any  great  elevation. 
While  Mount  Demavend  in  the  Elburz  range  south  of 
the  Caspian  exceeds  20,000  feet,  and  the  same  eleva- 
tion is  reached,  or  exceeded,  by  many  peaks  in  the 
Paropamisus,  the  greatest  altitude  of  the  Parthian 
ranges  does  not  exceed  ten  thousand,  or,  at  the  utmost, 
eleven  thousand  feet.  The  northern  range,  called  now 
the  Daman-i-Koh,  is  the  loftiest  and  the  least  known, 
the  rudeness  of  the  Kurdish  tribes  by  which  it  is  in- 


CLIMATE   OF  PARTHIA    PROPER.  5 

habited  repelling  travellers  :  the  central  range,  called 
towards  the  west  Alatagh,  and  towards  the  east  Mac- 
rabea,  is  considerably  lower  ;  while  the  southern 
range,  called  indifferently  Djuvein  and  Jaghetai,  is  of 
about  the  same  elevation. 

The  climate  of  Parthia  Proper,  according  to  ancient 
writers,  was  an  extreme  one,  exceedingly  hot  in  the 
low  plains,  and  exceedingly  cold  in  the  mountains. 
But  modern  travellers  are  inclined  to  modify  both 
statements.  They  tell  us,  that  the  winters,  although 
protracted,  are  nowhere  very  inclement,  the  thermo- 
meter rarely  sinking  below  ten  or  twelve  degrees  of 
Fahrenheit  during  the  nights,  and  during  the  day- 
time rising,  even  in  December  and  January,  which 
are  the  coldest  months,  to  forty  or  fifty.  The  winter, 
however,  sets  in  early.  Cold  weather  commences  in 
October,  and  continues  till  nearly  the  end  of  March, 
when  storms  of  sleet  and  hail  are  usual.  A  consider- 
able quantity  of  snow  falls  in  the  earlier  portion  of  the 
winter,  and  the  valleys  are  scarcely  clear  of  it  till 
March.  On  the  mountains  it  remains  much  longer, 
and  forms  the  chief  source  of  supply  for  the  rivers 
during  the  spring  and  the  early  summer  time.  In  the 
height  of  summer  the  heat  is  undoubtedly  great, 
more  especially  in  the  region  known  as  the  "  Atak," 
or  "  Skirt "  ;  and  here  the  unwholesome  wind,  which 
blows  from  the  southern  desert,  is  felt  from  time  to 
time  as  a  terrible  scourge.  But  in  the  upland  country 
the  heat  is  at  no  time  very  intense  ;  and  the  natives 
boast  at  the  present  day  that  they  are  not  compelled 
by  it  to  sleep  upon  their  house-tops  more  than  one 
month  during  the  year. 


6   PARTHIA    PROPER,   AND    THE   PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

The  country,  though  reported  by  modern  travellers 
to  be  only  scantily  clothed  with  wood,  is  still  found 
to  produce  the  pine,  the  walnut,  the  sycamore,  the 
ash,  the  poplar,  the  willow,  the  vine,  the  mulberry,  the 
apricot,  and  numerous  other  fruit  trees.  There  is 
reason  to  believe  that,  in  ancient  times,  if  the  variety 
of  trees  was  not  so  great,  the  number  of  them  was 
very  much  greater.  Strabo  calls  the  territory  haaeta, 
or  "  densely  wooded."  Among  indigenous  plants  are 
saffron,  the  assafcetida  plant,  and  the  gum  ammoniac 
plant.  Wheat,  barley,  and  cotton  are  capable  of  being 
raised  in  large  quantities  ;  and  the  fertility  is  such 
that  the  ordinary  return  on  wheat  and  barley,  under 
a  bad  system  of  cultivation,  is  reckoned  at  ten  for  one, 
while  instances  are  said  to  have  been  known  of  the 
return  of  a  hundred  for  one.  The  return  from  rice, 
according  to  one  witness,  is  often  four  hundred  for 
one  !  Game  abounds  in  the  mountains,  and  fish  in 
the  underground  watercourses.  Among  mineral  pro- 
ducts may  be  mentioned  salt,  iron,  copper,  and  lead. 
The  mountains  contain  precious  stones  of  several 
kinds,  especially  that  delicate  and  valuable  gem,  the 
turquoise. 

Starting  from  this  narrow,  but  fairly  productive 
region,  the  Parthians  gradually  brought  under  their 
dominion  the  greater  portion  of  Western  Asia.  Very 
soon  after  establishing  their  own  independence,  they 
made  an  attack  on  their  nearest  neighbour  to  the  west, 
Hyrcania.  Hyrcania  was  a  country  geographically 
connected,  in  the  closest  way,  with  Parthia,  very 
similar  in  general  character,  but  richer,  warmer,  and 
altogether  more  desirable.     It  occupied  the  western 


PARTHIAN   CONQUESTS — HYRCANIA.  7 

half  of  the  mountain  region  already  described  (p.  2) 
— extending  from  the  Caspian  Sea  to  the  Heri-rud — 
whereof  the  eastern  half  was  Parthia.  Mainly  com- 
posed of  the  two  fertile  valleys  of  the  Gurghan  and 
Ettrek,  with  the  mountain  chains  enclosing  and 
dividing  them,  it  was  a  picturesque  and  richly  wooded 
district  almost  as  large  as  Parthia  itself,  and  con- 
siderably more  productive.  Here,  on  the  slopes  of 
the  hills,  grew  the  oak,  the  beech,  the  elm,  the  alder, 
the  wild  cherry  ;  here  luxuriant  vines  sprang  from 
the  soil  on  every  side,  raising  themselves  aloft  by  the 
aid  of  their  stronger  sisters,  and  hanging  in  wild 
festoons  from  tree  to  tree ;  beneath  their  shade  the 
ground  was  covered  with  flowers  of  various  kinds, 
primroses,  violets,  lilies,  hyacinths,  and  others  of  un- 
known species  ;  while  in  the  flat  land  at  the  bottom 
of  the  valleys  were  meadows  of  the  softest  and  ten- 
dcrest  grass,  capable  of  affording  to  numerous  flocks 
and  herds  an  excellent  and  never-failing  pasture. 
Vast  quantities  of  game  found  shelter  in  the  forests, 
while  towards  the  mouths  of  the  rivers,  where  the 
ground  is  for  the  most  part  marshy,  large  herds  of 
wild  boars  were  frequent,  and  offered  a  variety  to 
sportsmen.  Altogether  Hyrcania  was  a  most  valu- 
able and  desirable  region,  and  well  deserved  Strabo's 
description  of  it  as  "highly  favoured  of  heaven."  Its 
fertility  was  extraordinary.  We  are  told  that  a  single 
vine  in  Hyrcania  produced  nine  gallons  of  wine,  and 
a  single  fig-tree  ninety  bushels  of  figs,  while  corn 
did  not  require  to  be  sown  by  the  hand,  but  sprang 
sufficiently  from  the  casual  droppings  of  the  last 
year's  crop. 


8   PARTHIA    PROPER,   AND    THE    PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

Not  very  long  after  the  absorption  of  Hyrcania,  the 
Parthian  arms  were  directed  against  the  country  of 
the  Mardi.  This  region  adjoined  on  Hyrcania  towards 
the  west,  and  consisted  mainly  of  the  mountain  tract 
which  shuts  in  the  Caspian  on  the  south,  forming  a 
continuation  of  the  most  southern  of  the  three 
Parthian  chains,  and  generally  known  under  the 
appellation  of  Elburz.  It  is  uncertain  how  far  the 
Mardian  territory  extended  towards  the  west,  but 
probable  that  it  was  comprised  within  about  two 
degrees,  reaching  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Dama- 
ghan  to  the  great  mountain  of  Demavend,  or  from 
E.  long.  540  to  5 2°  nearly.  It  is  generally  described 
as  wholly  rough  and  mountainous,  but  probably  in- 
cluded the  tract  between  the  foot  of  the  mountains 
and  the  Caspian— the  eastern  portion  of  the  modern 
Mazanderan.  This  is  a  rich  flat  plain  of  alluvial  soil, 
but  little  raised  above  the  level  of  the  neighbouring 
sea,  from  which  rise  gently-swelling  hills,  gradually 
increasing  in  elevation,  and  forming  the  supports  of 
the  lofty  range,  which  was  the  heart  of  the  Mardian 
territory.  Here  high  rocky  summits  alternated  with 
dense  pathless  woods,  the  mountains  being  clothed 
on  their  northern  flank  nearly  to  the  top  with  dwarf 
oaks,  or  with  shrubs  and  brushwood  ;  while  lower 
down  their  sides  were  covered  with  forests  of  elms, 
cedars,  chestnuts,  beeches,  and  cypress-trees.  At  the 
present  day,  the  gardens  and  orchards  of  the  natives, 
interspersed  among  the  masses  of  primeval  forest,  are 
of  the  most  superb  character  ;  the  vegetation  is 
luxuriant  ;  lemons,  oranges,  peaches,  pomegranates, 
besides  other  fruits,  abound  ;  rice,  hemp,  sugar-canes 


THE  MARDIAN   COUNTRY — MEDIA    RHAGIANA.      O, 

mulberries,  are  cultivated  with    success  ;  vines    grow 
wild  ;  and  the  valleys    are    strewn  with    shrubs    and 
flowers  of  rare  fragrance,  among  which  may  be  noted 
the  rose,  the  honeysuckle,  and  the  sweet-briar.   Nature 
however — inexorably   just,    as    usual — has    balanced 
these  extraordinary  advantages  with    peculiar  draw- 
backs ;  the  tiger,  scarcely  known  in  any  other  part  of 
Western    Asia,  here    lurks   in    the   jungles,  ready  to 
spring  at  any  moment  on  the  unwary  traveller  ;  inun- 
dations are    frequent,  and    carry  desolation    far    and 
wide  ;  the  waters,  which  thus  escape  from  the  river- 
beds, stagnate  in  marshes,  and,  during  the  summer  and 
autumn    heats,   pestilential    exhalations    arise,    which 
destroy  the  stranger,  and  bring  even  the  acclimatised 
native  to  the  brink  of  the  grave.  The  Mardian  territory- 
was  thus  of  no  great  value  to  the  conquerors,  except 
as  conducting  to  other  and  healthier  regions,  a  neces- 
sary link  in  the  chain  which  was  to  unite  East  with 
West,  and  by  means  of  which  were  to  be  re-knit  in 
one   the   scattered    fragments  of   the  empire,  which, 
built  up  originally  by  Cyrus,  had  been  destroyed  by 
Alexander. 

The  third  tract  which  the  Parthians  annexed  was  a 
portion  of  Media.  A  strong  spur  runs  out  from  the 
Elburz  mountain  range,  about  E.  long.  520  20',  which 
projects  far  into  the  desert,  and  forms  a  marked 
natural  division  between  the  regions  west  and  east  of 
it.  The  tract  immediately  to  the  west  of  the  spur 
belonged  to  the  ancient  Media,  and  was  known  as 
Media  Rhagiana  from  its  capital  city,  Rhages,  situ- 
ated in  the  angle  between  the  spur  and  the  main 
range,  at  no  great  distance  from  either.     Parthia,  soon 


10   PARTHIA  PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

after  the  conquest  of  the  Mardians,  invaded  this 
territory,  and  effected  a  lodgment  in  it  at  a  place 
called  Charax,  quite  close  to  the  spur,  probably  on 
the  site  now  called  Uewanikif.  Hence,  by  degrees, 
the  rest  of  Rhagiana  was  overrun,  and  the  entire  tract 
passed  into  the  possession  of  the  Parthians,  as  far 
probably  as  Kasvin  westward,  and  southward  as  far  as 
Kum.  This  was  a  district  of  a  considerable  size,  a 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  long  from  the  spur  to  Kasvin, 
and  about  eighty  broad  from  the  Elburz  mountains 
to  Kum.  It  was  an  elevated  plain,  from  three  thou- 
sand to  four  thousand  feet  above  the  sea  level,  having 
a  climate  dry  and  healthy,  but  a  soil  of  indifferent 
quality.  Portions  of  it  belonged  to  the  great  central 
Iranian  desert,  and  were  absolutely  unproductive, 
while  the  remainder  could  not  boast  any  special  fer- 
tility. It  possessed,  however,  salt  in  abundance,  was 
tolerably  well  watered,  and  could  produce  cereals  and 
green  crops  in  sufficient  quantity  to  sustain  a  numerous 
population. 

The  next  aggressive  movement  of  the  Parthians 
was  in  the  opposite  direction — towards  the  east.  Here 
Parthia  adjoined  on  the  considerable  state  of  Bactria, 
which  had  grown  up  simultaneously  with  herself,  and 
had  absorbed  several  extensive  countries.  Parthia's 
first  aggression  was  on  a  small  scale,  and  its  result 
was  merely  the  detachment  from  the  Bactrian 
dominion  of  two  inconsiderable  provinces,  known 
respectively  as  Turina  and  Aspionus.  The  exact 
position  of  these  tracts  is  unknown  to  us,  but  they 
must  certainly  be  placed  in  the  western  portion  of 
the    Bactrian   territory,   and   probably   were    districts 


PART    OF   BACTRIA— MEDIA    MAGNA.  II 

north  of  the  Paropamisus,  cither  upon  the  Murghab, 
or  upon  the  Ab-i-Kaisar  river.  The  accession  of 
territory  gained  by  this  conquest  was  insignificant. 

But  some  extensive  and  most  valuable  conquests 
soon  followed.  Turning  her  attention  once  more 
towards  the  west,  Parthia  made  war  upon  Media,  the 
great  country  which  had  for  a  time  held  the  first  place 
in  Western  Asia,  and  exercised  a  dominion  which 
reached  from  the  Caspian  Gates  to  the  Halys,  and 
from  the  mouth  of  the  Araxes  to  the  vicinity  of 
Isfahan.  Subjected  first  by  Persia,  and  then  by 
Alexander  the  Great,  she  had  sunk  back  within  much 
narrower  limits,  and  had  at  the  same  time  become 
split  up  into  three  provinces— Media  Rhagiana,  Media 
Magna,  and  Media  Atropatene.  The  Parthians  had 
previously  swallowed  up,  as  already  stated,  Media 
Rhagiana  :  now  they  attacked  Media  Magna.  This 
was  an  extensive  tract  situated  between  the  thirty- 
second  and  thirty-seventh  parallels,  and  reaching  from 
the  Great  Salt  Desert  of  Iran  upon  the  east  to  the 
main  chain  of  Mount  Zagros  upon  the  west.  Its 
length  from  north  to  south  was  about  five  degrees,  or 
nearly  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles,  and  its  width 
from  west  to  east  four  degrees,  or  about  two  hundred 
and  forty  miles.  The  entire  area  cannot  have  been 
much  under  eighty  thousand  square  miles,  which  is  a 
little  less  than  the  size  of  Great  Britain,  and  a  little 
more  than  that  of  German  Austria.  The  tract  divides 
itself  into  two  portions — the  wrestern  and  the  eastern. 
The  western,  which  is  rather  more  than  one  half  of 
the  whole,  lies  within  the  limits  of  the  broad  mountain 
region  known  as  Zagros,  and  is  a  country  of  alternate 


12   PARTHIA  PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

mountain  and  valley,  with  here  and  there  a  tolerably 
extensive  plain,  very  productive,  and  for  the  most,  part 
picturesque  and  beautiful.  The  loftiest  of  the  moun- 
tains are  bare  and  rugged  towards  their  summits,  but 
the  inferior  ranges  are  thickly  clothed  with  forests 
quite  to  their  top,  while  the  valleys  are  full  of  mag- 
nificent orchards  and  gardens.  The  walnut,  the 
Oriental  plane,  the  dwarf  oak,  the  willow,  and  the 
poplar  abound,  while  occasionally  are  to  be  seen  the 
ash,  and  the  terebinth,  or  turpentine  tree.  The  fruit- 
trees  in  the  orchards  and  gardens  include,  besides 
vines  and  mulberries,  the  apple,  the  pear,  the  quince, 
the  plum,  the  almond,  the  nut,  the  chestnut,  the  olive, 
the  peach,  the  nectarine,  and  the  apricot.  With  this 
western  region,  the  eastern  is  in  strong  contrast.  East 
of  Zagros,  where  the  mountains  sink  down  almost 
at  once  into  the  plain,  lies  a  vast  gravelly  or  sandy 
plateau,  covered  often  with  a  saline  efflorescence, 
called  the  "  Kavir,"  and  in  places  with  a  thick  salt 
deposit,  only  scantily  supplied  with  water  from 
streams  or  wells  which  are  often  brackish,  and  crossed 
in  places  by  bare  rocky  ridges,  destitute  of  all  vege- 
table mould,  and  incapable  of  nourishing  even  a  bush 
or  a  tuft  of  grass.  Still,  excepting  where  the  salt 
efflorescence  prevails,  even  the  plateau  can  be  made 
to  produce  good  crops,  if  only  water  be  supplied  in 
sufficient  quantity.  Hence  the  system  of  kanats, 
which  is  of  great  antiquity.  Everywhere  the  small 
streams  and  rills  which  descend  from  the  mountains, 
and  which,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  be  almost 
immediately  absorbed  by  the  sands  of  the  desert,  are 
led  into  subterranean  channels,  which  are  placed  at  a 


EL  AM   OR    SUSIANA.  1 3 

considerable  depth  below  the  surface,  and  conducted 
for  many  miles  across  the  plain.  Openings  are  made 
at  intervals,  from  which  water  may  be  drawn  by 
means  of  a  bucket  for  purposes  of  irrigation  ;  and  in 
this  way  a  considerable  portion  of  the  plateau  is 
brought  into  cultivation. 

The  conquest  of  Media  Magna  about  doubled  the 
extent  of  the  Parthian  dominions,  while  it  also  soon 
led  to  further  acquisitions  of  a  most  important 
character.  On  the  western  flank  of  Media  Magna  lay 
the  rich  and  valuable  country,  known  originally  as 
Elam,  and  later  on  as  Kissia  or  Susiana.  This  was  an 
extensive  tract  of  very  productive  territory,  interposed 
between  the  main  chain  of  Zagros  and  the  lower 
Tigris  river,  extending  a  distance  of  about  five 
degrees,  or  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  north- 
west to  south-east,  and  having  an  average  breadth  of 
about  a  hundred  and  fifty,  or  a  hundred  and  sixty 
miles,  in  the  transverse  direction.  Like  Media 
Magna,  it  consisted  of  two  strongly  contrasted 
regions.  Towards  the  west  was  a  broad  tract  of 
fertile  alluvium,  intervening  between  the  Tigris  and 
the  mountains,  well  watered  by  numerous  large 
streams — the  Jerahi,  the  Karun,  the  Kerkhah,  the 
Diala,  and  others — which  are  capable  of  giving  an 
abundant  irrigation  to  almost  the  whole  of  the  low 
country.  Above  this  region,  towards  the  east  and 
the  north-east,  was  a  still  more  pleasant  district,  com- 
posed of  alternate  mountain,  valley,  and  upland  plain, 
abounding  in  beautiful  glens,  richly  wooded,  and  full 
of  gushing  brooks  and  clear  rapid  rivers.  Much  of 
this  region  is  of  course  uncultivable  mountain,  range 


14   PARTHIA  PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN    EMPIRE. 

succeeding  range  in  six  or  eight  nearly  parallel  lines, 
as  the  traveller  advances  towards  the  north  cast  ;  and 
most  of  the  ranges  exhibiting  vast  tracts  of  bare  and 
often  precipitous  rock,  in  the  clefts  of  which  snow  rests 
till  midsummer.  Still  the  lower  flanks  of  the  mountains 
are,  in  general,  cultivable ;  while  the  valleys  teem  with 
orchards,  and  the  plains  furnish  excellent  pasture. 
The  region  closely  resembles  the  western  portion  of 
Media  Magna,  whereof  it  is  a  continuation.  As  we 
follow  it,  however,  towards  the  south-east,  into  the 
Bakhtiyari  country,  where  it  adjoins  upon  the  ancient 
Persia,  it  deteriorates  in  character,  the  mountains 
becoming  barer  and  more  arid,  and  the  valleys 
narrower  and  less  fertile. 

The  fate  of  Susiana  decided  that  of  the  adjoining 
countries  of  Babylonia  and  Persia,  which  seem  to 
have  submitted  to  Parthia  without  a  struggle.  Baby- 
lonia extended  from  the  Persian  Gulf  on  either  side 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates  to  the  extreme 
northern  limit  of  the  alluvium,  or  to  the  vicinity  of 
Hit  on  the  Euphrates,  and  Samarah  on  the  Tigris — a 
distance  of  about  four  hundred  miles.  The  greatest 
width  was  about  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles  ;  but 
the  average  width  cannot  be  estimated  at  more  than 
sixty  or  seventy,  so  that  the  area  probably  did  not 
much  exceed  twenty-five  thousand  square  miles.  But 
the  qualities  of  the  soil  were  such  as  rendered  the 
tract  one  of  the  chief  granaries  of  the  world.  Accord- 
ing to  Herodotus  and  others,  wheat,  barley,  and 
millet,  which  were  the  grains  principally  grown, 
yielded  ordinarily  a  return  of  two  hundred,  and  in 
some  instances  of  three  hundred,  fold.     Palm  groves 


BABYLONIA    AND    PERSIA.  1 5 

were  numerous  all  along  the  courses  of  the  rivers,  and 
the  dates  which  they  produced  were  of  first-rate 
quality.  Under  the  early  Achaemenian  kings,  when 
the  food  of  the  Court  was  supplied  by  each  of  the 
provinces  in  turn  for  a  fixed  portion  of  the  year,, 
Babylonia  had  the  duty  of  furnishing  the  supplies 
during  four  months,  so  that  it  was  reckoned  equal,  in 
respect  of  resources,  to  one-third  of  the  empire.  Irri- 
gation was  so  easy  in  Babylonia  that  the  whole 
country  was  brought  under  cultivation,  and  trans- 
formed into  a  garden.  Here  Parthia  inherited  all  the 
advantages  of  an  ancient  civilisation,  and  had  only  to 
maintain  the  works  of  earlier  times — canals,  sluices, 
dams,  embankments — in  order  to  obtain  from  a  single 
province  a  supply  of  food  equal  to  the  wants  of  almost 
her  entire  population. 

Persia  lay  in  the  opposite  direction  from  Babylonia, 
towards  the  east  and  the  south-east.  It  stretched 
along  the  south-eastern  shore  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 
from  the  inner  recess  of  the  Gulf  near  Mashur  to  Cape 
Jask,  a  little  outside  the  straits  of  Ormuz,  in  E.  long. 
57°  40'.  Inland  it  reached  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Isfahan  on  the  west,  and  to  the  deserts  of  Kerman 
and  Yezd  eastward.  In  length  it  thus  extended  to 
about  eight  degrees  of  longitude,  a  distance  of  six 
hundred  and  twenty  miles,  while  in  width  it  covered 
five  degrees  of  latitude,  or  nearly  three  hundred  and 
fifty  miles.  The  entire  area  cannot  have  fallen  much 
short  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  square  miles. 
The  character  of  the  region,  speaking  broadly,  was 
far  inferior  to  that  of  either  Babylonia  or  Susiana. 
Along  the  coast,  in  the  Ghermsir,  or  "  warm  country," 


16   PARTHTA  PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

as  it  is  now  called,  was  a  sandy  tract,  often  impreg- 
nated  with   salt,  extending  the  whole  length  of  the 
province,  being  a   continuation  of  the   flat  region   of 
Susiana,  but   falling  very  much  short  of  that    region 
in  all  the  qualities  which  make  a  territory  valuable. 
The  soil  is  poor,  consisting  of  alternate  sand  and  clay 
— it  is  ill-watered,  the  entire  tract  possessing  scarcely 
a  single  stream  worthy  of  the  name  of  river — and, 
lying  only  just  outside  of  the   northern    tropic,  the 
district    is    by    its   situation    among   the    hottest    in 
Western  Asia.     Fortunately,  it  was  not  very  large  in 
extent,   since    it    reached   inland  a  distance  of  only 
from  ten  to  fifty  miles,  and  thus  did  not  constitute 
much   more  than  one-eighth  of  the  entire  country. 
Of  the  other  seven-eighths  a  considerable  portion  — 
perhaps  as  much  as  half — was  very  little   superior, 
consisting  of  salt  or  sandy  deserts,  especially  those  of 
Kerman  and  Yezd,  which  were  almost  wholly  unpro- 
ductive by  nature,  and  capable  of  only  a  very  scanty 
cultivation.      But,  between  these   two    arid  districts, 
the   stretch  of  hilly  country   which   separated    them 
was  of  a  superior  character,  consisting  of  mountain, 
plain,  and   valley  curiously  intermixed,    and   for  the 
most    part    fairly    fertile.       In     places     it    is     rich, 
picturesque,  and  romantic,  almost    beyond  imagina- 
tion, with  lovely  wooded  dells,  green  mountain  sides, 
and  broad  plains  suited  for  the  production  of  crops 
of  almost   any   description.       But,    more   commonly 
these  features  are  absent,  and  there  is  a  general  look 
of   sterility  and  barrenness  which  is   unpleasant,  or 
even    forbidding.     The   supply   of  water   is,    almost 
everywhere,  scanty.     Scarcely  any  of  the  streams  are 


ASSYRIA.  17 

strong  enough  to  reach  the  sea.  After  short  courses, 
they  are  either  absorbed  by  the  sand,  or  end  in  small 
salt  lakes,  from  which  the  superfluous  water  is  evapo- 
rated. Persia  Proper  deserves,  on  the  whole,  the 
description  which  its  ancient  inhabitants  gave  of 
it  to  Cyrus  the  Great — "  a  scant  land  and  a  rugged  " — 
a  land  in  which  subsistence  can  only  be  obtained  by 
strenuous  and  continual  labour,  and  where  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  climate  are  such  as  to  brace  and  harden 
those  who  dwell  in  it. 

Another  country,  probably  subjugated  about  the 
same  time  as  Media  Magna,  Susiana,  Babylonia,  and 
Persia  Proper,  was  Assyria.  Assyria,  which  had 
been  long  previously  reduced  nearly  within  its  original 
limits,  was  at  this  period  a  smallish  country,  interposed 
between  Mount  Zagros  and  the  Tigris,  bounded  on 
the  east  by  Media  Magna,  on  the  north  by  Armenia, 
on  the  west  by  Mesopotamia,  and  on  the  south  by 
Susiana  or  Elymais.  Its  greatest  length  was  about 
three  hundred  and  twenty  miles,  and  its  average 
width  about  a  hundred.  It  would  thus  have  had  an 
area  of  about  thirty-two  thousand  square  miles,  or 
have  been  equal  in  size  to  Ireland.  But  these  narrow 
limits  were  amply  compensated  by  the  fertility  of  the 
soil.  The  tract  between  the  Zagros  mountains  and 
the  Tigris  is  principally  an  alluvium  brought  down  by 
the  rivers,  which  from  time  to  time  overflow  their 
banks  and  spread  themselves  far  and  wide  over  the 
flat  country.  It  produces  excellent  crops  of  wheat, 
barley,  millet,  and  sesame  ;  besides  growing  palms  in 
places,  as  well  as  walnuts,  Oriental  planes,  sycamores, 
and  poplars.     The  lower  ranges  of  hills,  outposts  of 


18    PARTHIA  PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

Zagros,  bore  olives,  and  in  favoured  situations  the 
citron  was  largely  cultivated  ;  while  figs,  vines,  mul- 
berries, pomegranates,  and  other  fruit-trees  were 
common.  Of  minerals,  Assyria  produced  iron,  cop- 
per, lead,  bitumen,  naphtha,  petroleum,  sulphur,  alum, 
and  salt. 

The  empire  having  been  thus  far  extended  towards 
the  west,  the  time  seemed  to  have  arrived  when  some- 
thing like  an  equivalent  expansion  towards  the  east 
was  desirable.  Bactria  had  hitherto  stood  in  the 
way  of  any  considerable  Parthian  advance  in  this 
direction  ;  and  though  Parthia  had  contrived  to  filch 
from  her  two  small  districts,  yet  no  real  impression 
had  been  made  upon  the  powerful  Bactrian  kingdom, 
which  at  this  time  bore  rule  over  the  entire  territory 
between  the  Tejend  and  the  Hydaspes.  But,  soon 
after  the  time  when  the  great  expansion  of  the  Par- 
thian dominion  towards  the  west  was  accomplished, 
Bactria  began  to  decline  in  power,  and  may  be  said  to 
have  invited  invasion.  In  the  war  which  followed 
between  the  two  countries,  the  success  of  the  Par- 
thian arms  was  marvellous.  A  few  years  sufficed  for 
the  subjugation  of  Bactria  Proper,  of  Margiana,  Aria, 
Sarangia  or  Drangiana,  Sacastana,  Arachosia,  and  per- 
haps we  may  add  Sagartia  and  Chorasmia.  It  follows 
to  give  a  short  account  of  each  of  these  countries. 

Bactria  Proper,  the  nucleus  from  which  the  Bac- 
trian Empire  had  proceeded,  may  be  considered  as 
equivalent  to  the  upper  valley  of  the  Ox  us,  or,  in 
other  words,  to  that  valley  from  the  remotest  sources 
of  the  river  towards  the  east  down  to  its  entrance  on 
the    great    Chorasmian    desert,    in    about    E.    long. 


BACTRTA    ASD   MARGIANA.  19 

650  30',  towards  the  west.  The  valley  is  enclosed  on 
the  north  by  the  Hazaret  Sultan,  and  Hissar  moun- 
tains, while  on  the  south  it  is  bounded  by  the  Paro- 
pamisus  or  Hindu  Kush.  Eastward  it  reaches  to  the 
Pamir  table-land,  whence  several  of  its  head-streams 
take  their  origin.  Its  length  between  the  Pamir  and 
the  desert  is  about  three  hundred  and  sixty  miles, 
while  its  width  between  the  two  mountain  chains 
varies  from  a  hundred  and  forty  to  two  hundred  and 
fifty  miles.  The  area  is  probably  twice  as  large  as 
that  of  Parthia  Proper,  and  may  be  estimated  at 
about  seventy  thousand  square  miles.  Much  of  the 
tract,  being  situated  at  a  high  elevation  above  the 
sea-level,  is  cold  and  infertile  ;  but  the  lower  portion 
of  the  valley,  especially  the  country  about  the  ancient 
capital,  Bactra,  now  Balkh,  is  fairly  productive  ;  and 
the  region  between  the  Oxus  and  the  Paropamisus — 
the  southern  moiety  of  the  province,  is  regarded  as 
among  the  most  valuable  portions  of  Afghanistan. 

Margiana,  or  the  district  upon  the  Margus  river 
(Marg-ab),  adjoined  Bactria  upon  the  west,  and, 
though  geographically  reckoned  as  distinct,  was 
probably  absorbed  into  it  at  an  early  period.  It  was 
mainly  a  narrow  tract,  shut  in  by  deserts  on  either 
side,  extending  along  the  course  of  the  Margus  river 
for  a  distance  of  some  two  hundred  miles,  and  then 
expanding  suddenly  into  a  broad  oasis  of  the  very 
highest  fertility.  Known  in  ancient,  and  again  in 
modern  times  as  Merv,  it  is  still  a  region  of  some 
importance,  and  has  recently  been  annexed  by  Russia, 
and  connected  by  railway  with  Ashkabad  and 
Bokhara. 


20   PART  HI  A    PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

Aria  lay  along  the  course  of  the  River  Arius,  now 
the  Heri-rud,  which,  rising  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Paropamisus  in  E.  long.  6y°  nearly,  runs  westward, 
first  through  the  mountains,  and  then  along  their 
southern  flank,  until,  about  E.  long.  6i°,  it  makes  a 
sweep  round  to  the  north,  and  finding,  or  forcing,  a 
way  through  the  chain,  joins  the  Tejend  at  Pul-i- 
Khatun,  in  lat.  360  nearly.  The  course  of  the  stream, 
until  it  makes  its  great  bend,  measures  between  two 
hundred  and  seventy  and  two  hundred  and  eighty 
miles  ;  and  this  may  be  regarded  as  the  length  of 
Aria  from  east  to  west.  Its  width  between  the  Paro- 
pamisus and  the  tract  known  as  Drangiana  or 
Sarangia  is  difficult  to  determine,  but  was  certainly 
not  great.  It  may  have  averaged  about  fifty  miles ; 
which  would  give  for  the  entire  area  a  size  of  about 
thirteen  thousand  square  miles.  The  country  was 
well  watered,  and  tolerably  fertile,  but  it  was  placed 
at  too  high  an  elevation  to  be  more  than  moderately 
productive,  Aria  (or  Herat),  the  capital,  being  more 
than  three  thousand  feet  above  the  sea-level,  and  the 
rest  of  the  country  being,  for  the  most  part,  consider- 
ably more  elevated. 

Drangiana,  or  Sarangia,  which  adjoined  on  Aria 
towards  the  south,  was  a  region  of  much  greater 
extent,  but  of  less  fertility.  It  was  the  country 
watered  by  the  streams  which  flow  into  the  Hamun, 
or  lake  of  Seistan,  from  the  north-east  and  the  north. 
On  the  west  it  verged  upon  the  great  Iranian  desert, 
and  partook  of  its  character  ;  on  the  east  it  extended 
to  the  upper  sources  of  the  Kash  river.  It  is  difficuLt 
to  determine  its  exact  dimensions  ;  but  it  must  have 


ARIA,   SARANGIA,    AND    SACASTANA.  21 

had  an  extent  at  least  double  that  of  Aria,  and  the 
entire  superficies  may  not  have  fallen  very  much  short 
of  thirty  thousand  square  miles. 

Another  country  probably  absorbed  by  Parthia  at 
this  time  was  Sacastana  or  Seistan.  Sacastana  was 
the  country  immediately  south  of  the  Hamun,  or 
Great  Salt  Lake,  in  which  the  river  Helmend  ends. 
Except  on  the  very  banks  of  the  Helmend,  it  was 
almost  wholly  unproductive,  and  incapable  of  habita- 
tion by  any  but  a  nomadic  population.  Portions  of 
it  were,  however,  liable  to  inundation,  when  the  Hel- 
mend overflowed  its  banks  ;  and  thus  its  general 
character  was  alternate  reedy  swamp  and  arid  sandy 
desert.  The  extent  was  somewhat  vague  and  indefi- 
nite, since  there  were  no  marked  boundaries,  unless 
the  Helmend  and  Hamun  may  be  reckoned  such 
towards  the  north.  Eastward  it  melted  into  Satta- 
gydia,  southward  into  Gedrosia,  and  westward  into 
the  desert  of  Kerman. 

Dominion  over  Sarangia  and  Sacastana  carried 
with  it,  almost  necessarily,  the  sovereignty  over 
Arachosia,  which  adjoined  those  countries  upon  the 
east.  Arachosia,  named  from  the  river  Arachotus 
(Argand-ab),  a  main  tributary  of  the  Helmend,  con- 
sisted of  the  mountain  tract  about  Candahar  and  a 
portion  of  the  adjacent  desert,  now  known  as  that  of 
Registan.  It  was  a  large,  but  not  very  valuable 
country,  and  lay  on  the  frontier  of  the  Parthian 
Empire  towards  the  south-east. 

The  power  which  held  Hyrcania,  Parthia,  Aria, 
and  Sarangia,  was  always  predominant  also  in 
Sagartia,    which    coincided    with    the    eastern    and 


22   PARTHIA    PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

north-eastern  portions  of  the  Iranian  desert.  The 
Sagartians  wandered  freely  over  the  greater  part  of 
the  central  region,  where  they  found  a  scanty  sub- 
sistence. Their  country,  notwithstanding  its  great 
extent,  was  almost  valueless,  being  incapable  of 
cultivation,  and  producing  no  mineral  excepting 
salt. 

An  equally  unproductive  and  undesirable  territory, 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Parthian  and  Arian 
mountain  chain,  is  commonly  regarded  as  forming, 
together  with  Bactria,  the  limit  of  the  Parthian 
dominion,  east  of  the  Caspian,  towards  the  north. 
This  is  Chorasmia,  or  the  country  of  the  Choras- 
mians,  known  to  moderns  as  the  desert  of  Khorasan, 
which  extends  from  the  foot  of  the  Bactrian,  Par- 
thian, and  Hyrcanian  hills  to  the  old  course  of  the 
Oxus,  from  its  entrance  on  the  desert  to  its  ancient 
principal  mouth.  Chorasmia  is  thus  a  very  extensive 
country,  not  less  than  six  hundred  miles  in  length 
by  three  hundred  in  breadth  ;  but  its  value  is  exceed- 
ingly slight,  since,  «except  along  the  course  of  the 
Oxus,  or  modern  Amu  Daria,  it  does  not  admit  of 
cultivation. 

By  the  absorption  of  these  various  countries,  and 
regions  Parthia  obtained  her  fullest  extension  towards 
the  east  and  the  north-east,  but  she  was  still  able  to 
make  important  additions  to  her  dominions  on  the 
opposite  side  of  her  empire,  especially  towards  the 
north-west.  At  a  comparatively  early  period,  certainly 
before  her  wars  with  Rome  began,  she  made  herself 
mistress  of  the  extensive  and  valuable  region  of 
Mesopotamia  Proper,  which   was  the  tract   enclosed 


MESOPOTAMIA.  23 

between  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates  rivers,  bounded 
on  the  north  by  Armenia,  and  on  the  south  by  the 
Babylonian  alluvium.  The  length  of  this  region 
from  north-west  to  south-east  was  at  least  three 
hundred  and  fifty  miles,  while  its  breadth,  where  it 
was  broadest,  cannot  be  estimated  at  much  under  two 
hundred  and  sixty.  But  as  in  some  places  the  width 
did  not  exceed  fifty  miles,  the  entire  area,  it  is  pro- 
bable, fell  short  of  fifty  thousand  square  miles.  Much 
of  it  was  very  unproductive,  being  a  treeless  plain, 
the  home  of  the  wild  ass,  the  bustard,  and  the  gazelle; 
but  towards  the  north  there  was  more  fertility,  and 
the  Mons  Masius,  together  with  its  southern  skirt, 
and  the  valley  of  the  Tigris  north  of  it,  were  tracts 
of  some  considerable  value.  Masius  produces  abun- 
dant timber,  together  with  manna  and  gall-nuts  ;  the 
pistachio  grows  wild  in  the  district  between  Orfah  and 
Diabekr  ;  the  Sinjar  range  of  hills  is  noted  for  the 
cultivation  of  the  fig  ;  and  the  whole  northern  region 
is  favourable  to  the  growth  of  fruit-trees,  and  produces 
walnuts,  oranges,  lemons,  pomegranates,  apricots,  and 
mulberries. 

During  the  period  of  the  wars  with  Rome  the 
limits  of  the  Parthian  Empire  fluctuated  greatly. 
Provinces  were  conquered  and  reconquered  ;  large 
annexations  were  made  and  then  relinquished  ;  whole 
countries  were  ceded,  and,  after  a  time,  recovered. 
This  is  not  the  place  for  tracing  out  and  placing  on 
record  all  these  various  changes.  We  are  concerned 
only  with  the  question  of  Parthia's  extremest  limits 
at  her  most  flourishing  period.  In  order,  however,  to 
complete  our   sketch  of  this  subject,  we  must  bring 


24   PARTHIA    PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

under  the  reader's  notice  two  more  districts — Media 
Atropatene  and  Armenia. 

Media  Atropatene,  which  became  ultimately  a 
dependency  of  Parthia,  was  the  tract  directly  west 
of  the  lower  Caspian  Sea,  extending  from  the  River 
Araxes  (Aras)  towards  the  north  to  the  borders  of 
Media  Magna  and  Media  Rhagiana  towards  the 
south.  Westward  it  bordered  on  Armenia,  with 
which  it  was  sometimes  connected  politically.  Its 
southern  boundary  lay  almost  along  the  line  of  the 
thirty-sixth  parallel.  It  was  thus  very  nearly  a 
square,  extending  from  east  to  west  for  the  space  of  two 
hundred  and  forty,  and  from  north  to  south  for  the 
space  of  about  two  hundred  and  twenty  miles.  The 
area  did  not  fall  much  short  of  fifty  thousand  square 
miles.  Its  chief  rivers  were  the  Aras  and  the  Sefid- 
rud  ;  and  it  further  contained  within  it  the  remark- 
able lake  of  Urumiah.  The  tract  was  mountainous, 
but  fairly  fertile,  with  a  cold  climate  in  the  winter, 
but  a  delicious  one  during  the  summer  months.  It 
was  a  region  of  considerable  value,  and  is  still  much 
prized  by  its  possessors,  the  modern   Persians. 

Armenia,  which,  to  the  west  of  the  Caspian,  closed 
in  the  Parthian  territory  towards  the  north  when  the 
empire  had  reached  its  acme,  lay  north-west  and 
partly  north  of  Atropatene.  It  reached  from  the 
Caspian  at  the  mouth  of  the  Aras  to  the  elbow  of 
the  Euphrates,  in  lat.  380  30',  long.  380  25'  nearly,  a 
distance  of  about  six  hundred  miles,  and  extended 
from  Iberia  on  the  north  to  Mount  Niphates  on  the 
south,  a  distance  of  rather  more  than  two  hundred 
miles.     But  Armenia  was  lozenge-shaped,  narrowing 


MEDIA    ATROPATENE   AND   ARMENIA.  25 

gradually  towards  both  extremities  ;  and  thus  the  area 
did  not  much  exceed  sixty  thousand  square  miles. 
The  character  of  the  region  closely  resembled  that  of 
Atropatene,  but  was  on  the  whole  superior ;  and 
Armenia  is  found  to  have  been  a  productive  terri- 
tory, which  exported  wine  to  Babylon,  and  traded 
in  the  markets  of  Phoenicia  with  horses  and  mules 
(Ezek.  xxvii.  14). 

It  would  seem,  then,  that  the  Parthian  Empire, 
when  at  the  highest  pitch  of  prosperity,  extended 
fully  two  thousand  miles  from  east  to  west  between 
the  Pamir  upland  and  the  Euphrates,  while  it  had  a 
general  width  of  about  five  or  six  hundred  miles 
between  its  northern  and  southern  frontiers.  It 
included  the  whole  of  modern  Persia,  the  greater 
part  of  Affghanistan,  much  of  Turkey  in  Asia,  and 
some  large  regions  which  are  now  in  the  possession 
of  the  Russians.  As  Persia  is  said  to  extend  over 
five  hundred  thousand  square  miles,  and  Affghanistan 
over  two  hundred  thousand,  while  the  Russian  and 
Turkish  provinces  which  were  once  Parthian  cannot  be 
estimated  to  contain  less  than  one  hundred  thousand 
square  miles,  the  whole  territory  included  within 
the  empire  of  the  Parthians  at  its  greatest  extent 
can  scarcely  have  fallen  far  short  of  eight  hundred 
thousand  square  miles.  It  would  thus  have  been 
about  equal  in  extent  to  France,  Germany,  Austria, 
and  Turkey  in  Europe  put  together. 

The  boundaries  of  the  empire  were,  upon  the 
north,  Iberia,  the  river  Kur  or  Cyrus,  the  Caspian, 
the  Oxus,  and  the  Hazaret  Sultan,  and  Hissar  ranges  ; 
on    the  east,    the    Pamir,  the   Bolor  Chain,  and  the 


26    PARTHIA    PROPER,  AND  THE  PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

valley  of  the  Indus  ;  on  the  south,  Beluchistan  and 
the  Persian  Gulf ;  on  the  west,  Cappadocia  and  the 
Euphrates.  Westward  of  the  Euphrates  lay  the 
territory  of  Rome  ;  northward  of  the  Oxus  were  the 
wild  tribes  of  Scythia,  Alani,  Massagetae,  Yue-ehi, 
and  others  ;  on  the  eastern  frontier  were  the  Indo- 
Scyths,  a  weak  and  divided  people.  Only  two 
neighbours  seemed  to  be  of  much  account — Rome 
upon  the  west,  and  the  Scythic  tribes  upon  the 
north  and  north-east.  With  each  of  these  enemies 
Parthia  had  important  and  dangerous  wars,  but  her 
destruction  came  from  neither.  Revolt  within  her 
own  borders  brought  the  Parthian  dominion  to  an 
end,  and  substituted  in  its  place  the  Second  Persian 
or  Sassanian  monarchy. 


II. 


ETHNOGRAPHICAL — TURANIAN    CHARACTER   OF 
THE   PARTHIAN    PEOPLE. 


THE  Parthians  do  not  appear  in  history  as  a  people 
until  the  time  of  Darius,  the  son  of  Hystaspes  (B.C. 
521-515).  There  is  no  mention  of  them  in  the  Old 
Testament,  cr  in  the  Assyrian  Inscriptions,  or  in 
the  Zendavesta.  We  first  find  any  record  of  their 
existence  in  the  great  Inscription  of  Darius,  at 
Behistun.  They  are  there  called  the  "  Parthva,"  or 
"  Parthvva,"  and  appear  in  close  connection  with  the 
"  Varkana,"  or  people  of  Hyrcania.  Darius  regards 
them  as  his  subjects,  and  speaks  of  their  "revolting" 
against  his  father,  Hystaspes,  who  seems  to  have  been 
at  the  time  their  satrap,  and  fighting  a  battle  with 
him  within  the  limits  of  their  own  country.  They 
were  defeated  with  the  loss  of  about  ten  thousand 
men  in  killed  and  prisoners  ;  after  which  they  sub- 
mitted, and  returned  to  their  allegiance. 

Through  the  rest  of  the  Achaemenian  period  (B.C. 
515-331)  we  never  hear  of  them  but  as  faithful 
Persian  subjects.  They  were  assigned  by  Darius  to 
his  sixteenth  satrapy,  and  united  in  it  with  the 
Arians,  the  Sogdians,  and    the  Chorasmians.     They 


28    TURANIAN   CHARACTER    OF  PARTHIAN   PEOPLE. 

took  part  in  the  expedition  of  his  son,  Xerxes, 
against  Greece.  They  fought  at  Issus  and  at  Arbela. 
We  never  hear  of  their  joining  in  any  revolt  after 
their  one  attempt  in  the  time  of  general  disturbance 
at  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  Darius.  If  they  did 
not  offer  a  very  strenuous  resistance  to  Alexander, 
it  was  probably  because  the  Persian  Empire  had 
collapsed,  and  the  conqueror  appeared  to  be  irre- 
sistible. 

This  fidelity  to  the  Persian  rule,  combined  with 
the  fact  that  geographically  Parthia  was  situated  in 
the  midst  of  a  group  of  purely  Arian  tribes — the 
Hyrcanians,  Chorasmians,  Margians,  Arians  of 
Herat,  Bactrians,  Sagartians,  and  Sarangians — has 
led  some  writers  on  ethnography  to  maintain  that 
the  Parthians,  like  all  the  other  people  of  the  Iranian 
plateau,  belonged  to  the  Iranian  family.  They 
certainly  affected,  to  a  large  extent,  Persian  names 
— e.g.,  Mithridates,  Tiridates,  Artabanus,  Orobazus, 
Rhodaspes,  Chosroes,  if  that  is  a  form  of  Cyrus 
(Kitrush  in  Persian) — and  some  of  the  appellations 
peculiar  to  them  are  explainable  by  Arian  ety- 
mologies. "  Priapatius,"  for  instance,  has  been  in- 
geniously compared  with  the  Zendic  "  Frijapaitis," 
which  means,  like  the  Greek  "  Philopator,"  "  Lover 
of  his  father."  But  conjectural  explanations  of 
names  are  an  exceedingly  unsafe  basis  for  ethno- 
logical speculations.  And  it  is  certain  that  the 
Parthian  names  do  not,  as  a  general  rule,  suggest 
the  idea  of  derivation  from  Arian  sources. 

If  we  ask  what  the  ancient  writers  have  left  on 
record  with  respect  to    the  Parthian    nationality,  we 


CALLED   SCYTHS   BY    THE   ANCIENT    WRITERS.    29 

shall  find,  in' the  first  place,  a  general  consensus  that 
they  were  Scyths.  "  The  Parthian  race  is  Scythic," 
says  Arrian.  "  The  Parthians,"  says  Justin,  in  his 
"  Epitome  of  Trogus  Pompeius,"  "  were  a  race  of 
Scyths,  who  at  a  remote  date  separated  themselves 
from  the  rest  of  the  nation,  and  occupied  the 
southern  portion  of  the  Chorasmian  desert,  whence 
they  gradually  made  themselves  masters  of  the 
mountain  region  adjoining  it."  Strabo  adds  to  this, 
that  the  particular  Scythic  tribe  whereto  they 
belonged  was  that  of  the  Dahae  ;  that  their  own 
proper  and  original  name  was  Parni,  or  Aparni ; 
and  that  they  had  migrated  at  a  remote  period  from 
the  country  to  the  north  of  the  Palus  Masotis  (Sea  of 
Azov),  where  they  left  the  great  mass  of  their  fellow- 
tribesmen.  Some  time  after  this  the  theory  was 
started  that  they  were  Scyths  whom  Sesostris,  on 
his  return  from  his  supposed  Scythian  expedition, 
brought  into  Asia  and  settled  in  the  mountain  tract 
south-east  of  the  Caspian.  We  cannot  put  much 
faith  in  the  details  of  any  of  these  various  state- 
ments, since,  in  the  first  place,  they  are  contradictory, 
and,  in  the  second,  they  are,  most  of  them,  highly 
improbable.  Sesostris,  for  instance,  if  there  ever 
was  such  a  king,  no  more  made  an  expedition  into 
Scythia  than  into  Lapland  or  Kamskatka.  No 
Egyptian  monarch  ever  penetrated  further  north 
than  the  mountain  chains  of  Taurus  and  Niphates. 
Arrian's  story  is  a  mere  variant  of  the  tale  told  to 
Herodotus  and  Diodorus,  and  believed  by  them,  of 
the  planting  of  Scythian  colonists  in  Colchis  by  the 
hypothetical  Sesostris  ;    and  it  is  even  more  impro- 


30    TURANIAN   CHARACTER    OF    PARTHIAN    PEOPLE. 

bable,  since  it  makes  the  returning  conqueror  depart 
from  his  natural  course,  and  go  a  thousand  miles 
out  of  his  way,  to  plant  for  no  purpose  a  colony  in 
a  region  which  he  wras  never  likely  to  visit  again. 
Strabo's  migration  tale  is  less  incredible,  since  the 
tribes  to  the  north  of  the  Euxine  and  Caspian  lived 
in  a  constant  state  of  unrest,  and  migratory  move- 
ments on  their  part,  far  exceeding  the  supposed 
Parthian  movement  in  the  distance  traversed,  are 
among  the  most  certain  facts  of  ancient  history. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  trustworthy  authority 
Strabo  could  even  suppose  that  he  had  for  his 
assertions,  since  the  migration  of  which  he  speaks 
must  have  taken  place  at  least  six  hundred  years 
before  his  own  time,  and  migratory  races  rarely 
retain  any  tradition  of  their  origin  for  so  much  as 
a  century.  Strabo,  moreover,  admits  it  to  be  doubt- 
ful whether  there  ever  were  any  Dahse  among  the 
Scyths  of  the  Maeotis,  and  thus  seems  to  cut  the 
ground  from  under  his  own  feet. 

The  utmost  that  can  be  safely  gathered  from  these 
numerous  and  discrepant  notices  is  the  conclusion 
that  the  Parthians  were  felt  by  the  Greeks  and 
Romans  who  first  came  into  contact  with  them  to  be 
an  alien  nation,  intruded  among  the  Arian  races  of 
these  parts,  having  their  congeners  in  the  great  steppe 
country  which  lay  north  of  the  Black  Sea,  the  Caucasus, 
the  Caspian,  and  the  Oxus  river.  These  nations 
were  nomadic,  uncivilised,  coarse,  not  to  any  brutal, 
in  their  habits  ;  of  a  type  very  much  inferior  to  that 
of  the  races  which  inhabited  the  more  southern 
regions,  felt  by  them  to  be  barbarians,  and  feared  as 


CHIEF  SCYTHIC    CHARACTERISTICS.  3 1 

a  continual  menace  to  their  prosperity  and  civili- 
sation. There  is  always  an  underlying  idea  of  dis- 
praise and  disparagement  whenever  a  Greek  or  a 
Roman  calls  any  race,  or  people,  or  custom  "Scythic" — 
the  term  connotes  rudeness,  grossness,  absence  of 
culture  and  refinement — it  is  not  perhaps  strictly 
ethnic,  since  it  designates  a  life  rather  than  a  descent, 
habits  rather  than  blood — but  it  points  to  such  a  life 
and  such  habits  as  have  from  the  remotest  antiquity 
prevailed,  and  as  still  prevail,  in  the  vast  plain  country 
which  extends  from  the  Caucasus,  the  Caspian,  and 
the  mountain  chains  of  the  Central  Asian  regions  to 
the  shores  of  the  great  Arctic  Sea. 

It  is  certain  that  the  inhabitants  of  this  tract 
have  belonged,  from  a  remote  antiquity,  to  the  ethnic 
family  generally  known  as  Turanian.  In  the  south 
they  are  of  the  Tatar  or  Turkish  type;  in  the  north, 
of  the  Finnish,  or  Samoeidic.  Their  language  is 
agglutinate,  and  wanting  in  inflections;  their  physique 
is  weak,  languid,  anaemic,  unmuscular  ;  they  have 
large  fleshy  bodies,  loose  joints,  soft  swollen  bellies, 
and  scanty  hair.  They  live  chiefly  on  horseback  or 
in  waggons.  Still,  as  enemies,  they  are  far  from 
contemptible.  Admirable  horsemen,  often  skilled 
archers,  accustomed  to  a  severe  climate  and  to  ex- 
posure in  all  weathers  ;  they  have  proved  formidable 
foes  to  many  warlike  nations,  and  still  give  serious 
trouble  to  their  Russian  masters. 

The  Scythian  character  of  the  Parthians,  vouched 
for  on  all  hands,  and  their  derivation  from  Upper 
Asia,  or  the  regions  beyond  the  Oxus,  furnish  a 
strong  presumption  of  their  belonging  to  the  Turanian 


32    TURANIAN   CHARACTER    OF  PARTHIAN   PEOPLE. 

family  of  nations.  This  presumption  is  strengthened 
by  the  little  that  we  know  of  their  language.  Their 
names,  when  not  distinctly  Persian,  which  they  would 
often  naturally  be  from  conscious  and  intentional 
imitation,  are  decidedly  non-Arian,  and  have  certain 
Turanian  characteristics.  Among  these  may  be 
mentioned,  first  of  all,  the  guttural  termination,  found 
in  Arsac-es,  Sinnac-es,  Parrhac-es,  Vasac-es,  Sana- 
troec-es,  Phraatac-es,  Valarsac-es,  &c. — a  termination 
which  characterises  the  primitive  Babylonian,  the 
Basque,  and  most  of  the  Turanian  tongues.  Beyond 
this,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  suggest  Turanian 
etymologies  for  a  large  number  of  Parthian  names, 
but  as  such  suggestions  could  only  be  "  guesses  at 
truth,"  not  very  much  weight  would  attach  to  them. 

The  main  argument  for  the  Turanian  character  of 
the  Parthian  people  is  to  be  found  in  their  physical 
and  mental  type,  and  in  their  manners  and  customs. 
Their  sculptures  give  them  the  large  ill-formed  limbs, 
the  heavy  paunches,  and  the  general  flaccid  appearance 
which  characterise  Turanian  races.  Their  history 
shows  them  to  have  had  the  merits  and  defects  of  the 
Turanian  type  of  character.  They  were  covetous, 
grasping,  ready  to  take  the  aggressive,  and,  on  the 
whole,  tolerably  successful  in  their  wars  against  weak 
races.  But  they  were  wanting  in  dash,  in  vigorous 
effort,  and  in  perseverance.  They  were  stronger  in 
defence  than  in  attack;  and,  as  time  went  on,  became 
more  and  more  unenterprising  and  lethargic.  In  the 
arts  they  were  particularly  backward,  devoid  of  taste, 
and  wanting  in  originality.  Considering  the  patterns 
that   they    had  before  their  eye's  in  the  architecture 


PARTHIAN    MANNERS   AND   CUSTOMS.  33 

and  sculptures  of  Pasargadae,  Nakhsh-i-Rustam, 
Istakr,  and  Persepolis,  it  is  simply  astonishing  that 
they  could  rise  no  higher  than  the  mean  palace  at 
Hatra,  and  the  grotesque  tablets  at  Behistun,  Sir-pul-i- 
Zohab,  and  Tengh-i-Saoulek.  Greek  art,  moreover, 
was  not  unknown  to  them  ;  and  they  imitated  it  upon 
their  coins  ;  but  the  travesty  is  painful,  and  often 
verges  on  the  ridiculous.  In  their  manners  and 
customs  there  was  much  that  was  markedly  Turanian. 
Like  the  Turkoman  and  Tatar  tribes  generally,  they 
passed  almost  their  whole  lives  on  horseback,  con- 
versing, transacting  business,  buying  and  selling,  even 
eating,  while  mounted  on  their  horses.  They  practised 
polygamy,  secluded  their  women  from  the  sight  of 
men,  punished  unfaithfulness  with  extreme  severity, 
delighted  in  hunting,  and  rarely  ate  any  flesh  but  that 
which  they  obtained  in  this  way,  were  moderate 
eaters  but  great  drinkers,  did  not  speak  much,  but  yet 
were  very  unquiet,  being  constantly  engaged  in  stirring 
up  trouble  either  abroad  or  at  home.  A  small  portion 
of  the  nation  only  was  free  ;  the  remainder  were  the 
slaves  of  the  privileged  few.  Nomadic  habits  con- 
tinued to  prevail  among  a  portion  of  those  who 
remained  in  their  primitive  seats,  even  in  the  time  of 
their  greatest  national  prosperity  ;  and  a  coarse,  rude, 
semi-barbarous  character  attached  always — even  to  the 
most  advanced  part  of  the  nation — to  the  king,  the 
court,  and  the  nobles  generally,  a  character  which, 
despite  a  certain  varnish  of  civilisation,  was  con- 
stantly showing  itself  in  their  dealings  with  each 
other,  and  with  foreign  nations.  "  The  Parthian 
monarchs,"    as    Gibbon    justly    observes,    "  like    the 


34   TURANIAN   CHARACTER   OF   PARTHIAN   PEOPLE. 

Mogul  sovereigns  of  Hindustan,  delighted  in  the 
pastoral  life  of  their  Scythian  ancestors,  and  the 
imperial  camp  was  frequently  pitched  in  the  plain 
of  Ctesiphon,  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Tigris." 
Niebuhr  seems  even  to  doubt  whether  the  Parthians 
dwelt  in  cities  at  all.  He  represents  them  as  main- 
taining from  first  to  last  their  nomadic  habits,  and 
regards  the  insurrection  by  which  their  empire  was 
brought  to  an  end  as  a  rising  of  the  inhabitants  of 
towns — the  Tadjiks  of  those  times — against  the 
Ilyats  or  wanderers,  who  had  oppressed  them  for 
centuries.  This  is,  no  doubt,  an  over-statement ;  but 
it  has  a  foundation  in  fact,  since  wandering  habits, 
and  even  tent  life,  were  affected  by  the  Parthians 
during  the  most  flourishing  period  of  their  empire. 

Another  respect  in  which  the  Parthians  resembled 
some,  at  any  rate,  of  the  principal  Turanian  tribes  was 
in  their  combination  of  the  rudeness  and  coarseness 
already  mentioned  with  great  vigour  of  administration 
and  government.  Like  the  early  (or  Accadian) 
Babylonians,  like  the  Mongols  under  Jenghis  Khan 
and  his  successors,  like  the  Turks  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  to  some  extent  even  of  modern  times,  the 
Parthians  possessed,  to  a  large  amount,  the  governing 
or  ruling  faculty.  They  rapidly  developed  a  great 
power ;  and  they  held  together  for  nearly  four 
centuries  a  heterogeneous  mass  of  subject  nations, 
who  could  have  had  no  love  for  their  rule,  yet  were 
constrained  by  their  energy  and  other  sterling 
qualities  to  render  them,  for  the  most  part,  a  cheerful 
and  steady  obedience.  Their  governmental  system 
was    not    refined,    but    it    was   effective ;    they    never 


COMPARISON  OF  THE  PARTHIANS  AND  TURKS.      35 

permanently  lost  a  province  ;  and,  at  the  dissolution 
of  the  empire,  its  limits  were  as  extensive  as  they  had 
ever  been. 

On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said,  that  the  Turanian 
character  of  the  Parthian  people,  though  not  abso- 
lutely proved,  appears  to  be  in  the  highest  degree 
probable.  If  we  accept  it,  we  must  regard  them  as 
in  race  closely  allied  to  the  vast  hordes  which,  from 
a  remote  antiquity,  have  roamed  over  the  steppe 
region  of  Upper  Asia,  from  time  to  time  bursting 
upon  the  south,  and  harassing  or  subjugating  the 
comparatively  unwarlike  inhabitants  of  the  warmer 
countries.  We  must  view  them  as  the  congeners  of 
the  Huns,  Bulgarians,  Avars,  Komans  of  the  ancient 
world  ;  of  the  Kalmucks,  Ouigurs,  Eleuts,  Usbegs, 
Turkomans,  &c.,  of  the  present  day.  Perhaps  their 
nearest  representatives  will  be,  if  we  look  to  their 
primitive  condition  at  the  founding  of  their  empire, 
the  modern  Turkomans,  who  occupy  nearly  the  same 
districts  ;  if  we  regard  them  at  the  period  of  their 
highest  prosperity,  the  Osmanli  Turks.  Like  the 
Turks,  they  combined  great  military  prowess  and 
vigour  with  a  capacity  for  organisation  and  govern- 
ment not  very  usual  among  Asiatics.  Like  them, 
they  remained  at  heart  barbarians,  though  they  put 
on  an  external  appearance  of  civilisation  and  refine- 
ment. Like  them,  they  never  to  any  extent  amal- 
gamated with  the  subject  peoples,  but  continued  for 
centuries  an  exclusive  dominant  race,  encamped  in 
the  countries  which  they  had  overrun. 


III. 


CONDITION     OF     WESTERN     ASIA      IN      THE      THIRD 
CENTURY  B.C. — ORIGIN  OF   THE  PARTHIAN  STATE. 


The  grand  attempt  of  Alexander  the  Great  to 
unite  the  East  and  West  in  a  single  universal 
monarchy,  magnificent  in  conception,  and  carried  out 
in  act  with  extraordinary  energy  and  political  wisdom, 
so  long  as  he  was  spared  to  conduct  his  enterprise  in 
person,  was  frustrated,  in  the  first  place,  by  the 
unfortunate  circumstance  of  his  premature  decease  ; 
and,  secondly,  by  the  want  of  ability  among  his 
"  Successors."  Although  among  them  there  were 
several  who  possessed  considerable  talent,  there  was 
no  commanding  personality  of  force  sufficient  to 
dominate  the  others,  and  certainly  none  who  inherited 
either  Alexander's  grandeur  of  conception  or  his  powers 
of  execution,  or  who  can  be  imagined  as,  under  any 
circumstances,  successfully  accomplishing  his  projects. 
The  scheme,  therefore,  which  the  great  Macedonian 
had  conceived,  unhappily  collapsed,  and  his  effort  to 
unite  and  consolidate  led  only  to  increased  division 
and  disintegration.  He  left  behind  him  at  least 
twelve  rival  claimants  of  his  power,  and  it  Was  only 
by  partition  that  the  immediate  breaking  out  of  civil 

36 


DIVISION  OF   THE   EMPIRE   OF  ALEXANDER.      37 

war  among"  the  competitors  was  prevented.  Partition 
itself  did  but  stave  off  the  struggle  for  a  few  years, 
and  the  wars  of  the  "  Successors,"  which  followed, 
caused  further  change,  and  tended  to  split  the  empire 
into  minute  fragments.  After  a  while  the  various 
collisions  produced  something  like  a  "  survival  of  the 
fittest,"  and  about  the  close  of  the  fourth  century,  after 
the  great  battle  of  Ipsus  (B.C.  301),  that  division  of 
the  Macedonian  Empire  was  made  into  four  principal 
parts,  which  thenceforward  for  nearly  three  centuries 
formed  the  basis  of  the  political  situation  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  Western  Asia.  Macedonia,  Asia  Minor, 
Syria,  and  Egypt  became  the  great  powers  of  the 
time,  and  on  the  fortunes  of  these  four  powers,  their 
policies,  and  lines  of  action,  depended  the  general 
course  of  affairs  in  the  Oriental  world  for  the  next 
two  hundred  years  at  any  rate. 

Of  these  four  great  monarchies  the  one  with  which 
the  interests  of  Parthia  were  almost  wholly  bound  up 
was  the  Syrian  kingdom  of  the  Seleucidae.  Originally, 
Seleucus  received  nothing  but  the  single  satrapy  of 
Babylonia.  But  his  military  genius  and  his  popularity 
were  such,  that  his  dominion  kept  continually  in- 
creasing until  it  became  an  empire  worthy  of  com- 
parison with  those  ancient  Oriental  monarchies,  which, 
in  remoter  times,  had  attracted,  and  almost  monopo- 
lised, the  attention  of  mankind.  As  early  as  B.C.  312, 
he  had  added  to  his  original  government  of  Babylonia 
the  important  countries  of  Media,  Susiana,  and  Persia. 
After  Ipsus  he  received,  by  the  agreement  then  made 
among  the  "  Successors,"  the  districts  of  Cappadocia, 
Eastern  Phrygia,  Upper  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  and  the 

4956  6 


38      WESTERN  ASIA    IN    THE    3RD    CENTURY  B.C. 

entire  valley  of  the  Euphrates  ;  while,  about  the  same 
time,  or  rather  earlier,  he,  by  his  own  unassisted 
efforts,  obtained  the  adhesion  of  all  the  eastern 
provinces  of  Alexander's  Empire,  Armenia,  Assyria, 
Sagartia,  Carmania,  Hyrcania,  Parthia,  Bactria,  Sog- 
diana,  Aria,  Sarangia,  Arachosia,  Sacastana,  Gedrosia, 
and  probably  part  of  India.  The  empire  thus  estab- 
lished extended  from  the  Mediterranean  on  the  west 
to  the  Indus  valley  and  the  Bolor  mountain  chain 
upon  the  east,  while  it  stretched  from  the  Caspian 
and  the  Jaxartes  towards  the  north  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  the  Indian  Ocean  southwards.  Its  entire 
area  could  not  have  been  much  less  than  1,200,000 
square  miles.  Of  these  some  300,000  or  400,000  may 
have  been  desert  ;  but  the  remainder  was  generally 
fertile,  and  comprised  within  its  limits  some  of  the 
very  most  productive  regions  in  the  whole  world. 
The  Mesopotamian  lowland,  the  Orontes  valley,  the 
tract  between  the  Southern  Caspian  and  the  moun- 
tains, the  regions  about  Merv  and  Balkh,  were  among 
the  richest  in  Asia,  and  produced  grain  and  fruit  in 
incredible  abundance.  The  fine  pastures  of  Media 
and  Armenia  furnished  excellent  horses.  Bactria 
gave  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  camels.  Elephants 
in  large  numbers  were  readily  procurable  from  India. 
Gold,  silver,  copper,  iron,  lead,  tin  were  furnished  by 
several  of  the  provinces,  and  precious  stones  of  various 
kinds  abounded.  Moreover,  for  above  ten  centuries, 
the  precious  metals  and  the  most  valuable  kinds  of 
merchandise  had  flowed  from  every  quarter  into  the 
region  ;  and  though  the  Macedonians  may  have  carried 
off,  or  wasted,  a  considerable  quantity  of  both,  yet  the 


SYRIAN   KINGDOM   OF    THE   SELEUCIDJE.         39 

accumulations  of  ages  withstood  the  strain  ;  and  the 
hoarded  wealth,  which  had  come  down  from  Assyrian, 
Babylonian,  and  Median  times,  was  to  be  found  in  the 
days  of  Seleucus  chiefly  within  the  limits  of  his  empire. 
It  might  have  seemed  that  Western  Asia  was  about 
to  enjoy  under  the  Seleucid  princes  as  tranquil  and 
prosperous  a  condition  as  had  prevailed  throughout 
the  region  for  the  two  centuries  which  had  intervened 
between  the  founding  of  the  Persian  Empire  by  Cyrus 
(B.C.  538)  and  its  destruction  by  Alexander  (B.C.  323  . 
But  the  fair  prospect  was  soon  clouded  over.  The 
Seleucid  princes,  instead  of  devoting  themselves  to 
the  consolidation  of  their  power  in  the  vast  region 
between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Indus,  turned  all 
their  attention  towards  the  West,  and  frittered  away 
in  petty  quarrels  for  small  gains  with  their  rivals  in 
that  quarter — the  Ptolemies  and  the  princes  of  Asia 
Minor — those  energies  which  would  have  been  far 
better  employed  in  arranging  and  organising  the 
extensive  dominions  whereof  they  were  already 
masters.  It  was  symptomatic  of  this  leaning  to  the 
West,  that  the  first  Seleucus,  almost  as  soon  as  he 
found  himself  in  quiet  possession  of  his  vast  empire, 
transferred  the  seat  of  government  from  Eower 
Mesopotamia  to  Upper  Syria,  from  the  banks  of  the 
Tigris  to  those  of  the  Orontes.  This  movement  had 
fatal  consequences.  Already  his  empire  contained 
within  itself  an  element  of  weakness  in  its  over-great 
length,  which  cannot  be  estimated  at  less  than  two 
thousand  miles.  To  counteract  this  disadvantage  a 
fairly  central  position  for  the  capital  was  almost  a 
necessity.     The  empire  of  Seleucus  might  have  been 


40      WESTERN   ASIA    IN    THE   $RD    CENTURY   B.C. 

conveniently  ruled  from  the  old  Median  capital  of 
Ecbatana,  or  the  later  Persian  one  of  Susa.  Even 
Babylon,  or  Seleucia,  though  further  to  the  west,  were 
not  unsuitable  sites  ;  and  had  Seleucus  been  content 
with  either  of  these,  no  blame  would  attach  to  him. 
But  when,  to  keep  watch  upon  his  rivals,  he  removed 
the  seat  of  government  five  hundred  miles  further  west- 
ward, and  placed  it  almost  on  his  extreme  western 
frontier,  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Mediterranean,  he 
intensified  the  weakness  which  required  to  be  counter- 
acted, and  made  the  disruption  of  his  empire  within 
no  great  length  of  time  certain.  The  change  loosened 
the  ties  which  bound  the  empire  together,  offended 
the  bulk  of  the  Asiatics,  who  saw  their  monarch  with- 
draw from  them  into  a  remote  corner  of  his  dominions, 
and  particularly  weakened  the  grasp  of  the  govern- 
ment on  those  more  eastern  districts  which  were  at 
once  furthest  from  the  new  metropolis,  and  least 
assimilated  to  the  Hellenic  character.  Among  the 
causes  which  led  to  the  disintegration  of  the  Seleucid 
kingdom,  there  is  none  which  deserves  so  well  to  be 
considered  the  main  cause  as  this.  It  was  calculated 
at  once  to  produce  the  desire  to  revolt,  and  to  render 
the  reduction  of  revolted  provinces  difficult,  if  not 
impossible. 

The  evil  day,  however,  might  have  been  indefinitely 
postponed,  if  not  even  escaped  altogether,  had  the 
Seleucid  princes  either  established  and  maintained 
throughout  their  empire  a  vigorous  and  efficient  ad- 
ministration, or  abstained  from  entangling  themselves 
in  wars  with  their  neighbours  upon  the  West — the 
Ptolemies,  the  kings  of  Pergamus,  and  others. 


ORGANISATION   OF   THE   SELEUCID   KINGDOM.      4 1 

But  the  organisation  of  the  Seleucid  Empire  was 
unsatisfactory.  Instead  of  pursuing  the  system  in- 
augurated by  Alexander,  and  seeking  to  weld  the 
heterogeneous  elements  of  which  his  kingdom  was 
composed  into  a  homogeneous  whole,  instead  of  at 
once  conciliating  and  elevating  the  Asiatics  by  uniting 
them  with  the  Macedonians  and  the  Greeks,  by  pro- 
moting intermarriage  and  social  intercourse  between 
the  two  classes  of  his  subjects,  educating  the  Asiatics 
in  Greek  ideas  and  Greek  schools,  opening  his  court 
to  them,  promoting  them  to  high  employments,  making 
them  feel  that  they  were  as  much  valued  and  as  much 
cared  for  as  the  people  of  the  conquering  race,  the 
first  Seleucus,  and  after  him  his  successors,  fell  back 
upon  the  older,  simpler,  and  ruder  system — the  system 
pursued  before  Alexander's  time  by  the  Persians,  and 
before  them  perhaps  by  the  Medes— the  system  most 
congenial  to  human  laziness  and  human  pride — that 
of  governing  a  nation  of  slaves  by  means  of  a  clique 
of  victorious  aliens.  Seleucus  divided  his  empire  into 
satrapies,  seventy-two  in  number.  He  bestowed  the 
office  of  satrap  on  none  but  Macedonians  and  Greeks. 
The  standing  army,  by  means  of  which  he  maintained 
his  authority,  was  indeed  composed  in  the  main  of 
Asiatics,  disciplined  after  the  Greek  model  ;  but  it 
was  officered  entirely  by  men  of  Greek  or  Macedonian 
parentage.  Nothing  was  done  to  keep  up  the  self- 
respect  of  the  Asiatics,  or  to  soften  the  unpleasant- 
ness which  must  always  attach  to  being  governed  by 
foreigners.  Even  the  superintendence  over  the  satraps 
seems  to  have  been  insufficient.  According  to  some 
writers,  it  was  a  gross  outrage  offered  by  a  satrap  to 


42       WESTERN   ASIA   IN    THE   3RD    CENTURY   B.C. 

an  Asiatic  subject  that  stirred  up  the  Parthians  to 
their  revolt.  The  story  may  not  be  true  ;  but  the 
currency  given  to  it  shows  of  what  conduct  to  those 
under  their  rule  the  satraps  of  the  Seleucidae  were 
thought,  by  those  who  lived  near  the  time,  to  have 
been  capable.  It  may  be  said  that  this  treatment 
was  no  worse  than  that  whereto  the  subject  races 
of  Western  Asia  had  been  accustomed  for  many 
centuries  under  their  Persian,  Median,  or  Assyrian 
masters,  and  this  statement  may  be  quite  consonant 
with  truth  ;  but  a  new  yoke  is  always  more  galling 
than  an  old  one  ;  in  addition  to  which  we  must  take 
into  consideration  the  fact,  that  the  hopes  of  the 
Asiatics  had  been  raised  by  the  policy  of  assimilation 
avowed,  and  to  some  extent  introduced,  by  Alexander; 
so  that  they  may  be  excused  if  they  felt  with  some 
bitterness  the  disappointment  of  their  very  legitimate 
expectations,  when  the  Seleucidae  revived  the  old 
satrapial  system,  unmodified,  unsoftened,  with  all  its 
many  abuses  as  pronounced  and  as  rampant  as  ever. 

An  entire  abstention  on  the  part  of  the  Seleucidae 
from  quarrels  with  the  other  "Successors  of  Alexander," 
would  perhaps  scarcely  have  been  possible.  Their 
territory  bordered  on  that  of  the  Ptolemies  and  the 
kings  of  Pergamus,  and  was  liable  to  invasion  from 
either  quarter.  But  by  planting  their  capital  on  the 
Orontes  they  aggravated  the  importance  of  the  attacks 
which  they  could  not  prevent,  and  became  mixed  up 
with  Pergamenian  and  Egyptian, and  even  Macedonian, 
politics  far  more  than  was  necessary.  Had  they  but 
made  Seleucia  permanently  their  metropolis,  and  held 
lightly  by  their  dominion  to  the  west  of  the  Euphrates, 


SYRIAN    WARS   OF   THE   PERIOD.  43 

they  might  certainly  have  avoided  to  a  large  extent 
the  entanglements  into  which  they  were  drawn  by 
their  actual  policy,  and  have  been  free  to  give  their 
main  attention  to  the  true  sources  of  their  real 
strength — the  central  and  eastern  provinces.  But  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  the  idea  of  abstention  ever 
presented  itself  to  the  mind  of  any  one  of  the  early 
Seleucid  princes.  It  was  the  fond  dream  of  each  of 
them,  as  of  the  other  "  Successors,"  that  possibly  in 
his  person  might  one  day  be  re-united  the  whole  of 
the  territories  which  had  been  ruled  by  the  Great 
Conqueror.  Each  Seleucid  prince  would  have  felt 
that  he  sacrificed  his  dearest  and  most  cherished 
hopes,  if  he  had  withdrawn  from  the  regions  of  the 
west,  and  shunning  engagements  and  adventures 
in  that  quarter,  had  contented  himself  with  efforts 
to  consolidate  a  great  power  in  the  more  inland 
and  more  thoroughly  Asiatic  portions  of  the 
empire. 

The  result  was  that,  during  the  first  half  of  the 
third  century  (B.C.  300-250),  the  Seleucid  princes  were 
almost  constantly  engaged  in  disputes  and  wars  in  Asia 
Minor  and  Syria  Proper,  gave  their  personal  super- 
intendence to  those  regions,  and  had  neither  time  nor 
attention  to  spare  for  the  affairs  of  the  far  East.  So 
long  as  the  satraps  of  these  regions  paid  regularly 
their  appointed  tributes,  and  furnished  regularly  the 
required  quotas  of  troops  for  service  in  the  western 
wars,  Seleucus  and  his  successors,  the  first  and  second 
Antiochi,  were  content.  The  satraps  were  left  to 
manage  the  affairs  of  their  provinces  at  their  own 
discretion  ;  and  we  cannot  be  surprised  if  the  absence 


44  ORIGIN   OF   THE   PARTHIAN   STATE. 

of  a  controlling  hand  led  to  various  complications 
and  disorders. 

As  time  went  on  these  disorders  would  naturally 
increase,  and  matters  might  very  probably  have  come 
to  a  head  in  a  few  more  years  through  the  mere 
negligence  and  apathy  of  those  who  had  the  direction 
of  the  state  ;  but  a  further  impulse  towards  actual 
disintegration  was  given  by  the  character  of  the 
second  Antiochus,  which  was  especially  weak  and 
contemptible.  To  have  taken  the  title  of  "  Theos  " — 
never  before  assumed,  so  far  as  we  know,  by  any 
monarch — was,  even  by  itself,  a  sufficient  indication 
of  presumption  and  folly,  and  might  justify  us,  did 
we  know  no  more  of  him,  in  concluding  that  the 
calamities  of  his  reign  were  the  fruit  of  his  unfitness 
to  direct  and  rule  an  empire.  But  we  have  further 
abundant  evidence  of  his  incapacity.  He  was  noted, 
even  among  Asiatic  sovereigns,  for  luxury  and  de- 
bauchery ;  he  neglected  all  state  affairs  in  the  pursuit 
of  pleasure  ;  his  wives  and  his  male  favourites  were 
allowed  to  rule  his  kingdom  at  their  will,  and  their 
most  flagrant  crimes  were  neither  restrained  nor 
punished.  The  satraps,  to  whom  the  character  and 
conduct  of  their  sovereign  could  not  but  become 
known,  would  be  partly  encouraged  to  follow  the 
bad  example  set  them,  partly  provoked  by  it  to 
shake  themselves  free  from  the  rule  of  so  hateful  yet 
contemptible  a  master. 

It  may  be  added,  that  already  there  had  been 
examples  of  successful  revolts  on  the  part  of  satraps 
in  outlying  provinces,  which  could  not  but  have  been 
generally    known,    and    which    must    have    excited 


REVOLTS   OF   SATRAPS.  45 

ambitious  longings  on  the  part  of  persons  similarly 
placed,  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  Macedonian 
period.  Even  at  the  time  of  Alexander's  great 
conquests,  a  Persian  satrap,  Atropates,  succeeded  in 
converting  his  satrapy  of  Upper  Media — thencefor- 
ward called  Media  Atropatene — into  an  independent 
sovereignty.  Not  long  afterwards,  Cappadocia  had 
detached  itself  from  the  kingdom  of  Eumenes  (B.C. 
326),  and  had  established  its  independence  under 
Ariarathes,  who  became  the  founder  of  a  dynasty. 
Still  earlier,  Bithynia,  Paphlagonia,  and  Pontus,  once 
Persian  provinces,  had  revolted,  and  in  each  case  the 
revolt  had  issued  in  the  recovery  of  autonomy.  Thus 
already  in  Western  Asia,  beside  the  Greco-Macedo- 
nian kingdoms  which  had  been  established  by  the 
"  Successors  of  Alexander,"  there  were  existent  some 
five  or  six  states  which  had  had  their  origin  in  successful 
rebellions. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  under  which,  in  or 
about  the  year  B.C.  256,  which  was  the  sixth  year  of 
Antiochus  Theus,  actual  disturbances  broke  out  in 
the  extreme  north-east  of  the  Seleucid  Empire.  The 
first  province  to  raise  the  standard  of  revolt,  and  pro- 
claim itself  independent,  was  Bactria.  This  district 
had  from  a  remote  antiquity  been  one  with  special 
pretensions.  The  country  was  fertile,  and  much  of 
it  readily  defensible  ;  the  people  were  hardy  and 
valiant  ;  they  had  been  generally  treated  with 
exceptional  favour  by  the  Persian  monarchs ;  and 
they  seem  to  have  had  traditions  which  assigned 
them  a  pre-eminence  among  the  Arian  nations  at 
some  indefinitely  distant  period.     "  Bactria  with  the 


46  ORIGIN   OF    THE   PARTHIAN  STATE. 

lofty  banner  "  is  celebrated  in  one  of  the  most  ancient 
portions  of  the  Zendavesta.  It  remained  unsubdued 
until  the  time  of  Cyrus.  Cyrus  is  said  by  some  to 
have  left  it  as  an  appanage  to  his  second  son,  Bardes, 
or  Tanyoxares.  Under  the  Persians,  it  had  for  satrap 
generally,  or  at  any  rate  frequently,  a  member  of  the 
royal  family.  Alexander  had  conquered  it  with  diffi- 
culty, and  only  by  prolonged  efforts.  It  was  therefore 
natural  that  disintegration  should  make  its  first 
appearance  in  this  quarter.  The  Greek  satrap  of  the 
time,  Diodotus,  either  disgusted  with  the  conduct  of 
Antiochus  Theus,  or  simply  seeing  in  his  weakness 
and  general  unpopularity  an  opportunity  which  it 
would  be  foolish  to  let  slip,  in  or  about  the  year 
B.C.  256,  assumed  the  style  and  title  of  king,  struck 
coins  stamped  with  his  own  name,  and  established 
himself  without  any  difficulty  as  king  over  the  entire 
province.  Theus,  engaged  in  war  with  the  Egyptian 
monarch,  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  did  not  even  make 
an  effort  to  put  him  down,  and  the  Bactrian  ruler, 
without  encountering  any  serious  opposition,  passed 
into  the  ranks  of  autonomous  sovereigns. 

The  example  of  successful  revolt  thus  set  could 
not  well  be  barren  of  consequences.  If  one  Seleucid 
province  might  throw  off  the  yoke  of  its  feudal  lord 
with  absolute  impunity,  why  might  not  others  ? 
There  seemed  to  be  actually  nothing  to  prevent  them. 
Syria,  so  far  as  we  can  discern,  allowed  Bactria  to 
go  its  way  without  any  effort  whatever  either  to  check 
the  revolt  or  to  punish  it.  For  eighteen  years  no 
Syrian  force  came  near  the  country.  Diodotus  was 
permitted  to  consolidate  his  kingdom   and  rivet  his 


CHARACTER    OF    THE   PARTHIAN   REVOLT.         47 

authority  on  his  subjects,  without  any  interference, 
and  the  Bactrian  monarchy  became  thus  a  permanent 
factor  in  Asiatic  politics  for  nearly  two  centuries. 

It  was  about  six  years  after  the  establishment  of 
Bactrian  independence  that  the  Parthian  satrapy 
followed  the  pattern  set  it  by  its  neighbour,  and  de- 
tached itself  from  the  Seleucid  Empire.  The  circum- 
stances, however,  under  which  the  severance  took 
place  were  very  different  in  the  two  cases.  History 
by  no  means  repeated  itself.  In  Bactria  the  Greek 
satrap  took  the  lead  ;  and  the  Bactrian  kingdom  wras, 
at  any  rate  at  its  commencement,  as  thoroughly 
Hellenic  as  that  of  the  Seleucidae.  But  in  Parthia 
Greek  rule  was  from  the  first  cast  aside.  The  native 
Asiatics  rebelled  against  their  masters.  A  people  of 
a  rude  and  uncivilised  type,  coarse  and  savage,  but 
brave  and  freedom-loving,  rose  up  against  the  polished 
but  comparatively  effeminate  Greeks,  who  held  them 
in  subjection,  and  claimed  and  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing their  independence.  The  Parthian  kingdom 
was  thoroughly  anti- Hellenic.  It  appealed  to  patriotic 
feelings,  and  to  the  hate  universally  felt  towards  the 
stranger.  It  set  itself  to  undo  the  work  of  Alexander, 
to  cast  out  the  Europeans,  to  recover  for  the  native 
race  the  possession  of  its  own  continent.  "  Asia  for 
for  the  Asiatics,"  was  its  cry.  It  was  naturally  almost 
as  hostile  to  Bactria  as  to  Syria,  although  danger 
from  a  common  enemy  might  cause  it  sometimes  to 
make  a  temporary  alliance  with  the  former  kingdom. 
It  had,  no  doubt,  the  general  sympathy  of  the  popula- 
tions in  the  adjacent  countries,  and  represented  to 
them  the  cause  of  freedom  and  autonomy.     Arsaces 


48  ORIGIN   OF   THE    PARTHIAN   STATE. 

effected  for  Parthia  that  which  Arminius  strove  to 
effect  for  Germany,  and  which  Tell  accomplished  for 
Switzerland,  and  Victor  Emmanuel  for  Lombardy. 

The  circumstances  of  the  revolt  of  Parthia  are 
variously  narrated  by  ancient  authors.  According  to 
a  story  reported  by  Strabo,  though  not  accepted  as  true 
by  him,  Arsaces  was  a  Bactrian,  who  did  not  approve 
of  the  proceedings  of  Diodotus,  and,  when  he  was 
successful,  quitted  the  newly-founded  kingdom,  and 
transferred  his  residence  to  Parthia,  where  he  stirred 
up  an  insurrection  against  the  satrap,  and,  succeeding 
in  the  attempt,  induced  the  Parthians  to  accept  him 
as  their  sovereign.  But  it  is  intrinsically  improbable 
that  an  entire  foreigner  would  have  been  accepted  as 
king  under  such  circumstances,  and  it  is  fatal  to  the 
narrative  that  every  other  account  contradicts  the 
Bactrian  origin  of  Arsaces,  and  makes  him  a  Parthian, 
or  next  door  to  a  Parthian.  Arrian  states  that  Arsaces 
and  his  brother,  Tiridates,  were  Parthians,  descen- 
dants of  Phriapites,  the  son  of  Arsaces  ;  that  they 
revolted  against  the  satrap  of  Antiochus  Theus,  by 
name  Pherecles,  on  account  of  a  gross  insult  which 
he  had  offered  to  one  of  them  ;  and  that  finally, 
having  murdered  the  satrap,  they  declared  Parthia 
iadependent,  and  set  up  a  government  of  their  own. 
Strabo,  while  giving  currency  to  more  than  one  story 
on  the  subject,  lets  us  see  that,  in  his  own  mind, 
he  accepts  the  following  account :  "  Arsaces  was  a 
Scythian,  a  chief  among  the  Parnian  Dahae,  who 
inhabited  the  valley  of  the  Ochus  (Attrek  ?).  Soon 
after  the  establishment  of  Bactrian  independence,  he 
entered  Parthia  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  his  country- 


r 


CONFLICTING   ACCOUNTS   OF  AUTHORS.  49 

men,  and  succeeded  in  making  himself  master  of  it." 
Finally,  Justin,  who  no  doubt,  here  as  elsewhere,  follows 
Trogus  Pompeius,  a  writer  of  the  Augustan  age,  ex- 
oresses  himself  as  follows :  "  Arsaces,  having  been 
long  accustomed  to  live  by  robbery  and  rapine, 
attacked  the  Parthians  with  a  predatory  band,  killed 
their  satrap,  Andragoras,  and  seized  the  supreme 
authority."  This  last  account  seems  fairly  probable, 
and  does  not  greatly  differ  from  Arrian's.  If  Arsaces 
was  a  Dahan  chief,  accustomed  to  make  forays  into 
the  fertile  hill  country  of  Parthia  from  the  Choras- 
mian  desert,  and,  in  one  of  them,  fell  in  with  the  Greek 
satrap,  defeated  him,  and  slew  him,  it  would  not  be 
unlikely  that  the  Parthians,  who  were  of  a  kindred 
race,  might  be  so  delighted  with  his  prowess  as  to 
invite  him  to  place  himself  at  their  head.  An  op- 
pressed people  gladly  adopts  as  ruler  the  chieftain  of 
an  allied  tribe,  if  he  has  shown  skill  and  daring,  and 
promises  them  deliverance  from  their  oppressors. 

The  date  of  the  Parthian  revolt  was  probably  B.C. 
250,  which  was  the  eleventh  year  of  Antiochus  Theus. 
Antiochus  was  at  that  time  engaged  in  a  serious 
;onflict  with  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  King  of  Egypt, 
which,  however,  was  brought  to  a  close  in  the  follow- 
ing year  by  his  marriage  with  Berenice,  Ptolemy's 
daughter.  It  might  have  been  expected  that,  as  soon 
as  his  hands  were  free,  he  would  have  turned  his 
attention  towards  the  East,  and  have  made  an  effort, 
at  any  rate,  to  regain  his  lost  territory.  But  Antio- 
chus lacked  either  the  energy  or  the  courage  to  engage 
in  a  fresh  war.  He  was  selfish  and  luxurious  in  his 
habits,  and  seems  to   have  preferred  the  delights  of 


50  ORIGIN   OF    THE    PARTHIAN   STATE. 

repose  amid  the  soft  seductions  of  Antioch  to  the 
perils  and  hardships  of  a  campaign  in  the  rough 
Caspian  region.  At  any  rate,  he  remained  quietly  at 
home,  while  Arsaces  consolidated  his  power,  chastised 
those  who  for  one  reason  or  another  resisted  his 
authority,  and  settled  himself  firmly  upon  the  throne. 
His  capital  appears  to  have  been  Hecatompylus, 
which  had  been  built  by  Alexander  in  the  valley  of 
the  Gurghan  river.  According  to  some  late  authors 
of  small  account,  he  came  to  a  violent  end,  having 
been  killed  in  battle  by  a  spear-thrust,  which  pene- 
trated   his    side.     It    is  certain  that  he  had   a  short 


COIN    OK   TIRIDATES    I. 


reign,  since   he    was    succeeded    in    B.C.    248   by   his 
brother,  Tiridates,  the  second   Parthian  monarch. 

Tiridates,  on  ascending  the  throne,  followed  a 
practice  not  very  uncommon  in  the  East,  and  adopted 
his  brother's  name  as  a  "  throne-name,"  reigning  as 
Arsaces  the  Second.  He  is  the  first  Parthian  king 
of  whom  we  possess  contemporary  memorials.  The 
coins  struck  by  Arsaces  II.  commence  the  Parthian 
series,  and  present  to  us  a  monarch  of  strongly- 
marked  features,  with  a  large  eye,  a  prominent, 
slightly  aquiline  nose,  a  projecting  chin,  and  an 
entire  absence  of  hair.  He  wears  upon  his  head  a 
curious    cap,  or  helmet,  with  lappets   on  either  side 


ARSACES   I.    AND    TIRIDATES.  51 

that  reach  to  the  shoulders,  and  has  around  his  fore- 
head and  above  his  cars  a  coronal  of  pearls,  apparently 
of  a  large  size.  On  the  reverse  side  of  his  coins  he 
exhibits  the  figure  of  a  man,  seated  on  a  sort  of 
stool,  and  holding  out  in  front  of  him  a  strung  bow, 
with  the  string  uppermost.  This  may  be  either  a 
representation  of  himself  in  his  war  costume,  or  an 
ideal  figure  of  a  Parthian  god,  but  is  probably  the 
former.  Tiridates  takes  upon  his  coins  the  title  either 
of  "  King,"  or  of  "  Great  King."  The  legend  which 
they  bear  is  Greek,  as  is  that  of  almost  all  the  kings 
his  successors.  The  coins  follow  the  Seleucid  model. 
Tiridates  was  an  able  and  active  monarch.  He 
had  the  good  fortune  to  hold  the  throne  for  a  period 
of  above  thirty  years,  and  had  thus  ample  space  for 
the  development  of  his  talents,  and  for  completing 
the  organisation  of  the  kingdom.  Having  received 
Parthia  from  his  brother  in  a  somewhat  weak  and 
unsettled  condition,  he  left  it  a  united  and  powerful 
monarchy,  enlarged  in  its  boundaries,  strengthened  in 
its  defences,  in  alliance  with  its  nearest  and  most 
formidable  neighbour,  and  triumphant  over  the  great 
power  of  Syria,  which  had  hoped  to  bring  it  once 
more  into  subjection.  He  witnessed  some  extra- 
ordinary movements,  and  conducted  affairs  during 
their  progress  with  prudence  and  moderation.  He 
was  more  than  once  brought  into  imminent  danger, 
but  succeeded  in  effectually  protecting  himself.  He 
made  a  judicious  use  of  the  opportunities  which 
the  disturbed  condition  of  Western  Asia  in  his  time 
presented  to  him,  and  might  well  be  considered,  as  he 
was  by  many,  a  sort  of  second  founder  of  the  State. 


52  ORIGIN   OF    THE    PARTHIAN   STATE. 

It  was  within  two  years  of  the  accession  of 
Tiridates  to  the  Parthian  throne  that  one  of  those 
vast,  but  transient,  revolutions  to  which  Asia  is 
subject,  but  which  are  rare  occurrences  in  Europe, 
swept  over  Western  Asia.  Ptolemy  Euergetes,  the 
son  of  Philadelphus,  having  succeeded  to  his  father's 
kingdom  in  B.C.  247,  made  war  on  Syria  in  B.C.  245, 
to  avenge  the  murder  of  his  sister*  Berenice,  to  whose 
death  the  Syrian  king,  Seleucus  II.,  had  been  a  party. 
In  the  war  which  followed  he  at  first  carried  every- 
thing before  him.  Having  taken  Antioch,  he  crossed 
the  Euphrates,  and,  in  the  course  of  a  couple  of  years, 
succeeded  in  effecting  the  conquest  of  Mesopotamia, 
Assyria,  Babylonia,  Susiana,  Media,  and  Persia,  while 
the  smaller  provinces,  as  far  as  Parthia  and  Bactria, 
submitted  to  him  without  resistance.  He  went  in 
person,  as  he  tells  us,  as  far  as  Babylon,  and,  re- 
garding his  power  as  established,  proceeded  somewhat 
hastily  to  gather  the  fruits  of  victory,  by  compelling 
the  conquered  countries  to  surrender  all  the  most  valu- 
able works  of  art  which  were  to  be  found  in  them,  and 
sending  off  the  treasures  to  Egypt,  for  the  adornment 
of  Alexandria.  He  also  levied  heavy  contributions 
on  the  countries  which  had  submitted  to  him,  and 
altogether  treated  them  with  a  severity  that  '  was 
impolitic.  Bactria  and  Parthia  cannot  but  have  felt 
considerable  alarm  at  his  victorious  progress.  Here 
was  a  young  warrior  who,  in  a  single  campaign,  had 
marched  the  distance  of  a  thousand  miles  from  the 
banks  of  the  Nile  to  those  of  the  Lower  Euphrates, 
without  so  much  as  receiving  a  check,  and  who  was 
threatening  to  repeat  the  career  of  Alexander.    What 


TIRI DATES    CONQUERS   HYRCANIA.  S3 

resistance  could  the  little  Parthian  state  hope  to  offer 
to  him  ?  It  must  have  rejoiced  the  heart  of  Tiridates 
to  hear  that,  while  the  conqueror  was  reaping  the 
spoils  of  victory  in  his  newly-subjugated  provinces, 
dangerous  disturbances  had  broken  out  in  his  own 
land,  which  had  forced  him  to  withdraw  his  troops 
suddenly  (B.C.  243),  and  evacuate  the  territory  which 
he  had  overrun.  Thus  his  invasion  proved  to  be  a 
raid  rather  than  a  real  conquest,  and,  instead  of 
damaging  Parthia,  had  rather  the  effect  of  improving 
her  position,  and  contributing  to  the  advance  of  her 
power.  On  Ptolemy's  departure,  Syria  recovered  her 
sway  over  her  lost  provinces,  and  again  stood  forward 
as  Parthia's  principal  enemy  ;  but  she  was  less  for- 
midable than  she  had  been  previously  ;  her  hold  over 
her  outlying  dominions  was  relaxed,  her  strength  was 
crippled,  her  prestige  lost,  and  her  honour  tarnished. 
Tiridates  saw  in  her  depression  his  own  opportunity, 
and,  suddenly  invading  Hyrcania,  his  near  neighbour, 
and  Syria's  most  distant  dependency,  succeeded  in 
overrunning  it  and  detaching  it  from  the  empire  of 
the  Seleucidae. 

The  gauntlet  was  thus  thrown  down  to  the  Syrian 
king,  and  a  challenge  given,  which  he  was  compelled 
to  accept,  unless  he  was  prepared  to  yield  unresist- 
ingly, one  after  another,  all  the  fairest  of  his  remaining 
provinces.  It  was  not  likely  that  he  would  so  act. 
Seleucus  II.  was  no  coward.  He  had  been  engaged 
in  wars  almost  continuously  from  his  accession,  and, 
though  more  than  once  defeated  in  battle,  had  never 
shown  the  white  feather.  On  learning  the  loss  of 
Hyrcania,  he  proceeded   immediately   to  patch  up  a 


54  ORIGIN   OF    THE   PARTHIAN   STATE. 

peace  with  his  brother,  Antiochus  Hierax,  against 
whom  he  was  at  the  time  contending,  and  having  col- 
lected a  large  army,  marched  away  to  the  East.  He  did 
not,  however,  at  once  invade  Parthia,  but,  deflecting 
his  course  to  the  right,  entered  into  negotiations  with 
the  revolted  Bactrian  king,  Diodotus,  and  made  alliance 
with  him  against  Tiridates.  It  may  be  supposed  that 
he  represented  Tiridates  as  their  common  foe,  as  much 
a  danger  to  Bactria  as  to  Syria,  the  head  of  a  move- 
ment, which  was  directed  against  Hellenism,  and 
which  aimed  as  much  at  putting  down  Bactrian  rule 
as  Syrian.  At  any  rate,  he  succeeded  in  gaining 
Diodotus  to  his  side  ;  and  the  confederate  monarchs, 
having  joined  their  forces,  proceeded  to  invade  the 
territory  of  the  Parthian  sovereign.  Tiridates  did  not 
await  their  onset.  Regarding  himself  as  overmatched, 
he  quitted  his  country,  and  fled  northwards  into  the 
region  between  the  Oxus  and  the  Jaxartes,  where  he 
took  refuge  with  a  Scythic  tribe,  called  the  Aspasiacae, 
which  was  powerful  at  this  period.  The  Aspasiacae, 
probably  lent  him  troops,  for  he  did  not  remain  long 
in  retirement  ;  but,  hearing  that  the  first  Diodotus, 
the  ally  of  Seleucus,  had  died,  he  contrived  to  draw 
over  his  son,  Diodotus  II.,  to  his  alliance,  and,  in  con- 
junction with  him,  gave  Seleucus  battle,  and  com- 
pletely defeated  his  army.  Seleucus  retreated  hastily 
to  Antioch,  and  resumed  his  struggle  with  his  brother, 
whom  he  eventually  overcame  ;  but,  having  learned 
wisdom  by  experience,  he  made  no  further  attempts 
against  either  the  Bactrian  or  the  Parthian  power. 

This    victory    was    with    reason    regarded    by    the 
Parthians    as   a   sort   of  second    beginning   of  their 


WAR   OF    TIRIDATES    WITH   SELEUCUS   II.        55 

independence.  Hitherto  the  kingdom  had  existed 
precariously,  and  as  it  were  by  sufferance.  From  the 
day  that  the  revolt  took  place,  it  was  certain  that, 
some  time  or  other,  Syria  would  reclaim,  and  make 
an  attempt  to  recover,  its  lost  territory.  Until  a 
battle  had  been  fought,  until  the  new  monarchy  had 
measured  its  strength  against  that  of  its  former 
mistress,  it  was  impossible  for  any  one  to  feel  secure 
that  it  would  be  able  to  maintain  its  existence.  The 
victory  gained  by  Tiridates  over  Seleucus  Callinicus 
put  an  end  to  these  doubts.  It  proved  to  the  world  at 
large,  as  well  as  to  the  Parthians  themselves,  that  they 
had  nothing  to  fear — that  they  were  strong  enough 
to  preserve  their  freedom.  If  we  consider  the 
enormous  disproportion  between  the  military  strength 
and  resources  of  the  narrow  Parthian  state  and  the 
vast  Syrian  Empire — if  we  remember  that  the  one 
comprised  at  this  time  about  fifty  thousand,  and  the 
other  above  a  million  of  square  miles  ;  that  the  one 
had  inherited  the  wealth  of  ages,  while  the  other  was 
probably  as  poor  as  any  province  in  Asia  ;  that  the 
one  possessed  the  Macedonian  arms,  training,  and 
tactics,  while  the  other  knew  only  the  rude  warfare  of 
the  Steppes — the  result  of  the  struggle  cannot  but  be 
regarded  as  surprising.  Still,  it  was  not  without  pre- 
cedent ;  and  it  has  not  been  without  repetition.  It 
adds  another  to  the  many  instances,  where  a  small 
but  brave  people,  bent  on  resisting  foreign  domina- 
tion, have,  when  standing  on  their  defence  in  their 
own  territory,  proved  more  than  a  match  for  the 
utmost  force  that  a  foe  of  overwhelming  strength 
could  bring  against  them.    It  reminds  us  of  Marathon, 


56  ORIGIN   OF   THE   PARTHIAN   STATE. 

of  Bannockburn,  of  Morgarten,  We  may  not  sympa- 
thise wholly  with  the  victors,  for  Greek  civivisation, 
even  of  the  type  introduced  by  Alexander  into  Asia, 
was  ill  replaced  by  Tatar  coarseness  and  barbarism  ; 
but  we  cannot  refuse  our  admiration  to  the  spectacle 
of  a  handful  of  gallant  men  determinedly  resisting  in 
the  fastnesses  of  their  native  land  a  host  of  aliens, 
and  triumphing  over  their  would-be  oppressors.  The 
Parthians  themselves  were  so  impressed  with  the  im- 
portance of  the  conflict,  that  they  preserved  the  memory 
of  it  by  a  solemn  festival  on  the  anniversary  of  their 
victory,  which  was  still  celebrated  in  the  days  of  the 
historian  Trogus  Pompeius. 

It  is  possible  that  Seleucus  would  not  have  accepted 
his  defeat  as  final,  or  desisted  from  his  attempt 
to  reduce  Parthia  to  obedience,  if  he  had  felt  per- 
fectly free  to  continue  or  discontinue  the  Parthian 
war  at  his  pleasure.  But,  on  his  return  to  Antioch, 
he  found  much  to  occupy  him.  His  brother,  Antiochus 
Hierax,  was  still  a  rebel  against  his  authority,  and 
the  proceedings  of  Attalus,  King  of  Pergamus,  were 
threatening.  Seleucus  was  engaged  in  contests  with 
these  two  enemies  from  the  time  of  his  return  from 
Parthia  (B.C.  237)  almost  to  his  death  (B.C.  226).  He 
was  thus  compelled  to  leave  Tiridates  to  take  his  own 
course,  and  either  occupy  himself  with  fresh  conquests, 
or  devote  himself  to  the  strengthening  and  adorning  of 
his  existing  kingdom,  as  he  pleased.  Tiridates  chose 
the  latter  course;  and  during  the  remainder  of  his 
long  reign,  for  the  space  of  above  twenty  years, 
employed  his  leisure  in  useful  labours  within  the 
limits  of  his  own  territories.      He  erected  a  number 


LATER    YEARS   OF   TIRIDATES.  57 

of  strong  forts,  or  castles,  in  suitable  positions,  fortified 
the  Parthian  towns  generally,  and  placed  garrisons 
in  them,  and  carefully  selected  a  site  for  a  new  city, 
which  he  probably  intended  to  make,  and  perhaps 
actually  made,  his  capital.  The  situation  chosen  was 
one  in  the  mountain  range  known  as  Zapavortenon, 
where  a  hill  was  found,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by 
precipitous  rocks,  and  placed  in  the  middle  of  a  plain 
of  extraordinary  fertility.  Abundant  wood  and 
copious  streams  of  water  existed  in  the  neighbourhood. 
The  soil  was  so  rich  that  it  scarcely  required  cultiva- 
tion, and  the  woods  were  so  full  of  game  as  to  afford 
endless  amusement  to  hunters.  The  city  itself  was 
called  Dara,  which  the  Greeks  and  Romans  elongated 
into  Dareium.  Its  exact  site  is  undiscovered  ;  but 
it  seems  to  have  lain  towards  the  east,  and  was 
probably  not  very  far  from  the  now  sacred  city  of 
Meshed. 

We  may  account  for  the  desire  of  Tiridates  to 
establish  a  new  capital  by  the  natural  antipathy  of 
the  Parthians  to  the  Greeks,  and  the  fact  that  Heca- 
tompylos,  which  had  been  hitherto  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, was  a  thoroughly  Greek  town,  having  been 
built  by  Alexander  the  Great,  and  peopled  mainly  by 
Grecian  settlers.  The  Parthians  disliked  close  con- 
tact with  Hellenic  manners  and  Hellenic  ideas.  Just 
as,  in  their  most  palmy  days,  they  rejected  Seleucia 
for  their  capital,  and  preferred  to  build  the  entirely 
new  town  of  Ctesiphon  in  its  immediate  vicinity,  as 
the  residence  of  the  Court  and  monarch,  so  even  now, 
when  their  prosperity  was  but  just  budding,  an 
instinctive  feeling  of  repulsion  caused  them  to  shrink 


58  ORIGIN    OF   THE   PARTHIAN    STATE. 

from  sharing  a  locality  with  the  Greeks,  and  make 
the  experiment  of  having  for  their  headquarters  a 
city  wholly  their  own.  The  experiment  did  not 
altogether  succeed.  Either  Hecatompylos  had  natural 
advantages  even  greater  than  those  of  Dara,  or,  as  the 
growth  of  the  Parthian  power  was  mainly  towards 
the  west,  the  eastward  position  of  the  latter  was  found 
inconvenient.  After  a  short  trial,  the  successors  of 
Tiridates  ceased  to  reside  at  Dara,  and  Hecatompylos 
became  once  more  the  Parthian  capital  and  the  seat 
of  Parthian  government. 

Tiridates,  having  done  his  best,  according   to   his 


COIN   OF   ARTABANUS    I. 


lights,  for  the  security  of  Parthia  from  without,  and 
for  her  prosperity  within,  died  peaceably  after  a 
reign  which  is  reckoned  at  thirty-four  years,  and 
which  lasted  probably  from  B.C.  248  to  B.C.  214.  He 
left  his  throne  to  a  son,  named  Artabanus,  who,  like 
his  father,  took  the  "  throne-name  "  of  Arsaces,  and  is 
known  in  history  as  Arsaces  the  Third. 

Artabanus  I  ,  if  we  may  judge  by  his  coins,  was 
not  unlike  his  father  in  appearance,  having  the  same 
projecting  and  slightly  aquiline  nose,  and  the  same 
large  eye  ;  but  he  differed  from  his  father  in  possessing 
abundance  of  hair,  and  wearing  a  long  beard.  He 
has  discarded,   moreover,  the   cap  of  Tiridates,  and, 


REIGN   OF  ARTABANUS   I.  59 

instead  of  it,  wears  his  own  hair,  which  he  confines 
with  a  band  (the  diadem),  passing  from  the  forehead 
to  the  occiput,  there  knotted,  and  flowing  down  behind. 
He  takes  the  later  legend  of  his  father — BA2IAE&S 
MErAAOY  APSAKOY— "Arsaces,  the  Great  King." 

It  was  the  aim  of  Artabanus  to  pursue  his  father's 
aggressive  policy,  and  further  enlarge  the  limits  of 
the  kingdom.  He  was  scarcely  settled  upon  the 
throne,  when  he  declared  war  against  Antiochus  the 
Great,  the  second  son  of  Seleucus  Callinicus,  who  had 
inherited  the  Syrian  crown  in  B.C.  223,  and  was 
entangled  in  a  contest  with  one  of  the  satraps  of 
Asia  Minor,  named  Achaeus.  Proceeding  westward 
along  the  skirts  of  the  mountains,  he  made  his  way  to 
Ecbatana  in  Media,  receiving  the  submission  of  the 
various  countries  as  he  went,  and  (nominally)  adding 
to  his  dominions  the  entire  tract  between  Hyrcania 
and  the  Zagros  mountain  chain.  From  this  elevated 
position  he  threatened  the  low-lying  countries  of  the 
Mesopotamian  plain,  and  seemed  likely,  unless 
opposed,  in  another  campaign  to  reach  the  Euphrates. 
The  situation  was  most  critical  for  Syria ;  and 
Antiochus,  recognising  his  peril,  bent  all  his  energies 
to  meet  and  overcome  it.  Fortunately  he  had  just 
crushed  Achaeus,  and  was  able,  without  greatly 
exposing  himself  to  serious  loss  in  the  West,  to 
collect  and  lead  a  vast  expedition  against  the  East. 
With  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  foot  and  twenty 
thousand  horse,  he  set  out  for  Media  in  the  spring 
of  B.C.  213,  recovered  Ecbatana  without  a  battle,  and 
thence  pressed  eastward  after  his  startled  enemy, 
who  retreated  as  he  advanced.     In  vain  Artabanus 


60  ORIGIN   OF    THE   PARTHIAN  STATE. 

attempted  to  hinder  his  progress  by  stopping,  or 
poisoning,  the  wells  along  the  route  which  he  had 
necessarily  to  take  ;  Antiochus  caught  the  poisoners 
at  their  work,  and  brushed  them  from  his  path.  He 
then  marched  rapidly  against  Parthia,  and  entering 
the  enemy's  country,  took  and  occupied  without  a 
battle  the  chief  city,  Hecatompylos. 

Artabanus,  bent  on  avoiding  an  engagement,  re- 
treated into  Hyrcania,  perhaps  flattering  himself  that 
his  adversary  would  not  venture  to  follow  him  into 
that  rugged  and  almost  inaccessible  region.  If  so, 
however,  he  soon  found  that  he  had  underrated  the 
perseverance  and  tenacity  of  the  Syrian  king. 
Antiochus,  after  resting  his  army  for  a  brief  space  at 
Hecatompylos,  set  out  in  pursuit  of  his  enemy,  crossed 
by  a  difficult  pass,  chiefly  along  the  dry  channel  of  a 
mountain  torrent,  obstructed  by  masses  of  rock  and 
trunks  of  trees,  the  "high  ridge  which  separated  be- 
tween Parthia  and  Hyrcania — his  advance  disputed 
by  the  Parthians  at  every  step — fought  and  won  a 
battle  at  the  top,  and  thence  descending  into  the  rich 
Hyrcanian  valley,  endeavoured  to  take  possession  of 
the  entire  country.  But  Artabanus,  brought  to  bay 
by  his  foe,  defended  himself  with  extraordinary 
courage  and  energy.  One  by  one  the  principal 
Hyrcanian  towns  were  besieged  and  taken,  but  the 
monarch  himself  was  unsubdued.  Carrying  on  a 
guerilla  warfare,  moving  from  place  to  place,  occupy- 
ing one  strong  position  after  another,  he  continued 
his  resistance  with  such  dogged  firmness  that  at 
length  the  patience  of  Antiochus  was  worn  out,  and 
he  came  to  terms  with  his  gallant  adversary,  conced- 


REIGNS   OF  PRIAPATIUS    AND   PHRAATES   I.       6 1 

ing  to  him  that  which  was  the  real  bone  of  conten- 
tion, his  independence.  Parthia  came  out  of  the 
struggle  with  the  Great  Antiochus  unscathed  :  she  did 
not  even  have  to  relinquish  her  conquered  dependency 
of  Hyrcania.  Artabanus  moreover  had  the  honour  of 
being  admitted  into  the  number  of  the  Great  King's 
allies.  As  for  Antiochus,  he  turned  his  attention  to 
the  affairs  of  Bactria,  and  the  remoter  East,  and 
having  arranged  them  to  his  satisfaction,  returned 
by  way  of  Arachosia,  Drangiana,  and  Kerman  to  his 
western  possessions  (B.C.  206). 

The  retirement  of  Antiochus,  however  honourable 


COIN    OF   PRIAPATIUS. 


to  Parthia,  must  have  left  her  weakened  and  ex- 
hausted by  her  vast  and  astonishing  efforts.  She 
had  been  taxed  almost  beyond  her  strength,  and  must 
have  needed  a  breathing-space  to  recruit  and  recover 
herself.  Artabanus  wisely  remained  at  peace  during 
the  rest  of  his  reign  ;  and  his  son  and  successor,  Pria- 
patius,  followed  his  example.  It  was  not  till  B.C. 
181  that  the  fifth  Arsaces,  Phraates  I.,  son  of  Priapa- 
tius,  having  mounted  the  throne,  resumed  the  policy 
of  aggression  introduced  by  Tiridates,  and  further 
extended  the  dominion  of  Parthia  in  the  region  south 


62  ORIGIN   OF   THE   PARTHIAN   STATE. 

of  the  Caspian.  The  great  Antiochus  was  dead.  His 
successor,  Seleucus  IV.  (Philopator),  was  a  weak  and 
unenterprising  prince,  whom  the  defeat  of  Magnesia 
had  cowed,  and  who  regarded  inaction  as  his  only 
security.  Aware  probably  of  this  condition  of  affairs, 
Phraates,  early  in  his  reign,  invaded  the  country  of 
the  Mardi,  which  lay  in  the  mountain  tract  south  of 
the  Caspian  Sea,  overran  it,  and  added  it  to  his  terri- 
tories. Successful  thus  far,  he  proceeded  to  make 
an  encroachment  on  Media  Rhagiana,  the  district  be- 
tween the  Caspian  Gates  and  Media  Atropatene,  by 
occupying  the  tract  immediately  west  of  the  Gates, 
and  building  there  the  important  city  of  Charax, 
which  he  garrisoned  with  Mardians.  This  was  an 
advance  of  the  Parthian  Terminus  towards  the  west 
by  a  distance  of  nearly  two  hundred  miles — an 
advance,  not  so  much  important  in  itself  as  in  the 
indication  which  it  furnished,  at  once  of  Parthian 
aggressiveness  and  of  Syrian  inability  to  withstand 
it.  The  conquests  of  Phraates  added  little  either 
to  the  military  strength  or  to  the  resources  of  his 
kingdom,  but  they  were  prophetic  of  the  future. 
They  foreshadowed  that  gradual  waning  of  the  Syrian 
and  advance  of  the  Parthian  state,  which  is  the 
chief  fact  of  West  Asian  history  in  the  two  centuries 
immediately  preceding  our  era,  and  which  was  to 
make  itself  startlingly  apparent  within  the  next  few 
years,  during  the  reign  of  the  sixth  Arsaces. 


IV. 


FIRST     PERIOD     OF    EXTENSIVE     CONQUEST — REIGN 
OF   MITHRIDATES   I. 


MlTHRlDATES  THE  FIRST,  a  brother  of  Phraates, 
was  nominated  to  the  kingly  office  by  his  predecessor, 
who  had  shown  his  affection  for  him  during  his  life 
by  assuming  the  title  of  "  Philadelphus "  upon  his 
coins,  and  at  his  death  passed  over  in  his  favour  the 
claims  of  several  sons.     Undoubtedly,  he  was  a  born 


COIN    OF   MITHRIDATES   I. 

"  king  of  men  " — pointed  out  by  nature  as  fitter  to 
rule  than  any  other  individual  among  his  contempo- 
raries. He  had  a  physiognomy  which  was  at  once 
intelligent,  strong,  and  dignified.  He  was  ambi- 
tious, but  not  possessed  of  an  ambition  which  was 
likely  to  "  o'erleap  itself" — strict,  but  not  cruel— brave, 

63 


64  REIGN   OF   MITHRIDATES   I. 

energetic,  a  good  general,  an  excellent  administrator, 
a  firm  ruler.  Parthia,  under  his  government,  advanced 
"  by  leaps  and  bounds."  Receiving  at  his  accession 
a  kingdom  but  of  narrow  dimensions,  confined 
apparently  between  the  city  of  Charax  on  the  one 
side  and  the  river  Arius,  or  Heri-rud,  on  the  other, 
he  transformed  it,  within  the  space  of  thirty-seven 
years — which  was  the  time  that  his  reign  lasted — into 
a  great  and  flourishing  empire.  It  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that,  but  for  him,  Parthia  might  have  remained  to 
the  end  a  mere  petty  state  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
Syrian  kingdom,  and,  instead  of  becoming  a  rival  to 
Rome,  might  have  sunk  after  a  short  time  into  insig- 
nificance and  obscurity. 

To  explain  the  circumstances  under  which  this  vast 
change — this  revolution  in  the  Asiatic  balance  of 
power  —  became  possible,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
should  cast  our  eye  over  the  general  condition  of 
Western  Asia  in  the  early  part  of  the  second  century 
before  our  era,  and  especially  consider  the  course  of 
events  in  the  two  kingdoms  between  which  Parthia 
intervened,  the  Bactrian  and  Syrian  monarchies. 

The  Bactrian  kingdom,  as  originally  established  by 
Diodotus,  lay  wholly  to  the  north  of  the  Paropa- 
misus,  in  the  long  and  broad  valley  of  the  Oxus, 
from  its  sources  in  the  Pamir  to  its  entrance  on  the 
Kharesmian  Desert.  The  countries  to  the  south  of 
the  range  continued  to  be  Syrian  dependencies,  and 
were  reckoned  by  Seleucus  Nicator  as  included  within 
the  limits  of  his  dominion.  But  it  was  not  long  before 
the  empire  of  Alexander  in  these  parts  began  to 
crumble  and  decay.       Indian    princes,  like    Sandra- 


SITUATION  OF  BACTRIA    AT  HIS   ACCESSION.      65 

cottus  (Chandragupta)  and  Sophagasenus,  asserted 
their  rights  over  the  Region  of  the  Five  Rivers 
(Punjab),  and  even  over  the  greater  portion  of 
Affghanistan.  Greek  dominion  was  swept  away. 
At  the  time  when  Bactria,  having  had  its  indepen- 
dence acknowledged  by  Antiochus  the  Great,  felt 
itself  at  liberty  to  embark  in  ambitious  enterprises, 
as  Parthia  had  done,  the  Greco-Macedonian  sway 
over  the  tracts  between  Parthia  and  the  Sutlej  was 
either  swept  away  altogether,  or  reduced  to  a  mere 
shadow  ;  and  Euthydemus,  the  third  Bactrian 
monarch,  was  not  afraid  of  provoking  hostilities 
from  Syria,  when,  about  B.C.  205,  he  began  his 
aggressions  in  this  direction.  Under  him,  and  under 
his  son  and  successor,  Demetrius,  in  the  twenty  years 
between  B.C.  205  and  B.C.  185,  Bactrian  conquest  was 
pushed  as  far  as  the  Punjab  region,  Cabul  and  Can- 
dahar  were  overrun,  and  the  southern  side  of  the 
mountains  occupied  from  the  Heri-rud  to  the  Indus. 
Eucratidas,  who  succeeded  Demetrius  (about  B.C.  180), 
extended  his  sway  still  further  into  the  Punjab  region, 
but  with  unfortunate  results,  so  far  as  his  original 
territories  were  concerned.  Neglected,  and  compara- 
tively denuded  of  troops,  these  districts  began  to  slip 
from  his  grasp.  The  Scythian  nomads  of  the  Steppes 
saw  their  opportunity,  and  bursting  into  Bactria, 
harried  it  with  fire  and  sword,  even  occupying  por- 
tions, and  settling  themselves  in  the  Oxus  valley. 

While  matters  were  thus  progressing  in  the  East, 
and  the  Bactrian  princes,  attempting  enterprises 
beyond  their  strength,  were  exhausting  rather  than 
advantaging    the    kingdom    under    their    sway,    the 


66  REIGN   OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

Seleucid  monarchs  in  the  West  were  also  becoming 
more  and  more  entangled  in  difficulties,  partly  of 
their  own  creation,  partly  brought  about  by  the 
ambition  of  pretenders.  Antiochus  the  Great,  shortly 
after  his  return  from  the  eastern  provinces,  became 
embroiled  with  the  Romans  (B.C.  196),  who  dealt  his 
power  a  severe  blow  by  the  defeat  of  Magnesia  (B.C. 
190),  and  further  weakened  it  by  the  support  which 
they  lent  to  the  kings  of  Pergamus,  which  was  now 
the  ruling  state  in  Asia  Minor.  The  weakness  of 
Antiochus  encouraged  Armenia  to  revolt,  and  so  lost 
Syria  another  province  (B.C.  189).  Troubles  began 
to  break  out  in  Elymai's,  consequent  upon  the  ex- 
actions of  the  Seleucidae  (B.C.  187).  Eleven  years 
later  (B.C.  176)  there  was  a  lift  of  the  clouds,  and 
Syria  seemed  about  to  recover  herself  through  the 
courage  and  energy  of  the  fourth  Antiochus  (Epi- 
phanes)  ;  but  the  hopes  raised  by  his  successes  in 
Egypt  (B.C.  1 71-168)  and  Armenia  (B.C.  165)  were 
destroyed  by  his  unwise  conduct  towards  the  Jews, 
whom  his  persecuting  policy  permanently  alienated, 
and  erected  into  a  hostile  state  upon  his  southern 
border  (B.C.  168-160).  Epiphanes  having  not  only 
plundered  and  desecrated  the  Temple,  but  having  set 
himself  to  eradicate  utterly  the  Jewish  religion,  and 
completely  Hellenise  the  people,  was  met  with  the 
most  determined  resistance  on  the  part  of  a  moiety 
of  the  nation.  A  patriotic  party  rose  up  under  de- 
voted leaders,  who  asserted,  and  in  the  end  secured, 
the  independence  of  their  country.  Not  alone  during 
the  remaining  years  of  Epiphanes,  but  for  half  a 
century  after  his  death,  throughout  seven  reigns,  the 


SITUATION   OF  SYRIA.  67 

struggle  continued  ;  Judaea  taking  advantage  of  every 
trouble  and  difficulty  in  Syria  to  detach  herself  more 
and  more  completely  from  her  oppressor,  and  being 
a  continued  thorn  in  her  side,  a  constant  source  of 
weakness,  preventing  more  than  anything  else  the  re- 
covery of  her  power.  The  triumph  which  Epiphanes 
had  obtained  in  the  distant  Armenia,  where  he  de- 
feated and  captured  the  king,  Artaxias,  was  a  poor 
set-off  against  the  foe  which  he  had  created  for 
himself  at  his  doors  through  his  cruelty  and  intoler- 
ance. Nor  did  the  removal  of  Epiphanes  (B.C.  164) 
improve  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Syria.  The  throne 
fell  to  his  son,  Antiochus  V.  (Eupator),  a  boy  of  nine, 
according  to  one  authority,  or,  according  to  another, 
of  twelve  years  of  age.  The  regent,  Lysias,  exercised 
the  chief  power,  and  was  soon  engaged  in  a  war  with 
the  Jews,  whom  the  death  of  the  oppressor  had  en- 
couraged to  fresh  efforts.  The  authority  of  Lysias 
was  further  disputed  by  a  certain  Philip,  whom 
Epiphanes,  shortly  before  his  death,  had  made  tutor 
to  the  young  monarch.  The  claim  of  this  tutor  to 
the  regent's  office  being  supported  by  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  army,  a  civil  war  arose  between  him 
and  Lysias,  which  raged  for  the  greater  part  of  two 
years,  terminating  in  the  defeat  and  death  of  Philip 
(B.C.  162).  But  Syrian  affairs  did  not  even  then  settle 
down  into  tranquillity.  A  prince  of  the  Seleucid 
house,  Demetrius  by  name,  the  son  of  Seleucus  IV., 
and  consequently  the  first  cousin  of  Eupator,  was  at 
this  time  detained  in  Rome  as  a  hostage,  having  been 
sent  there  during  his  father's  lifetime,  as  a  security 
for  his  fidelity.  Demetrius,  with  some  reason,  regarded 


68  REIGN   OF  MITHRIDATES    I. 

his  claim  to  the  Syrian  throne  as  better  than  that  of 
his  cousin,  who  was  the  son  of  the  younger  brother ; 
and,  being  in  the  full  vigour  of  early  youth,  he  deter- 
mined to  assert  his  pretensions  in  Syria,  and  to  make 
a  bold  stroke  for  the  crown.  Having  failed  to  obtain 
the  Senate's  consent  to  his  quitting  Italy,  he  took  his 
departure  secretly,  crossed  the  Mediterranean  in  a 
Carthaginian  vessel,  and  landing  in  Asia,  succeeded 
within  a  few  months  in  establishing  himself  as  Syrian 
monarch. 

From  this  review  of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the 
Syrian  and  Bactrian  kingdoms  during  the  first  half 
of  the  second  century  before  Christ,  it  is  sufficiently 
apparent,  that  in  both  countries  the  state  of  things 
was  favourable  to  any  aspirations  which  the  power 
that  lay  between  them  might  entertain  after  dominion 
and  self-aggrandisement.  The  kings  of  the  two 
countries  indeed,  at  the  time  of  the  accession  of 
Mithridates  to  the  Parthian  throne  (B.C.  174),  were, 
both  of  them,  energetic  and  able  princes,  but  the 
Syrian  monarch  was  involved  in  difficulties  at  home 
which  required  all  his  attention,  while  the  Bactrian 
was  engaged  in  enterprises  abroad  which  equally 
engrossed  and  occupied  him.  Mithridates  might 
have  attacked  either  with  a  good  prospect  of  success. 
Personally,  he  was  at  least  their  equal,  and  though 
considerably  inferior  in  military  strength  and  re- 
sources, he  possessed  the  great  advantage  of  having 
a  perfectly  free  choice  both  of  time  and  place,  could 
seize  the  most  unguarded  moment,  and  make  his 
attack  in  the  quarter  where  he  knew  that  he  would 
be  least  expected  and  least  likely  to  find  his  enemy 


HIS   FIRST  ATTACK   ON  BACTRIA.  6$ 

on  the  alert.  Circumstances,  of  which  we  now  can- 
not appreciate  the  force,  seem  to  have  determined 
him  to  direct  his  first  attack  against  the  territories  of 
his  eastern  neighbour,  the  Bactrian  king,  Eucratidas. 
These,  as  we  have  seen,  were  left  comparatively 
unguarded,  while  their  ambitious  master  threw  all 
his  strength  into  his  Indian  wars,  pressing  through 
Cabul  into  the  Punjab  region,  and  seeking  to  extend 
his  dominion  to  the  Sutlej  river,  or  even  to  the  Ganges. 
Naturally,  Mithridates  was  successful.  Attacking  the 
Bactrian  territory  where  it  adjoined  Parthia,  he  made 
himself  master,  without  much  difficulty,  of  two  pro- 
vinces— those  of  Turiua  and  of  Aspionus.  Turiua 
recalls  the  great  but  vague  name  of  "  Turanian," 
which  certainly  belongs  to  these  parts,  but  can 
scarcely  be  regarded  as  local.  Aspionus  has  been 
regarded  as  the  district  of  the  Aspasiacae  ;  but  the 
two  words  do  not  invite  comparison.  It  is  best  to  be 
content  with  saying  that  we  cannot  locate  the  districts 
conquered,  but  that  they  should  be  looked  for  in  the 
district  of  the  Tejend  and  Heri-rud,  between  the 
Paropamisus  and  the  great  city  of  Balkh. 

It  does  not  appear  that  Eucratidas  attempted  any 
retaliation.  Absorbed  in  his  schemes  of  Indian  con- 
quest, he  let  his  home  provinces  go,  and  sought 
compensation  for  them  only  in  the  far  East.  Mean- 
time Mithridates,  having  been  successful  in  his  Bac- 
trian aggression,  and  thus  whetted  his  appetite  for 
territorial  gain,  determined  on  a  more  important 
expedition.  After  waiting  for  a  few  years,  until 
Epiphanes  was  dead,  and  the  Syrian  throne  occu- 
pied   by    the    boy    king,    Eupator,    while    the    two 


70  REIGN   OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

claimants  of  the  regency,  Lysias  and  Philip,  were 
contending  in  arms  for  the  supreme  power,  he 
suddenly  marched  with  a  large  force  towards  the 
West,  and  fell  upon  the  great  province  of  Media 
Magna,  which,  though  still  nominally  a  Syrian 
dependency,  was  under  the  rule  of  a  king,  and  prac- 
tically, if  not  legally,  independent.  Media  was  a 
most  extensive  and  powerful  country.  Polybius  calls 
it  "  the  most  powerful  of  all  the  kingdoms  of  Asia, 
whether  we  consider  the  extent  of  the  territory,  or 
the  number  and  quality  of  the  men,  or  the  goodness 
of  the  horses  produced  there.  For  these  animals," 
he  says,  "  are  found  in  it  in  such  abundance,  that 
almost  all  the  rest  of  Asia  is  supplied  with  them  from 
this  province.  It  is  here  also  that  the  Royal  horses 
are  always  fed,  on  account  of  the  excellence  of  the 
pasture."  The  capital  of  the  province  was  now,  as  in 
the  more  ancient  times,  Ecbatana,  situated  on  the 
declivity  of  Mount  Orontes  (Elwand),  and,  though 
fallen  from  its  former  grandeur,  yet  still  a  place  of 
much  importance,  second  only  in  all  Western  Asia 
to  Antioch  and  perhaps  Babylon.  The  invasion  of 
Mithridates  was  stoutly  resisted  by  the  Medes,  and 
several  engagements  took  place,  in  which  sometimes 
one  and  sometimes  the  other  side  had  the  advantage  ; 
but  eventually  the  Parthians  prevailed.  Mithridates 
seized  and  occupied  Ecbatana,  which  was  at  the  time 
an  unwalled  town,  established  his  authority  over  the 
whole  region,  and  finally  placed  it  under  the  govern- 
ment of  a  Parthian  satrap,  Bacasis,  while  he  himself 
returned  home,  to  crush  a  revolt  which  had  broken 
out. 


HIS   CONQUEST   OF  MEDIA    MAGNA.  Jl 

The  scene  of  the  revolt  was  Hyrcania.  The 
Hyrcanian  people,  one  markedly  Arian,  had  pro- 
bably from  the  time  of  their  subjugation  chafed 
under  the  Parthian  yoke,  and  seeing  in  the  absence 
of  Mithridates,  with  almost  the  whole  of  his  power, 
in  Media  a  tempting  opportunity,  had  resolved  to 
make  a  bold  stroke  for  freedom  before  the  further 
growth  of  Parthia  should  render  such  an  attempt 
hopeless.  We  are  not  told  that  they  had  any  special 
grievances  ;  but  they  were  brave  and  high-spirited  ; 
they  bad  enjoyed  exceptional  privileges  under  the 
Persians  ;  and  no  doubt  they  found  the  rule  of  a 
Turanian  people  galling  and  oppressive.  They  may 
well  have  expected  to  receive  support  and  assistance 
from  the  other  Arian  nations  in  their  neighbourhood, 
as  the  Mardi,  the  Sagartians,  the  Arians  on  the  Heri- 
rud,  &c,  and  they  may  have  thought  that  Mithri- 
dates would  be  too  fully  occupied  with  his  Median 
struggle  to  have  leisure  to  direct  his  arms  against 
them.  But  the  event  showed  that  they  had  mis- 
calculated. Media  submitted  to  Mithridates  without 
any  very  protracted  resistance  ;  the  Parthian  monarch 
knew  the  value  of  time,  and,  quitting  Media,  marched 
upon  Hyrcania  without  losing  a  moment  ;  the  other 
Arian  tribes  of  the  vicinity  were  either  apathetic  or 
timid,  and  did  not  stir  a  step  for  their  relief.  The 
insurrection  was  nipped  in  the  bud  ;  Hyrcania  was 
forced  to  submit,  and  became  for  centuries  the 
obedient  vassal  of  her  powerful  neighbour. 

The  conquest  of  Media  had  brought  the  Parthians 
into  contact  with  the  important  country  of  Susiana  or 
Elymai's,  an  ancient  seat  of  power,  and  one  which  had 


72  REIGN  OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

flourished  much  during  the  whole  of  the  Persian 
period,  having  contained  within  it  the  principal 
Persian  capital,  Susa.  This  tract  possessed  strong 
attractions  for  a  conqueror  ;  and  it  appears  to  have 
been  not  very  long  after  he  had  succeeded  in  crushing 
the  Hyrcanian  revolt,  that  Mithridates  once  more 
turned  his  arms  westward,  and  from  the  advantageous 
position  which  he  held  in  Media,  directed  an  attack 
upon  the  rich  and  flourishing  province  which  lay  to 
the  south.  It  would  seem  that  Elymai's,  like  Media, 
though  reckoned  a  dependency  of  the  Seleucid  Em- 
pire, had  a  king  of  its  own,  who  was  entrusted  with  its 
government  and  defence,  and  expected  to  fight  his 
own  battles.  At  any  rate  we  do  not  hear  of  any 
aid  being  rendered  to  the  Elymaeans  in  this  war, 
or  of  Mithridates  having  any  other  antagonist  to 
meet  in  the  course  of  it,  besides  "  the  Elymaean 
king."  This  monarch  he  defeated  without  diffi- 
culty, and,  having  overrun  his  country,  apparently 
in  a  single  campaign,  added  the  entire  territory  to  his 
dominions. 

Elymai's  was  interposed  between  two  regions  of 
first-rate  importance,  Babylonia  and  Persia.  The 
thorough  mastery  of  any  one  of  the  three,  com- 
monly carried  with  it  in  ancient  times  dominion 
over  the  other  two.  So  far  as  can  be  gathered  from 
the  scanty  materials  which  we  possess  for  Parthian 
history  at  this  period,  the  conquest  of  Elymai's  was 
followed  almost  immediately  by  the  submission  of 
Babylonia  and  Persia  to  the  conqueror.  Media  and 
Elymai's  having  been  forced  to  submit,  the  great 
Mithridates   was  very  shortly  acknowledged  as  their 


HIS   SECOND   ATTACK   ON  BACTRIA.  73 

sovereign  lord    by  all  the  countries  that    intervened 
between  the  Paropamisus  and  the  Lower  Euphrates. 

Thus  gloriously  successful  in  this  quarter,  Mithri- 
dates,  who  may  fairly  be  considered  the  greatest 
monarch  of  his  day,  after  devoting  a  few  years  to 
repose,  judged  that  the  time  was  come  for  once  more 
embarking  on  a  career  of  aggression,  and  seeking  a 
similar  extension  of  his  dominions  towards  the  East 
to  that  which  he  had  found  it  so  easy  to  effect  in 
the  regions  of  the  West.  The  Bactrian  troubles  had 
increased.  Eucratidas,  after  greatly  straining  the 
resources  of  Bactria  in  his  Indian  wars,  had  been 
waylaid  and  murdered  on  his  return  from  one  of 
them  by  his  son  Heliocles,  who  chose  to  declare  him 
a  public  enemy,  drove  his  chariot  over  his  corpse,  and 
ordered  it  to  be  left  unburied.  This  ill  beginning 
inaugurated  an  unfortunate  reign.  Attacked  by 
Scythians  from  the  north,  by  Indians  and  Sarangians 
on  the  east  and  the  south-east,  Heliocles  had  already 
more  on  his  hands  than  he  could  conveniently  manage, 
when  Mithridates  declared  war  against  him,  and 
marched  into  his  country  (about  B.C.  150)..  Already 
exhausted  by  his  other  wars,  Heliocles  could  bear  up 
no  longer.  Mithridates  rapidly  overran  his  dominions, 
and  took  possession  of  the  greater  part  of  them.  Ac- 
cording to  some  he  did  not  stop  here,  but  pressing  still 
further  eastward  invaded  India,  and  carried  his  arms 
over  the  Punjab  to  the  banks  of  the  Hydaspes.  But 
this  last  advance,  if  it  ever  took  place,  was  a  raid 
rather  than  an  attempt  at  conquest.  It  had  no  serious 
results.  Indo-Bactrian  kingdoms  continued  to  exist  in 
Cabul  down  to  about  B.C.  80,  when  Hellenism  in  this 


74  REIGN   OP    MITHRIDATES   I. 

quarter  was  finally  swept  away  by  the  Yue-chi  and 
other  Scythic  tribes.  The  Parthian  Empire  never 
included  any  portion  of  the  Indus  region,  its  furthest 
provinces  towards  the  east  being  Bactria,  Aria, 
Sarangia,  Arachosia,  and  Sacastana. 

The  great  increase  of  power  which  Mithridates 
had  obtained  by  his  conquests  could  not  be  a  matter 
of  indifference  to  the  Syrian  monarchs.  But  their 
domestic  troubles — the  contentions  between  Philip 
and  Lysias,  between  Lysias  and  Demetrius  Soter, 
Soter  and  Alexander  Balas,  Balas  and  Demetrius  II., 
Demetrius  II.  and  Tryphon — had  so  engrossed  them 
for  twenty  years  (from  B.C.  162  to  B.C.  142),  that  they 
had  felt  it  impossible,  or  hopeless,  to  attempt  any 
expedition  towards  the  East,  for  the  protection  or 
recovery  of  their  provinces.  Mithridates  had  been 
allowed  to  pursue  his  career  of  conquest  unopposed, 
so  far  as  the  Syrians  were  concerned,  and  to  establish 
his  sway  from  the  Hindu  Kush  to  the  Euphrates. 
A  time,  however,  at  last  came  when  home  dangers 
were  less  absorbing,  and  a  prospect  of  engaging  the 
terrible  Parthians  with  success  seemed  to  present 
itself.  The  second  Demetrius  had  not,  indeed, 
altogether  overcome  his  domestic  enemy,  Tryphon  ; 
but  he  had  so  far  brought  him  into  difficulties  as  to 
believe  that  he  might  safely  be  left  to  be  dealt  with  by 
his  wife,  Cleopatra,  and  by  his  captains.  At  the  same 
time,  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  East  seemed  to 
invite  his  interference.  Mithridates  ruled  his  new 
conquests  with  some  strictness,  probably  suspecting 
their  fidelity,  and  determined  that  he  would  not  by 
any  remissness  allow  them  to  escape  from  his  grasp. 


HIS    WAR    WITH   DEMETRIUS   NICATOR.  75 

The  native  inhabitants  could  scarcely  be  much 
attached  to  the  Syro-Macedonians,  who  had  certainly 
not  treated  them  with  much  tenderness  ;  but  a 
possession  of  one  hundred  and  ninety  years'  duration 
confers  prestige  in  the  East,  and  a  strange  yoke  may 
have  galled  more  than  one  to  whose  pressure  they 
had  become  accustomed.  Moreover,  all  the  provinces 
which  the  Parthians  had  taken  from  Syria  contained 
Greek  towns,  and  their  inhabitants  might  at  all 
times  be  depended  on  to  side  with  their  countrymen 
against  the  Asiatics.  At  the  present  conjuncture, 
too,  the  number  of  the  malcontents  was  swelled  by 
the  addition  of  the  recently  subdued  Bactrians,  who 
hated  the  Parthian  yoke,  and  longed  for  an  oppor- 
tunity of  recovering  their  freedom. 

Thus,  when  Demetrius  II.,  anxious  to  escape  the 
reproach  of  inertness,  determined  to  make  a  great  ex- 
pedition upon  the  formidable  Parthian  monarch,  who 
ruled  over  all  the  countries  between  the  Paropamisus 
and  the  Lower  Euphrates,  he  found  himself  welcomed 
as  a  deliverer  by  a  considerable  number  of  his 
enemy's  subjects,  whom  the  harshness  or  the  novelty 
of  the  Parthian  rule  had  offended.  The  malcontents 
joined  his  standard  as  he  advanced  ;  and  supported, 
as  he  thus  was,  by  Persian,  Elymaean,  and  Bactrian 
contingents,  he  engaged  and  defeated  the  Parthians 
in  several  battles.  Mithridates  at  last,  recognising 
his  inferiority  in  military  strength,  determined  to 
have  recourse  to  stratagem,  and  having  put  Demetrius 
off  his  guard  by  proposals  of  peace,  made  a  sudden 
attack  upon  him,  completely  defeated  his  army,  and 
took  him  prisoner.     The  conquered  monarch  was  at 


j6  REIGN    OF   MITHRIDATES  I. 

first  treated  with  some  harshness,  being  conveyed 
about  to  the  several  nations  which  had  revolted,  and 
paraded  before  each  in  turn,  to  show  them  how 
foolish  they  had  been  in  lending  him  their  aid  ;  but 
when  this  purpose  had  been  answered,  Mithridates 
showed  himself  magnanimous,  gave  his  royal  captive 
the  honours  befitting  his  rank,  assigned  him  a 
residence  in  Hyrcania,  and  even  gave  him  the  hand 
of  his  daughter,  Rhodogune,  in  marriage.  It  was 
policy,  however,  still  more  than  clemency,  which 
dictated  this  conduct.  Mithridates  nurtured  de- 
signs against  the  Syrian  kingdom  itself,  and  saw 
that  it  would  be  for  his  advantage  to  have  a  Syrian 
prince  in  his  camp,  allied  to  him  by  marriage,  whom 
he  could  put  forward  as  entitled  to  the  throne,  and 
whom,  if  his  enterprise  succeeded,  he  might  leave  to 
govern  Syria  for  him,  as  tributary  monarch.  These 
far-reaching  plans  might  perhaps  have  been  crowned 
with  success,  had  the  head  which  conceived  them 
been  spared  to  watch  over  and  direct  their  execution. 
But  Providence  decreed  otherwise.  Mithridates  had 
reached  an  advanced  age,  and,  being  attacked  by 
illness  soon  after  his  capture  of  Demetrius,  found  his 
strength  insufficient  to  battle  with  his  malady,  and, 
to  the  great  grief  of  his  subjects,  succumbed  to  it 
(B.C.  136),  after  an  eventful  and  glorious  reign  of 
thirty-eight  years. 


V. 


GOVERNMENTAL    SYSTEM    OF     MITHRIDATES    I. — 
LAWS   AND   INSTITUTIONS. 

The  Parthian  institutions  had,  no  doubt,  their  roots 
in  that  early  condition  of  society  among  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Caspian  region,  which  belongs  to  the 
twilight,  rather  than  to  the  dawn  of  history,  and 
which  has  to  be  conjectured  or  divined  rather  than 
worked  out  from  the  statements  of  ancient  writers. 
From  time  immemorial  this  region  has  been  mainly 
occupied  by  nomadic  tribes,  for  whom  alone  it  is 
fitted,  and  has  been  divided  up  among  a  number  of 
races  more  or  less  closely  allied,  and  generally  very 
similar  in  character.  Constant  wars  and  raids  occupy 
such  races.  Every  man  has  to  be  a  warrior  ;  and 
their  conduct  in  war  marks  out  a  comparatively  few 
for  leaders,  the  mass  for  mere  soldiery.  Hence, 
something  like  a  feudal  organisation  naturally  pre- 
vails. The  leader  in  war  is  the  chieftain  or  noble  in 
peace.  An  aristocracy  forms  itself,  round  which  the 
"  villeins  "  or  "  serfs  "  are  grouped.  When,  in  course 
of  time,  some  specially  perilous  war  threatens,  or 
some  enterprise  is  taken  in  hand  of  more  than  usual 
magnitude  and  gravity,  the  need  of  a  directing  hand 

77 


78     GOVERNMENTAL    SYSTEM   OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

is  felt — the  confederacy  of  chiefs  recognises  the 
weakness  of  a  confederacy — and  by  common  consent 
a  single  individual  is  selected  as  King,  Great  Khan, 
Dictator,  Governor,  Commander-in-chief.  Thus,  in 
such  a  state  of  society  as  has  been  described, 
monarchy  makes  its  appearance.  The  fittest  to 
command  and  direct  is  placed  at  the  head  of  affairs, 
given  some  title  or  other  implying  authority,  and 
accepted  by  the  general  body  of  chiefs  as  their 
suzerain. 

But  in  conceding  this  authority  to  the  necessities 
of  the  case,  the  chiefs  are  careful  to  reserve  to  them- 
selves considerable  powers,  and  the  result  is  thus  a 
limited  monarchy.  In  Parthia,  the  king  was  per- 
manently advised  by  two  councils,  consisting  of 
persons  not  of  his  own  nomination,  whom  rights, 
conferred  by  birth  or  office,  entitled  to  their  high 
positions.  One  of  these  was  a  family  conclave 
{concilium  domesticum),  or  assembly  of  full-grown 
males  of  the  Royal  House  ;  the  other  was  a  Senate 
comprising  both  the  spiritual  and  the  temporal  chiefs 
of  the  nation,  the  "  Sophi,"  or  "  Wise  Man,"  and  the 
"  Magi,"  or  "  Priests."  Together  these  two  bodies 
constituted  the  Megistanes,  the  "  Nobles,"  or  "  Great 
Men  " — the  privileged  class  which,  to  a  considerable 
extent,  checked  and  controlled  the  monarch.  The 
monarchy  was  elective,  but  only  in  the  house  of  the 
Arsacidae  ;  and  the  concurrent  vote  of  both  councils 
was  necessary  to  the  election  of  a  new  king.  Prac- 
tically, the  ordinary  law  of  hereditary  descent  appears 
to  have  been  commonly  followed,  unless  in  the  case 
where  a  king  left  no  son  of  sufficient  age  to  exercise 


THE   KING,    THE   SOPHI,  AND    THE   MAGI.         79 

the  royal  office.  Under  such  circumstances,  the 
Megistanes  usually  nominated  the  late  king's  next 
brother  to  succeed  him,  or,  if  he  had  left  no  brother, 
went  back  to  an  uncle.  When  the  line  of  succession 
had  once  been  changed,  the  right  of  the  elder  branch 
was  lost,  and  did  not  revive,  unless  the  branch 
preferred  died  out  or  possessed  no  member  qualified 
to  rule.  When  a  king  had  been  duly  nominated  by 
the  two  councils,  the  right  of  placing  the  crown 
upon  his  head  belonged  to  the  Surena,  the  "  Field- 
Marshal,"  or  "  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Parthian 
armies."  The  Megistanes  further  claimed,  and  some- 
times exercised,  the  right  of  deposing  a  monarch 
whose  conduct  displeased  or  dissatisfied  them  ;  but 
an  attempt  to  exercise  this  privilege  naturally,  and 
almost  necessarily,  led  to  a  civil  war,  since  no  monarch 
was  likely  to  accept  his  deposition  without  a  struggle  ; 
and  thus  it  was  force,  and  not  right,  which  practically 
determined  whether  a  deposed  king  should  lose  his 
crown  or  no. 

After  a  monarch  had  been  once  elected,  and 
firmly  fixed  upon  the  throne,  the  power  which  he 
wielded  appears  to  have  been  very  nearly  despotic. 
At  any  rate,  he  could  put  to  death  without  a  trial 
whomsoever  he  chose  ;  and  adult  members  of  the 
Royal  House,  who  ventured  to  provoke  the  reigning 
monarch's  jealousy,  were  constantly  so  treated.  But 
probably  it  would  have  been  more  risky  to  arouse 
the  fears  of  the  "  Sophi  "  or  "  Magi."  The  latter 
especially  were  a  powerful  body,  consisting  of  an 
organised  hierarchy  which  had  come  down  from 
ancient  times,  and  was  feared  and   venerated  by  all 


80    GOVERNMENTAL   SYSTEM    OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

classes  of  the  people.  Their  numbers  at  the  close  of 
the  empire,  counting  adult  males  only,  are  reckoned 
at  eighty  thousand  ;  they  possessed  considerable 
tracts  of  fertile  land,  and  were  the  sole  inhabitants  of 
many  large  towns  or  villages,  which  they  were  per- 
mitted to  govern  as  seemed  good  to  them.  The 
arbitrary  power  of  the  monarchs  must,  in  practice, 
have  been  largely  checked  by  the  privileges  of  this 
numerous  priestly  class,  of  which  it  would  seem  that, 
in  the  later  times,  they  became  jealous,  thereby 
preparing  the  way  for  their  own  downfall. 

The  dominion  of  the  Parthians  over  the  provinces, 
which  Mithridates  and  earlier  kings  had  conquered, 
was  maintained  by  reverting  to  the  system  which  had 
prevailed  generally  throughout  the  East  before  the 
accession  of  the  Achaemenian  Persians  to  power,  and 
which  is  the  simplest  and  rudest  of  all  possible 
empire  organisations.  This  was  the  system  of 
establishing  in  the  various  countries  either  viceroys, 
holding  office  for  life,  or  else  dependent  dynasties  of 
kings.  In  either  case,  the  rulers,  so  long  as  they  paid 
their  tribute  regularly  to  the  Parthian  monarchs,  and 
furnished  the  contingents  required  of  them  for  the 
wars  in  which  Parthia  was  almost  always  engaged, 
were  allowed  to  govern  the  people  under  their  sway 
at  their  pleasure.  Among  monarchs,  in  the  higher 
sense  of  the  term,  who  nevertheless  were  vassals  to 
Parthia,  may  be  enumerated  the  kings  of  Persia, 
Elyma'i's,  Adiabene,  Osrhoene,  and  of  Armenia  and 
Media  Atropatene,  when  they  formed,  as  they  some- 
times did,  portions  of  the  Parthian  Empire.  The 
viceroys,  who  governed  the  other  provinces,  bore  the 


THE    VITAXM,   OR    VASSAL   MONARCHS.  8 1 

title  of  Vitaxae,  or  Bistakes,  and  were  fourteen  or 
fifteen  in  number.  The  remark  has  been  made  by 
perhaps  the  greatest  of  English  historians,  Gibbon, 
that  the  system  thus  established  "  exhibited  under 
other  names,  a  lively  image  of  the  feudal  system, 
which  has  since  prevailed  in  Europe."  The  com- 
parison is  of  some  value,  as  pointing  out  an  analogy 
which  might  otherwise  have  been  overlooked  ;  but, 
like  most  historical  parallels  it  is  inexact,  the  points 
of  difference  between  the  Parthian  and  the  feudal 
systems  being  probably  more  numerous  than  those  of 
resemblance,  but  the  points  of  resemblance  being  very 
main  points,  not  few  in  number,  and  striking.  It  was 
with  special  reference  to  the  system  thus  established 
that  the  Parthian  monarchs  took  the  title  of  "  King 
of  Kings  " — BASIAEY2  BA2IAEQN — so  frequent 
upon  their  coins— a  title  exchanged,  but  in  one  in- 
stance only,  for  "Satrap  of  Satraps" — SATPAI1HS 
TON  SATPAIIQN.  The  title  "King  of  Kings" 
naturally  appears  first  on  the  coins  of  Mithridates. 
In  the  Parthian  system  there  was  one  anomaly  of 
a  very  curious  character.  The  Grecian  cities  which 
were  scattered  in  large  numbers  throughout  the 
empire,  foundations  of  Alexander  or  his  successors, 
enjoyed  a  municipal  government  of  their  own,  and  in 
some  cases  were  almost  independent  communities, 
the  Parthian  kings  exercising  over  them  little  or  no 
control.  The  great  city  of  Seleucia  upon  the  Tigris 
was  the  most  important  of  these  places  ;  its  popula- 
tion was  estimated  in  the  first  century  after  Christ  at 
six  hundred  thousand  souls  ;  it  had  strong  walls,  and 
was  surrounded  by  a  most  fertile  territory.     Tacitus 


82    GOVERNMENTAL   SYSTEM  OF  Mil HR1  DATES   I. 

tells  us  that  it  had  its  own  senate,  or  municipal 
council  of  three  hundred  members,  elected  by  the 
inhabitants  to  rule  over  them,  from  among  the 
wealthiest  and  best  educated  of  the  citizens.  Under 
ordinary  circumstances  it  enjoyed  the  blessing  of 
complete  self  government,  and  was  entirely  free  from 
Parthian  interference,  paying  no  doubt  its  appointed 
tribute,  but  otherwise  holding  the  position  of  a  "  free 
city."  It  was  only  in  the  case  of  internal  dissensions 
that  these  advantages  were  lost,  and  the  Parthian 
soldiery,  invited  within  the  walls,  arranged  the 
quarrels  of  parties,  and  settled  the  constitution  of  the 
State  at  its  pleasure.  Privileges  of  a  similar  character, 
though  probably  less  extensive,  belonged,  it  would 
seem,  to  most  of  the  other  Greek  cities,  at  least 
seventy  in  number,  contained  within  the  empire.  The 
Parthian  monarchs  thought  it  politic  to  favour  them  ; 
and  their  practice  in  this  respect  justified  the  title  of 
"  Phil-Hellene,"  which  they  were  fond  of  assuming 
upon  their  coins.  On  the  whole,  the  policy  may  have 
been  wise,  but  it  diminished  the  unity  of  the  empire, 
and  there  were  times  when  serious  danger  arose  from 
it.  The  Syro- Macedonian  monarchs  could  always 
count  with  certainty  on  having  powerful  friends  in 
Parthia,  anxious  to  render  them  assistance,  what- 
ever portion  of  it  they  invaded  ;  and  even  the 
Romans,  though  their  ethnic  connection  with  the 
cities  was  not  so  close,  were  sometimes  indebted  to 
them  for  aid  of  an  important  kind. 

Another  anomaly  of  a  similar  character,  but  of  less 
importance,  since  the  number  of  persons  which  it 
affected  cannot  have  been  nearly  so  great,  was  the 


THE   FREE    CITIES — GREEK  AND   JEWISH.        83 

position  occupied  by  the  Jewish  communities  within 
the  Parthian  state.  These,  though  far  less  numerous 
than  the  Grecian,  were  still  not  infrequent,  and  their 
location  in  some  of  the  most  considerable  cities  of 
the  empire  gave  them  a  consequence  which  makes  it 
necessary  that  they  should  not  be  overlooked.  In 
Babylon,  in  Seleucia,  in  Ctesiphon,  and  in  other 
principal  towns,  as  Susa  probably,  and  Rhages,  there 
was  so  large  a  Jewish  element  in  the  population,  that 
it  had  been  thought  best  to  give  them  municipal 
independence,  the  power  to  elect  magistrates,  and 
perhaps  a  special  quarter  in  each  town  to  dwell  in. 
There  were  also  a  certain  number  of  places  the 
inhabitants  of  which  were  wholly  Jews,  and  these 
enjoyed  similar  privileges  with  the  "  free  towns  "  of 
the  Greeks.  Hence  another  element  of  weakness  in 
the  organisation  of  the  empire,  wherein  an  amalga- 
mation of  races,  or  even  a  thorough  consolidation 
was  impossible.  The  worst  results  showed  themselves 
in  the  towns  with  mixed  populations,  where,  from  time 
to  time,  the  most  fearful  disturbances  broke  out,  often 
terminating  in  horrible  massacres. 

A  Greek  author  of  the  Augustan  age  tells  us,  that 
the  Great  Mithridates,  after  effecting  his  conquests, 
made  a  collection  of  the  best  laws  which  he  found 
to  prevail  among  the  various  subject  peoples,  and 
imposed  them  on  the  Parthian  nation.  This  state- 
ment is,  no  doubt,  an  exaggeration  ;  but  we  may 
attribute  to  Mithridates  with  some  reason,  the  intro- 
duction at  this  time  of  various  practices  and  usages, 
whereby  the  Parthian  Court  was  assimilated  to  those 
of  the  earlier  Great  Monarchies  of  Asia,  and  became 


84     GOVERNMENTAL   SYSTEM   OF  MITHRIDATES  I. 

in  the  eyes  of  foreigners  the  successor  and  repre- 
sentative of  the  old  Assyrian  and  Persian  kingdoms. 
The  assumption  of  new  titles  and  of  a  new  state— the 
organisation  of  the  Court  on  a  new  plan — the  bestowal 
of  a  new  character  on  the  subordinate  officers  of  the 
empire,  were  suitable  to  the  new  phase  of  its  life  on 
which  the  monarchy  had  now  entered,  and  may  with 
the  highest  probability,  if  not  with  absolute  certainty, 
be  assigned  to  this  period. 

It  has  been  already  noticed  that  Mithridates  I. 
appears  to  have  been  the  first  Parthian  sovereign 
who  took  the  sounding  title  of  "  King  of  Kings."  The 
title  had  been  a  favourite  one  with  the  old  Assyrian 
and  Persian  monarchs,  but  was  not  adopted  either  by 
the  Seleucida^  or  by  the  Greek  kings  of  Bactria.  Its 
revival  implied  a  distinct  pretension  to  that  mastery 
of  Western  Asia,  which  had  belonged  of  old  to  the 
Assyrians  and  Persians,  and  which  was,  in  later  times, 
formally  claimed  by  Artaxerxes,  the  son  of  Babek, 
the  founder  of  the  New  Persian  Kingdom.  Previous 
Parthian  monarchs  had  been  content  to  call  them- 
selves "  the  King,"  or  "  the  Great  King  " — Mithridates 
I.  is  "  the  King  of  Kings,  the  great  and  illustrious 
Arsaces  "  —  BA2IAEQ2  BA2IAE12N  MErAAOY 
AP2AK0Y  EIII<t>ANOYS. 

At  the  same  time  Mithridates  appears  to  have 
assumed  the  tiara,  or  tall  stiff  crown  which,  with 
certain  modifications  in  its  shape,  had  been  the  mark 
of  sovereignty,  both  under  the  Assyrians  and  under 
the  Persians.  Previously  the  royal  headdress  had 
been  either  a  mere  cap  of  a  Scythic  type,  pointed,  but 
lower  than  the  Scyths  usually  wore  it,  or  the  ordinary 


TITLES,    DRESS,   AND    STATUS   OF   THE   KING.      85 

diadem,  which  was  a  band  encircling  the  head,  and 
terminating"  in  two  long  ribbons  or  ends,  that  hung 
down  behind  the  head  on  the  back.  According  to 
Herodian,  the  diadem,  in  the  later  times,  was  double  ; 
but  the  coins  of  Parthia  do  not  exhibit  this  peculiarity. 
The  cap  of  the  first  king  is  ornamented  with  pendant 
pearls  in  front ;  the  stiff  tiara  of  Mithridates  has  three 
rows  of  pearls  sewn  on  to  it. 

Ammianus  Marcellinus  tells  us  that  among  the 
titles  assumed  by  the  Parthian  monarchs  was  that 
of  "  Brother  of  the  Sun  and  Moon."  The  Shahs  of 
modern  Persia  still  claim  the  epithet.  It  is  ordinarily 
used,  not  so  much  by  themselves,  as  by  their  courtiers 
and  subjects,  in  the  language  of  compliment,  and  this 
may  have  been  to  some  extent  the  case  in  Parthia. 
Still,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  in  the  minds  of 
men  at  the  time,  something  of  a  divine  character  was 
regarded  as  attaching  to  the  Arsacid  race.  In  the 
civil  contentions,  which  form  so  main  a  feature  of  the 
later  history,  combatants  abstained  from  lifting  their 
hands  knowingly  against  one  of  the  royal  stock, 
since  to  kill  or  wound  one  was  looked  upon  as  a 
sacrilege.  The  actual  name  of  @eo?,  "  God,"  was  even 
assumed  as  a  title  by  at  least  one  of  the  kings,  and  a 
favourite  epithet  upon  the  coins  is  Oeo-Trdroop,  which 
implies  the  divinity  of  the  king's  father.  After  his 
death  the  monarch  seems  generally  to  have  been  the 
object  of  a  qualified  worship  ;  statues  were  erected 
to  him  in  the  temples,  where  they  were  apparently 
associated  with  the  images  of  the  Sun-God  and  the 
Moon-God. 

No  account  of  the  Parthian  Court  has  come  down 


86     GOVERNMENTAL    SYSTEM   OF  MITHRIDATES   I. 

to  us  that  is  cither  complete  or  altogether  trustworthy  ; 
but  some  particulars  may  be  gathered  of  it  from  the 
scattered  notices  of  various  ancient  writers,  on  which 
we  may  place  reliance.  The  best  authorities  are 
agreed  that  it  was  not  stationary,  but  migrated  at 
different  times  of  the  year  to  different  cities  of  the 
empire,  in  this  respect  resembling  the  Court  of  the 
Achaemenians.  It  is  not  quite  clear,  however,  which 
of  the  cities  wrere  thus  honoured.  Ctesiphon  was 
undoubtedly  one  of  them.  All  writers  agree  that  it 
was  the  chief  city  of  the  empire,  and  the  ordinary 
seat  of  the  government.  Here,  according  to  Strabo, 
the  kings  passed  the  winter  months,  delighting  in  the 
excellence  of  the  air.  The  town  was  situated  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tigris,  opposite  to  Seleucia,  twelve  or 
thirteen  miles  below  the  modern  Baghdad.  Pliny 
says  that  it  was  built  by  the  Parthians  in  order  to 
reduce  Seleucia  to  insignificance,  and  that  when  it 
failed  of  its  purpose,  they  built  another  city,  Volo- 
gesocerta,  in  the  same  neighbourhood  with  the  same 
object  ;  but  the  account  of  Strabo  is  more  probable — 
namely,  that  it  grewr  up  gradually  out  of  the  wish  of 
the  Parthian  kings  to  spare  Seleucia  the  unpleasant- 
ness of  having  the  rude  soldiery,  which  followed  the 
Court  from  place  to  place,  quartered  upon  them.  The 
remainder  of  the  year,  according  to  the  same  authority, 
was  spent  by  the  Parthian  monarchs  either  at  the 
Median  city  of  Ecbatana,  which  is  the  modern 
Hamadan,  or  in  the  province  of  Hyrcania.  In 
Hyrcania  the  palace,  Strabo  says,  was  at  Tape  ;  and 
between  this  place  and  Ecbatana  he  appears  to  have 
regarded  the  monarchs  as  spending  the  whole  time 


SPLENDOUR    OF    THE    COURT.  87 

which  was  not  passed  at  Ctesiphon.  Athenaeus,  how- 
ever, declares  that  Rhages,  near  the  Caspian  Gates, 
was  the  spring  residence  of  the  Parthian  kings  ;  and 
it  seems  not  unlikely  that  this  famous  city,  which 
Isidore  of  Charax,  writing  in  Parthian  times,  calls 
"  the  greatest  in  Media,"  was  among  the  occasional 
residences  of  the  Court.  Parthia  itself  was,  it  would 
seem,  deserted  ;  but  still  a  city  of  that  region  pre- 
served in  one  respect  a  royal  character,  being  the 
place  where  all  the  earlier  monarchs  were  interred. 
Ultimately  Arbela  became  the  royal  burying-place. 

The  pomp  and  grandeur  of  the  Parthian  kings  are 
described  only  in  the  vaguest  terms  by  the  Greek  and 
Roman  writers.  No  author  of  repute,  whose  remains 
have  come  down  to  us,  appears  to  have  visited  the 
Parthian  Court.  We  may  perhaps  best  obtain  a  true 
notion  of  the  splendour  of  the  sovereign  from  the 
accounts  which  have  reached  us  of  his  relations  and 
great  officers,  who  can  have  reflected  only  faintly  the 
magnificence  of  the  sovereign.  Plutarch  tells  us  that 
the  general  whom  Orodes  deputed  to  conduct  the  war 
against  Crassus  came  into  the  field  accompanied  by 
two  hundred  litters  wherein  were  contained  his  con- 
cubines, and  by  a  thousand  camels  which  carried  his 
baggage.  His  dress  was  the  long  flowing  robe  of 
the  ancient  Medes  ;  he  wore  his  hair  parted  down  the 
middle,  and  had  his  face  painted  with  cosmetics.  A 
body  of  ten  thousand  horse,  composed  entirely  of  his 
clients  and  slaves,  followed  him  in  battle.  We  may 
conclude  from  this  picture,  and  from  the  general 
tenor  of  the  classical  notices,  that  the  Arsacidae 
revived  and  maintained  very  much  such  a  Court  as 


88     GOVERNMENTAL   SYSTEM   OF   MITHRIDATES  I. 

that  of  the  old  Achaemenian  princes,  falling  probably 
somewhat  below  their  model  in  general  politeness  and 
refinement,  but  equalling  it  in  luxury,  in  extravagant 
expenditure,  and  in  display.  Moreover,  in  one  respect, 
an  advance  was  made  beyond  the  limits  of  Achae- 
menian civilisation.  The  theatrical  representations 
introduced  into  Asia  by  the  Greeks  proved  extra- 
ordinarily attractive  to  the  semi-barbaric  race, 
unacquainted  hitherto  with  any  such  performances. 
The  Greek  language  and  literature  were  so  far  studied 
as  to  render  the  representation  of  Greek  dramas 
intelligible  to  the  upper  classes.  "  An  exotic  litera- 
ture and  a  gaudy  theatre  flourished  at  Seleucia  under 
the  royal  patronage,  the  ritual  ceremonies  of  the  most 
graceful  of  superstitions  were  too  closely  interwoven 
with  the  forms  of  the  Grecian  drama  not  to  follow  in 
its  train.  The  Court  of  Seleucia  presented  a  motley 
combination  of  the  manners  of  different  ages  and 
countries,  only  to  be  paralleled,  perhaps,  in  the  semi- 
European  fashions  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow."  * 

But  if,  at  their  Court,  the  Parthian  kings  thus 
tolerated,  or  even  encouraged,  luxurious  habits  and 
enervating  amusements,  among  the  bulk  of  the  nation 
the  very  opposite  characteristics  prevailed.  The  taint 
of  their  Scythian  origin  always  clung  to  the  Parthian 
people.  They  had  always  about  them,  as  Strabo 
notes,  "  much  that  was  barbaric  and  Scythic."  The 
organisation  of  their  army  was  very  rude.  Each 
chieftain  brought  into  the  field,  like  the  nobles  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  an  indefinite  and  probably  uncounted 
contingent  of  retainers,  armed  as  their  means  allowed 

1  See  Merivale,  "Roman  Empire,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  3,  4. 


RUDE    ORGANISATION    OF    THE   ARMY.  89 

them — some,  the  richest,  in  coats  of  scale  or  chain 
armour,  and  mounted  on  steeds  similarly  protected, 
carrying,  besides  the  universal  bow  and  arrows,  a 
long  spear  or  pike — others  lightly  equipped,  without 
armour,  and  carrying  nothing  but  a  bow  and  arrows, 
with  a  short  sword  or  knife.  Of  these  last,  a  portion 
only  were  mounted,  while  the  remainder  served  on 
foot.  When  the  contingents  united,  the  troops  were 
simply  massed  together,  according  to  their  character, 
into  three  bodies — the  heavy  cavalry,  the  light  cavalry, 
and  the  foot.  There  were  no  divisions  corresponding 
to  the  Roman  legions,  or  our  regiments  ;  and,  ap- 
parently, no  petty  officers  each  contingent  simply 
obeying  its  chief.  When  he  went  out  to  battle  with 
his  army,  the  king  was,  of  course,  Commander-in- 
chief.  In  his  absence,  his  place  was  taken  by  a 
Surena,  or  field-marshal,  appointed  by  him  to  the 
command.  There  was,  however  a  chief  Surena,  whose 
office  was  hereditary,  and  who,  besides  commanding 
in  the  field,  was  a  great  State  official. 

Such  seems  to  have  been  the  general  character  of 
those  practices  and  institutions  which  distinguished 
the  Parthians  from  the  foundation  of  their  empire 
by  Mithridates.  Some  of  them,  it  is  probable,  he 
rather  adopted  than  invented  ;  but  there  is  no  good 
reason  for  doubting  that  of  many  he  was  the 
originator.  He  appears  to  have  been  one  of  those 
rare  individuals  to  whom  it  has  been  given  to  unite 
the  powers  and  capacities  which  form  the  conqueror 
with  those  which  constitute  the  successful  organiser 
of  a  State.  Brave  and  enterprising  in  war,  prompt 
to  seize  an  occasion  and  skilful  to  turn  it  to  the  best 


90     GOVERNMENTAL    SYSTEM   0E   MTTHKIDATES    I. 

advantage,  not  even  averse  to  severities  when  they 
seemed  to  be  required,  he  yet  felt  no  acrimony 
towards  those  who  had  resisted  his  arms,  but  was 
ready  to  befriend  them  as  soon  as  their  resistance 
ceased.  Mild,  clement,  philanthropic,  he  conciliated 
those  whom  he  subdued  almost  more  easily  than  he 
subdued  them,  and  by  the  efforts  of  a  few  years 
succeeded  in  welding  together  a  dominion  which 
lasted  without  suffering  serious  mutilation  for  nearly 
four  centuries.  Though  not  formally  dignified  with 
the  epithet  of  "  Great,"  he  was  beyond  all  question  the 
greatest  of  the  Parthian  monarchs.  Later  times  did 
him  more  justice  than  his  contemporaries  ;  and,  when 
the  names  of  almost  all  the  other  kings  had  sunk 
into  oblivion,  retained  his  in  honour,  and  placed  it 
on  a  par  with  that  of  the  original  founder  of  Par- 
thian independence.  "  The  Parthians,'  says  Agathias, 
"  though  a  subject  nation,  and  previously  of  very  little 
reputation,  put  an  end  to  the  dominion  of  the  Mace- 
donians, and  subsequently  became  lords  of  the  whole 
empire  except  Egypt,  Arsaces  first  of  all  beginning 
the  rebellion,  and  Mithridates  not  very  long  afterwards 
exalting  the  Parthian  name  to  a  high  pitch  of  glory." 


VI. 


LAST   STRUGGLE   WITH    SYRIA — DEFEAT  AND  DEATH 
OF   ANTIOCHUS   SIDETES. 

The  death  of  Mithridates,  and  the  accession  of  a 
comparatively  unenterprising  successor,  Phraates  II., 
encouraged  Syria  to  make  one  more  effort  to  thrust 
the  Parthians  back  into  their  native  wilds,  and  to 
recover  the  dominion  of  Western  Asia.  So  great  a 
position  was  not  a  thing  to  be  surrendered  without 


COIN    OK    PHRAATES    II. 


a  final,  even  if  it  were  a  despairing,  struggle  ;  and  in 
the  actual  position  of  affairs  it  was  quite  open  to 
question  whether,  on  the  whole,  Parthia  or  Syria 
were  the  stronger.  The  dominion  of  both  countries 
was  comparatively  recent  ;  neither  had  any  firm  hold 
on    its    outlying    provinces  ;    neither   could  claim  to 


92  LAST    STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

have  conciliated  to  itself  the  affections  of  the  Western 
Asiatics  generally,  or  to  rest  its  power  on  any  other 
basis  than  that  of  military  force.  And  in  military 
force  it  was  uncertain  which  way  the  balance  inclined. 
Both  countries  had  a  nucleus  of  native  troops,  on 
which  absolute  reliance  might  be  placed,  which  was 
brave,  faithful,  stanch,  and  would  contend  to  the 
death  for  their  respective  sovereigns.  But,  beyond 
this,  both  had  also  a  fluctuating  body  of  unwilling 
subjects  or  subject-allies,  unworthy  of  implicit  trust, 
and  likely  to  gravitate  to  one  side  or  the  other, 
according  as  hope,  or  fancy,  or  the  merest  caprice 
might  decide.  The  chances  of  victory  or  defeat 
turned  mainly  on  this  fluctuating  body,  the  in- 
stability of  which  had  been  amply  proved  in  the 
wars  of  the  last  half-century.  Those  wars  them- 
selves, taken  as  a  whole,  had  manifested  no  decided 
preponderance  of  either  people  over  the  other  ;  at 
one  time  Parthia,  at  another  Syria,  had  been  hard 
pressed  ;  and  it  was  natural  for  the  leaders  on  either 
side  to  believe  that  accidental  circumstances,  rather 
than  any  marked  superiority  of  one  of  the  two 
peoples  over  the  other,  had  brought  about  the  re- 
sults that  had  been  reached. 

In  the  last  war  that  had  been  waged  success  had 
finally  rested  with  Parthia.  An  entire  army  had  been 
destroyed,  and  the  Syrian  monarch  captured.  Deme- 
trius "  the  Conqueror,"  as  he  called  himself,  was 
expiating  in  the  cold  and  rugged  region  of  Hyrcania, 
the  rashness  which  had  led  him  to  deem  himself  a 
match  for  the  craft  and  strategic  skill  of  Mithridates. 
But  now  a  new  and  untried  monarch  was  upon  the 


REIGN   OF  PHRAATES   II.  93 

throne — one  who  was  clearly  without  his  father's 
ambition,  and  probably  lacked  his  ability.  Settled 
in  his  kingdom  for  the  space  of  six  years,  he  had 
not  only  attempted  nothing  against  Syria,  but  had 
engaged  in  no  military  enterprise  whatever.  Yet  the 
condition  of  Syria  had  been  such  as  to  offer  the 
strongest  possible  temptation  to  a  neighbour  pos- 
sessed of  courage  and  energy.  Civil  war  had  raged, 
and  exhausted  the  resources  of  the  country,  from 
B.C.  146  to  137,  after  which  there  had  been  a  pro- 
tracted struggle  between  the  Syrians  and  the  Jews 
(B.C.  137-133),  in  which  the  Syrian  arms  had  at 
first  been  worsted,  but  had  at  length  asserted  their 
superiority.  Had  Phraates  II.,  the  son  and  suc- 
cessor of  Mithridates,  inherited  a  tenth  part  of  his 
father's  military  spirit,  he  would  have  taken  advan- 
tage of  this  troubled  time  to  carry  the  war  into 
Syria  Proper,  and  might  have  shaken  the  Syrian 
throne  to  its  base,  or  even  wholly  overturned  it.  In 
the  person  of  the  captured  Demetrius,  he  possessed 
one  whom  he  might  have  set  up  as  a  pretender  with 
a  certainty  of  drawing  many  Syrians  to  his  side,  and 
whom  he  might,  if  successful,  have  left  to  rule  as 
Vitaxa,  or  subject  king,  the  country  of  which  he  had 
once  been  actual  monarch.  But  Phraates  had  no 
promptitude,  no  enterprise.  He  let  all  the  oppor- 
tunities which  offered  themselves  escape  him,  content 
to  keep  watch  on  Demetrius — when  he  escaped  from 
confinement,  to  pursue  and  retake  him — and  to  hold 
him  in  reserve  as  a  force  of  which  he  might  one  day 
make  use,  when  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  fitting  time 
was  come  for  it. 


94         LAST   STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

The  result  of  his  long  procrastination  was,  that  the 
war,  when  renewed,  was  renewed  from  the  other  side. 
Antiochus  Sidetes,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  Syrian 
throne  on  the  captivity  of  his  brother,  Demetrius,  and 
had  taken  to  wife  his  brother's  wife,  Cleopatra,  having 
crushed  the  pretender,  Tryphon,  with  her  assistance, 
and  then  with  some  difficulty  enforced  submission  on 
the  Jews,  felt  himself,  in  B.C.  129,  at  liberty  to  resume 
the  struggle  with  Parthia,  and,  having  made  great 
preparations,  set  out  for  the  East  with  the  full  inten- 
tion of  releasing  his  brother,  and  recovering  his  lost 
provinces. 

It  is  impossible  to  accept  without  considerable 
reserve  the  accounts  that  have  come  down  to  us  of  the 
force  which  Antiochus  collected.  According  to  Justin, 
it  consisted  of  no  more  than  eighty  thousand  fighting 
men,  to  whom  were  attached  the  incredible  number  of 
three  hundred  thousand  camp-followers,  the  majority 
of  them  consisting  of  cooks,  bakers,  and  actors  !  As 
in  other  extreme  cases  the  camp-followers  do  but 
equal,  or  a  little  exceed,  the  number  of  men  fit  for 
actual  service,  this  estimate,  which  makes  them  nearly 
four  times  as  numerous,  is  entitled  to  but  little  credit. 
The  late  historian,  Orosius,  corrects  the  error  here 
indicated  ;  but  his  account  seems  to  err  in  rating  the 
supernumeraries  too  low.  According  to  him,  the 
armed  force  amounted  to  three  hundred  thousand, 
while  the  camp-followers,  including  grooms,  sutlers, 
courtesans,  and  actors,  were  no  more  than  a  third  of 
the  number.  From  the  two  accounts,  taken  together, 
we  are  perhaps  entitled  to  conclude  that  the  entire 
host  did  not  fall  much  short  of  four  hundred  thousand 


INVASION   OF  ANTIOCHUS   SIDETES.  95 

men.  This  estimate  receives  a  certain  amount  of 
confirmation  from  an  independent  statement  made 
incidentally  by  Diodorus,  with  respect  to  the  number 
on  the  Syrian  side  that  fell  in  the  campaign,  which  he 
estimates  at  three  hundred  thousand. 

The  army  of  Phraates,  according  to  two  consentient 
accounts,  numbered  no  more  than  a  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand.  An  attempt  which  he  made  to 
enlist  in  his  service  a  body  of  Scythian  mercenaries 
from  the  regions  beyond  the  Oxus  failed,  the  Scyths 
being  quite  willing  to  lend  their  aid,  but  arriving  too 
late  at  the  rendezvous  to  be  of  any  use.  At  the  same 
time  a  defection  on  the  part  of  the  subject  princes 
deprived  the  Parthian  monarch  of  contingents  which 
usually  swelled  his  numbers,  and  threw  him  upon  the 
support  of  his  own  countrymen,  chiefly  or  solely. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  more  surprising  that 
he  was  able  to  collect  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
men  than  that  he  did  not  succeed  in  bringing  into  the 
field  a  larger  number. 

The  Syrian  troops  were  magnificently  appointed. 
The  common  soldiers  had  their  military  boots 
fastened  with  buckles  or  studs  of  gold  ;  and  the 
culinary  utensils,  in  which  the  food  of  the  army 
was  cooked,  were  in  many  instances  of  silver.  It 
seemed  as  if  banqueting,  rather  than  fighting,  was 
to  be  the  order  of  the  day.  But  to  suppose  that 
this  was  actually  so  would  be  to  do  the  army  of 
Antiochus  an  injustice.  History,  from  the  time  of 
Sardanapalus  to  that  of  the  Crimean  War  of  1854-6, 
abounds  with  instances  of  the  somewhat  strange  com- 
bination of  luxurious  habits  with  valour  of  the  highest 


96  LAST   STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

kind.  No  charge  of  poltroonery  can  be  established 
against  the  Syrian  soldiery,  who,  on  the  contrary, 
seem  to  have  played  their  part  in  the  campaign  with 
credit.  They  were  accompanied  by  a  body  of  Jews 
under  John  Hyrcanus,  the  son  of  Simon  and  grand- 
son of  the  first  Maccabee  leader,  who  had  been  forced 
to  take  up  temporarily  the  position  of  a  Syrian 
feudatory.  As  they  advanced  through  the  Meso- 
potamian  region  after  crossing  the  Euphrates,  they 
received  continually  fresh  accessions  of  strength  by 
the  arrival  of  contingents  from  the  Parthian  tributary 
states,  which,  disgusted  with  Parthian  arrogance  and 
coarseness,  or  perhaps  attracted  by  Syrian  luxury 
and  magnificence,  embraced  the  cause  of  the  invader. 
Phraates,  on  his  part,  instead  of  awaiting  attack  in 
the  fastnesses  of  Parthia  or  Hyrcania,  advanced  to 
meet  his  enemy  across  the  Assyrian  and  Babylonian 
plains,  and,  either  in  person  or  by  his  generals, 
engaged  the  Syrian  monarch  in  three  pitched  battles, 
in  each  of  which  he  was  worsted.  One  of  these  was 
fought  upon  the  banks  of  the  Greater  Zab  or  Lycus, 
in  Adiabene,  not  far  from  the  site  of  Arbela,  where 
Antiochus  met  and  defeated  the  Parthian  general, 
Indates,  and  raised  a  trophy  in  honour  of  his  victory. 
The  exact  scene  of  the  other  two  engagements  is  un- 
known to  us,  and  in  no  case  have  we  any  description 
of  the  battles,  so  that  we  have  no  means  of  judging 
whether  it  was  by  superiority  of  force  or  of  strategy 
that  the  Syrian  monarch  thus  far  prevailed,  and 
obtained  almost  the  whole  for  which  he  was  fighting. 
The  entire  province  of  Babylonia,  the  heart  of  the 
empire,  where  were  situated   the  three  great  cities  of 


EARLY   SUCCESSES   OF  SIDETES.  97 

Babylon,  Seleucia,  and  Ctesiphon,  fell  into  his  hands, 
and  a  further  defection  of  the  tributary  countries  from 
the  Parthian  cause  took  place,  a  defection  so  wide- 
spread, that  the  writer  who  records  it  says,  with  a 
certain  amount  of  rhetoric,  no  doubt — "  Phraates  had 
now  nothing  left  to  him  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
original  Parthian  territory."  He  maintained,  however, 
a  position  somewhere  in  the  Lower  Babylonian  plain, 
and  still  confronted  Antiochus  with  an  army,  which, 
though  beaten,  was  bent  on  resistance. 

When  affairs  were  in  this  state,  Phraates,  recognis- 
ing the  peril  of  his  position,  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  was  necessary  to  attempt,  at  any  rate,  a  diver- 
sion. He  had  still  what  seemed  to  him  a  winning 
card  in  his  hand,  and  it  was  time  to  play  it.  Deme- 
trius, the  brother  of  Antiochus,  and  dejure  the  king  of 
Syria,  was  still  in  his  possession,  watched  and  carefully 
guarded  in  the  rough  Hyrcanian  home,  from  which  he 
had  twice  escaped,  but  only  to  be  re-captured.  He 
would  send  Demetrius  into  Syria  under  an  escort  of 
Parthian  troops,  who  should  conduct  him  to  the 
frontier  and  give  him  the  opportunity  of  recovering 
his  kingdom.  It  would  be  strange  if  one,  entitled  to 
the  throne  by  his  birth,  and  its  actual  occupant  for  the 
space  of  six  years,  could  not  rally  to  himself  a  party 
in  a  country  always  ready  to  welcome  pretenders,  and 
to  accept,  as  valid,  claims  that  were  utterly  baseless. 
Let  troubles  break  out  in  his  rear,  let  his  rule  over 
Syria  be  threatened  in  Syria  itself,  and  Antiochus 
would,  he  thought,  either  hasten  home,  or,  at  the  least, 
be  greatly  alarmed,  have  his  attention  distracted  from 
his   aggressive   designs,   and    be   afraid    of  plunging 


g8        LAST    STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

deeper  into  Asia,  lest,  while  grasping  at  the  shadow  of 
power,  he  should  lose  the  substance. 

Demetrius  and  his  Parthian  escort  set  out,  but  the 
distance  to  be  traversed  was  great,  and  travelling 
is  slow  in  Asia.  Moreover,  the  winter  time  was 
approaching,  and  each  week  would  increase  the  diffi- 
culties of  locomotion.  The  scheme  of  Phraates  hung 
fire.  No  immediate  effect  followed  from  it.  Antio- 
chus  may  not  have  received  intelligence  of  the 
impending  danger,  or  he  may  have  thought  his  wife, 
Cleopatra,  whom  he  had  left  at  Antioch,  capable  of 
coping  with  it.  In  any  case,  it  is  certain  that  his 
movements  were  in  no  way  affected  by  the  bolt  which 
Phraates  had  launched  at  him  Instead  of  withdraw- 
ing his  troops  from  the  occupied  provinces  and 
marching  them  back  into  Syria,  thus  relinquishing  all 
that  he  had  gained  by  his  successful  campaign,  he 
resolved  to  maintain  all  the  conquests  that  he  had  made, 
and  to  keep  his  troops  where  they  were,  merely 
dividing  them,  on  account  of  their  numbers,  among 
the  various  cities  which  he  had  taken,  and  making 
them  go  into  winter  quarters.  His  design  was  carried 
out  ;  the  army  was  dispersed  ;  discipline  was  probably 
somewhat  relaxed  ;  and  the  soldiery,  having  no 
military  duties  to  perform,  amused  themselves,  as 
foreign  soldiers  are  apt  to  do,  by  heavy  requisitions, 
and  by  cavalier  treatment  of  the  native  inhabitants. 

Some  months  of  the  winter  passed  in  this  way. 
Gradually  the  discontent  of  the  ciyil  populations  in 
the  cities  increased.  Representations  were  made  to 
Phraates  by  secret  messengers,  that  the  yoke  of  the 
Syrians  was  found  to  be  intolerable,  and  that,  if  he 


SECRET   MACHINATIONS   OF  PHRAATES.  99 

would  give  the  signal,  the  cities  were  ripe  for  revolt. 
Much  hidden  negotiation  must  have  taken  place  before 
a  complete  arrangement  could  have  been  made,  or  a 
fixed  plan  settled  on.  As  in  the  "  Saint  Bartholomew," 
as  in  the  "  Sicilian  Vespers,"  as  in  the  great  outbreak 
against  the  Roman  power  in  Asia  Minor  under 
Mithridates  of  Pontus,  the  secret  must  have  been 
communicated  to  hundreds,  who,  with  a  marvellous 
tenacity  of  purpose,  kept  it  inviolate  for  weeks  or 
months,  so  that  not  a  whisper  reached  the  ears  of  the 
victims.  Sunk  in  a  delicious  dream  of  the  most 
absolute  security,  careless  of  the  feelings,  and  deaf  to 
the  grumblings  of  the  townsmen,  the  Syrian  soldiers 
continued  to  enjoy  their  long  and  pleasant  holiday, 
without  a  suspicion  of  the  danger  that  was  impending. 
Meanwhile  Phraates  arranged  all  the  details  of  his 
plan,  and  communicated  them  to  his  confederates.  It 
was  agreed  that,  on  an  appointed  day,  all  the  cities 
should  break  out  in  revolt  ;  the  natives  should  take 
arms,  rise  against  the  soldiers  quartered  upon  them, 
and  kill  all,  or  as  many  as  possible.  Phraates 
promised  to  be  at  hand  with  his  army,  to  prevent  the 
scattered  garrisons  from  giving  help  to  each  other. 
It  was  calculated  that,  in  this  way,  the  invaders  might 
be  cut  off  almost  to  a  man  without  the  trouble  of 
even  fighting  a  battle. 

But,  before  he  proceeded  to  these  terrible  extremi- 
ties, the  Parthian  prince,  touched  perhaps  with  com- 
passion, determined  to  give  his  adversary  a  chance 
of  escaping  the  fate  prepared  for  him  by  timely  con- 
cessions. The  winter  was  not  over  ;  but  the  snow  was 
beginning  to  melt  through  the  increasing  warmth  of 


IOO  LAST   STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

the  sun's  rays,  and  the  day  appointed  for  the  general 
rising  was  probably  drawing  near.  Phraates  felt  that 
no  time  was  to  be  lost.  Accordingly,  he  sent  ambas- 
sadors to  Antiochus  to  propose  peace,  and  to  inquire 
on  what  terms  it  would  be  granted  him.  The  reply 
of  Antiochus,  according  to  Diodorus,  was  as  follows  : 
"If  Phraates  would  release  his  prisoner,  Demetrius, 
from  captivity,  and  deliver  him  up  without  ransom,  at 
the  same  time  restoring  all  the  provinces  which  had 
been  taken  by  Parthia  from  Syria,  and  consenting  to 
pay  a  tribute  for  Parthia  itself,  peace  might  be  had  ; 
but  not  otherwise."  To  such  terms  it  was,  of  course, 
impossible  that  any  Parthian  king  should  listen  ;  and 
the  ambassadors  of  Phraates  returned,  therefore, 
without  further  parley. 

Soon  afterwards,  the  day  appointed  for  the  out- 
break arrived.  Apparently,  even  yet  no  suspicion  had 
been  excited.  The  Syrian  troops  were  everywhere 
quietly  enjoying  themselves  in  their  winter  quarters, 
when,  suddenly  and  without  any  warning,  they  found 
themselves  attacked  by  the  natives.  Taken  at  disad- 
vantage, it  was  impossible  for  them  to  make  a  success- 
ful resistance  ;  and  it  would  seem  that  the  great  bulk 
of  them  were  massacred  in  their  quarters.  Antiochus, 
and  the  detachment  stationed  with  him,  alone,  so  far 
as  we  hear,  escaped  into  the  open  field,  and  contended 
for  their  lives  in  just  warfare.  It  had  been  the 
intention  of  the  Syrian  monarch,  when  he  quitted  his 
station,  to  hasten  to  the  protection  of  the  division 
quartered  nearest  to  him  ;  but  he  had  no  sooner  com- 
menced his  march  than  he  found  himself  confronted 
by  Phraates,  who  was  at  the  head  of  his  main  army, 


THE    GREAT    MASSACRE.  IOI 

having,  no  doubt,  anticipated  the  design  of  Antiochus 
and  resolved  to  frustrate  it.  The  Parthian  prince  was 
anxious  to  engage  at  once,  as  his  force  far  out- 
numbered that  commanded  by  his  adversary  ;  but  the 
latter  might  have  declined  the  battle  had  he  so  willed, 
and  have  at  any  rate  greatly  protracted  the  struggle. 
He  had  a  mountain  region — Mount  Zagros,  probably 
— within  a  short  distance  of  him,  and  might  have 
fallen  back  upon  it,  so  placing  the  Parthian  horse  at 
great  disadvantage  ;  but  he  was  still  at  an  age  when 
caution  is  apt  to  be  considered  cowardice,  and  temerity 
to  pass  for  true  courage.  Despite  the  advice  of  one 
of  his  captains,  he  determined  to  accept  the  battle 
which  the  enemy  offered,  and  not  to  fly  before  a  foe 
whom  he  had  three  times  defeated.  But  the  determi- 
nation of  the  commander  was  ill  seconded  by  the 
army  which  he  commanded.  Though  Antiochus 
fought  strenuously,  he  was  defeated,  since  his  troops 
were  without  heart  and  offered  but  a  poor  resistance. 
Athenaeus,  the  general  who  had  advised  retreat,  was 
the  first  to  fly,  and  then  the  whole  army  broke  up 
and  dispersed  itself.  Antiochus  himself  perished, 
either  slain  by  the  enemy  or  by  his  own  hand.  His 
son,  Seleucus,  and  a  niece,  a  daughter  of  his  brother, 
Demetrius,  who  had  accompanied  him  in  his  expe- 
dition, were  captured.  His  troops  were  either  cut  to 
pieces  or  made  prisoners.  The  entire  number  of 
those  slain  in  the  battle,  and  in  the  general  massacre, 
was  reckoned  at  three  hundred  thousand. 

Such  was  the  issue  of  this  great  expedition.  It  was 
the  last  which  any  Seleucid  monarch  conducted  into 
these  countries — the  final  attempt  made  by  Syria  to 


102  LAST   STRUGGLE    WITH   SYRIA. 

repossess  herself  of  her  lost  Eastern  provinces. 
Henceforth,  Parthia  was  no  further  troubled  by  the 
power  that  had  hitherto  been  her  most  dangerous  and 
most  constant  enemy,  but  was  allowed  to  enjoy,  with- 
out molestation  from  Syria,  the  conquests  which  she 
had  effected.  Syria,  in  fact,  had  received  so  deep  a 
wound  that  she  had  from  this  time  a  difficulty  in  pre- 
serving her  own  existence.  The  immediate  result  of 
the  destruction  of  Antiochus  and  his  host  was  the 
revolt  of  Judaea,  which  henceforth  maintained  its 
independence  uninterruptedly  to  the  time  of  the 
Romans.  The  dominions  of  the  Seleucidae  were 
reduced  to  Cilicia,  and  Syria  Proper,  or  the  tract  west 
of  the  Euphrates  between  the  chain  of  Amanus  and 
Palestine.  Internally,  the  Syrian  state  was  agitated 
by  constant  commotions  from  the  claims  of  various 
pretenders  to  the  sovereignty  ;  externally,  it  was  kept 
in  continual  alarm  by  the  Egyptians,  the  Romans, 
and  the  Armenians.  During  the  sixty  years  that 
elapsed  between  the  return  of  Demetrius  to  his  king- 
dom (B.C.  128)  and  the  conversion  of  Syria  into  a 
Roman  province  (B.C.  65)  she  ceased  wholly  to  be 
formidable  to  her  neighbours.  Her  flourishing  period 
was  gone  by,  and  a  rapid  decline  set  in,  from  which 
there  was  no  recovery.  It  is  surprising  that  the 
Romans  did  not  step  in  earlier,  to  terminate  a  rule 
which  was  but  a  little  removed  from  anarchy.  Rome, 
however,  had  other  work  on  her  hands — civil  troubles, 
social  wars,  and  the  struggle  with  Mithridates  ;  and 
hence  the  Syrian  state  continued  to  exist  till  the  year 
B.C.  65,  though  in  a  feeble  and  moribund  condition. 
In  Parthia  itself  the  consequences  of  Syria's  defeat 


RESULTS — REMOTE   AND    IMMEDIATE.  IO3 

and  collapse  were  less  important  than  might  have 
been  expected.  One  would  naturally  have  looked  to 
see,  as  the  immediate  result,  a  fresh  development  of 
the  aggressive  spirit,  and  a  burst  of  energy  and  enter- 
prise parallel  to  that  which  had  carried  the  arms  of 
Mithridates  I.,  from  his  Parthian  fastnesses  to  the 
Hydaspes  on  the  one  hand  and  to  the  Euphrates  on  the 
other.  But  no  such  result  followed.  We  hear  indeed 
of  Phraates  intending  to  follow  up  his  victory  over 
Antiochus  by  a  grand  attack  upon  Syria — an  attack 
to  which,  if  it  had  taken  place,  she  must  almost 
certainly  have  succumbed — but,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries  continued  for 
many  years  after  the  Great  Massacre,  peaceful,  if  not 
even  friendly.  Phraates  celebrated  the  obsequies  of 
Antiochus  with  the  pomp  and  ceremony  befitting  a 
powerful  king,  and  ultimately  placed  his  remains  in  a 
coffin  of  silver,  and  sent  them  into  Syria,  to  find  their 
last  resting-place  in  their  native  country.  He  treated 
Seleucus,  the  son  of  Antiochus,  who  had  been  made 
prisoner  in  the  final  battle,  with  the  highest  honour, 
and  took  to  wife  Antiochus's  niece,  who  fell  into  his 
hands  at  the  same  time.  The  royal  houses  of  the 
Seleucidae  and  the  Arsacidae  became  thus  doubly 
allied  ;  and,  all  grounds  for  further  hostilities  having 
been  removed,  peace  and  amity  were  established 
between  the  former  rivals.  No  doubt  a  powerful 
motive  influencing  Parthia  in  the  adoption  of  this 
policy  was  that  revelation  of  a  new  danger  which 
will  form  the  chief  subject  of  the  ensuing  section. 


VII. 


PRESSURE  OF  THE  NORTHERN  NOMADS  UPON 
PARTHIA  —  SCYTHIC  WARS  OF  PHRAATES  II. 
AND   ARTABANUS   II. 


The  Turanian  or  Tatar  races  by  which  Central 
and  Northern  Asia  are  inhabited,  have  at  all  times 
constituted  a  serious  danger  to  the  inhabitants 
of  the  softer  South.  Hordes  of  wild  barbarians 
wander  over  those  inhospitable  regions,  increase, 
multiply,  exert  a  pressure  on  their  southern  neigh- 
bours, and  are  felt  as  a  perpetual  menace.  Every 
now  and  then  a  crisis  arrives.  Population  has 
increased  beyond  the  means  of  subsistence,  or  a 
novel  ambition  has  seized  a  tribe  or  a  powerful 
chief,  and  the  barrier,  which  has  hitherto  proved  a 
sufficient  restraint,  is  forced.  There  issues  suddenly 
out  of  the  frozen  bosom  of  the  North  a  stream  of 
coarse,  uncouth  savages — brave,  hungry,  countless — 
who  swarm  into  the  fairer  southern  regions  deter- 
minedly, irresistibly  ;  like  locusts  winging  their  flight 
into  a  green  land.  How  such  multitudes  come  to  be 
propagated  in  countries  where  life  is  with  difficulty 
sustained,  we  do  not  know  ;  why  the  impulse 
suddenly  seizes   them   to   quit   their  old   haunts  and- 


GENERAL    CHARACTER    OF   NOMADIC    INROADS.      105 

move  steadily  in  a  given  direction,  we  cannot  say  ; 
but  we  see  that  the  phenomenon  is  one  of  constant 
recurrence,  and  we  have  thus  come  to  regard  it  as 
being  scarcely  curious  or  strange  at  all.  In  Asia, 
Cimmerians,  Scythians,  Comans,  Mongols,  Turks  ;  in 
Europe,  Gauls,  Goths,  Huns,  Avars,  Vandals,  Bur- 
gundians,  Lombards,  Bulgarians,  have  successively 
illustrated  the  law,  and  made  us  familiar  with  its 
operation.  "  Inroads  of  the  northern  barbarians  " 
has  become  a  common-place  with  writers  of  history, 
and  there  is  scarcely  any  country  of  the  South, 
whether  in  Asia  or  in  Europe,  that  has  not  ex- 
perienced them. 

Such  inroads  are  very  dreadful  when  they  take 
place.  Hordes  of  savages,  coarse  and  repulsive  in 
their  appearance,  fierce  in  their  tempers,  rude  in  their 
habits,  not  perhaps  individually  very  brave  or  strong, 
but  powerful  by  their  numbers,  and  sometimes  by  a 
new  mode  of  warfare,  which  it  is  found  difficult  to 
meet,  pour  into  the  seats  of  civilisation,  and  spread 
havoc  around.  On  they  come  (as  before  observed) 
like  a  flight  of  locusts,  countless,  irresistible — finding 
the  land  before  them  a  garden,  and  leaving  it  behind 
them  a  howling  wilderness.  Neither  sex  nor  age  is 
spared.  The  inhabitants  of  the  open  country  and  of 
the  villages,  if  they  do  not  make  their  escape  to  high 
mountain  tops  or  other  strongholds,  are  ruthlessly 
massacred  by  the  invaders,  or,  at  best,  fprced  to 
become  their  slaves.  The  crops  are  consumed,  the 
flocks  and  herds  swept  off  or  destroyed,  the  villages 
and  homesteads  burnt,  the  whole  country  made  a 
scene   of  desolation.     Walled    towns    perhaps    resist 


106  THE   NORTHERN   NOMADS. 

them,  as  they  have  not  often  patience  enough  for 
sieges  ;  but  sometimes,  with  a  dogged  determination, 
they  sit  down  before  the  ramparts,  and  by  a  pro- 
longed blockade,  starve  the  defenders  into  sub- 
mission. Then  there  ensues  an  indescribable  scene 
of  havoc,  rapine,  and  bloodshed.  Ancient  cities, 
rich  with  the  accumulated  stores  of  ages,  are  ran- 
sacked and  perhaps  burnt  ;  priceless  works  of  art 
often  perish  ;  civilisations  which  it  has  taken 
centuries  to  build  up  are  trampled  down.  Few 
things  are  more  terrible  than  the  devastation  and 
ruin  which  such  an  inroad  has  often  spread  over  a 
fair  and  smiling  kingdom,  even  when  it  has  merely 
swept  over  it,  like  a  passing  storm,  and  has  led  to  no 
permanent  occupation. 

Against  a  danger  of  this  kind  the  Parthian  princes 
had  had,  almost  from  the  first,  to  guard.  They  were 
themselves  of  the  nomadic  race— Turanians,  if  our 
hypothesis  concerning  them  be  sound — and  had  es- 
tablished their  kingdom  by  an  invasion  of  the  type 
above  described.  But  they  had  immediately  become 
settlers,  inhabitants  of  cities  ;  they  had  been  softened, 
to  a  certain  extent,  civilised  ;  and  now  they  looked 
on  the  nomadic  hordes  of  the  North  with  the.  same 
dislike  and  disgust  with  which  the  Persians  and  the 
Greco  -  Macedonians  had  formerly  regarded  them. 
In  the  Scythians  of  the  Trans-Oxianian  tract  they 
saw  an  unceasing  peril,  and  one,  moreover,  which 
was,  about  the  time  of  Phraates,  continually  increas- 
ing and  becoming  more  and  more  threatening. 

Fully  to  explain  the  position  of  affairs  in  this 
quarter,  we  must    ask   the  reader  to  accompany  us 


THE    YUE-CHI  AND    THE   SU.  107 

into  the  remoter  regions  of  inner  Asia,  where  the 
Turanian  tribes  had  their  headquarters.  There, 
about  the  year  B.C.  200,  a  Turanian  people  called 
the  Yue-chi  were  expelled  from  their  territory  on 
the  west  of  Chen-si  by  the  Hiong-nu,  whom  some 
identify  with  the  Huns.  "  The  Yue-chi  separated 
into  two  bands :  the  smaller  descended  southwards 
into  Thibet ;  the  larger  passed  westwards,  and  after 
a  hard  struggle,  dispossessed  a  people  called  '  Su,'  of 
the  plains  west  of  the  river  of  Hi.  The  latter  ad- 
vanced to  Ferghana  and  the  Jaxartes  ;  and  the  Yue- 
chi  not  long  afterwards  retreating  from  the  U-siun, 
another  nomadic  race,  passed  the  '  Su  '  on  the  north, 
and  occupied  the  tracts  between  the  Oxus  and  the 
Caspian.  The  '  Su  '  were  thus  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Bactrian  Greeks  ;  the  Yue-chi  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  Parthians." I  On  the  particulars  of  this  ac- 
count, which  comes  from  the  Chinese  historians,  we 
cannot  perhaps  altogether  depend  ;  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  the  main  fact,  testified  by  an  eye- 
witness, that  the  Yue-chi,  having  migrated  about  the 
period  mentioned  from  the  interior  of  Asia,  had 
established  themselves  sixty  years  later  (B.C.  140) 
in  the  Caspian  region.  Such  a  movement  would 
necessarily  have  thrown  the  entire  previous  popula- 
tion of  those  parts  into  commotion,  and  would 
probably  have  precipitated  them  upon  their  neigh- 
bours. It  accounts  satisfactorily  for  the  unusual 
pressure  of  the  northern  hordes  at  this  period  on  the 
Parthians,  the  Bactrians,  and  even  the  Indians  ;  and  it 
completely  explains    the   crisis  of    Parthian    history 

1  See  Wilson,  "  Ariana  Antiqua,"  p.  303. 


108  THE   NORTHERN   NOMADS. 

which  we  have  now  reached,  and  the  necessity  which 
lay  upon  the  nation  of  meeting,  and  if  possible  over- 
coming, a  new  danger. 

In  fact,  one  of  those  occasions  of  peril  had  arisen 
to  which  we  have  before  alluded,  and  to  which,  in 
ancient  times,  the  civilised  world  was  always  liable 
from  an  outburst  of  northern  barbarism.  Whether 
the  peril  has  altogether  passed  away  or  not,  we  need 
not  here  inquire,  but  certainly  in  the  old  world  there 
was  always  a  chance  that  civilisation,  art,  refinement, 
luxury,  might  suddenly  and  almost  without  warning 
be  swept  away  by  an  overwhelming  influx  of  savagery 
from  the  North.  From  the  reign  of  Cyaxares,  when 
the  evil,  so  far  as  we  know,  first  showed  itself,  the 
danger  was  patent  to  all  wise  and  far-seeing  governors 
both  in  Europe  and  Asia,  and  was  from  time  to  time 
guarded  against.  The  expeditions  of  Cyrus  against 
the  Massagetae,  of  Darius  Hystaspis  against  the 
European  Scyths,  of  Alexander  against  the  Getae,  of 
Trajan  and  Probus  across  the  Danube,  were  designed 
to  check  and  intimidate  the  northern  nations,  to  break 
their  power,  and  diminish  the  likelihood  of  their 
taking  the  offensive.  It  was  now  more  than  four 
centuries  since  in  this  part  of  Asia  any  such  effort 
had  been  made  ;  and  the  northern  barbarians  might 
naturally  have  ceased  to  fear  the  arms  and  discipline 
of  the  South.  Moreover,  the  circumstances  of  the 
time  scarcely  left  them  a  choice.  Pressed  on  con- 
tinually more  and  more  by  the  newly-arrived  "Su"  and 
Yue-chi,  the  old  inhabitants  of  the  Trans-Oxianian 
regions  were  under  the  necessity  of  seeking  new 
settlements,  and  could  only  attempt  to  find  them  in 


SCYTHIC    INVASION    OF  BACTRIA.  109 

the  quarter  towards  which  they  were  driven  by  the 
new-comers.  Strengthened  probably  by  daring  spirits 
from  among  their  conquerors  themselves,  they  crossed 
the  rivers  and  the  deserts  by  which  they  had  been 
hitherto  confined,  and  advancing  against  the  Par- 
thians,  Bactrians,  and  Arians,  threatened  to  carry  all 
before  them.  In  Bactria,  soon  after  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Greco-Bactrian  kingdom,  they  began  to 
give  trouble.  Province  after  province  was  swallowed 
up  by  the  invaders,  who  occupied  Sogdiana,  or  the 
tract  between  the  Lower  Jaxartes  and  the  Lower 
Oxus,  and  hence  proceeded  to  make  inroads  into 
Bactria  itself.  The  rich  land  on  the  Polytimetus,  or 
Ak-Su,  the  river  of  Samarkand,  and  even  the  high- 
lands between  the  Upper  Jaxartes  and  Upper  Oxus, 
were  permanently  occupied  by  Turanian  immigrants  ; 
and,  if  the  Bactrians  had  not  compensated  them- 
selves for  their  losses  by  acquisitions  of  territory 
in  Afghanistan  and  India,  they  would  soon  have  had 
no  kingdom  left.  The  hordes  were  always  increas- 
ing in  strength  through  the  influx  of  fresh  tribes. 
Bactria  was  pressed  to  the  south-eastward,  and  pre- 
cipitated upon  its  neighbours  in  that  direction. 

Presently,  in  Ariana,  the  hordes  passed  the  moun- 
tains, and  proceeding  southwards,  occupied  the  tract 
below  the  great  lake  wherein  the  Helmend  terminates, 
which  took  from  them  the  name  of  Sacastana — "  the 
land  of  the  Saka  or  Scyths  " — a  name  still  to  be 
traced  in  the  modern  Seistan.  Further  to  the  east 
they  effected  a  lodgment  in  Cabul,  and  another  in 
the  southern  portion  of  the  Indus  valley,  which  for  a 
time  bore  the  name   of   Indo-Scythia.      They   even 


HO  THE    NORTHERN   NOMADS. 

crossed  the  Indus,  and  attempted  to  penetrate  into 
the  interior  of  Hindustan,  but  here  they  were  met 
and  repulsed  by  a  native  monarch,  about  the  year 
B.C.  56. 

The  people  engaged  in  this  great  movement  are 
called  in  a  general  way  by  the  classical  writers  Sacae 
or  Scythae,  i.e.,  Scyths.  They  consisted  of  a  number 
of  tribes,  similar  for  the  most  part  in  language,  habits, 
and  mode  of  life,  and  allied  more  or  less  closely  to 
the  other  nomadic  races  of  Central  and  Northern 
Asia.  Of  these  tribes  the  principal  were  the 
Massagetae  ("great  Jits  or  Jats"),  the  former  adver- 
saries of  Cyrus,  who  occupied  the  country  on  both 
sides  of  the  lower  course  of  the  Oxus  ;  the  Dahae, 
who  bordered  the  Caspian  above  Hyrcania,  and 
extended  thence  to  the  longitude  of  Herat  ;  the 
Tochari,  who  settled  in  the  mountains  between  the 
Upper  Jaxartes  and  the  Upper  Oxus,  where  they  gave 
name  to  the  tract  known  as  Tokharistan  ;  the  Asii 
or  Asians,  who  were  closely  connected  with  the 
Tochari  ;  and  the  Sacarauli,  who  are  found  connected 
with  both  the  Tochari  and  the  Asians.  Some  of 
these  tribes  contained  within  them  further  sub- 
divisions, as  the  Dahae,  who  comprised  the  Parni  or 
Aparni,  the  Pissuri,  and  the  Xanthii  ;  and  the  Massa- 
getae, who  included  among  them  Chorasmii,  Attasii, 
and  others. 

The  general  character  of  the  barbarism,  in  which 
these  various  races  were  involved,  may  be  best  learnt 
from  the  description  given  of  one  of  them,  with  but 
few  differences,  by  Herodotus  and  Strabo.  According 
to  these  writers,  the  Massagetae   were  nomads  who 


CHARACTER    OF   SCYTHIC   BARBARISM.  Ill 

moved  about  in  waggons  or  carts,  like  the  modern 
Kalmucks,  accompanied  by  their  flocks  and  herds,  on 
whose  milk  they  chiefly  sustained  themselves.  Each 
man  had  only  one  wife,  but  all  the  wives  were  held  in 
common.  They  were  good  riders,  and  excellent 
archers,  but  fought  both  on  horseback  and  on  foot, 
and  used,  besides  their  bows  and  arrows,  lances, 
knives,  and  battle-axes.  They  had  little  or  no  iron, 
but  made  their  spear  and  arrow-heads,  and  their 
other  weapons,  of  bronze.  They  had  also  bronze 
breastplates,  but  otherwise  the  metal  with  which  they 
adorned  and  protected  their  own  persons  and  the 
heads  of  their  horses,  was  gold.  To  a  certain  extent 
they  were  cannibals.  It  was  their  custom  not  to  let 
the  aged  among  them  die  a  natural  death,  but,  when 
life  seemed  approaching  its  term,  to  offer  them  up  in 
sacrifice,  and  then  boil  the  flesh  and  feast  upon  it. 
This  mode  of  ending  life  was  regarded  as  the  best 
and  most  honourable  ;  such  as  died  of  disease  were 
not  eaten,  but  buried,  and  their  friends  bewailed  their 
misfortune.  It  may  be  added  to  this,  that  we  have 
sufficient  reason  to  believe,  that  the  Massageta.*  and 
the  other  nomads  of  these  parts  regarded  the  use  of 
poisoned  arrows  in  warfare  as  legitimate,  and  employed 
the  venom  of  serpents  and  the  corrupted  blood  of 
men,  to  make  the  wounds  which  they  inflicted  more 
deadly. 

Thus,  what  was  threatened  by  the  existing  position 
of  affairs  was  not  merely  the  conquest  of  one  race  by 
another  cognate  to  it,  like  that  of  the  Medes  by  the 
Persians,  or  of  the  Greeks  by  Rome,  but  the  oblite- 
ration   of    such    art,    civilisation,    and    refinement  as 


112  THE   NORTHERN   NOMADS. 

Western  Asia  had  attained  to  in  the  course  of  ages 
by  the  successive  efforts  of  Babylonians,  Assyrians, 
Mcdes,  Persians,  and  Greeks — the  spread  over  some 
of  the  fairest  regions  of  the  earth  of  a  low  type  of 
savagery — a  type  which  in  religion  went  no  further 
than  the  worship  of  the  Sun  ;  in  art  knew  but  the 
easier  forms  of  metallurgy  and  the  construction  of 
carts  ;  in  manners  and  customs,  included  cannibalism, 
the  use  of  poisoned  weapons,  and  a  relation  between 
the  sexes  destructive  alike  of  all  delicacy  and  all 
family  affection.  The  Parthians  were,  no  doubt,  rude 
and  coarse  in  their  character  as  compared  with  the 
Persians  ;  but  they  had  been  civilised  to  some  extent 
by  three  centuries  of  subjection  to  the  Persians  and 
the  Greeks  before  they  rose  to  power  ;  they  affected 
Persian  manners  ;  they  patronised  Greek  art  ;  they 
had  a  smattering  of  Greek  literature  ;  they  appreciated 
the  advantages  of  having  in  their  midst  a  number  of 
Grecian  states.  Many  of  their  kings  called  them- 
selves upon  their  coins  "  Phil- Hellenes,"  or  "  lovers  of 
the  Hellenic  people." x  Had  the  Massagetae  and 
their  kindred  tribes  of  Sacae,  Tochari,  Dahae,  Yue-chi, 
and  Su,  which  now  menaced  the  Parthian  power, 
succeeded  in  sweeping  it  away,  the  gradual  declension 
of  all  that  is  lovely  or  excellent  in  human  life  would 
have  been  marked.  Scythicism  would  have  overspread 
Western  Asia.  No  doubt  the  conquerors  would  have 
learnt  something  from  those  whom  they  subjected  to 
their  yoke ;  but  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  they 
would  have  learnt  much.  The  change  would  have 
been  like  that  which  passed  over  the  Western  Roman 

1  Lindsay,  "  History  and  Coinage  of  the  Parthians,"  p.  213. 


WAR   OF    SCYTHS    WITH   PHRAATES   II.  II3 

Empire,  when  Goths,  Vandals,  Burgundians,  Alans, 
Heruli,  depopulated  its  fairest  provinces  and  laid  its 
civilisation  in  the  dust.  The  East  would  have  been 
barbarised  ;  the  gains  of  centuries  would  have  been 
lost  ;  the  work  of  Cyrus,  Darius,  Alexander,  and 
other  great  benefactors  of  Asiatic  humanity,  would 
have  been  undone  ;  Western  Asia  would  have  sunk 
back  into  a  condition  not  very  much  above  that  from 
which  it  had  been  raised  two  thousand  years  previously 
by  the  primitive  Chaldaeans  and  the  Assyrians. 

The  first  monarch  to  recognise  the  approach  of  the 
crisis  and  its  danger  was  Phraates  II.,  the  son  of 
Mithridates  I.,  and  the  conqueror  of  Antiochus 
Sidetes.  Not  that  the  danger  presented  itself  to  his 
imagination  in  its  full  magnitude  ;  but  that  he  first 
woke  up  to  the  perception  of  the  real  position  of 
affairs  in  the  East,  and  saw  that,  whereas  Parthia's 
most  formidable  enemy  had  hitherto  been  Syria,  and 
the  Syro-Macedonian  power,  it  had  now  become 
Scythia  and  the  Sacae.  No  sooner  did  the  pressure 
of  the  nomads  begin  to  make  itself  felt  on  his  north- 
eastern frontier,  than,  relinquishing  all  ideas  of  Syrian 
conquests,  if  he  had  really  entertained  them,  he  left  his 
seat  of  empire  in  Babylonia  to  the  care  of  a  viceroy, 
Hymerus,  or  Evemerus,  and  marched  in  person  to 
confront  the  new  peril.  The  Scythians,  apparently, 
had  attacked  Parthia  Proper  from  their  seats  in  the 
Oxus  region.  Phraates,  in  his  haste  to  collect  a 
sufficient  force  against  them,  enlisted  in  his  service  a 
large  body  of  Greeks — the  remnants  mainly  of  the 
defeated  army  of  Antiochus — and  taking  with  him 
also  a  strong  body  of  Parthian  troops,  marched  at  his 


114         THE   NORTHERN   NOMADS. 

best  speed  eastward.  A  war  followed  in  the  mountain 
region,  which  must  have  lasted  for  some  years,  but  of 
which  we  have  only  the  most  meagre  account.  At 
last  there  was  an  engagement  in  which  the  Scythians 
got  the  advantage,  and  the  Parthian  troops  began  to 
waver  and  threaten  to  break,  when  the  Greeks,  who 
had  been  from  the  first  disaffected,  and  had  only 
waited  for  an  occasion  to  mutiny,  went  over  in  a 
body  to  the  enemy,  and  so  decided  the  battle. 
Deserted  by  their  allies,  the  Parthian  soldiery  were 
cut  to  pieces,  and  Phraates  himself  was  among  the 
slain.  The  event  proved  that  he  had  acted  rashly 
in  taking  the  Greeks  with  him,  but  he  can  scarcely 
be  said  to  have  deserved  much  blame.  It  would  have 
been  surprising  if  he  had  anticipated  so  strange  a 
thing  as  the  fraternisation  of  a  body  of  luxurious 
and  over-civilised  Greeks  with  the  utter  barbarians 
against  whom  he  was  contending,  or  had  imagined 
that  in  so  remote  a  region,  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
their  countrymen,  they  would  have  ventured  to  take 
a  step  which  must  have  thrown  them  entirely  on 
their  own  resources. 

We  have  no  information  with  regard  to  the  ultimate 
fate  of  the  Greek  mutineers.  As  for  the  Scythians, 
with  that  want  of  energy  and  of  a  settled  purpose 
which  characterised  them,  they  proceeded  to  plunder 
and  ravage  the  portion  of  the  Parthian  territory 
which  lay  open  to  them,  and,  when  they  had  thus 
wasted  their  strength,  returned  quietly  to  their  homes. 

The  Parthian  nobles  appointed  as  monarch,  in 
place  of  the  late  king,  an  uncle  of  his,  named  Arta- 
banus,  who  is  known    in  history  as  "  Artabanus  the 


WAR    CONTINUED    WITH     ARTABANUS  II.         115 

Second."  He  was  probably  advanced  in  years,  and 
might  perhaps  have  been  excused,  had  he  folded  his 
arms,  awaited  the  attack  of  his  foes,  and  stood  wholly 
on  the  defensive.  But  he  was  brave  and  energetic  ; 
and,  what  was  still  more  important,  he  appears  to 
have  appreciated  the  perils  of  the  position.  He  was 
not  content,  when  the  particular  body  of  barbarians, 
which  had  defeated  and  slain  his  predecessor,  having 
ravaged  Parthia  Proper,  returned  home,  to  sit  still 
and  wait  till  he  was  attacked  in  his  turn.  According 
to  the  brief  but  emphatic  words  of  Justin,  he 
assumed  the  aggressive,  and   invaded  the  country  of 


COIN    OF    ARTABANUS    II. 


the  Tochari,  one  of  the  most  powerful  of  the  Scythian 
tribes,  which  was  now  settled  in  a  portion  of  the 
region  that  had,  till  lately,  belonged  to  the  Bactrian 
kingdom.  Artabanus  evidently  felt  that  what  was 
needed  was,  not  simply  to  withstand,  but  to  roll 
back  the  flood  of  invasion,  which  had  advanced  so 
near  to  the  sacred  home  of  his  nation  ;  that  the 
barbarians  required  to  be  taught  a  lesson  ;  that  they 
must  at  least  be  made  to  understand  that  Parthia  was 
to  be  respected  ;  if  this  could  not  be  done,  then  the 
fate  of  the  empire  was  sealed.  He  therefore,  with  a 
gallantry  and  boldness  that  we  cannot  sufficiently 
admire — a  boldness  that  seemed   likt    rashness,  but 


Il6  THE   NORTHERN     NOMADS. 

was  in  reality  prudence — without  calculating  too 
closely  the  immediate  chances  of  battle,  led  his  troops 
against  one  of  the  most  forward  of  the  advancing 
tribes.  But  fortune,  unhappily,  was  adverse.  How 
the  battle  was  progressing  we  are  not  told  ;  but  it 
appears  that,  in  the  thick  of  an  engagement,  Arta- 
banus,  who  was  leading  his  men,  received  a  wound  in 
the  fore-arm,  from  the  effect  of  which  he  died  almost 
immediately.  The  death  of  the  leader  on  either  side 
decides  in  the  East,  almost  to  a  certainty,  the  issue  of  a 
conflict.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  Parthians,  having 
lost  their  monarch,  were  repulsed  ;  that  the  expedition 
failed  ;  and  that  the  situation  of  affairs  became  once 
more  at  least  as  threatening  as  it  had  been  before 
Artabanus  made  his  attempt.  Two  Parthian  mon- 
archs  had  now  fallen,  within  the  space  of  a  few  years, 
in  combat  with  the  aggressive  Scyths — two  Parthian 
armies  had  suffered  defeat.  Was  this  to  be  always  so  ? 
If  it  was,  then  Parthia  had  only  to  make  up  her  mind 
to  fall,  and,  like  the  great  Roman,  to  let  it  be  her  care 
that  she  should  fall  grandly  and  with  dignity. 


VIII. 

MITHRIDATES     II.     AND   THE    NOMADS — WAR    WITH 
ARMENIA — FIRST   CONTACT   WITH    ROME. 


ARTABANUS  II.  was  succeeded  on  the  throne  by 
his  son,  Mithridates  II.,  about  the  year  B.C.  124.  His 
military  achievements  were  considerable,  and  pro- 
cured him  the  epithet  of  "  the  Great,"  though  that 
title  was  perhaps  better  deserved  by  Mithridates  the 
First,  his  uncle.  However,  the  reign  of  the  second 
Mithridates  was  undoubtedly  a  distinguished  one,  and 
it  is  most  unfortunate  that  the  accounts  of  it,  which 
have  come  down  to  us,  are  so  meagre  and  unsatis- 
factory. We  can  but  trace  the  history  of  Parthia 
during  his  time  in  its  general  outline,  with  very  scanty 
details,  and  those  not  always  altogether  trustworthy. 

There  seems,  however,  to  be  no  doubt,  that  his 
earliest  efforts  after  mounting  the  throne  were  directed 
to  the  quarter  where  the  great  danger  pressed — the 
danger  which  had  proved  fatal  to  his  two  immediate 
predecessors,  his  cousin  and  his  uncle.  Probably,  in 
thus  determining,  he  scarcely  exercised  any  choice. 
The  Scyths,  after  their  double  victory,  would  naturally 
take  an  attitude  so  menacing  that  unless  immediately 
met    and    checked,  all  hope  would  have  had  to  be 


117 


Il8  REIGN    OF   MITHRIDATES  II. 

given  up— absolute  ruin  would  have  had  to  be  met 
and  faced — Parthia  would  have  been  overrun,  and  the 
empire  established  by  the  first  Mithridates  would 
have  been  extinguished,  within  twenty  or  thirty  years 
of  its  first  appearance,  under  the  second.  The  young 
king,  perceiving  his  peril,  bent  every  effort  to  meet 
and  repel  it.  He  employed  the  whole  force  of  the 
State  upon  his  north-eastern  frontier,  and,  in  a  series 
of  engagements,  so  effectually  checked  the  advance 
of  the  Scyths,  that  from  his  time  the  danger  which 
had  been  impending  wholly  passed  away.  The 
nomads  gave  up  the  hope  of  making  any  serious 
impression  on  the  Arsacid  kingdom,  and,  turning 
their  restless  energies  in  another  direction,  found  a 
vent  for  their  superabundant  population  in  the  far 
East,  in  Affghanistan  and  India,  where  they  settled 
themselves,  and  set  up  permanent  governments. 
Parthia  was  so  completely  relieved  from  their  attacks, 
that  she  was  able  once  more  to  take  the  aggressive  in 
this  region,  and  to  extend  her  sway  at  the  expense  of 
the  nation  before  which  she  had  so  lately  trembled. 
The  acquisition  of  parts  of  Bactria  from  the  Scyths, 
which  is  attested  by  Strabo,  belongs,  in  all  probability, 
to  this  reign  ;  and  it  is  even  possible  that  the  exten- 
sion of  Parthian  dominion  over  Sacastane,  or  Seistan, 
dates  from  the  same  period.  We  are  assured  that 
the  second  Mithridates  "added  many  nations  to  the 
Parthian  Empire."  As  these  were  decidedly  not  on 
the  western  side  of  the  empire,  where  Mithridates 
did  not  even  succeed  in  conquering  Armenia,  it  would 
seem  that  they  must  have  lain  towards  the  East,  in 
which  case  it  would  be  almost  certain  that  thev  must 


REBELLION   OF  EUEMERUS.  I  ig 

have    been    outlying    tribes    of    the    recent    Scythic 
immigration. 

The  successes  of  Mithridates  in  this  quarter  left 
him  at  liberty,  after  a  time,  to  turn  his  attention 
towards  the  west,  where,  though  Syria  was  no  longer 
formidable,  troubles  of  various  kinds  had  broken  out, 
which  could  no  longer  be  safely  neglected.  Hymerus, 
or  Euemerus,  the  viceroy  appointed  to  direct  the 
affairs  of  the  west  from  Babylon  by  Phraates  II.  when 
he  marched  eastward  against  the  Scyths,  had  greatly 
misconducted  himself  in  his  government,  and  almost 
shaken  himself  free  from  the  Parthian  yoke.  He  had 
treated  the  inhabitants  of  Babylon  with  extreme 
cruelty,  condemning  many  of  them  to  slavery,  and 
sending  them  into  Media,  besides  burning  the  market- 
place, several  temples,  and  other  buildings  of  that 
great  city.  He  had  greatly  encouraged  luxury  and 
extravagance,  had  offended  many  by  his  exactions, 
and  affected  the  state,  if  he  did  not  actually  claim 
the  title,  of  an  independent  monarch.  Mithridates, 
on  reaching  the  West,  crushed  the  nascent  rebellion 
of  Hymerus,  and  having  thus  recovered  dominion 
over  those  regions,  proceeded  to  engage  in  war  with 
a  new  enemy. 

Armenia,  the  new  enemy,  was  a  territory  of  very 
considerable  importance,  and  was  henceforth  so 
mixed  up  with  Parthia  in  her  various  wars  and 
negotiations,  that  some  account  of  the  country,  and 
people,  and  of  the  previous  history  of  the  people 
seems  to  be  necessary. 

According  to  Justin,  Armenia  was  a  tract  eleven 
hundred     miles    long  by   seven  hundred   broad  ;  but 


120  REIGN   OF   MITHRIDATES   II. 

this  is  an  extravagant  estimate.  If  we  extend 
Armenia  from  the  Caspian  to  the  range  of  Taurus, 
we  cannot  make  its  length  much  more  than  seven 
hundred  miles  ;  and  if  we  even  allow  it  to  have  reached 
from  the  Caucasus  to  Mount  Masius  and  the  lake  of 
Urumiyeh,  we  cannot  make  its  width  more  than  four 
hundred  miles.  But,  practically,  its  limits  were  almost 
always  much  narrower.  Iberia  and  Albania  were 
ordinarily  independent  countries,  occupying  the 
modern  Georgia,  and  intervening  between  Armenia 
and  the  Caucasus ;  the  Euphrates  was  the  natural 
boundary  of  Armenia  on  the  west  ;  and  Niphates, 
rather  than  Mons.  Masius,  shut  it  in  upon  the  south. 
Its  normal  dimensions  have  been  already  estimated 
in  this  volume  at  six  hundred  miles  in  length  by  a 
little  more  than  two  hundred  in  breadth,  and  its  area 
at  about  sixty. or  seventy  thousand  square  miles. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  during  the  Parthian 
period,  it  ever  much  exceeded  these  dimensions,  except 
it  were  during  the  fourteen  years  (B.C.  83  to  69)  when, 
under  Tigranes  I.,  it  held  possession  of  the  dwindled 
kingdom  of  the  Seleucidas. 

Armenia  was  a  country  of  lofty  ridges,  deep  and 
narrow  valleys,  numerous  and  copious  streams,  and 
occasional  broad  plains — a  country  of  rich  pasture 
grounds,  productive  orchards,  and  abundant  harvests. 
It  occupied  the  loftiest  position  in  Western  Asia,  and 
contained  the  sources  of  all  the  great  rivers  of  these 
parts — the  Euphrates,  the  Tigris,  the  Halys,  the 
Araxes,  and  the  Cyrus — which,  rising  within  a  space  of 
two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  long  by  a  hundred  wide, 
flow  down  in  four  directions  to  three  different  seas. 


WAR    WITH  ARMENIA.  121 

It  was  thus  to  this  part  of  Asia  what  Switzerland  is  to 
Western  Europe,  an  elevated  fastness  region  contain- 
ing within  it  the  highest  mountains,  and  yielding  the 
waters  which  fertilise  the  subjacent  regions.  It  con- 
tained also  two  large  lakes,  each  occupying  its  own 
basin,  and  having  no  connection  with  any  sea — those 
of  Van  and  Urumiyeh — salt  lakes  of  a  very  peculiar 
character.  The  mountain  tracts  yielded  supplies  of 
gold,  silver,  copper,  lead,  and  other  metals,  beside 
emery  and  antimony.  The  soil  in  the  valleys  was 
fertile  and  bore  several  kinds  of  grain  ;  the  flanks  of 
the  hills  grew  vines  ;  and  the  pastures  produced  horses 
and  mules  of  good  quality. 

The  Armenians  of  Parthian  times  were  probably 
identical  with  the  race,  which,  still  under  the  same 
name,  occupies  the  greater  portion  of  the  old  country, 
and  holds  an  important  position  among  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Western  Asia.  They  are  a  pale  race,  with  a 
somewhat  sallow  complexion,  marked  features,  and 
dark  eyebrows  and  hair.  By  their  language,  which 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  fourth  century  of  our  era,  it 
appears  that  they  are  an  Arian  people,  but  with  a 
certain  amount  of  Turanian  admixture.  Their  rela- 
tions are  closer  with  the  Persians  than  probably  with 
any  other  race,  but  still  they  possess  many  notable 
points  of  difference.  They  are  of  a  weaker  physique 
than  the  Persians,  slighter  in  their  frames,  less  muscular 
and  robust.  They  are  subtle,  wily,  with  a  great  talent 
for  commerce,  but  wanting  in  strength,  stamina,  and 
endurance.  In  the  earlier  times  they  were  strongly 
attached  to  their  own  independence,  and,  though 
seldom  able  to  maintain  it  for  long,  were  continually 


122  REIGN   OF   MITHRIDATES   II. 

reasserting  it  whenever  an  opportunity  seemed  to 
offer.  But  they  have  now  for  many  centuries  been 
absolutely  quiescent,  and  are  patient  under  the  harsh 
rule  of  the  three  races  which  hold  them  in  subjection 
— the  Russians,  the  Persians,  and  the  Turks. 

Historically,  the  Armenians  of  to-day  cannot  be 
traced  further  back  than  about  the  sixth  century  B.C., 
when  they  appear  to  have  immigrated  into  the  terri- 
tory that  they  have  from  that  time  occupied.  Pre- 
viously their  land  was  possessed  by  three  powerful  and 
warlike  races,  who  are  thought  to  have  been  Turanians, 
and  who  from  the  tenth  to  the  seventh  century  B.C.  were 
continually  at  war  with  the  great  Assyrian  Empire. 
These  were  the  Nai'ri,  the  Urarda,  and  the  Mannai,  or 
Minni — names  which  constantly  recur  in  the  cuneiform 
inscriptions.  The  Nai'ri  were  spread  from  the  mountains 
west  of  lake  Van,  along  both  sides  of  the  Tigris,  to  Bir  on 
the  Euphrates,  and  even  further  ;  the  Urarda,  or  people 
of  Ararat,  probably  the  Alarodii  of  Herodotus,  dwelt 
north  and  east  of  the  Nai'ri,  on  the  Upper  Euphrates, 
about  the  lake  of  Van,  and  probably  on  the  Araxes  ; 
while  the  Minni,  or  Mannai,  whose  country  lay  south- 
east of  the  Urarda,  held  the  Urumiyeh  basin,  and  the 
adjoining  parts  of  Zagros.  Of  these  three  races,  the 
Urarda  were  the  most  powerful,  and  it  was  with  them 
that  the  Assyrians  waged  their  most  bloody  wars. 
The  capital  city  of  the  Urarda  was  Van,  on  the  eastern 
shores  of  the  lake,  and  here  it  was  that  the  kings  set 
up  the  most  remarkable  of  their  inscriptions.  The 
language  of  these  inscriptions  is  of  a  Turanian  type, 
and,  though  it  may  have  furnished  the  non-Arian 
element  in  the  modern  Armenian,  cannot  have  been 


PREVIOUS   HISTORY   OF   ARMENIA.  1 23 

its  real  main  progenitor.  An  immigration  must  have 
occurred  between  the  end  of  the  Assyrian  and  the 
early  part  of  the  Persian  period,  which  changed  the 
population  of  the  mountain  region,  submerging  the 
original  occupants  in  a  far  larger  number  of  Arian 
in-comers. 

The  first  distinct  knowledge  that  we  obtain  of  this 
new  people  is  from  the  inscriptions  of  Darius  Hys- 
taspis.  Darius,  after  mentioning  Armenia  (Armina) 
among  the  twenty-three  provinces  into  which  his 
empire  was  divided,  informs  us  that,  in  the  second 
year  of  his  reign  (B.C.  520),  while  he  was  at  Babylon, 
a  great  revolt  broke  out,  in  which  Armenia  participated, 
together  with  eight  other  districts.  It  was  not  till  his 
third  year  that  the  revolt  was  put  down,  the  Arme- 
nians, as  well  as  the  other  confederates,  making  a  most 
vigorous  resistance.  The  names  of  the  persons  and 
of  the  places  mentioned  in  this  campaign  seem  to  be 
Arian,  as  are  the  other  Armenian  names  generally. 
On  the  suppression  of  the  revolt,  and  the  full  establish- 
ment of  the  power  of  Darius,  Armenia,  together  with 
some  adjacent  regions,  became  a  satrapy  of  the  Persian 
Empire — the  thirteenth,  according  to  Herodotus — and 
was  rated  in  the  Royal  Books  as  bound  to  furnish  a 
revenue  of  four  hundred  talents — about  ,£96,000 — 
annually.  From  this  time  its  fidelity  to  the  Persian 
monarchs  was  remarkable.  Not  only  was  the  money 
tribute  paid  regularly,  but  a  contribution  of  twenty 
thousand  young  colts  was  made  each  year  to  the  Royal 
Stud,  so  far  as  appears,  without  any  murmuring.  Con- 
tingents of  troops  were  also  readily  furnished  whenever 
required  by  the  Great  Monarch;  and, through  the  whole 


124  REIGN   OF    MITHRIDATES   II. 

Achsemenian  period,  after  the  reign  of  Darius,  Armenia 
remained  perfectly  tranquil,  and  never  caused  the 
Persians  the  slightest  alarm  or  anxiety. 

After  Arbela  (B.C.  331)  the  Armenians  submitted 
to  Alexander  without  a  struggle,  or  an  attempt  at 
regaining  independence,  and,  when  in  the  division  of 
his  dominions  which  followed  upon  the  battle  of  Ipsus 
(B.C.  301),  they  were  assigned  to  Seleucus,  they 
acquiesced  in  the  arrangement.  It  was  not  until 
Antiochus  the  Great  suffered  his  great  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  the  Romans  (B.C.  190),  and  all  Western  Asia 
was  thrown  into  a  ferment,  that  the  Arian  Armenians, 
after,  at  least,  four  centuries  of  subjection,  raised  their 
thoughts  to  independence,  and  succeeded  in  establish- 
ing an  autonomous  monarchy.  Even  then  the  move- 
ment seems  to  have  originated  rather  in  the  ambition 
of  a  chief  than  in  any  ardent  desire  for  liberty  upon 
the  part  of  the  people.  Artaxias  had  been  governor 
of  the  Greater  Armenia  in  the  earlier  portion  of  the 
reign  of  Antiochus,  and  seized  the  opportunity  afforded 
by  the  defeat  of  Magnesia  to  change  his  title  of  satrap 
into  that  of  sovereign.  Antiochus  was  too  much 
occupied  at  home  to  resist  him  ;  and  he  was  allowed 
at  his  leisure  to  establish  his  power,  to  build  a  new 
capital  at  Artaxata  near  the  Araxes,  and  to  reign  in 
peace  for  a  space  of  about  twenty-five  years.  Then, 
however,  he  was  attacked  by  Antiochus  Epiphanes. 
This  prince  (about  B.C.  165)  resolved  on  an  attempt  at 
re-establishing  the  power  of  Syria  over  Armenia,  and 
invading  the  country  with  a  large  army,  forced 
Artaxias  to  an  engagement,  in  which  he  defeated  him 
and   took  him  prisoner.     Armenia,  for  the  time,  sub- 


PREVIOUS    HISTORY   OF  ARMENIA.  1 25 

mitted  ;  but  it  was  not  long  before  fresh  troubles  broke 
out.  When  Mithridates  I.  overran  the  eastern  pro- 
vinces of  Syria  (about  B.C.  150),  and  made  himself 
master  in  succession  of  Media,  Babylonia,  and  Ely  mats, 
Armenia  was  once  more  thrown  into  a  state  of  excite- 
ment, and,  partly  by  her  own  efforts,  partly,  it  would 
seem,  by  Parthian  assistance,  threw  off  for  a  second 
time  the  Syrian  yoke,  and  became  again  independent, 
this  time  under  an  Arsacid  prince,  named  Wagharshag 
or  Val-arsaces,  a  member  of  the  Parthian  royal  family. 
A  reign  of  twenty-two  years  is  assigned  to  this  monarch, 
whose  kingdom  is  declared  to  have  extended  from  the 
Caucasus  to  Nisibis,  and  from  the  Caspian  to  the 
Mediterranean.  He  was  succeeded  by  a  son  named 
Arshag  or  Arsaces,  who  carried  on  wars  with  the 
neighbouring  state  of  Pontus,  and  had  a  reign  of 
thirteen  years,  probably  from  about  B.C.  128  to  B.C.  1 1 5. 
Ardashes — the  Ortoadistus  of  Justin — then  became 
king,  and  was  firmly  seated  on  the  Armenian  throne, 
when  Mithridates  II.,  nephew  of  Mithridates  I.,  having 
brought  the  Scythic  war  to  a  successful  termination, 
determined  (about  B.C.  100)  to  make  an  attempt  to  add 
Armenia  to  his  dominions. 

No  account  has  come  down  to  us  of  the  war  between 
Ortoadistus  and  the  invaders.  The  relative  power  of 
the  two  states  was,  however,  such  as  to  make  it  almost 
certain  that  in  a  collision  between  the  two  Parthia 
would  have  the  advantage  ;  and  a  casual  allusion  in 
Strabo  appears  to  indicate  pretty  clearly,  that  in  point 
of  fact,  the  advantage  gained  was  not  inconsiderable. 
Strabo  says  that  Tigranes,  the  eldest  son  of  Ortoadistus, 
was  a  hostage  in  the  hands  of  the  Parthians  for  some 


126  REIGN   OF   M IT II RI DATES   II. 

time  before  his  accession  to  the  throne — a  statement 
from  which  it  may  be  confidently  inferred,  that 
Ortoadistus,  having  been  worsted  in  battle  by  Mithri- 
dates,  concluded  with  him  an  ignominious  peace,  and  as 
security  for  the  performance  of  its  terms  gave  hostages 
to  the  Parthian  monarch,  his  own  son  being  among  the 
number.  Still,  it  is  also  clear,  from  the  fact  recorded, 
that  Armenia,  if  worsted,  was  far  from  being  subju- 
gated— she  ended  the  war  by  a  treaty  of  peace — she 
maintained  her  own  monarch  upon  the  throne — she 
was  not  even  seriously  reduced  in  strength,  since 
within  the  space  of  the  next  twenty  years  she  attained 
to  the  height  of  her  power,  absorbing  the  Syrian  state, 
and  really  ruling  for  a  time  from  the  Gulf  of  Issus  to 
the  shores  of  the  Caspian. 

It  cannot  have  been  more  than  a  (ew  years  after  the 
termination  of  the  Armenian  war,  which  must  have 
fallen  about  the  close  of  the  second,  or  the  beginning 
of  the  first  century  before  our  era,  that  the  Parthian 
state,  while  still  under  the  rule  of  Mithridates  II.,  was 
for  the  first*  time  brought  into  contact  with  Rome. 

Rome  appears  as  a  permanent  factor  in  the  politics 
of  the  East  somewhat  later  than  might  have  been 
expected.  When,  towards  the  close  of  the  second 
century  B.C.,  the  ambition  of  the  Great  Antiochus 
dragged  her  unwillingly  into  Asiatic  quarrels,  she 
disembarrassed  herself,  as  speedily  as  she  could,  of  all 
ties  binding  her  to  Asia,  and  made  what  was  almost 
a  formal  retreat  to  her  own  continent,  and  renuncia- 
tion of  the  heritage  of  another,  which  fortune  pressed 
upon  her.  For  more  than  half  a  century  the  policy 
of  abstention  was   pursued.      The  various  states  of 


FIRST   CONTACT   OF   PARTHIA    WITH  ROME.      127 

Western  Asia  were  left  to  follow  their  own  schemes 
of  self-aggrandisement,  and  fight  out  their  own  quarrels 
without  Roman  interference.  But,  in  course  of  time, 
the  reasons  for  the  policy  of  abstention  disappeared. 
Macedonia  and  Greece  having  been  conquered  and 
absorbed,  and  Carthage  destroyed  (B.C.  148-146),  the 
conditions  of  the  political  problem  seemed  to  be  so  far 
changed  as  to  render  a  further  advance  towards  the 
East  a  safe  measure  ;  and  accordingly,  when  it  was 
perceived  that  the  line  of  the  kings  of  Pergamus  was 
coming  to  an  end,  the  Senate  set  on  foot  intrigues 
which  had  for  their  object  the  devolution  upon  Rome 
of  the  sovereignty  belonging  to  those  monarchs.  By 
dexterous  management  the  third  Attalus  was  induced, 
in  repayment  of  his  father's  obligations  to  the  Romans, 
to  take  the  extraordinary  and  wholly  unprecedented 
step  of  bequeathing  by  will  his  entire  dominions  as  a 
legacy  to  the  Republic.  In  vain  did  his  illegitimate 
half-brother,  Aristonicus,  dispute  the  validity  of  so 
strange  a  testament ;  the  Romans,  aided  by  Mithri- 
dates  IV.,  then  monarch  of  Pontus,  easily"  triumphed 
over  such  resistance  as  this  unfortunate  prince  could 
offer,  and,  having  ceded  to  their  ally  the  portion  of 
Phrygia  which  had  belonged  to  the  Pergamene  king- 
dom, entered  on  the  possession  of  the  remainder. 
Having  thus  become  an  Asiatic  power,  the  Great 
Republic  was  of  necessity  mixed  up  henceforth  with 
the  various  movements  and  struggles  which  agitated 
Western  Asia,  and  was  naturally  led  to  strengthen  its 
position  among  the  Asiatic  kingdoms  by  such  alliances 
as  seemed  at  each  conjuncture  to  be  best  suited  to  its 
interests. 


128  REIGN    OF  MITHRIDATES  II. 

Hitherto  no  occasion  had  arisen  for  any  direct 
dealings  between  Rome  and  Parthia.  Their  respec- 
tive territories  were  still  separated  by  considerable 
tracts,  which  were  in  the  occupation  of  the  Syrians, 
the  Cappadocians,  and  the  Armenians.  Their  interests 
had  neither  clashed,  nor  as  yet  sufficiently  united 
them  to  give  rise  to  any  diplomatic  intercourse.  But 
the  progress  of  the  two  empires  in  opposite  directions 
was,  slowly  but  surely,  bringing  them  nearer  to  each 
other ;  and  events  had  now  reached  a  point  at  which 
the  empires  began  to  have—  or  to  seem  to  have — such 
a  community  of  interests  as  led  naturally  to  an  ex- 
change of  communications.  A  new  power  had  been 
recently  developed  in  these  parts.  In  the  rapid  way 
so  common  in  the  East,  Mithridates  V.  of  Pontus,  the 
son  and  successor  of  Rome's  ally,  had,  between  B.C. 
112  and  B.C.  93,  built  up  an  empire  of  vast  extent, 
large  population,  and  almost  inexhaustible  resources. 
He  had  established  his  authority  over  Armenia  Minor, 
Colchis,  the  entire  eastern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea,  the 
Chersonesus  Taurica,  or  kingdom  of  the  Bosporus, 
and  even  over  the  whole  tract  lying  west  of  the  Cher- 
sonese as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Tyras,  or  Dniestr. 
Nor  had  these  gains  contented  him.  He  had  obtained 
half  of  Paphlagonia  by  an  iniquitous  compact  with 
Nicomedes,  King  of  Bithynia  ;  he  had  occupied 
Galatia  ;  and  he  was  engaged  in  attempts  to  bring 
Cappadocia  under  his  influence.  In  this  last- 
mentioned  project  he  was  assisted  by  the  Armenians, 
with  whose  king,  Tigranes,  the  son  of  Ortoadistus, 
he  had  (about  B.C.  96)  formed  a  close  alliance,  at  the 
same  time   giving   him    his    daughter,  Cleopatra,   in 


HIS  EMBASSY   TO   SULLA.  120 

marriage.  Rome,  though  she  had  not  yet  determined 
on  war  with  Mithridates,  was  bent  on  thwarting  his 
Cappadocian  projects,  and  in  B.C.  92  sent  Sulla  into 
Asia,  with  orders  to  put  down  the  puppet  king  whom 
Mithridates  V.  and  Tigranes  were  establishing,  and 
to  replace  upon  the  Cappadocian  throne  a  certain 
Ariobarzanes,  whom  they  had  driven  from  his  king- 
dom. In  the  execution  of  this  commission,  Sulla  was 
brought  into  hostile  collision  with  the  Armenians, 
whom  he  defeated  with  great  slaughter,  and  drove 
from  Cappadocia,  together  with  their  puppet  king. 
Thus,  not  only  did  the  growing  power  of  Mithridates 
of  Pontus,  by  inspiring  Rome  and  Parthia  with  a 
common  fear,  tend  to  draw  them  together,  but  the 
course  of  events  had  actually  given  them  a  common 
enemy  in  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  who  was  equally 
obnoxious  to  both  of  them. 

For  Tigranes,  who,  during  the  time  that  he  was  a 
hostage  in  Parthia,  had  contracted  engagements 
towards  the  Parthian  monarch,  which  involved  a  ces- 
sion of  territory,  and  who,  on  the  faith  of  his  pledges, 
had  been  aided  by  the  Parthians  in  seating  himself  on 
his  father's  throne,  though  he  made  the  cession 
required  of  him  in  the  first  instance,  had  soon  after- 
wards repented  of  his  honesty,  had  gone  to  war  with 
his  benefactors,  recovered  the  ceded  territory,  and  laid 
waste  a  considerable  tract  of  country  lying  within  the 
admitted  limits  of  the  Parthian  kingdom.  These  pro- 
ceedings had,  of  course,  alienated  Mithridates  II.  ;  and 
we  may  with  much  probability  ascribe  to  them  the 
step,  which  he  now  took,  of  sending  an  ambassador  to 
Sulla.     Orobazus,  the  individual  selected,  was  charged 


130  REIGN  OF  MITHRIDATES   II. 

with  the  duty  of  proposing  an  alliance  offensive  and 
defensive  between  the  two  countries.  The  Roman 
general  received  the  overture  favourably,  but  pro- 
bably considered  that  it  transcended  his  powers  to 
conclude  a  treaty  ;  and  thus  no  further  result  was 
secured  by  the  embassy  than  the  establishment,  at 
their  first  contact,  of  a  friendly  understanding  between 
the  two  states. 

Soon  after  this,  Tigranes  appears  to  have  renewed 
his  attacks  upon  Parthia,  which  in  the  interval 
between  B.C.  92  and  B.C.  83  he  greatly  humbled, 
depriving  it  of  the  whole  of  Upper  Mesopotamia,  at 


COIN    OK    MITHRIDATES   II. 


this  time  called  Gordyene,  or  the  country  of  the 
Kurds,  and  under  the  rule  of  one  of  the  Parthian 
tributary  kings.  Rome  was  too  deeply  engaged  in  the 
first  Mithridatic  war  to  lend  Parthia  any  aid,  even  if 
she  had  been  so  disposed,  and  Parthia  herself  seems 
to  have  been  suffering  from  domestic  troubles,  a  time 
of  confusion  and  disturbance  having  followed  on  the 
death  of  Mithridates  II.  about  B.C.  89. 

Mithridates  the  Second  is  commonly  regarded  as 
the  most  distinguished  of  all  the  Parthian  monarchs 
after  his  uncle,  Mithridates  the  First.  He  has  a  fine 
head   upon   his  coins,  with  a  large  eye,  and  a  pro- 


HIS    COINS   AND    TITLES.  131 

minent  Roman  nose.  He  takes  the  epithets  of 
"  Theopator  "  and  "  Nicator."  The  obverse  of  his 
coins  is  commonly  adorned  with  the  sitting  Parthian 
figure  with  an  outstretched  bow  ;  but  sometimes  ex- 
hibits, instead  of  this,  a  Pegasus  or  winged  horse.  The 
military  exploits  of  the  prince  were  undoubtedly  re- 
markable, and  it  is  unfortunate  for  him  that  the 
record  of  them  is  so  scant}'.  It  is  certain  that  he 
made  a  deep  impression  upon  the  Scythian  hordes, 
and  thus  averted  from  his  country  a  great  danger.  It 
is  probable  that  he  considerably  enlarged  the  limits  of 
his  empire  on  the  side  of  Bactria  and  India.  But,  on 
the  whole,  perhaps  his  permanent  fame  will  rest 
mainly  upon  the  two  facts,  that  he  was  the  first  to 
initiate  those  Armenian  wars  which  occupied  so  large 
a  portion  of  the  later  Parthian  history,  and  that  he 
was  also  the  first  to  bring  Parthia  into  contact  with 
the  most  formidable  of  all  her  external  enemies,  Rome, 
and  thus — though  with  far  different  intent — to  pave 
the  way  for  those  many  bloody  struggles  with  the 
Great  Imperial  Power,  which  for  nearly  three  centuries 
— from  the  time  of  Crassus  to  that  of  Caracallus — 
riveted  the  attention  of  mankind  upon  the  East. 


IX. 


DARK    PERIOD    OF    PARTHIAN    HISTORY— ACCESSION 
OF   SANATRCECES— PHRAATES   III.  AND   POMPEY. 


The  death  of  Mithridates  II.  introduced  into 
Parthian  history,  as  has  been  already  observed,  a 
period  of  confusion  and  disturbance.  Civil  wars,  ac- 
cording to  one  authority,  raged  during  this  period  ; 
according  to  another,  there  was  a  rapid  succession  of 
monarchs.  It  would  seem  that  the  ancient  race  of  the 
Arsacidae  had  pretty  nearly  died  out  ;  and,  as  the 
superstition  still  prevailed,  that  fatal  consequences 
would  follow,  if  any  one  in  whose  veins  the  old  blood 
did  not  run  were  allowed  to  ascend  the  throne,  very 
aged  scions  of  the  royal  house  had  to  be  sought  out, 
and  the  royal  authority  committed  to  hands  that  were 
quite  unfitted  for  it.  One  king  who  has  been  thought 
to  belong  to  the  period  is  said  to  have  died  at  the  age 
of  ninety-six  J  ;  another  was  eighty  at  his  accession. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  may  well  have  been  that 
younger  rivals  sprang  up,  whether  of  the  royal,  or  of 
some  fresher  and  lustier  stocks,  who  disputed  the  crown 
with  the  decrepit  monarchs  preferred  to  the  position 
by  the  Megistanes,  and  threw  the  whole  country  into 
confusion.  These  quarrels  fell  out  at  an  unfortunate 
1  See  Appendix. 


DARK  PERIOD    OF  PARTHIAN  HISTORY.        133 

conjuncture.  Rome  had  at  last  been  forced  into  a 
contest  with  M ithridates  of  Pontus,  and  this  pre-occu- 
pation  of  the  two  great  powers  had  for  the  moment 
given  Armenia  a  free  hand.  Armenia,  under  Tigranes, 
one  of  the  most  ambitious  princes  that  ever  lived,  took 
immediate  advantage  of  the  occasion,  and,  while  the 
Mithridatic  war  was  impending,  and  also  during  the 
eleven  years  that  it  lasted  (B.C.  85-74),  employed  herself 
in  building  up  a  powerful  and  extensive  empire.  Not 
content  with  recovering  from  Parthia  the  portion  of 
territory  which  he  had  begun  by  ceding  to  her, 
Tigranes  had,  quite  early  in  his  reign,  carried  his 
aggressions  much  further,  had  made  himself  master  of 
two  most  important  Parthian  provinces,  Gordyene  or 
Northern  Mesopotamia,  and  Adiabene  or  the  tract 
about  the  Zab  rivers,  including  Assyria  Proper  and 
Arbelitis,  had  conquered  Sophene,  or  the  lesser 
Armenia,  which  was  independent  under  a  king  named 
Artanes,  and  had  also  brought  under  subjection  the 
extensive  and  valuable  country  of  Media  Atropatene, 
which  had  maintained  its  independence  since  the  time 
of  Alexander.  Nor  had  these  successes  contented 
him.  Invited  into  Syria,  about  B.C.  83,  by  the  wretched 
inhabitants,  who  were  driven  to  desperation  by  the 
never-ceasing  civil  wars  between  rival  princes  of  the 
house  of  the  Seleucidae,  he  had  found  no  difficulty  in 
absorbing  the  last  remnant  of  the  Syro-Macedonian 
Empire,  and  establishing  himself  as  king  over  Cilicia, 
Syria,  and  most  of  Phoenicia.  About  B.C.  80  he  had 
determined  on  building  himself  a  new  capital  in  the 
recently-acquired  province  of  Gordyene — a  capital  of 
a  vast  size,  provided  with  all  the  luxuries  required  by 


134        DARK   PERIOD   OF    PARTHIAN    HISTORY. 

an  Oriental  Court,  and  fortified  with  walls  such  as 
should  recall  the  glories  of  the  ancient  cities  of  the 
Assyrians.  Twelve  Greek  cities  were  depopulated  to 
furnish  Tigrano-certa — so  the  new  capital  was  called 
— with  a  sufficiency  of  Hellenic  inhabitants  ;  three 
hundred  thousand  Cappadocians  were  at  the  same 
time  transported  thither  ;  and  the  population  was 
further  swelled  by  contingents  from  Cilicia,  Gordyene, 
Adiabene,  and  Assyria  Proper.  A  royal  palace  on  a 
large  scale  was  constructed  in  the  immediate  vicinity, 
together  with  extensive  parks  or  "  paradises,"  marshes 
well  stocked  with  wild-fowl,  and  well-appointed  hunt- 
ing establishments.  The  walls  of  the  city  are  declared 
to  have  been  seventy- five  feet  in  height  ;  and  the 
intention  evidently  was  to  constitute  it  a  standing 
menace  to  Seleucia,  Ctesiphon,  Babylon,  or  whatever 
might  be  made  the  Parthian  western  capital.  The 
supersession  of  Parthia  by  Armenia  was  clearly  aimed 
at  ;  and  it  was  only  a  slight  step  in  advance  when 
finally  Tigranes  placed  upon  his  coins  the  ancient  title 
of  the  Great  Sovereigns  of  Asia — recently  claimed 
only  by  the  Arsacid  monarchs — the  title  of  ftacnXevs 
ftaaiXecov. 

The  emergence  of  Armenia  into  the  position  of  a 
Great  Power  would,  under  any  circumstances,  have 
tended  to  throw  Parthia  into  the  shade  ;  and  now, 
occurring  as  it  did  when  she  was  already  under  a 
cloud,  rent  with  civil  dissensions,  and  guided  by  the 
uncertain  hands  of  aged  and  feeble  monarchs,  it  pro- 
duced her  almost  entire  disappearance.  For  twenty 
years— from  B.C.  89  to  B.C.  69 — amid  the  rapid 
movements  that  occupy  the  field  of  Oriental  history, 


ACCESSION    OE   SANATRCECES.  135 

we  scarcely  obtain  a  glimpse  of  Parthia,  which  is 
jostled  out  of  sight  by  the  stronger  and  burlier  forms 
that  fill  the  space,  and  force  themselves  on  our 
attention. 

It  is  with  difficulty  that,  by  dint  of  careful  search, 
we  at  length  discover,  or  fancy  we  discover,  among 
the  fierce  struggles  of  the  times  two  shadowy  forms 
of  Parthian  kings  to  place  in  this  interval  as  links 
connecting  the  earlier  with  the  later  history.  The 
first  of  these  is  a  certain  Mnasciras,  of  whom  Lucian 
appears  to  speak,  as  a  Parthian  prince  who  reached 


COIN    OF    SANATROZCES. 

the  great  age  of  ninety-six  years,  and  whom  it  is 
impossible  to  insert  at  any  other  point.1  The  other 
is  a  somewhat  better  defined  personage  -  a  certain 
Sanatrceces,  called  also  Sinatroces  and  Sintricus — 
who  has  left  his  name  upon  some  of  his  coins,  and 
is  mentioned  by  several  authors.  This  last-named 
monarch  appears  to  have  reigned  from  B.C.  j6 
to    B.C.   69,    and    thus    to    have    been    contemporary 

1  Professor  Gardner  argues  that  the  supposed  Mnasciras  is  in  reality 
a  certain  Kamnasciras,  otherwise  known  to  us,  who  was  not  a  Parthian 
king  at  all,  and  did  not  belong  to  this  period  ("  Coinage  of  Parthia," 
p.  8).     His  arguments  must  be  allowed  to  have  great  force. 


136  REIGN   OF   SANATRCECES. 

with  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  Mithridates  of  Pontus,  and 
the  Roman  general,  Lucullus.  He  was  seventy-nine 
years  old  at  his  accession,  and  is  said  to  have  been 
indebted  for  his  crown  to  aid  lent  him  in  the  civil 
struggles,  wherein  he  was  engaged  with  rivals,  by  the 
Scythic  tribe  of  the  Sacauracre.  During  his  short 
reign  it  was  his  special  endeavour  to  hold  himself 
aloof  from  the  quarrels  of  his  neighbours,  and  thus 
escape  the  fate  of  the  earthen  pot  when  brought  into 
collision  with  iron  ones.  He  entirely  declined  the 
overtures  of  Mithridates  for  an  alliance,  which  were 
made  to  him  in  B.C.  72  ;  and  when,  in  B.C.  69,  the 
war  had  approached  his  own  frontier,  and,  the  most 
earnest  appeals  for  assistance  reaching  him  from  both 
parties,  he  found  it  impossible  to  maintain  the  line  of 
pure  abstention,  he  had  recourse  to  the  expedient  of 
amusing  both  sides  with  promises,  while  he  lent  no 
real  aid  to  either.  Plutarch  tells  us  that  this  course 
of  action  so  offended  and  enraged  Lucullus,  that  at 
one  time  it  almost  induced  him  to  defer  to  a  more 
convenient  season  his  quarrel  with  Mithridates  and 
his  ally,  Tigranes,  and  direct  the  whole  force  at  his 
command  against  Parthia.  But  the  prolonged  re- 
sistance of  Nisibis,  and  the  success  of  Mithridates  in 
Pontus  (B.C.  67)  averted  the  danger,  and,  the  war 
rolling  northwards,  Parthia  was  not  yet  driven  to 
take  a  side,  but  found  herself  able  to  maintain  her 
neutral  position  for  a  few  years  longer. 

The  turning  point  of  the  Mithridatic  War  was  the 
recall  of  Lucullus  (B.C.  66),  and  his  replacement  by  one 
of  the  greatest  Roman  generals  of  the  time,  Cneius 
Pompeius.      Pompey's    generalship    showed    him    at 


ACCESSION  OF   PHRAATES   III.  137 

once  that,  so  long  as  Rome  was  obliged  to  contend 
single-handed  with  two  such  powerful  enemies  as 
Mithridates  and  Tigranes,  success  could  not  be 
reasonably  expected.  The  Pontine  and  Armenian 
kings  played  into  each  other's  hands,  and  between 
them  possessed  such  advantages  in  local  position,  in 
men,  and  in  resources,  that  the  war  might  go  on 
indefinitely  without  any  clear  and  decisive  issue, 
unless  its  conditions  could  be  changed.  He  looked 
about  therefore  to  see  whether  a  new  factor  could  not 
be  called  in,  and  a  change  in  the  balance  of  force  be 
thereby  brought  about.  Might  not  Parthia,  which 
had  rejected  the  cheap  blandishments  of  Lucullus 
and  despised  his  coarse  threats,  be  won  over  by  some- 
what more  dexterous  management,  and  more  refined 
diplomacy  ?  A  Parthian  monarch  was  now  seated 
upon  the  throne  who  was  untried,  to  whom  overtures 
had  not  yet  been  made,  who  at  any  rate  had  not 
committed  himself  to  the  policy  of  abstention.  Might 
he  not  be  prevailed  upon?  Might  not  Phraates  the 
Third,  the  son  of  Sanatrceces,  who  had  just  succeeded 
his  father  upon  the  Parthian  throne,  be  induced  by 
a  sufficiently  tempting  promise,  to  join  his  forces  with 
those  of  Rome  in  the  war,  and  so  place  the  pre- 
ponderance of  military  strength  on  the  Roman  side  ? 
The  main  question  was,  what  would  be  a  sufficiently 
tempting  offer  ?  Pompey  thought  it  enough  to 
pledge  himself,  that,  if  Parthia  embraced  his  cause 
and  gave  him  the  assistance  which  he  required, 
Armenia  should  at  the  end  of  the  war  be  compelled 
to  make  restitution  to  her  of  her  lost  provinces — she 
should  be  once  more  put  in  possession  of  Gordyene, 


138  PHRAATES    III.    AND    POMPEY. 

and  Adiabene.  The  bait  took — Phraates  came  into 
the  terms  proposed— and  Parthia  for  the  first  and  last 
time  became  a  Roman  ally. 

The  general  terms  of  the  agreement  made  between 
the  high  contracting  parties  seem  to  have  been,  that, 
while  Rome  pressed  the  war  against  the  Pontine 
monarch  incessantly  and  without  relaxing  in  her  efforts, 
Phraates  should  enter  Armenia,  and  find  occupation  for 
Tigranes  in  his  own  country.  As  Parthia  and  Armenia 
were  conterminous  along  an  extended  line  of  frontier, 
Phraates  could  make  his  assault  where  he  pleased, 
and  how  he  pleased.  It  happened  that  he  had  at  his 
Court  an  Armenian  refugee  of  the  highest  consequence 
— no  less  a  person  than  the  Crown  Prince  of  Armenia, 
or  eldest  living  son  of  Tigranes,  who,  having  quarrelled 
with  his  father,  had  raised  a  rebellion,  and  being 
defeated  had  been  forced  to  fly,  and  seek  a  refuge  in 
Parthia.  Phraates  determined  to  take  advantage  of 
this  circumstance.  Having  completed  his  arrange- 
ments with  Pompey,  he,  in  the  year  B.C  65,  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  and,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Armenian  prince,  invaded  the  territory  of 
Tigranes.  The  prince  had  a  party  in  the  country 
which  desired  to  see  a  youthful  monarch  upon  the 
throne,  and  was  soon  joined  by  a  considerable  body 
of  supporters.  The  invading  army  penetrated  deep 
into  Armenia,  advancing  upon  the  capital,  Artaxata, 
whither  Tigranes  had  retreated.  The  Armenian 
monarch  made,  however,  no  stand,  even  at  his 
metropolis  ;  but,  when  his  foes  still  pressed  forward, 
quitted  the  city,  and  fled  to  the  neighbouring 
mountains.       Artaxata    was    invested  ;    but,    as    the 


PHRAATES   III.   ATTACKS    TIGRANES.  139 

siege  promised  to  be  long,  Phraates  became  tired  of 
sitting  before  the  place,  and  persuaded  himself  that 
he  had  done  enough  to  satisfy  Pompey,  and  might 
safely  leave  the  young  prince,  with  a  contingent  of 
Parthian  troops  and  his  own  adherents,  to  carry  on 
the  war  against  his  father.  Accordingly,  he  retired, 
and  the  young  prince  remained  in  sole  command. 
The  result  followed  which  might  have  been  antici- 
pated. Scarcely  was  Phraates  withdrawn,  when  the 
old  king,  descending  suddenly  from  his  fastnesses, 
fell  upon  his  son's  army  at  unawares,  defeated  it, 
and  drove  it  out  of  the  country.  He  thus  recovered 
full  possession  of  Armenia,  and  was  once  more 
in  a  position  to  render  help  to  Mithridates  against 
Pompey  ;  but  the  time  for  giving  effectual  help  was 
gone  by.  Pompey  had  made  such  good  use  of  the 
interval  during  which  the  hands  of  Tigranes  were 
fully  employed,  that  in  a  single  campaign  he  had 
broken  the  power  of  Mithridates,  driven  him  in  head- 
long flight  from  place  to  place,  and  finally  forced  him 
to  seek  a  refuge  beyond  the  Phasis,  at  Dioscurias,  in 
the  modern  Mingrelia.  Deprived  of  his  ally,  Tigranes 
was  too  weak  to  make  further  head  against  Rome, 
and  his  complete  submission,  in  the  autumn  of  B.C.  66, 
left  Pompey  at  liberty  to  settle  the  affairs  of  the  East 
at  his  pleasure. 

The  settlement  made  was  not  very  greatly  to  the 
liking  of  the  Parthian  king.  His  old  adversary,  the 
elder  Tigranes,  who  had  propitiated  Pompey  by  the 
gift  of  six  thousand  silver  talents — nearly  a  million 
and  a  half  of  our  money — though  deprived  of  Syria, 
which  was  made  into  an  actual  Roman  province,  was 


140  PHRAATES   III.   AND   POMPEY. 

left  in  full  possession  of  his  ancestral  kingdom  of 
Armenia,  and  not  even  mulcted  of  the  valuable 
province  of  Gordyene,  which  he  had  seized  in  the 
time  of  the  acute  Parthian  distress.  His  friend  and 
protege,  the  younger  Tigranes,  was  first  offered  the 
petty  principality  of  Sophene,  and  when  he  refused  it 
and  remonstrated,  was  arrested,  put  in  confinement, 
and  reserved  by  Pompey  for  h*s  triumph.  He  himself 
gained  nothing  by  the  Roman  alliance  but  the 
recovery  of  Adiabene,  of  which  he  no  doubt  took 
possession  before  invading  Armenia  in  B.C.  66. 
When  he  attemped,  without  Pompey 's  permission,  to 
repeat  in  Gordyene  the  process  which  had  proved 
successful  on  the  other  side  of  the  Tigris,  Pompey  did 
not  scruple  to  resist  him  in  open  warfare — and  this 
notwithstanding  that  the  province  had  been  actually 
promised  to  him  as  the  price  of  his  alliance.  Phraates 
learnt  what  Roman  promises  were  worth,  when,  on 
seeking  to  repossess  himself  of  Gordyene,  he  was 
met  by  Pompey's  legate,  Afranius,  who,  at  the  head 
of  an  armed  force,  drove  his  troops  from  the  country, 
and  proceeded  to  deliver  it  into  the  hands  of  the 
Armenians.  Policy  might,  conceivably,  have  been 
pleaded  for  this  measure,  which  would  tend  to  weaken 
Parthia,  Rome's  most  formidable  rival  in  the  East, 
and  strengthen  Armenia,  Rome's  most  convenient 
ally,  against  her  ;  but  no  plea  of  policy  could  excuse 
the  useless  insult  offered  to  the  Parthian  monarch, 
when  Pompey  in  his  written  communications  refused 
him  his  generally  recognised  title  of  "  King  of 
Kings." 

There  can  be  little  doubt,  but  that,   at  this  time, 


HESITATION   OF  POMPEY.  141 

Pompey  was  balancing  in  his  mind,  with  an  inclina- 
tion to  the  affirmative  side,  the  question  whether  he 
should,  or  should  not,  declare  the  Parthian  prince,  a 
Roman  enemy,  and  direct  the  full  force  of  the 
Republic  against  him.  There  was  much  to  attract 
him  to  the  formation  of  such  a  decision.  His  military 
career  had  been  hitherto  without  a  reverse.  He  had 
great  confidence  in  his  good  fortune.  If  not  as 
ambitious  as  his  rival,  Julius,  he  was  at  any  rate 
thoroughly  desirous  of  posing  in  the  eyes  of  his 
countrymen  as  unmistakably  the  foremost  man  of 
his  day.  To  engage  a  new  enemy,  and  that  enemy 
the  recognised  successor  of  Assyria  and  Persia  in  the 
inheritance  of  the  Asian  continent,  to  tread  in  the 
steps  of  Alexander,  and  carry  the  arms  of  the  West 
to  the  shores  of  the  ocean  which  shut  in  the  world 
upon  the  East,  would  give  him  a  prestige  which 
would  elevate  him  far  above  all  rivals,  and  satisfy  all 
the  dreams  that  he  had  ever  entertained  of  distinc- 
tion and  glory.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  prudence 
counselled  abstention  from  a  risky  enterprise.  As 
the  war  had  not  been  formally  committed  to  him,  his 
enemies  at  Rome  would  make  his  having  entered 
upon  it  a  ground  of  accusation.  He  had  seen,  more- 
over, with  his  own  eyes,  that  the  Parthians  were  an 
enemy  far  from  despicable,  and  his  knowledge  of 
campaigning  told  him  that  success  against  them  was 
by  no  means  certain.  He  feared  to  risk  the  loss  of 
all  the  glory  which  he  had  hitherto  gained  by  grasp- 
ing greedily  at  more,  and  deemed  it  wiser  to  enjoy 
the  fruits  of  the  good  luck  which  had  hitherto 
attended  him  than  to  tempt  fortune  on  a  new  field. 


142  PIIRAATES   III.    AND    POMPEY. 

He  therefore,  after  hesitating  for  a  while,  determined 
finally  on  a  pacific  course.  He  would  not  allow  him- 
self to  be  provoked  into  hostilities  by  the  reproaches, 
the  dictatorial  words,  or  even  the  daring  acts  of  the 
Parthian  king.  When  Phraates  demanded  his  lost 
provinces,  he  replied,  that  the  question  of  borders  was 
one  which  lay,  not  between  Parthia  and  Rome,  but 
between  Parthia  and  Armenia.  When  he  laid  it 
down  that  the  Euphrates  properly  and  of  right 
bounded  the  Roman  territory,  and  charged  Pompey 
not  to  cross  it,  the  latter  said  he  would  keep  to  the 
just  bounds,  whatever  they  were.  When  Tigranes 
on  his  part  complained,  that,  after  having  been 
received  into  the  Roman  alliance,  he  was  still 
attacked  by  the  Parthian  armies,  the  reply  of  Pompey 
was,  that  he  was  quite  willing  to  appoint  arbitrators 
who  should  decide  all  the  disputes  between  the  two 
nations.  The  moderation  and  caution  of  these  answers 
proved  contagious.  On  hearing  them,  the  monarchs 
addressed  resolved  to  compose  their  differences,  or  at 
any  rate  to  defer  the  settlement  of  them  to  a  more 
convenient  time,  when  Rome  should  have  withdrawn 
from  the  neighbourhood.  They  accepted  Pompey's 
proposal  of  an  arbitration  ;  and  in  a  short  time  an 
arrangement  was  effected  by  which  relations  of  amity 
were  re-established  between  the  two  countries. 

With  the  retirement  of  Pompey  from  Asia  in  the 
year  B.C.  62,  the  East  settled  down  into  a  state  of 
comparative  tranquillity.  There  was  a  general  feel- 
ing that  time  was  necessary  to  recruit  the  strength 
exhausted  in  the  fierce  and  sanguinary  wars  of  the 
last    thirty    years,    and    a    general     impression     that 


MURDER   OF   PHRAATES   BY  HIS   SONS.         143 

further  contention  would  only  advantage  the  common 
enemy — Rome.  Rome  had  now  to  be  looked  upon 
as  a  permanent  neighbour,  securely  lodged  in  Cilicia, 
Syria,  and  Cappadocia,  biding  her  time,  and  at  any 
moment  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  false  step 
which  might  be  made  by  any  of  the  Asiatic  king- 
doms. Parthia,  as  having  the  most  to  lose,  had  the 
most  to  fear  ;  but  Armenia  was  still  more  exposed  to 
attack,  and  might  expect  to  be  assailed  first.  The 
other  minor  powers  could  only  hope  to  escape  de- 
struction by  remaining  quiet,  and  offering  no  provo- 
cation to  the  stronger  states  in  their  vicinity. 

But  external  tranquillity  in  Parthia  was  only  too 
apt  to  be  the  precursor  of  domestic  disturbance. 
Within  two  years  of  Pompey's  departure  from  Asia, 
a  conspiracy  was  formed  against  the  life  of  Phraates, 
which  resulted  in  his  assassination.  His  two  sons, 
Mithridates  and  Orodes,  plotted  and  effected  his 
destruction,  for  what  reason,  or  on  what  pretext,  we 
know  not.  Phraates  had  held  the  throne  during  a 
time  of  difficulty,  and  had  ruled,  if  not  with  signal 
success,  yet  on  the  whole  with  prudence  and  vigour. 
He  had  shown  himself  an  active  commander,  a  fair 
strategist,  a  successful  negotiator.  He  was  apparently 
in  the  full  possession  of  all  his  powers  and  faculties 
when  he  was  struck  down.  It  seems  as  if  the  motive 
of  the  parricide  must  have  been  mere  personal  ambi- 
tion, that  unnatural  longing  to  thrust  a  parent  from 
his  rightful  place  which  has  too  often  produced  such 
tragedies,  more  especially  in  the  East. 

Mithridates,  the  elder  son,  obtained  the  throne,  but 
scarcely  succeeded  in  establishing  himself  firmly  upon 


144  REIGN    OF  MITHRIDATES   III. 

it.  Very  early  in  his  reign  he  became  jealous  of  his 
brother  and  fellow-conspirator,  Orodes,  and  drove 
him  into  banishment ;  while  at  the  same  time  he 
treated  a  large  number  of  the  Parthian  nobles  with 
cruelty.  The  Megistanes  consequently  deposed  him, 
and  the  hereditary  commander-in-chief  brought  back 
Orodes  from  exile,  and  set  him  up  as  king  in  his 
brother's  room.  As  some  compensation  for  the  loss 
of  his  independent  sovereignty,  Mithridates  was  given 
the  government  of  the  important  province  of  Media 
Magna ;  and,  had  he  been  content  to  remain  in  this 
subordinate  position    he    might  probably  have  lived 


COIN   OF    MITHRIDATES   III. 


out  the  full  term  of  his  natural  life  in  peace  and  quiet- 
ness. But  there  are  temperaments  which  nothing  but 
actual  kingship  will  content,  after  they  have  once  had 
a  taste  of  it,  and  the  temperament  of  Mithridates 
would  appear  to  have  been  of  this  order.  He  was 
raising  an  army  with  a  view  to  the  recovery  of  his 
lost  throne,  when  Orodes,  having  become  aware  of 
his  intention,  marched  against  him,  and  crushed  his 
nascent  rebellion.  Mithridates  had  to  cross  the 
frontier,  and  place  himself  under  the  protection  of 
the  nearest  Roman  proconsul,  who  happened  to  be 
Gabinius,  governor  of  Syria,  who  had  obtained  his 
post  through   the    influence  of    Pompey.       Gabinius, 


MITHRIDATES   III.   AND   ORODES.  I45 

a  man  of  moderate  abilities,  but  of  vast  ambition, 
readily  received  the  fugitive,  and  for  a  time  contem- 
plated an  immediate  invasion  of  the  Parthian  territory, 
and  an  attempt  to  force  back  Mithri dates  upon  his 
unwilling  subjects.  The  expedition  would  probably 
have  taken  place,  had  it  not  happened  that,  just  at 
the  time,  the  Syrian  proconsul  received  another  invi- 
tation from  another  quarter,  which,  on  the  whole,  was 
more  tempting.  Ptolemy  Auletes  ("  the  Fluter "), 
expelled  from  Egypt  by  his  exasperated  subjects, 
having  obtained  the  countenance  and  patronage  of 
Pompey,  presented  himself  before  Gabinius  in  the 
spring  of  B.C.  55,  and  besought  his  powerful  assistance 
in  recovering  his  lost  kingdom.  The  price  which 
he  was  ready  to  pay  for  the  boon  named  was  a  sum 
nearly  equal  to  two  and  a  half  millions  of  our  money 
(twelve  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars).  This  offer 
dazzled  Gabinius,  and  almost  persuaded  him  ;  but 
the  opposition  made  by  his  officers  was  such  as  might 
perhaps  have  induced  him  to  decline  it,  had  not  the 
influence  of  the  young  Mark  Antony,  who  was  in  his 
camp,  been  exerted  in  favour  of  Auletes,  and  his 
representations  turned  the  scale  in  favour  of  the 
Egyptian  venture.  Mithridates,  whose  hopes  had 
been  raised  to  the  highest  pitch,  was  thus  left  to  bear 
as  he  might  his  cruel  disappointment.  It  is  surprising 
that  he  did  not  altogether  succumb.  But  it  would 
seem  that  he  still  fancied  he  saw  a  possible  chance  of 
success.  The  wild  Arab  tribes  recently  settled  by 
Tigranes  in  Mesopotamia  were  willing  to  espouse  his 
cause,  and  the  great  cities  of  Seleucia  and  Babylon 
appear  to  have  also  declared  in  his  favour.     Under 


146 


DEATH    OF   MITHR1 DATES   III. 


these  circumstances  he  threw  himself  into  Babylon, 
and  there  endured  a  long  siege  at  the  hands  of  his 
brother.  It  was  not  until  food  failed  the  garrison 
that  a  surrender  was  determined  on.  Then  at  last 
Mithridates,  trusting  that  the  ties  of  blood  would  be 
taken  into  consideration  by  his  adversary,  and  would 
cause  him  to  be  spared  the  usual  penalty  of  rebellion, 
allowed  himself  to  fall  alive  into  Orodes'  hands.  But 
fraternal  affection  was  not  strongly  developed  among 
the  Parthians.  Orodes,  having  declared  that  he 
placed  the  claims  of  country  above  those  of  kindred, 
caused  the  traitor  who  had  sought  aid  from  Rome  to 
be  instantly  executed  in  his  presence.  Such  was  the 
end  of  the  third  Mithridates,  a  weak  and  selfish 
prince,  with  whom  it  is  impossible  to  feel  any  sym- 
pathy. 


X. 


GREAT  EXPEDITION  OF  CRASSUS  AGAINST  PARTHIA, 
AND  ITS  FAILURE  —  RETALIATORY  RAID  OF 
PACORUS. 


CRASSUS — or,  to  give  him  his  full  name,  Marcus 
Licinius  Crassus — though  one  of  the  foremost  Romans 
of  his  day,  was  neither  a  great  man,  nor  a  great  com- 
mander. Sprung  from  a  noble  stock,  and  the  son  of 
a  respectable  father,  he  first  became  noted  for  his 
skill  and  success  in  money-getting,  an  employment 
to  which  for  many  years  he  devoted  all  his  energies, 
and  which  he  pursued  with  an  ardour  and  persever- 
ance that  made  success  certain.  The  times  were 
favourable  for  the  quick  accumulation  of  a  fortune 
by  commercial  methods.  The  civil  struggles,  through 
which  Rome  was  passing,  were  accompanied  by  a 
continual  succession  of  forfeitures,  confiscations,  and 
forced  sales,  which  gave  an  opportunity,  even  for 
moderate  capitalists,  within  a  comparatively  short 
space,  by  judicious  investments,  to  become  men  of 
large  wealth.  Crassus  allowed  no  considerations  of 
compassion,  or  friendship,  or  delicacy  to  hamper  him 
in  his  bargains  ;  and  the  result  was  that  in  course  of 
time  he  came  to  be  the  legal  owner  of  the  greater 


148  EXPEDITION    OF   CRASSUS. 

portion  of  the  soil  on  which  Rome  was  built.  His 
other  possessions  were  in  proportion.  He  had  mines 
which  were  rich  and  productive,  fertile  and  well-culti- 
vated estates,  and,  above  all,  an  enormous  number  of 
valuable  slaves.  His  own  estimate  of  the  worth  of 
his  property,  shortly  before  he  started  on  his  expedi- 
tion, rated  it  at  above  seven  thousand  talents,  or  more 
than  a  million  and  seven  hundred  thousand  English 
pounds. 

In  Rome — or  at  any  rate  in  the  Rome  of  this  time 
— wealth  led,  almost  of  necessity,  to  political  distinc- 
tion. An  enormous  expenditure  was  needed  in  order 
to  obtain  the  highest  offices  of  the  state,  and  these 
offices  became  naturally  the  objects  of  contention 
among  the  most  opulent  men.  The  wealth  of  Crassus 
thrust  him  into  a  prominent  position,  and  the  position 
gradually  awoke  in  him  those  ambitious  longings 
which  do  not  seem  to  have  troubled  him  during  his 
youth.  After  a  time  he  began  to  court  popularity, 
and  to  endeavour  to  outshine  the  other  political 
favourites  of  the  hour.  He  came  forward  as  a  pleader 
in  the  courts,  undertook  causes  which  others  declined, 
and  showed  himself  especially  zealous  and  pains- 
taking. He  threw  his  house  open  to  all,  lent  money 
freely  to  his  friends  without  requiring  interest,  and 
exercised  a  wide,  if  not  a  lavish,  hospitality.  In  this 
way  he  crept  on  into  office,  and  by  degrees  worked 
his  way  up  to  the  highest  grades.  There,  the  talents 
that  he  displayed,  without  being  brilliant,  were  re- 
spectable. He  came  to  be  reckoned  shrewd  and  safe. 
At  last,  he  was  put  on  a  par  with  the  highest  candi- 
dates   for  political    power,  and,  though    really   quite 


CAREER   AND   CHARACTER    OF   CRASSUS.        I49 

undeserving  of  the  position,  was  "  bracketed  "  with 
Caesar  and  Pompey  in  the  so-called  "  First  Trium- 
virate." The  consulship  followed  (B.C.  55)  as  a  matter 
of  course,  and  when,  on  the  lots  being  cast,  Syria 
came  out  as  his  "  province,"  Crassus  found  himself 
exalted  to  what  was,  practically,  the  first  position  in 
the  state. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that,  for  many  long 
years,  the  ambition  of  Crassus,  and  his  jealousy  of 
the  other  chief  political  leaders,  especially  of  Pompey 
and  Caesar,  had  been  growing  and  expanding.  It 
was  particularly  in  military  renown  that  their  repu- 
tation excelled  his  ;  and  it  was  consequently  in  this 
respect  that  he  was  most  anxious  to  place  himself  on 
their  level,  if  not  even,  as  he  hoped,  to  excel  and  out- 
do them.  In  the  position  now  assigned  him  he 
thought  he  saw  his  opportunity.  The  project  of 
Gabinius  had  got  wind,  and  it  had  flashed  upon  the 
imagination  of  Crassus  how  grand  a  thing  it  would 
be  to  reduce  under  the  dominion  of  Rome  a  wholly 
new  country,  and  that  country  the  seat  of  ancient 
empires,  and  the  scene  of  the  highest  triumphs  of 
Alexander.  Like  many  another  man  of  dull  and 
plodding  temper,  Crassus  no  sooner  allowed  the  desire 
of  glory  to  get  a  hold  on  him,  than  his  unstable  mind 
was  carried  all  lengths,  and  indulged  in  flights  of  the 
most  wild  and  irrational  character.  Instead  of  wait- 
ing till  he  had  reached  his  province,  and  examined 
into  the  position  of  affairs,  before  deciding  how  he 
would  act,  or  what  enterprise  he  would  undertake, 
Crassus  immediately  began  to  boast  among  his  friends 
of  his  designs  and  intentions.      He  spoke  of  the  wars 


150  EXPEDITION    OF   CRASSUS. 

which  Lucullus  had  waged  against  Tigranes  and 
Pompey  against  Mithridates  of  Pontus  as  mere  child's 
play,  and  declared  that  he  was  not  going  to  con- 
tent himself  with  such  paltry  conquests  as  had  satis- 
fied them  ;  Syria  did  not  bound  his  horizon,  no,  nor 
Parthia  either  ;  it  was  his  intention  to  carry  the  Roman 
arms  to  Bactria,  India,  and  the  Eastern  Ocean.  The 
more  prudent  among  the  statesmen  of  the  Republic 
remonstrated,  but  in  vain.  His  friends  and  flatterers 
applauded  and  encouraged  him.  Even  Caesar,  nothing 
loth  to  help  towards  the  downfall  of  a  reputation, 
wrote  to  him  from  Gaul  to  fan  the  flame  of  his 
ambition  and  stimulate  his  hopes.  Crassus  hurried 
on  his  preparations,  and,  though  the  tribune  Ateius 
endeavoured  to  deter  him  by  a  solemn  curse,  and 
even,  had  the  other  tribunes  permitted,  would  have 
arrested  his  steps  at  the  city  gates,  left  Rome  some 
weeks  before  his  consulship  had  expired,  and,  despis- 
ing alike  warnings  and  omens,  set  sail  with  a  large 
fleet  from  Brundusium. 

^he  journey  of  Crassus  from  Brundusium  to  the 
Et    hrates  was  prosperous  on  the  whole  and  unevent- 
ful.    He  lost  a  certain  number  of  his  transports  in 
ing  the  Adriatic,  which,  as  it  was  already  mid- 
:mber,  was  not  surprising.     Landing  at  Dyrrha- 
1,  he  passed  through  Macedonia  and  Thrace  to 
t:       Hellespont,  and  thence  through  Asia  Minor  into 
Syi.     where  he  established  himself  at  Antioch.     On 
his   way  he  fell  in  with  an  old  Roman  ally,  Deiotarus, 
King  of  Galatia,  who  happened  to  be  building  a  new 
city  on    his    line   of  route.      As    Deiotarus   was    far 
advanced  in   years,  Crassus,  forgetting  his  own  age, 


PREPARATIONS   OF    ORODES.  151 

indulged  in  a  joke  at  his  expense :  "  You  begin  to 
build,  Prince,"  he  said,  "  rather  late  in  the  day  "  ; — 
whereto  the  other  replied  with  the  retort :  "  And  you, 
too,  Commander,  are  not  beginning  very  early  in  the 
morning  to  attack  the  Parthians." 

During  the  time  that  Crassus  was  making  his 
preparations  at  Rome,  and  the  further  time  that  he 
spent  upon  his  march,  Orodes,  the  Parthian  monarch, 
had  an  ample  space  for  forming  his  general  plan  of 
campaign  at  his  leisure,  and  making  ready  to  receive 


COIN   OF   ORODES    I. 


his  enemy.  Not  only  was  he  able  to  collect  his  native 
troops  from  all  parts  of  the  empire,  and  to  arm,  train, 
and  exercise  them,  but  he  had  an  opportunity  of  gain- 
ing over  certain  chiefs  upon  his  borders,  who  had 
hitherto  held  a  semi-independent  position,  and  might 
have  been  expected  to  welcome  the  Romans.  The 
most  important  of  these  was  Abgarus,  prince  of 
Osrhoene,  or  the  tract  lying  east  of  the  Euphrates 
about  the  city  of  Edessa,  who  had  been  received  into 
the  Roman  alliance  by  Pompey,  and  was  thought  by 
the  Romans  generally  to  be  well  disposed  to  their 
cause.      Orodes,  however,  persuaded  him,  while  still 


152  EXPEDITION   OF    CRASSUS. 

remaining  professedly  a  Roman  ally,  to  give  in  secret 
his  best  services  to  the  Parthian  side.  Another  chief, 
Alchandonius,  an  Arab  sheikh  of  these  parts,  who  had 
made  his  submission  to  Rome  even  earlier,  becoming 
convinced  that  Parthia  was  the  stronger  power  of 
the  two,  was  at  the  same  time  gained  over.  Orodes 
held  himself  on  the  defensive,  covering  the  important 
cities  of  Seleucia  and  Babylon  with  his  troops,  and 
waiting  to  see  in  what  way  Crassus  would  develop 
his  attack,  and  by  what  route  he  would  advance  into 
the  interior. 

The  proconsul  was  at  first  in  no  hurry.  His  old  lust  of 
gain  came  upon  him,  and  after  contenting  himself  with 
a  mere  reconnaissance  in  Mesopotamia,  where  he 
defeated  a  Parthian  satrap  at  Ichnae  on  the  Belik,  and 
received  the  voluntary  submission  of  a  number  of 
small  Greek  towns,  which  he  garrisoned,  he  retraced 
his  steps  ere  the  year  was  half  out,  and  gave  himself 
up  to  a  series  of  discreditable  but  "very  lucrative" 
transactions.  At  Hierapolis,  or  Bambyce,  where  was 
a  famous  temple  of  the  Syrian  goddess,  Atergatis 
or  Derketo,  he  entered  the  shrine,  carefully  weighed 
all  the  offerings  in  the  precious  metals,  and  then 
ruthlessly  carried  them  off.  Having  tidings  of  the 
treasures  still  remaining  in  the  Sanctuary  of  Jehovah 
at  Jerusalem,  notwithstanding  Pompey's  sacrilege,  he 
paid  the  city  a  visit  for  the  mere  purpose  of  plunder, 
rifled  the  sacred  treasury,  carried  off  the  golden  orna- 
ments, and  possessed  himself  by  a  perjury  of  a  beam 
of  solid  gold  of  750  pounds  weight.  In  the  other 
cities  and  states  he  professed  to  make  requisitions  of 
men  and  supplies,  but  let  it  be  understood  that  in  all 


PROPOSAL   MADE   BY  ARTAVASDES.  153 

cases  he  was  willing  to  accept,  instead,  a  composition  in 
money.  One  Greek  town  in  Mesopotamia,  which  re- 
sisted his  arms,  he  took  by  storm  and  sacked,  after- 
wards selling  all  the  inhabitants,  who  survived  the 
sack,  as  slaves. 

Thus  passed  the  autumn  and  winter  of  B.C.  54. 
The  spring  of  B.C.  53  arrived,  and  the  avaricious  pro- 
consul began  to  see  that  he  must  absolutely  do  some- 
thing to  justify  his  high  boasts.  Caesar  had  sent  him 
from  Gaul  his  eldest  son,  a  gallant  youth  and  good 
officer,  who  was  burning  to  distinguish  himself;  and 
his  quaestor,  C.  Cassius  Longinus,  was  also  a  captain 
of  repute,  who  would  have  been  ashamed  to  return  to 
Rome  without  having  fleshed  his  sword  upon  some 
worthier  enemy  than  a  handful  of  miserable  Greek 
colonists.  Artavasdes  too,  the  Armenian  king,  the  son 
of  the  younger  Tigranes,  was  anxious  that  so  large  a 
Roman  army  as  had  been  collected,  should  not  quit  the 
neighbourhood  without  striking  Parthia  a  blow  that 
might  seriously  weaken,  if  not  even  permanently 
cripple  her.  With  the  first  appearance  of  spring  he 
came  into  the  camp  of  Crassus,  and  made  him  the 
offer  of  all  the  resources  of  his  country.  He  promised 
the  assistance  of  sixteen  thousand  cavalry,  of  whom 
ten  thousand  should  be  equipped  in  complete  armour, 
and  of  thirty  thousand  infantry,  at  the  same  time 
strongly  urging  Crassus  to  direct  his  march  through 
his  own  friendly  territories,  well  supplied  with  water 
and  provisions,  and  abounding  with  hills  and  streams, 
suited  to  baffle  the  manoeuvres  of  the  terrible  Parthian 
horsemen.  A  march  through  Southern  Armenia  would 
conduct  to  the  head  streams  of  the  Tigris,  whence 


154  EXPEDITION    OF   CRASSUS. 

there  was  an  easy  route  through  a  fertile  and  practi- 
cable country  down  the  course  of  the  river  to  Seleucia- 
Ctesiphon,  the  double  Parthian  capital.  Seleucia 
might  be  expected  to  welcome  the  Romans  as  libera- 
tors ;  and  there  were  other  Grecian  cities  upon  the 
route  that  might  lend  important  aid.  The  Armenian 
proposals  had  much  that  was  tempting  about  them, 
and  there  were  not  wanting  some,  among  the  more 
sober  of  the  proconsul's  advisers,  to  recommend  their 
acceptance ;  but  he  himself  felt  hampered  by  the 
situation  into  which  he  had  brought  himself  by  his 
movements  of  the  preceding  year,  which  had  led  to 
his  placing  garrisons  in  the  various  cities  of  Osrhoene, 
whom  he  could  not  now  leave  to  the  tender  mercies  of 
the  enemy.  He  therefore  felt  compelled  to  decline  the 
offers  of  Artavasdes  ;  and  it  was  probably  with  some 
feeling  of  offence  that  that  prince  quitted  his  camp 
and  returned  hastily  to  his  own  country. 

On  the  part  of  Orodes  no  important  movement  was 
made  during  the  winter  season  except  his  despatch  of 
an  embassy  to  the  proconsul,  which  seems  to  have 
been  intended  rather  to  exasperate  him  than  to 
induce  him  to  forego  his  attack.  The  Parthian 
monarch,  it  may  be  suspected,  had  begun  to  despise 
his  enemy.  He  would  naturally  compare  him  with 
Lucullus  and  Pompey,  and  when  the  whole  of  the 
first  year  passed  by  without  anything  more  important 
being  undertaken  then  a  raid  into  an  outlying  province 
and  the  occupation  of  few  insignificant  and  disaffected 
towns,  he  would  begin  to  understand  that  a  Roman 
army,  like  any  other,  was  formidable  or  the  reverse, 
according  as  it  was  ably  or  feebly  commanded.      He 


ORODES    TAUNTS   HIS   ADVERSARY.  155 

would  know  that  Crassus  was  a  sexagenarian,  and  may 
have  heard  that  he  had  never  yet  shown  himself  a 
captain  or  even  a  soldier.  Perhaps  he  almost  doubtec1 
whether  the  proconsul  had  any  real  intention  of  pres- 
sing the  contest  to  a  decision,  and  might  not  rather  be 
expected,  when  he  had  enriched  himself  and  his  troops 
with  Mesopotamia!!  plunder,  to  withdraw  his  garrisons 
across  the  Euphrates.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Orodes,  in  the  early  spring,  sent  an  embassy  to  the 
Roman  camp,  with  a  message  which  was  well  calcu- 
lated to  stir  to  action  the  most  sluggish  and  poor- 
spirited  of  commanders.  "  If  the  war,"  said  his 
envoys,  "  was  really  waged  by  Rome,  it  must  be  fought 
out  to  the  bitter  end.  But  if,  as  they  had  good  reason 
to  believe,  Crassus,  against  the  wish  of  his  country,  had 
attacked  Parthia  and  seized  her  territory  for  his  own 
private  gain,  Arsaces  wrould  be  moderate.  He  would 
have  pity  on  the  advanced  years  of  the  proconsul, 
and  would  give  the  Romans  back  those  men  of  theirs, 
who  were  not  so  much  keeping  watch  in  Mesopotamia 
as  having  watch  kept  on  them."  Crassus,  stung  with 
the  taunt,  made  the  answer  so  significant  of  the  pride 
that  goes  before  a  fall — "  He  would  give  the  ambassa- 
dors his  response  in  their  capital."  Wagises,  the  chief 
envoy,  prepared  for  some  such  exhibition  of  feeling, 
and  glad  to  heap  taunt  on  taunt,  replied,  striking  the 
palm  of  one  hand  with  the  fingers  of  the  other : 
"  Hairs  will  grow  here,  Crassus,  before  you  see 
Seleucia." 

Soon  after  this,  before  the  winter  could  well  be  said 
to  be  over,  the  offensive  was  taken  against  the  Roman 
garrisons  and  adherents  in  Mesopotamia.     The  towns 


156  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

occupied  were  attacked  by  the  Parthians  in  force, 
and  though  it  does  not  seem  that  any  of  them  were 
recovered,  yet  all  of  them  were  menaced,  and  all 
suffered  considerably.  The  more  timid  of  the  de- 
fenders made  their  escape  from  some  of  them  and 
brought  to  the  Roman  camp  an  exaggerated  account 
of  the  difficulties  of  Parthian  warfare.  "  The  enemy," 
they  said,  "  were  so  rapid  in  their  movements  that  it 
was  impossible  either  to  overtake  them  when  they  fled 
or  to  escape  them  when  they  pursued  ;  their  arrows 
sped  faster  than  sight  could  follow,  and  penetrated 
every  kind  of  defence,  while  their  mail-clad  horsemen 
had  weapons  that  would  pierce  through  any  armour, 
and  armour  that  defied  the  thrust  of  every  weapon." 
Considerable  alarm  was  excited  by  these  rumours,  an 
alarm  which  was  reflected  in  the  reports  of  unfavour- 
able omens  issuing  from  the  augural  staff-,  but  the 
proconsul  had  by  this  time  made  up  his  mind  that 
something  must  be  risked,  and  that  he  could  not  face 
the  storm  of  ridicule  that  would  meet  him  at  Rome, 
if  he  did  not  fight  at  least  one  great  battle. 

A  second  campaign  was  therefore  resolved  upon  ; 
but  it  still  remained  to  determine  the  line  of  march. 
Armenia  had  been  already  rejected,  partly  as  too  cir- 
cuitous and  involving  an  unnecessary  waste  of  time, 
but  mainly  as  implying  the  desertion,  and  so  the  sacri- 
fice, of  the  troops  which  to  the  number  of  eight  thou- 
sand had  been  left  in  Mesopotamia  the  year  before. 
Crassus  felt  bound  to  support  his  garrisons,  and  so  to 
make  Mesopotamia,  and  not  Armenia,  the  basis  of  his 
operations.  But  there  were  several  lines  of  route 
through  Mesopotamia.   In  the  first  place,  there  was  the 


HIS  ADVANCE    THROUGH   MESOPOTAMIA.      157 

line  best  known  to  the  Greeks,  and  through  them 
best  known  to  the  Romans — that  of  the  Euphrates — 
which  had  been  pursued  by  Cyrus  the  Younger  in  the 
expedition  against  his  brother,  whereon  he  had  been 
accompanied  by  the  Ten  Thousand.  Along  this  line 
water  would  be  plentiful  ;  forage  and  other  supplies 
might  be  counted  on  to  a  certain  extent  ;  and  the  ad- 
vancing army,  resting  its  right  upon  the  river,  could 
not  be  surrounded.  Another  was  that  which  Alexan- 
der had  taken  against  Darius  Codomannus — the  line 
along  the  foot  of  the  Mons.  Masius  (Karajah  Dagh), 
by  Edessa  and  Nisibis  to  Nineveh.  Here,  too,  water 
and  supplies  would  have  been  readily  procurable,  and 
by  clinging  to  the  skirts  of  the  hills  the  Roman 
infantry  would  have  been  able  to  set  the  Parthian 
cavalry  at  defiance.  Between  these  two  extreme 
courses  to  the  right  and  to  the  left,  were  numerous 
slightly  divergent  lines  across  the  Mesopotamian  plain, 
all  of  them  shorter  than  either  of  the  two  above- 
mentioned  routes,  and  none  offering  any  great  advan- 
tage over  the  remainder. 

The  original  inclination  of  Crassus  seems  to  have 
been  to  follow  in  the  track  of  the  Ten  Thousand.  He 
crossed  the  Euphrates  at  Zeugma  (Bir  or  Birehjik),  in 
about  latitude  37°  at  the  head  of  seven  legions,  four 
thousand  cavalry,  and  an  equal  number  of  slingers 
and  archers,  and  at  first  began  his  march  along  the 
river  bank.  No  enemy  appeared  in  sight ;  and  his 
scouts  brought  him  word  that  there  was  none  to  be 
seen  for  a  long  distance  in  front ;  the  only  traces  that 
appeared  were  numerous  tracks  of  horses  in  rapid 
retreat  before  his  advancing  squadrons.      The  news 


158  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

was  considered  to  be  good,  and  the  soldiers  marched 
forward  cheerfully.  The  same  direction  was  main- 
tained ;  but  presently,  Abgarus,  the  Osrhoenian  sheikh, 
made  his  appearance,  and  had  a  conference  with  the 
proconsul,  wherein  he  professed  the  most  friendly  feel- 
ings, and  strongly  recommended  an  entire  change  of 
tactics.  "  The  Parthians,"  he  said,  "  did  not  intend  to 
make  a  stand  ;  they  might  do  so  later,  when  the  king 
had  collected  all  his  forces  ;  but  at  present  they  were 
demoralised,  and  were  thinking  only  of  quitting  Meso- 
potamia, and  flying  with  their  treasures  to  the  remote 
regions  of  Hyrcania  and  Scythia.  The  king  was 
already  far  away  ;  the  main  host  was  in  full  retreat  ; 
only  a  rearguard  under  a  couple  of  generals,  Surenas 
and  Sillaces,  still  lingered  in  Mesopotamia,  and  might 
be  within  striking  distance.  Crassus  should  give  up  his 
cautious  proceedings,  and  hurry  on  at  his  best  speed  ; 
he  would  then  probably  succeed  in  overtaking  and 
cutting  to  pieces  the  rearguard  of  the  great  army, 
a  flying  multitude  encumbered  with  baggage,  which 
would  furnish  a  rich  spoil  to  the  victors."  The  crafty 
Osrhoenian  was  believed  ;  and,  though  Cassius  with 
some  other  officers  is  said  to  have  still  counselled 
a  more  cautious  advance,  the  proconsul  resolved  on 
giving  himself  up  to  the  guidance  of  "  the  Bedouin," 
and  altering  the  direction  of  the  march  in  accordance 
with  his  recommendations.  Accordingly,  he  turned 
off  from  the  Euphrates,  and  proceeded  eastward  over 
the  swelling  hills  and  dry  gravelly  plains  of  Upper 
Mesopotamia. 

Here  we  shall  leave  him  for  the  present,  while  we 
consider  the  real  disposition  of  his  forces  which  the 


ARRANGEMENTS    MADE    BY  ORODES.  159 

Parthian  monarch  had  made  to  meet  the  impending 
attack.  Me  had,  as  already  stated,  come  to  terms 
with  his  outlying  vassals,  the  prince  of  Osrhoene  and 
the  sheikh  of  the  Scenite  Arabs,  and  had  engaged 
especially  the  services  of  the  former  against  his  as- 
sailant. He  had  further,  on  considering  the  various 
possibilities  of  the  campaign,  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  would  be  best  to  divide  his  forces,  and  while 
himself  attacking  Artavasdes  in  the  mountain  fast- 
nesses of  his  own  country,  to  commit  the  task  of 
meeting  and  coping  with  the  Romans  to  a  general  of 
approved  talents.  It  was  of  the  greatest  possible 
importance  to  prevent  the  Armenians  from  effecting  a 
junction  with  the  Romans,  and  strengthening  them  in 
that  arm  in  which  they  were  especially  deficient,  the 
cavalry.  Probably  nothing  short  of  an  invasion  of  his 
kingdom  by  the  Parthian  monarch  in  person  would 
have  prevented  Artavasdes  from  detaching  a  portion 
of  his  troops  to  act  in  Mesopotamia.  And  no  doubt 
it  is  also  true  that  Orodes  had  great  confidence  in  his 
general,  whom  he  may  even  have  felt  to  be  a  better 
commander  than  himself.  Surenas,  as  we  must  call 
him,  since  his  personal  appellation  has  not  come  down 
to  us,  was  in  all  respects  a  person  of  the  highest  con- 
sideration. He  was  the  second  man  in  the  kingdom 
for  birth,  wealth,  and  reputation.  In  courage  and 
ability  he  excelled  all  his  countrymen  ;  and  he  had 
the  physical  advantages  of  commanding  height,  and 
great  personal  beauty.  When  he  went  to  battle,  he 
was  accompanied  by  a  train  of  a  thousand  camels, 
which  carried  his  baggage ;  and  the  concubines  in 
attendance  on  him  required  for  their  conveyance  as 


l6o  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

many  as  two  hundred  chariots.  A  thousand  mail- 
clad  horsemen,  and  a  still  larger  number  of  light- 
armed,  formed  his  body-guard.  At  the  coronation  of 
a  Parthian  monarch,  it  was  his  hereditary  right  to 
place  the  diadem  on  the  brow  of  the  new  sovereign. 
When  Orodes  was  driven  into  banishment,  it  was  he 
who  had  brought  him  back  to  Parthia  in  triumph. 
When  Seleucia  revolted,  it  was  he  who  at  the  assault 
had  first  mounted  the  breach,  and  striking  terror  into 
the  defenders,  had  taken  the  city.  Though  less  than 
thirty  years  of  age  when  he  was  appointed  com- 
mander, he  was  believed  to  possess,  besides  these 
various  qualifications,  consummate  prudence  and 
sagacity. 

The  force  which  Orodes  committed  to  his  brave  and 
skilful  lieutenant  consisted  entirely  of  horse.  This 
was  not  the  ordinary  character  of  a  Parthian  army, 
which  often  comprised  four  or  five  times  as  many 
cavalry  as  infantry.  Whether  it  was  to  any  extent 
the  result  of  his  own  selection  and  military  insight,  is 
uncertain.  Perhaps  fortunate  accident  rather  than 
profound  calculation  brought  about  the  sole  employ- 
ment against  the  Romans  of  the  cavalry  arm.  Horse 
would  be  wholly  useless  in  the  rugged  and  mountainous 
Armenia,  while  they  would  act  with  effect  in  the  com- 
paratively open  and  level  Mesopotamian  region.  Foot- 
men,on  the  other  hand,  were  essential  for  the  Armenian 
war,  and  perhaps  the  king  thought  that  he  needed 
as  many  as  he  could  collect.  In  this  case  he  would 
naturally  take  with  him  the  whole  of  the  infantry,  and 
leave  his  general  the  troops  which  were  not  required 
for  his  own  operations.  It  certainly  does  not  appear, 
that  Surenas  was  allowed  any  choice  in  the  matter. 


PARTHIAN  FORCE    OPPOSED    TO   HIM.  l6l 

The  Parthian  horse,  like  the  Persian,  was  of  two 
kinds,  standing  in  strong  contrast  the  one  to  the 
other.  The  bulk  of  their  cavalry  was  of  the  lightest 
and  most  agile  description.  Fleet  and  active  coursers, 
with  scarcely  any  caparison  but  a  headstall  and  a 
single  rein,  were  mounted  by  riders  clad  only  in  a 
tunic  and  trousers,  and  armed  with  nothing  but  a 
strong  bow  and  a  quiver  full  of  arrows.  A  training 
begun  in  early  boyhood  and  continued  through  youth 
made  the  rider  almost  one  with  his  steed  ;  and  he 
could  use  his  weapons  with  equal  ease  and  effect 
whether  his  horse  was  stationary  or  at  full  gallop,  or 
whether  he  was  advancing  towards  or  hurriedly  re- 
treating from  his  enemy.  His  supply  of  missiles  was 
practically  inexhaustible,  since  when  he  found  his 
quiver  empty,  he  had  only  to  retire  a  short  distance 
and  replenish  his  stock  from  magazines,  borne  on  the 
backs  of  camels,  in  the  rear.  It  was  his  ordinary  plan 
to  keep  constantly  in  motion  when  in  the  presence  of 
an  enemy,  to  gallop  backwards  and  forwards,  or 
round  and  round  his  square  or  column,  never  charging 
it,  but  at  a  moderate  interval  plying  it  with  his  keen 
and  barbed  shafts  ;  which  were  driven  by  a  practised 
hand  from  a  bow  of  unusual  strength.  Clouds  of  this 
light  cavalry  enveloped  the  advancing  or  retreating 
foe,  and  inflicted  grievous  damage,  without,  for  the 
most  part,  suffering  anything  in  return. 

But  this  was  not  the  whole,  nor  the  worst.  In  ad- 
dition to  these  light  troops,  a  Parthian  army  contained 
always  a  body  of  heavy  cavalry,  armed  on  an  entirely 
different  system.  The  strong  chargers  selected  for  this 
service  were  clad  almost  wholly  in  mail.     Their  head, 


1 62  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

neck,  chest,  even  their  sides  and  flanks,  were  protected 
by  scale-armour  of  bronze  or  iron,  sewn  probably  upon 
leather.  Their  riders  had  cuirasses  and  cuisses  of  the 
same  materials,  and  helmets  of  burnished  iron.  For 
an  offensive  weapon  they  carried  a  long  and  strong 
spear  or  pike.  They  formed  a  serried  line  in  battle, 
bearing  down  with  great  weight  on  the  enemy  whom 
they  attacked,  and  standing  firm  as  an  iron  wall 
against  the  charges  that  were  made  upon  them.  A 
cavalry,  answering  to  this  in  some  respects,  had  been 
employed  by  the  later  Persian  monarchs,  and  was  in 
use  also  among  the  Armenians  at  this  period  ;  but 
the  Parthian  pike  appears  to  have  been  considerably 
more  formidable  than  the  corresponding  weapon  borne 
by  either  of  these  nations. 

As  compared  with  these  troops,  the  Romans,  as 
Mommsen  observes,  were  thoroughly  inferior  both  in 
respect  of  number  and  of  excellence.  Their  infantry 
of  the  line,  excellent  as  they  were  in  close  combat, 
whether  at  a  short  distance  with  the  heavy  javelin,  or 
in  hand-to-hand  combat  with  the  sword,  could  not 
compel  an  army  consisting  wholly  of  cavalry  to  come  to 
an  engagement  with  them  ;  and  they  found,  even  when 
they  did  come  to  a  hand-to-hand  conflict,  an  equal 
or  superior  adversary  in  the  iron-clad  hosts  of  lancers. 
As  compared  with  a  force  like  that  of  Surenas,  the 
Roman  army  was  at  a  disadvantage  strategically,  be- 
cause the  cavalry  commanded  the  communications  ; 
and  at  a  disadvantage  tactically,  because  every  weapon 
of  close  combat  must  succumb  to  that  which  is  wielded 
from  a  distance,  unless  the  struggle  becomes  an  in- 
dividual   one  man   against  man.      The   concentrated 


HTS   ARMY   AT  A    DISADVANTAGE.  163 

position,  on  which  the  whole  Roman  method  of  war 
was  based,  increased  the  danger  in  the  presence  of 
such  an  attack,  since  the  closer  the  ranks  of  the 
Roman  column,  the  less  could  the  missiles  fail  to  hit 
their  mark.  Under  ordinary  circumstances,  where 
towns  have  to  be  defended,  and  difficulties  of  the 
ground  have  to  be  considered,  such  a  system  of  opera- 
ting with  mere  cavalry  against  infantry  could  never 
be  completely  carried  out ;  but  in  the  Mesopotamian 
plain  region,  where  an  army  was  almost  like  a  ship  on 
the  high  seas,  neither  encountering  an  obstacle,  nor 
meeting  with  a  basis  for  strategic  dispositions  during 
many  days'  march,  this  mode  of  warfare  was  irresistible 
for  the  very  reason  that  circumstances  allowed  it  to  be 
developed  there  in  all  its  purity  and  therefore  in  all  its 
power.  TJiere  everything  combined  to  put  the  foreign 
infantry  at  a  disadvantage  against  the  native  cavalry. 
Where  the  heavily-laden  Roman  foot  soldier  dragged 
himself  toilsomely  over  the  steppe,  and  perished  from 
hunger,  or  still  more  from  thirst,  on  a  route  marked 
only  by  water-springs  that  were  far  apart  and  difficult 
to  find,  the  Parthian  horseman,  accustomed  from  child- 
hood to  sit  on  his  fleet  steed  or  camel,  nay,  almost  to 
spend  his  life  in  the  saddle,  easily  traversed  the  desert, 
whose  hardships  he  had  long  learned  how  to  lighten, 
and  in  case  of  need  to  bear.  There  no  rain  fell  to 
mitigate  the  intolerable  heat,  and  to  slacken  the  bow- 
strings and  leathern  thongs  of  the  enemy's  archers  and 
slingers  ;  there  in  the  light  soil  of  some  places  ordinary 
ditches  and  ramparts  could  hardly  be  formed  for  the 
camp.  Imagination  can  hardly. conceive  a  situation  in 
which  all  the  military  advantages  were  more  on  the 


164  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

one  side,  and  all  the  disadvantages  more  thoroughly  on 
the  other. 

The  force  entrusted  by  Orodes  to  Surenas  com- 
prised cavalry  of  both  the  kinds  above  described.  No 
estimate  is  given  us  of  their  number  ;  but,  as  they  are 
called  "  a  vast  multitude,"  and  "  an  immense  body," 
we  may  assume  that  it  was  considerable.  At  any  rate 
it  was  sufficient  to  induce  him  to  make  a  movement 
in  advance — to  cross  the  Sinjar  range  and  the  river 
Khabour,  and  take  up  his  position  in  the  country  be- 
tween that  stream  and  the  Belik — instead  of  merely 
seeking  to  cover  the  capital.  The  presence  of  the 
traitor,  Abgarus,  in  the  camp  of  Crassus,  became  now 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  Parthian  commander. 
Abgarus,  fully  trusted  by  the  Romans,  and  at  the  head 
of  a  body  of  light  horse,  admirably  adapted  for  out- 
post servic  >,  was  allowed,  upon  his  own  request,  to 
scour  the  country  in  front  of  the  advancing  legions, 
and  had  thus  the  means  of  communicating  freely  with 
the  Parthian  chief.  He  kept  Surenas  informed  of  all  the 
movements  and  intentions  of  Crassus,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  suggested  to  Crassus  such  a  line  of  route 
as  suited  the  views  and  designs  of  his  adversary.  Our 
chief  authority  for  the  details  of  the  expedition,  Plu- 
tarch, tells  us,  that  he  led  the  Roman  troops  through 
an  arid  and  trackless  desert,  across  plains  without  tree, 
or  shrub,  or  even  grass,  where  the  soil  was  composed 
of  a  light  shifting  sand,  which  the  wind  raised  into  a 
succession  of  hillocks  that  resembled  the  waves  of  an 
interminable  sea  The  soldiers,  he  says,  fainted  with 
the  heat  and  with  the  drought,  while  the  audacious 
Osrhoenian  scoffed  at  their  complaints  and  reproach^- 


THE   DISADVANTAGE   EXAGGERATED.  165 

asking  them  whether  they  expected  to  find  the  border- 
tract  between  Arabia  and  Assyria  a  country  of  cool 
streams  and  shady  groves,  of  baths  and  hostelries,  like 
their  own  delicious  Campania.  But  our  knowledge  of 
the  real  geographical  character  of  the  region  through 
which  the  march  lay  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to 
accept  this  account  as  true.  The  country  between  the 
Euphrates  and  the  Belik  is  one  of  alternate  hill  and 
plain,  neither  destitute  of  trees,  nor  very  ill-provided 
with  water.  The  march  through  it  can  have  presented 
no  very  great  difficulties.  All  that  Abgarus  could  do  to 
serve  the  Parthian  cause  was,  first,  to  induce  Crassus 
to  trust  himself  to  the  open  country  instead  of  cling- 
ing either  to  a  river  or  to  the  mountains  ;  and,  secondly, 
to  bring  him,  after  a  hasty  march,  and  in  the  full  heat 
of  the  day,  into  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  Both 
these  things  he  contrived  to  effect ;  and  Surenas  was, 
no  doubt,  so  far  beholden  to  him.  But  the  notion 
that  he  enticed  the  Roman  army  into  a  trackless 
desert,  and  gave  it  over,  when  it  was  perishing  with 
weariness,  hunger,  and  thirst,  into  the  hands  of  its 
enraged  enemy,  being  in  contradiction  with  the  topo- 
graphical facts,  must  be  regarded  as  a  fiction  of  Roman 
apologists,  and  is  one  not  even  consistently  maintained 
by  all  the  classical  writers. 

It  was  probably  on  the  third  or  fourth  day  after  he 
had  quitted  the  Euphrates  that  Crassus  found  him- 
self approaching  his  enemy.  After  a  hasty  and  hot 
march  he  had  approached  the  banks  of  the  Belik, 
when  his  scouts  brought  him  word  that  they  had 
fallen  in  with  the  Parthian  army,  which  was  advancing 
in   force  and  seemingly  full   of  confidence.     Abgarus 


1 66  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

had  recently  quitted  him  on  the  pretence  of  doing 
him  some  undefined  service,  but  in  reality  to  range 
himself  on  the  side  of  his  true  friends,  the  Parthians. 
His  officers  now  advised  Crassus  to  encamp  upon  the 
river,  and  defer  an  engagement  till  the  morrow,  but 
he  had  no  fears  ;  his  son,  Publius,  a  gallant  officer 
formed  in  the  school  of  Julius  Caesar,  was  anxious  for 
the  fray  ;  and  accordingly  the  Roman  commander 
gave  the  order  to  his  troops  to  take  some  refreshment 
as  they  stood,  and  then  to  push  forward  rapidly 
Surenas,  on  his  side,  had  taken  up  a  position  on 
wooded  and  hilly  ground,  which  concealed  his  num- 
bers, and  had  even,  we  are  told,  made  his  troops 
cover  their  arms  with  cloths  and  skins,  that  the  glitter 
might  not  betray  them.  But,  as  the  Romans  drew 
near,  all  concealment  was  cast  aside  ;  the  signal  for 
battle  was  given  ;  the  clang  of  the  kettledrums 
sounded  on  every  side ;  the  squadrons  came  forward 
in  their  brilliant  array ;  and  it  seemed  at  first  as  if  the 
heavy  cavalry  was  about  to  charge  the  Roman  host, 
which  was  formed  in  a  hollow  square,  with  the  light- 
armed  in  the  middle,  and  with  supports  of  horse  along 
the  whole  line,  as  well  as  upon  the  flanks.  But,  if 
this  intention  was  ever  entertained,  it  was  altered 
almost  as  soon  as  formed,  and  the  better  plan  was 
adopted  of  halting  at  a  convenient  distance,  and 
assailing  the  legionaries  with  flight  after  flight  of 
arrows,  delivered  without  pause,  and  with  extraordi- 
nary force.  The  Roman  endeavoured  to  meet  this 
attack  by  throwing  forward  his  own  skirmishers,  but 
they  were  quite  unable  to  cope  with  the  numbers  and 
superior   weapons    of   the    enemy,  who   forced    them 


BATTLE   OF    THE'BELIK.  167 

almost  immediately  to  retreat,  and  take  shelter 
behind  the  line  of  the  legionaries.  These  were  once 
more  exposed  to  the  deadly  missiles,  which  pierced 
alike  through  shield  and  breastplate  and  greaves,  and 
inflicted  the  most  fearful  wounds.  More  than  once 
the  legionaries  dashed  forward  and  sought  to  close 
with  their  assailants,  but  in  vain.  The  Parthian 
squadrons  retired  as  the  Roman  infantry  advanced, 
maintaining  the  distance  which  they  thought  best 
between  themselves  and  their  foe,  whom  they  plied 
with  their  shafts  as  incessantly  while  they  fell  back  as 
when  they  rode  forward.  For  a  while  the  Romans 
maintained  the  hope  that  the  missiles  would  at  last  be 
all  spent,  but  when  they  found  that  each  archer  con- 
stantly obtained  a  fresh  supply  of  arrows  from  the 
rear,  this  expectation  deserted  them.  .It  became 
evident  to  Crassus  under  these  circumstances  that 
some  new  movement  must  be  attempted,  and,  as  a 
last  resource,  he  commanded  his  son,  Publius,  whom 
the  Parthians  were  threatening  to  outflank,  to  take 
such  troops  as  he  thought  proper  and  charge.  The 
brave  youth  was  only  too  glad  to  receive  the  order. 
Selecting  the  Celtic  cavalry  which  Caesar  had  sent 
with  him  from  Gaul,  who  numbered  a  thousand,  and 
adding  to  them  three  hundred  other  horsemen,  five 
hundred  archers,  and  about  four  thousand  legionaries, 
he  advanced  at  speed  against  the  nearest  squadrons  , 
of  the  enemy.  The  Parthians  pretended  to  be  afraid, 
and  beat  a  hasty  retreat.  Publius  followed  with  all 
the  impetuosity  of  youth,  and  was  soon  out  of  sight 
of  his  friends,  pressing  the  flying  foe,  whom  he 
believed    to  be   panic-stricken.     But  when  they  had 


l68  EXPEDITION   OF    CRASSUS. 

drawn  him  on  sufficiently,  they  suddenly  made  a 
stand,  brought  their  heavy  cavalry  up  against  his  line, 
and  completely  enveloped  him  and  his  detachment 
with  their  light-armed.  Publius  made  a  desperate 
resistance.  His  Gauls  seized  the  Parthian  pikes  with 
their  hands,  and  dragged  the  encumbered  horsemen 
to  the  ground  ;  or,  dismounting,  slipped  beneath  the 
horses  of  their  opponents,  and  stabbing  them  in  the 
belly  brought  steed  and  rider  down  upon  themselves. 
His  legionaries  occupied  a  slight  hillock,  and  endea- 
voured to  make  a  wall  of  their  shields,  but  the  Par- 
thian archers  closed  around  them,  and  slew  them 
almost  to  a  man.  Of  the  whole  detachment,  nearly 
six  thousand  strong,  no  more  than  five  hundred  were 
taken  prisoners,  and  scarcely  a  man  escaped.  The 
young  Crassus  might  possibly,  had  he  chosen  to  make 
the  attempt,  have  forced  his  way  through  the  enemy 
to  Ichnae,  a  Greek  town  not  far  distant,  but  he  pre- 
ferred to  share  the  fate  of  his  men.  Rather  than  fall 
alive  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  he  caused  his 
shield-bearer  to  despatch  him  ;  and  his  example  was 
followed  by  his  principal  officers.  The  victors  struck 
off  his  head,  and,  elevating  it  on  a  pike,  returned  to 
resume  their  attack  on  the  main  body  of  the  Roman 
army. 

The  main  army,  much  relieved  by  the  diminution 
of  the  pressure  upon  them,  had  waited  patiently  for 
Publius  to  return  in  triumph,  regarding  the  battle  as 
well-nigh  over,  and  success  as  certain.  After  a  time 
the  prolonged  absence  of  the  young  captain  aroused 
suspicions,  which  grew  into  alarm  when  messengers 
arrived    telling    of    his    extreme    danger.       Crassus, 


RETREAT   OF    THE    ROMANS.  l6g 

almost  beside  himself  with  anxiety,  had  given  the 
word  to  advance,  and  the  army  had  moved  forward  a 
short  distance  when  the  shouts  of  the  returning  enemy 
were  heard,  and  the  head  of  the  unfortunate  Publius 
was  seen  displayed  aloft,  while  the  Parthian  squad- 
rons, closing  in  once  more,  renewed  the  assault  on 
their  remaining  foes  with  increased  vigour.  The 
mailed  horsemen  approached  close  to  the  legionaries 
and  thrust  at  them  with  their  long  pikes,  which 
sometimes  transfixed  two  men  at  once  ;  while  the 
light-armed,  galloping  across  the  Roman  front,  dis. 
charged  their  unerring  arrows  over  the  heads  of  their 
own  men.  The  Romans  could  neither  successfully 
defend  themselves  nor  effectively  retaliate  ;  they 
could  neither  break  the  ranks  of  the  lancers,  nor 
reach  the  archers.  Still  time  brought  some  relief. 
Bowstrings  broke,  spears  were  blunted  or  splintered, 
arrows  began  to  fail,  thews  and  sinews  to  relax  ;  and 
when  night  closed  in  both  parties  were  almost  equally 
glad  of  the  cessation  of  arms  which  the  darkness  ren- 
dered compulsory. 

It  was  the  custom  of  the  Parthians,  as  of  the  Per- 
sians, to  bivouac  at  a  considerable  distance  from  an 
enemy  for  fear  of  a  night  surprise.  Accordingly,  as 
evening  closed  in,  they  drew  off,  having  first  shouted 
jeeringly  to  the  Romans  that  they  would  grant  the 
general  one  night  in  which  to  bewail  his  son  ;  on  the 
morrow  they  would  return  and  take  him  prisoner, 
unless  he  should  prefer  the  better  course  of  surrender- 
ing himself  to  the  mercy  of  Arsaces.  A  short 
breathing-space  was  thus  allowed  the  Romans,  who 
took  advantage  of  it  to  retire  towards  Carrhae,  leaving 


170  EXPEDITION  OF   CRASSUS. 

behind  them  the  greater  part  of  their  wounded,  to 
the  number  of  four  thousand.  A  small  body  of  horse 
under  the  command  of  Egnatius  reached  Carrhae 
about  midnight,  and  gave  the  commandant  such 
information  as  led  him  to  put  his  men  under  arms 
and  issue  forth  to  the  succour  of  the  proconsul.  The 
Parthians,  though  the  cries  of  the  forsaken  wounded 
made  them  well  aware  of  the  Roman  retreat,  adhered 
to  their  system  of  avoiding  night  combats,  and 
attempted  no  pursuit  till  daybreak.  Even  then  they 
allowed  themselves  to  be  delayed  by  comparatively 
trivial  matters — the  capture  of  the  Roman  camp,  the 
massacre  of  the  wounded,  and  the  slaughter  of  the 
numerous  stragglers  scattered  along  the  line  of  march 
— and  made  no  haste  to  overtake  the  retreating  army. 
The  bulk  of  the  troops  were  thus  enabled  to  effect 
their  retreat  in  safety  to  Carrhne,  where,  having  the 
protection  of  walls,  they  were,  at  any  rate  for  a  time, 
secure. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  Romans 
would  here  have  made  a  stand.  The  siege  of  a 
fortified  place  by  cavalry  is  ridiculous,  if  we  under- 
stand by  siege  anything  more  than  a  very  incomplete 
blockade.  And  the  Parthians  were  notoriously 
inefficient  against  walls.  There  was  a  chance,  more- 
over, that  Artavasdes  might  have  been  more  success- 
ful than  his  ally,  and,  having  repulsed  the  Parthian 
monarch,  might  be  on  his  way  to  bring  relief  to  the 
Romans.  But  the  soldiers  were  thoroughly  dispirited, 
and  would  not  listen  to  these  suggestions.  Pro- 
visions, no  doubt,  ran  short,  since,  as  there  had  been 
no  expectation  of  a  disaster,  no  preparations  had  been 


BATTLE    OF   SINNACA.  171 

made  for  standing  a  siege.  The  Greek  inhabitants  of 
the  place  could  not  be  trusted  to  exhibit  fidelity  to  a 
falling  cause.  Moreover,  Armenia  was  near,  and  the 
Parthian  system  of  abstaining  from  action  during  the 
night  seemed  to  render  escape  tolerably  easy.  It  was 
resolved,  therefore,  instead  of  clinging  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  walls,  to  issue  forth  once  more,  and  to 
endeavour  by  a  rapid  night  march  to  reach  the 
Armenian  hills.  The  various  officers  seem  to  have 
been  allowed  to  arrange  matters  each  for  himself. 
Cassius  took  his  way  towards  the  Euphrates,  and 
succeeded  in  escaping  with  five  hundred  horse. 
Octavius,  with  a  division  which  is  estimated  at  five 
thousand  men,  reached  the  outskirts  of  the  hills  at  a 
place  called  Sinnaca,  and  found  himself  in  compara- 
tive security.  Crassus,  misled  by  his  guides,  made 
but  poor  progress  during  the  night ;  he  had,  however, 
arrived  within  little  more  than  a  mile  of  Octavius 
before  the  enemy,  who  would  not  stir  till  daybreak, 
overtook  him.  Pressed  upon  by  their  advancing 
squadrons,  he,  with  his  small  band  of  two  thousand 
legionaries  and  a  few  horsemen,  occupied  a  low 
hillock  connected  by  a  ridge  of  rising  ground  with 
the  position  of  Sinnaca.  Here  the  Parthian  host 
beset  him,  and  he  would  infallibly  have  been  slain  or 
captured  at  once  had  not  Octavius,  deserting  his 
place  of  safety,  descended  to  the  aid  of  his  com- 
mander. The  united  seven  thousand  held  their  own 
against  the  enemy,  having  the  advantage  of  the 
ground,  and  having,  perhaps,  by  the  experience  of 
some  days,  learnt  the  weak  points  of  Parthian  war- 
fare. 


172  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

Surenas  was  anxious,  above  all  things,  to  secure 
the  person  of  the  Roman  commander.  In  the  East 
an  excessive  importance  is  attached  to  this  proof  of 
success  ;  and  there  were  reasons  which  made  Crassus 
particularly  obnoxious  to  his  antagonists.  He  was 
believed  to  have  originated,  and  not  merely  con- 
ducted, the  war,  incited  thereto  by  simple  greed  of 
gold.  He  had  refused  with  the  utmost  haughtiness 
all  discussion  of  terms,  and  had  insulted  the  majesty 
of  the  Parthians  by  the  declaration  that  he  would 
treat  with  them  nowhere  but  at  their  capital.  If  he 
escaped,  he  would  be  bound  at  some  future  time  to 
repeat  his  attempt  ;  if  he  were  made  a  prisoner  his 
fate  would  be  a  terrible  warning  to  others.  But  now, 
as  evening  approached,  it  seemed  to  the  Parthian 
that  the  prize  which  he  so  much  desired  was  about  to 
elude  his  grasp.  The  highlands  of  Armenia  would 
be  gained  by  the  fugitives  during  the  night,  and 
further  pursuit  of  them  would  be  futile.  It  remained 
that  he  should  effect  by  craft  what  he  could  no  longer 
hope  to  obtain  by  the  employment  of  force  ;  and  to 
this  point  all  his  efforts  were  henceforth  directed. 
He  drew  off  his  troops  and  left  the  Romans  without 
further  molestation.  He  allowed  some  of  his 
prisoners  to  escape  and  rejoin  their  friends,  having 
first  contrived  that  they  should  overhear  a  conversa- 
tion among  his  men,  of  which  the  theme  was  the 
Parthian  clemency,  and  the  wish  of  Orodes  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  Romans.  He  then,  having  allowed 
time  for  the  report  of  his  pacific  intentions  to  spread, 
rode  with  a  few  chiefs  towards  the  Roman  camp, 
carrying    his    bow    unstrung,    and    his    right    hand 


DEATH   OF  CRASSUS.  1 73 

stretched  out,  in  token  of  amity.  "  Let  the  Roman 
general,"  he  said,  "  come  forward  with  an  equal  num- 
ber of  attendants,  and  confer  with  me  in  the  open 
space  between  the  armies  on  terms  of  peace."  The 
aged  proconsul  was  disinclined  to  trust  these  over- 
tures, but  the  Roman  soldiery,  demoralised  as  it  was, 
clamoured  and  threatened  ;  upon  which  Crassus 
yielded,  and  went  down  into  the  plain,  accompanied 
by  Octavius  and  a  few  others.  Surenas  received  the 
proconsul  and  his  staff  with  apparent  honour,  and 
terms  were  arranged  ;  only,  with  just  bitterness,  the 
Parthian  chief  required  that  they  should  be  at  once 
reduced  to  writing,  "  since,"  he  said,  with  pointed 
allusion  to  the  bad  faith  of  Pompey,  "you  Romans 
are  not  very  apt  to  remember  your  engagements."  A 
movement  being  requisite  for  the  purpose  of  drawing 
up  the  formal  instruments,  Crassus  and  his  officers 
were  induced  to  mount  upon  horses  furnished  by 
the  Parthians,  who  had  no  sooner  seated  the  pro- 
consul on  his  steed  than  they  proceeded  to  hurry  him 
forward,  with  the  evident  intention  of  carrying  him 
off  to  their  camp.  The  Roman  officers  took  the  alarm 
and  resisted.  Octavius  snatched  a  sword  from  a 
Parthian,  and  killed  one  of  the  grooms  who  were 
hurrying  Crassus  away.  A  blow  from  behind 
stretched  him  on  the  ground  lifeless.  A  general 
melee  followed,  and  in  the  confusion  Crassus  was 
killed,  whether  by  one  of  his  own  side  and  with  his 
own  consent,  or  by  the  hand  of  a  Parthian,  is  uncer- 
tain. The  army,  learning  the  fate  of  their  com- 
mander, with  but  few  exceptions,  surrendered.  Such 
as  sought  to  escape  under  cover  of  the  approaching 


174  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

night  were  hunted  down  by  the  Bedouins,  who  served 
under  the  Parthian  standard,  and  killed  almost  to  a 
man.  Of  the  entire  force  which  had  crossed  the 
Euphrates,  consisting  of  above  forty  thousand  men, 
not  more  than  a  fourth  returned.  One  half  of  the 
whole  number  perished.  Nearly  ten  thousand 
prisoners  were  settled  by  the  victors  near  the  extreme 
east  of  their  empire  in  the  fertile  oasis  of  Margiana 
(Merv)  as  bondsmen,  compelled  after  the  Parthian 
fashion  to  render  military  service.  Here  they  inter- 
married with  native  wives,  and  became  submissive 
Parthian  subjects. 

Such  was  the  result  of  this  great  expedition,  the 
first  attempt  of  the  grasping  and  ambitious  Romans, 
not  so  much  to  conquer  Parthia,  as  to  strike  terror 
into  the  heart  of  her  people,  and  to  degrade  them  to 
the  condition  of  obsequious  dependants  on  the  will 
and  pleasure  of  the  "  world's  lords."  The  expedition 
failed  so  utterly,  not  from  any  want  of  bravery  on 
the  part  of  the  soldiers  employed  in  it,  nor  from  any 
absolute  superiority  of  the  Parthian  over  the  Roman 
tactics,  but  partly  from  the  incompetence  of  the 
commander,  partly  from  the  inexperience  of  the 
Romans  up  to  this  date,  in  the  nature  of  the  Parthian 
warfare,  and  from  their  consequent  ignorance  of  the 
best  manner  of  meeting  it.  To  attack  an  enemy  whose 
main  arm  is  the  cavalry  with  a  body  of  foot  soldiers, 
supported  by  an  insignificant  number  of  horse,  must 
be  at  all  times  rash  and  dangerous.  To  direct  such 
an  attack  on  the  more  open  part  of  the  country, 
where  cavalry  could  operate  freely,  was  wantonly  to 
aggravate  the  peril.     After  the  first  disaster,  to  quit 


RESULTS   OF    THE   EXPEDITION.  175 

the  protection  of  walls,  when  it  had  once  been 
obtained,  was  a  piece  of  reckless  folly.  Had  Crassus 
taken  care  to  get  the  support  of  some  of  the  desert 
tribes,  if  Armenia  could  not  or  would  not  help  him, 
and  had  he  then  advanced,  either  by  the  way  of  the 
Mons.  Masius  and  the  Tigris,  or  along  the  line  of 
the  Euphrates,  the  issue  of  his  attack  might  have  been 
different.  He  might  have  fought  his  way  to  Seleucia 
and  Ctesiphon,  as  did  Trajan,  Avidius  Cassius,  and 
Septimius  Severus,  and  might  have  taken  and 
plundered  those  cities.  He  would,  no  doubt,  have 
experienced  difficulties  in  his  retreat ;  but  he  might 
have  come  off  no  worse  than  Trajan,  whose  Parthian 
expedition  has  been  generally  regarded  as  rather  a 
feather  in  his  cap,  and  as  augmenting  rather  than 
detracting  from  his  reputation.  But  an  ignorant  and 
inexperienced  commander,  venturing  on  a  trial  of 
arms  with  an  enemy  of  whom  he  knew  little  or 
nothing,  in  their  own  country,  without  supports  or 
allies,  and  then  neglecting  every  precaution  suggested 
by  his  officers,  allowing  himself  to  be  deceived  by  a 
pretended  friend,  and  marching  straight  into  a  net 
prepared  for  him,  naturally  suffered  defeat.  The 
credit  of  the  Roman  arms  does  not  greatly  suffer  by 
the  disaster,  nor  is  that  of  the  Parthians  greatly 
enhanced.  The  latter  showed,  as  they  had  shown  in 
their  wars  against  the  Syro-Macedonians,  that  their 
somewhat  loose  and  irregular  army  was  capable  of 
acting  with  effect  against  the  solid  masses  and  well- 
ordered  movements  of  the  best  disciplined  troops. 
They  acquired  by  their  use  of  the  bow  a  fame  like 
that  which  the  English  bowmen  obtained  at   Crecy 


176  EXPEDITION   OF   CRASSUS. 

and  Agincourt.  They  forced  the  arrogant  Romans  tc 
respect  them,  and  to  allow  that  there  was  at  least  one 
nation  in  the  world  which  could  meet  them  on  equal 
terms  and  not  be  worsted  in  the  encounter.  They 
henceforth  obtained  recognition  from  the  Greco- 
Roman  writers — albeit  a  grudging  and  covert  recogni- 
tion— as  the  Second  Power  in  the  world,  the  admitted 
rival  of  Rome,  the  only  real  counterpoise  upon  the 
earth  to  the  mighty  empire  which  ruled  from  the 
banks  of  the  Euphrates  to  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic 
Ocean. 

While  the  general  of  King  Orodes  was  thus  com- 
pletely successful  against  the  Romans  in  Mesopotamia, 
the  king  himself  had  in  Armenia  obtained  advantages 
of  almost  equal  importance,  though  of  a  different  kind. 
Instead  of  waging  an  internecine  war  with  Artavasdes, 
he  had  come  to  terms  with  him,  and,  having  con- 
cluded a  close  alliance,  had  set  himself  to  confirm  and 
cement  it  by  uniting  his  son,  Pacorus,  in  marriage 
with  the  sister  of  the  royal  Armenian.  A  series  of 
festivities  was  in  course  of  being  held,  to  celebrate 
the  auspicious  event,  when  news  arrived  of  the  triumph 
of  Surenas  and  the  fate  of  Crassus.  According  to  the 
barbarous  customs  at  all  times  prevalent  in  the  East, 
the  head  and  hand  of  the  slain  proconsul  accompanied 
the  intelligence.  We  are  told  that,  at  the  moment  of 
the  messengers'  arrival  the  two  sovereigns,  with  their 
attendants,  were  being  amused  by  a  dramatic  enter- 
tainment. Strolling  companies  of  Greek  players  were 
at  this  time  frequent  in  the  East,  where  they  were  sure 
of  patronage  in  the  many  Greek  cities,  and  might 
sometimes   find   an  appreciative  audience  among  the 


TREATMENT   OF    THE   BODY   OF  CRASSUS.       1 77 

natives.  Artavasdes,  as  the  master  of  the  revels,  had 
engaged  such  a  company,  since  both  he  and  Orodes 
had  a  good  knowledge  of  the  Greek  literature  and 
language,  in  which  he  had  himself  composed  both 
historical  works  and  tragedies.  The  performance  had 
begun,  and  it  happened,  that,  when  the  messengers 
arrived,  the  actors  were  engaged  in  the  representation 
of  the  famous  scene  in  the  "  Bacchae  "  of  Euripides, 
where  Agave  and  the  Bacchanals  come  upon  the 
stage  with  the  mutilated  remains  of  the  murdered 
Pentheus.  The  head  of  Crassus  was  thrown  to  them  ; 
and  instantly  the  player  who  personated  Agave  seized 
the  bloody  trophy,  and  placing  it  on  his  thyrsus  in 
lieu  of  the  one  that  he  was  carrying,  paraded  it  before 
the  delighted  spectators,  while  he  chanted  the  well- 
known  lines — 

"  From  the  mountain  to  the  hall 
New-cut  tendril,  see,  we  bring  — 
Blessed  prey !  " 

The  horrible  spectacle  was  one  well  suited  to  please 
an  Eastern  audience  ;  loud  and  prolonged  plaudits, 
we  may  be  sure,  rang  out  ;  and  the  entire  assemblage 
felt  a  keen  satisfaction  in  the  performance.  It  was 
followed  by  a  proceeding  of  equal  barbarity,  and  still 
more  thoroughly  Oriental.  The  Parthians,  in  derision 
of  the  motive  which  was  supposed  to  have  led  Crassus 
to  make  his  attack,  had  a  quantity  of  gold  melted  and 
poured  it  into  his  mouth. 

Meanwhile  Surenas  was  amusing  his  victorious 
troops,  and  seeking  to  annoy  the  disaffected  Seleu- 
cians  by  the  exhibition  of  a  farcical  ceremony.     He 


178  EXPEDITION    OF  CRASSUS. 

spread  the  report  that  Crassus  was  not  killed  but 
captured  ;  and  selecting  from  among  the  prisoners 
the  Roman  most  like  him  in  appearance,  he  dressed 
the  man  in  woman's  clothes,  mounted  him  upon  a 
horse,  and  requiring  him  to  answer  to  the  names  of 
"Crassus"  and  "  Imperator,"  conducted  him  in  triumph 
to  the  Grecian  city.  Before  him  went,  mounted  on 
camels,  a  band  arrayed  as  trumpeters  and  lictors, 
the  lictors' rods  having  purses  suspended  to  them,  and 
the  axes  in  their  midst  being  crowned  with  the  bleed- 
ing heads  of  Romans.  In  the  rear  followed  a  train  of 
Seleucian  music-girls,  who  sang  songs  derisive  of  the 
effeminacy  and  cowardice  of  the  proconsul.  After 
this  pretended  parade  of  his  prisoner  through  the 
streets  of  the  town,  Surenas  called  a  meeting  of  the 
Seleucian  senate,  and  indignantly  denounced  to  them 
the  indecency  of  the  literature  which  he  had  found  in 
the  Roman  tents.  The  charge,  it  is  said,  was  true ; 
but  the  Seleucians  were  not  greatly  impressed  by  the 
moral  lesson  read  to  them,  when  they  remarked  the 
train  of  concubines  that  had  accompanied  Surenas 
himself  to  the  field,  and  thought  further  of  the  loose 
crowd  of  dancers,  singers,  and  prostitutes,  that  was 
commonly  to  be  seen  in  the  rear  of  a  Parthian  army. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  terrible 
disaster  which  had  befallen  the  Roman  arms,  and  the 
vast  triumph  which  the  Parthians  had  achieved  for 
themselves,  would  have  had  extraordinary  and  far- 
reaching  consequences.  No  one  could  have  been 
surprised  if  the  result  had  been  to  shake  the  very 
foundations  of  the  Roman  power  in  the  East,  or  even 
to  restore  to  Asia  that  aggressive  attitude  towards  the 


TEMPORARY   INACTION    OF    THE    PARTHIANS.     179 

rest  of  the  world,  which  she  had  held  four  hundred 
and  fifty  years  earlier.  But  the  commotion  and 
change  produced  was  far  less  than  might  have  been 
anticipated.  Mesopotamia  was,  of  course,  recovered 
by  the  Parthians  to  itsextremest  limit,  the  Euphrates  ; 
and  Armenia  was  lost  to  the  Roman  alliance,  and 
thrown  for  the  time  into  complete  dependence  upon 
Parthia.  The  whole  East  was,  to  some  extent,  excited  ; 
and  the  Jews,  always  impatient  of  a  foreign  yoke,  and 
recently  aggrieved  by  the  unprovoked  spoliation  of 
their  Temple  by  Crassus,  flew  to  arms.  But  no 
general  movement  of  the  Oriental  races  took  place. 
It  might  have  been  supposed  that  the  Syrians,  Phoe- 
nicians, Cilicians,  Cappadocians,  Phrygians,  and  other 
Asiatic  peoples  whose  proclivities  were  altogether 
Oriental,  would  have  seized  the  opportunity  of  rising 
against  their  Western  lords  and  driving  the  Romans 
back  upon  Europe.  It  might  have  been  thought  that 
Parthia  at  least  would  have  immediately  assumed  the 
offensive  in  force,  and  have  made  a  determined  effort 
to  rid  herself  of  neighbours  who  had  proved  so 
troublesome  But  though  the  conjuncture  of  circum- 
stances was  most  favourable — though  not  only  was 
Rome  paralysed  in  the  East,  but  was  also  on  the 
point  of  civil  war  in  the  West — yet  the  man  was 
wanting.  Had  Mithridates  of  Pontus  or  Tigranes  of 
Armenia  been  living,  or  had  Surenas  been  king  of 
Parthia  instead  of  a  mere  general,  advantage  would 
probably  have  been  taken  of  the  occasion,  and  Rome 
might  have  suffered  seriously.  But  Orodes  seems  to 
have  been  neither  ambitious  as  a  prince  nor  skilful 
as  a  commander ;  he  lacked  at  any  rate  the  keen  and 


l8o  EXPEDITION    OF   CRASSUS. 

all-embracing  glance  which  could  sweep  the  political 
horizon,  and,  comprehending  the  exact  character  of  the 
situation,  see  at  the  same  time  how  to  make  the  most 
of  it.  He  allowed  the  opportunity  to  slip  by  without 
hastening  to  put  forth  his  full  strength,  or  indeed 
making  any  considerable  effort  ;  and  the  occasion 
once  lost  was  sure  never  to  return. 

If  there  was  a  man  living  at  the  time  who  might 
possibly  have  taken  full  advantage  of  the  situation, 
and  forced  Rome  to  pay  the  deserved  penalty  of  her 
rashness  and  aggressiveness,  it  was  Surenas.  But 
that  chief  had  lost  the  favour  of  his  sovereign. 
There  are  services  which,  in  the  East,  it  is  not  safe 
for  a  subject  to  render  to  the  head  of  the  state,  and 
Surenas  had  exceeded  the  proper  measure.  The 
jealousy  of  Orodes  was  aroused  by  the  success  and 
reputation  of  his  general  ;  and  it  was  not  long  before 
he  found  an  excuse  for  handing  him  over  to  the 
executioner.  Parthia  was  thus  left  without  any  com- 
mander of  approved  merit,  for  Sillaces,  the  second 
in  command  during  the  war  with  Crassus,  had  in  no 
way  distinguished  himself  in  the  course  of  it.  This 
condition  of  things  may  account  for  the  feebleness  of 
the  efforts  made,  in  the  years  B.C.  53  and  52,  to 
retaliate  on  the  Romans  the  damage  done  by  their 
invasion.  A  few  weak  flying  bands  only  crossed  the 
Euphrates,  and  began  the  work  of  plunder  and 
ravage,  in  which  they  were  speedily  disturbed  by 
Cassius,  who  easily  drove  them  back  across  the  river. 
Rome  should  have  taken  advantage  of  the  interval 
to  strengthen  her  forces  in  these  parts,  and  secure  the 
inviolability  of  her  frontier  ;  but  those  who  were  at 


RETALIATORY   RAID   OF  PACORUS.  161 

the  head  of  the  Roman  State,  knowing  civil  war  to 
be  imminent,  declined  to  detach  troops  from  their 
own  party  standards  for  the  advantage  of  the 
national  cause. 

Hence,  when,  in  B.C.  51,  Orodes  had  made  up  his 
mind  to  attempt  a  blow,  and  a  great  Parthian  army 
under  the  young  prince,  Pacorus,  and  an  officer  of 
ripe  age  and  experience,  by  name  Osaces,  appeared 
on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Euphrates,  there  were  no 
means  of  resisting  them.  Cassius  had  done  his  best 
to  unite  and  re  organise  the  broken  remnants  of  the 
army  of  Crassus,  which  he  had  formed  into  two  weak 


COIN   OF   PACORUS   I. 


legions  ;  but  no  reinforcements  had  reached  him,  and 
he  did  not  feel  justified  in  taking  the  open  field  with 
his  small  force,  much  less  in  giving  battle  to  the 
enemy.  The  Parthians  therefore  crossed  the  Euphrates 
unopposed,  and  swarmed  into  the  rich  Syrian  territory. 
The  walled  towns  shut  their  gates,  and  maintained 
themselves  ;  but  the  open  country  was  everywhere 
overrun  :  and  a  thrill  of  mingled  alarm  and  excite- 
ment passed  through  all  the  Roman  provinces  in 
Asia.  These  provinces  were  at  the  time  most 
inadequately  supplied  with  Roman  troops,  owing  to 
the  impending  civil  war  in  Italy.  The  natives  were 
for  the  most  part  disaffected,  and  inclined  to  hail  the 


182  RETALIATORY   RAID   OF  PACORUS. 

Parthians  as  brethren  and  deliverers.  Excepting 
Deiotarus  of  Galatia,  and  Ariobarzanes  of  Cappa- 
docia,  Rome  had,  as  Cicero  (then  proconsul  of  Cilicia) 
plaintively  declared,  not  a  friend  on  the  Asiatic  con- 
tinent. And  Cappadocia  was  miserably  weak,  and 
open  to  attack  on  the  side  of  Armenia.  Had  Orodes 
and  Artavasdes  acted  in  concert,  and  had  the  latter, 
while  Orodes  sent  his  armies  into  Syria,  poured  the 
Armenian  forces  into  Cappadocia  and  then  into 
Cilicia  (as  it  was  expected  that  he  would  do),  there 
would  have  been  the  greatest  danger  to  the  Roman 
possessions.  As  it  was,  the  excitement  in  Asia 
Minor  was  extreme.  Cicero  marched  into  Cappa- 
docia with  the  bulk  of  his  Roman  troops,  and 
summoned  to  his  aid  Deiotarus  with  his  Galatians, 
at  the  same  time  writing  to  the  Roman  Senate  to 
implore  reinforcements.  Cassius  shut  himself  up  in 
Antioch,  and  allowed  the  Parthian  cavalry  to  pass 
him  by,  and  even  to  proceed  beyond  the  bounds  of 
Syria  into  Cilicia.  But  the  Parthians  seem  scarcely 
to  have  understood  the  straits  of  their  adversaries  or 
to  have  been  aware  of  their  own  advantages.  Pro- 
bably their  "  information  department "  was  ill 
organised.  Instead  of  spreading  themselves  wide, 
raising  the  natives,  and  leaving  them  to  blockade  the 
towns,  while  with  their  as  yet  unconquered  squadrons 
they  defied  the  enemy  in  the  open  country,  we  find 
them  engaging  in  the  siege  and  blockade  of  cities,  for 
which  they  were  totally  unfit,  and  confining  them- 
selves almost  entirely  to  the  narrow  valley  of  the 
Orontes.  Under  these  circumstances  we  are  not 
surprised  to  learn   that   Cassius,    having    first   beaten 


PLOT    TO   MAKE   PACORUS   KING.  1 83 

them  back  from  Antioch,  contrived  to  lead  them  into 
an  ambush  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  severely 
handled  their  troops,  even  killing  the  general,  Osaces. 
The  Parthians  withdrew  from  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  Syrian  capital  after  this  defeat,  which  must 
have  taken  place  about  the  end  of  September,  and 
soon  after  went  into  winter  quarters  in  Cyrrhestica,  or 
the  part  of  Syria  immediately  east  of  Amanus. 
Here  they  remained  quietly  during  the  winter  months 
under  Prince  Pacorus,  and  it  was  expected  that  the 
war  would  break  out  again  with  fresh  fury  in  the 
spring  ;  but  Bibulus,  the  new  proconsul  of  Syria — 
"  as  wretched  a  general  as  he  was  an  incapable 
statesman " — conscious  of  his  military  deficiencies, 
contrived  to  sow  dissensions  among  the  Parthians 
themselves  and  to  turn  the  thoughts  of  Pacorus  in 
another  direction.  He  suggested  to  Ornodapantes, 
a  Parthian  noble,  with  whom  he  had  managed  to 
open  a  correspondence,  that  Pacorus  would  be  a  more 
worthy  occupant  of  the  throne  of  the  Arsacidae  than 
his  father,  and  that  he  would  consult  well  for  his  own 
interests,  if  he  were  to  proclaim  the  young  prince  as 
king,  and  lead  the  army  of  Syria  against  Orodes. 
Pacorus  had  already  been  associated  in  the  govern- 
ment by  his  father,  and  his  name  appears  on  some  of 
his  father's  later  coins  ;  but  this,  while  stimulating, 
did  not  satisfy  his  ambition.  He  appears  to  have 
lent  a  ready  ear  to  the  whispers  of  Ornodapantes,  and 
to  have  been  on  the  verge,  if  he  did  not  even  over- 
step the  verge,  of  rebellion.  There  are  Parthian 
coins  bearing  the  head  of  a  beardless  youth,  and 
the   exact   set  of  titles   that  had  become  fashionable 


184  END   OF    THE    FIRST   ROMAN   WAR. 

under  Orodes,  which  are  with  ample  reason  assigned 
to  this  prince,  and  which  must  have  been  struck  to  be 
put  in  circulation  when  his  revolt  was  declared.  But 
the  plot  was  nipped  in  the  bud.  Orodes,  learning  the 
designs  cherished  by  Pacorus,  summoned  him  to  his 
Court  ;  and,  the  plans  laid  down  not  being  yet  ripe 
for  execution,  he  felt  that  there  was  no  other  course 
open  to  him  but  to  obey.  The  Parthian  squadrons 
seem  to  have  recrossed  the  Euphrates  in  July, 
B.C.  50.  The  danger  to  Rome  was  past ;  but  the 
stain  was  not  wiped  out  from  the  shield  of  Roman 
honour,  nor  was  the  reputation  of  Rome  restored  in 
the  East.  The  "  First  Roman  War  "  ended,  after  a 
period  of  a  little  more  than  four  years,  with  the 
advantage  wholly  on  the  side  of  Parthia,  both  in 
respect  of  glory  and  of  material  gain.  The  laurels 
lost  by  Rome  at  Carrhae  had  never  been  recovered, 
and  the  acquisition  of  Armenia  by  Parthia  was  a 
substantial  increase  of  strength. 


XI. 


SECOND  WAR  OF  PARTHIA  WITH  ROME — PARTHIAN 
INVASION  OF  SYRIA,  PALESTINE,  AND  ASIA 
MINOR. 

The  end  of  the  first  war  of  Parthia  with  Rome 
synchronised  nearly  with  the  breaking  out  of  the 
civil  contest  between  Caesar  and  Pompey.  In  this 
struggle  the  sympathies  of  Parthia  were  on  the 
Pompeian  side.  Though  Pompey  had  certainly  not 
given  the  Parthians  much  reason  for  regarding  him 
with  favour,  since  he  had  openly  and  flagrantly 
broken  the  terms  of  his  treaty  of  alliance  with  them, 
yet  on  the  whole  they  seem  certainly  to  have  pre- 
ferred his  cause  to  that  of  his  great  adversary. 
Perhaps  they  viewed  Caesar  as  more  bound  in 
honour  than  Pompey  to  seek  revenge  for  the  death 
of  Crassus,  since  he  had  sent  a  favourite  officer,  with 
a  contingent  of  troops,  to  his  aid,  or  possibly  they 
may  simply  have  felt  more  fear  of  his  military 
capacity.  Communications  certainly  took  place  be- 
tween Orodes  and  Pompey  in  the  course  of  the  year 
B.C.  49  or  48,  and  the  terms  of  an  alliance  were  dis- 
cussed between  them.  Pompey,  who  was  not  very 
scrupulous,  or  really  patriotic,  made  the  overtures, 
and    desired   to   know  on   what    terms    the    Parthian 

185 


l86      SECOND    WAR    OF  PARTHIA    WITH   ROME. 

monarch  would  lend  him  effective  aid  in  the  war 
which  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  out.  The  reply 
of  Orodes  was  to  the  following  effect  :  "If  the 
Roman  leader  would  deliver  into  his  hands  the 
province  of  Syria,  and  make  it  wholly  over  to  the 
Parthians,  Orodes  was  willing  to  conclude  an  alliance 
with  him  and  send  him  help  ;  but  not  otherwise." 
It  is  to  the  credit  of  Pompey  that  he  rejected  these 
terms,  and,  while  not  above  contemplating  a  foreign 
alliance  against  a  domestic  foe,  was  unwilling  to 
purchase  the  assistance  to  himself  at  a  cost  that 
would  have  inflicted  a  serious  injury  on  his  country. 
The  rupture  of  the  negotiations  produced  an  estrange- 
ment between  the  negotiators,  and  Orodes  went  so 
far  as  to  throw  Hirrus,  the  envoy  of  Pompey,  into 
prison,  as  a  means  of  giving  vent  to  his  disappoint- 
ment. Still,  however,  Pompey  looked  upon  Orodes 
as  a  friend  ;  and  when,  a  few  months  later,  he  had 
fought  his  great  fight,  and  suffered  his  great  defeat, 
at  Pharsalus  (August  9,  B.C.  48),  his  thoughts  reverted 
to  the  powerful  Parthian  king,  and  he  entertained  for 
some  time  the  idea  of  taking  refuge  at  the  Court  of 
Ctesiphon.  It  is  even  said  that  he  only  relinquished 
the  design,  and  made  his  disastrous  choice  of  Egypt 
as  a  refuge,  when,  on  the  receipt  of  intelligence  that 
Antioch  had  declared  for  his  rival,  he  understood  that 
the  route  to  the  Parthian  capital  was  no  longer  open 
to  him.  Otherwise,  notwithstanding  the  persuasions 
of  his  friends,  who  thought  the  risk  too  great,  both 
for  himself  and  his  wife,  Cornelia,  to  be  run  with 
prudence,  the  world  might  have  have  seen  the  spec- 
tacle of  a  second  Coriolanus,  thundering  at  the  gates 


CIRCUMSTANCES    WHICH    LED    TO   IT.  187 

of  Rome  and  demanding  recall  and  reinstatement,  at 
the  head  of  legions  recruited  in  a  foreign  land  and 
furnished  by  a  foreign  enemy.  As  it  was,  Roman 
history  was  spared  this  scandal  ;  and  at  the  same 
time  Orodes  was  spared  the  awkwardness  and 
difficulty  of  having  to  elect  between  repulsing  a 
suppliant,  and  provoking  the  hostility  of  the  most 
powerful  chieftain  and  the  greatest  general  of  the 
age. 

The  year  B.C.  47  saw  Caesar  in  Syria  and  Asia 
Minor,  whither  he  was  drawn  by  the  necessity  of 
crushing  the  mad  schemes  of  Pharnaces,  son  of 
Mithridates  of  Pontus,  who  thought  he  saw  in  the 
internal  quarrels  of  the  Romans  an  opportunity  of 
re-establishing  his  father's  ertipire.  After  the  facile 
victory  of  Zela,  the  Great  Roman  can  scarcely  have 
avoided  debating  with  himself  the  question,  whether 
he  should  at  once  turn  his  arms  against  his  only 
other  Asiatic  enemy,  and  by  a  movement  as  rapid  as 
that  which  had  crushed  Pharnaces,  strike  a  blow 
against  Orodes,  and  so  avenge  the  defeat  of  Carrhae. 
But,  if  the  idea  crossed  his  mind,  he  dismissed  it. 
The  time  was  not  suitable.  Too  much  remained  to 
be  done  in  Africa,  in  Spain,  and  at  home,  for  so  large 
a  matter  as  a  Parthian  War  to  be,  for  the  moment, 
taken  in  hand.  Caesar  resolutely  averted  his  gaze 
from  the  far  East,  and  deferring  the  "  revenge  "  to  a 
comparatively  remote  date,  kept  whatever  projects  he 
may  have  entertained  on  the  subject  to  himself,  and 
was  careful,  while  he  remained  in  Asia,  to  avoid 
provoking  or  exasperating  by  threats  or  hostile 
movements,   the   Power    on    which    the   peace  of  the 


l88       SECOND    WAR    OF  PARTHIA    WITH   ROME. 

East  principally  depended.  It  was  not  until  he  had 
brought  the  African  and  Spanish  wars  to  an  end  that 
he  allowed  his  intention  of  leading  an  expedition 
against  Parthia  to  be  openly  talked  about.  In  B.C.  44, 
four  years  after  Pharsalus,  having  put  down  all  his 
domestic  enemies,-  and  arranged  matters,  as  he 
thought,  satisfactorily  at  Rome,  he  let  a  decree  be 
passed,  formally  assigning  to  him  the  Parthian  War, 
and  sent  the  legions  across  the  Adriatic  on  their  way 
to  Asia.  What  plan  of  campaign  he  may  have  con- 
templated is  uncertain.  One  writer  represents  him 
as  intending  to  enter  Parthia  by  way  of  the  Lesser 
Armenia,  and  to  proceed  cautiously  to  try  the 
strength  of  the  Parthians  before  engaging  them  in  a 
battle.  Another  credits  him  with  a  plan  for  rapidly 
overrunning  Parthia,  and  then  proceeding  by  the 
way  of  the  Caspian  into  Scythia,  from  Scythia 
invading  Germany,  and  after  conquering  Germany 
returning  into  Italy  by  the  way  of  Gaul !  But  neither 
author  is  likely  to  have  had  any  trustworthy  authority 
for  his  statement.  The  Great  Dictator  would  not  be 
likely  to  have  formed  any  definite  scheme  ;  he  would 
have  felt  the  need  of  being  guided  by  circumstances. 
Still,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  expedition  under 
his  auspices  would  have  constituted  a  most  serious 
danger  to  Parthia,  and  might  have  terminated  in  her 
subjection  to  Rome.  The  military  talents  of  Julius 
were  of  the  most  splendid  description  ;  his  powers  of 
organisation  and  consolidation  enormous ;  his  pru- 
dence and  caution  equal  to  his  ambition  and  courage. 
Once  launched  on  a  career  of  conquest  in  the  East, 
it  is   impossible  to  say  whither  he  might   not    have 


CIRCUMSTANCES    WHICH   LED    TO   IT.  189 

carried  the  Roman  eagles,  or  what  countries  he  might 
not  have  added  to  the  empire.  But  Parthia  was  saved 
from  the  imminent  peril  without  any  effort  of  her 
own.  The  daggers  of  the  "  Liberators  "  struck  down 
on  the  1 5th  of  March,  B.C.  44,  the  only  man  whom 
she  had  seriously  to  fear  ;  and  with  the  removal  of 
Julius  passed  away  even  from  Roman  thought  for 
many  a  year  the  design  which  he  had  entertained, 
and  which  he  alone  could  have  accomplished. 

In  the  civil  war  which  followed  on  the  murder  of 
Julius,  the  Parthians  appear  to  have  actually  taken 
a  part.  The  East  fell  into  confusion  on  the  with- 
drawal of  Julius  after  Zela,  and  in  the  course  of  the 
troubles  a  Parthian  contingent  was  sent  to  the  aid  of 
a  certain  Caecilius  Bassus,  a  Pompeian  adherent,  who 
was  seeking  to  obtain  for  himself  something  like  an 
independent  principality  in  Syria.  The  soldiers  of 
Bassus,  after  a  while  (B.C.  43),  went  over  in  a  body  to 
Cassius,  who  was  in  the  East  collecting  troops  for  his 
great  struggle  with  Antony  and  Octavian  ;  and  thus 
a  handful  of  Parthians  came  into  the  power  of  the 
second  among  the  "  Liberators."  Of  this  accidental 
circumstance  he  determined  to  take  advantage,  in 
order  to  obtain,  if  possible,  a  considerable  body  of 
troops  from  Orodes.  He  therefore  presented  each  of 
the  Parthian  soldiers  with  a  sum  of  money  for  their 
immediate  wants,  and  dismissed  them  graciously  to 
their  homes,  at  the  same  time  seizing  the  opportunity 
to  send  some  of  his  own  officers  as  ambassadors  to 
Orodes,  with  a  request  for  substantial  aid.  On  re- 
ceiving this  application,  the  Parthian  monarch  seems 
to  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  a 


IQO      SECOND    WAR   OF  PARTHIA     WITH  ROME. 

wise  policy  to  comply  with  it.  It  was  for  the  interest 
of  Parthia  that  the  Roman  arms,  instead  of  being 
directed  to  Asiatic  conquests,  should  be  engaged  for 
as  long  a  time  as  possible  in  intestine  strife  ;  and 
Orodes  might  well  conceive  that  he  was  promoting 
his  own  advantage  by  fomenting  and  encouraging 
the  quarrels  which,  at  any  rate  for  the  time,  secured 
his  own  empire  from  attack.  He  may  have  hoped 
also  to  obtain  some  equivalent  in  territory  from  the 
gratitude  of  Cassius  at  some  future  period,  since 
Cassius  was  at  the  time  Proconsul  of  Syria,  and,  if 
successful  against  Octavian  and  Antony,  might  be 
expected  to  choose  the  East  for  his  province  and  to 
make  a  fresh  arrangement  of  it.  At  any  rate,  he 
complied  with  Cassius's  request,  and  sent  him  a  body 
of  Parthian  horse,  which  were  among  the  troops 
engaged  at  Philippi. 

The  crushing  defeat  suffered  by  the  "Liberators" 
(November,  B.C.  42)  was  an  immediate  disappointment 
to  Orodes,  but,  as  instead  of  producing  a  pacification 
of  the  Roman  world,  it  only  intensified  the  strife  and 
general  confusion,  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  worked 
disadvantageously  for  his  interests.  He  himself,  at 
any  rate,  judged  otherwise.  The  Roman  world 
seemed  to  him  more  divided  against  itself  than  ever  ; 
and  the  "  self-wrought  ruin,"  which  Horace  prophesied, 
seemed  absolutely  impending.  Three  rivals  held 
divided  sway  in  the  corrupted  State,  each  of  them 
jealous  of  the  other  two,  and  anxious  for  his  own 
aggrandisement.  The  two  chief  pretenders  to  the 
first  place  were  bitterly  hostile  ;  and  while  the  one 
was   detained    in    Italy    by    insurrection    against  his 


ATTACK   MADE    BY   ORODES.  1 91 

authority,  the  other  was  plunged  in  luxury  and  dis- 
sipation, enjoying  the  first  transports  of  a  lawless 
passion,  at  the  Egyptian  capital.  The  nations  of  the 
East  were,  moreover,  alienated  by  the  exactions  of 
the  profligate  Triumvir,  who,  to  reward  his  parasites 
and  favourites,  had  laid  upon  them  a  burden  that  it 
was  scarcely  possible  for  them  to  bear.  The  condi- 
tion of  things  generally  seemed  to  invite  a  foreign 
power  to  step  in,  and,  taking  the  opportunity  offered 
by  Rome's  weakness,  seriously  to  cripple  her  power. 

Parthia  enjoyed  also  at  the  time  the  rare  good 
fortune  of  having  at  her  disposal  the  services  of  a 
Roman  general.  Quintus  Labienus,  the  son  of  Titus, 
Caesar's  legate  in  Gaul,  who  had  gone  over  to  the 
Pompeians,  having  been  sent  a^  envoy  to  Orodes  by 
Brutus  and  Cassius  a  little  before  Philippi,  had,  on 
learning  the  severities  of  the  Triumvirs,  elected  to 
make  Parthia  his  home,  and  had  taken  service  under 
the  Parthian  banner.  Though  not  an  officer  of  much 
distinction  among  his  countrymen,  he  had  the  advan- 
tage of  knowing  the  weak  points  of  their  military 
system  ;  and  it  might  well  seem  to  Orodes,  that  the 
occasion  which  thus  offered  itself  ought  to  be  utilised. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Parthian  monarch, 
who  had  never  accepted  the  failure  of  Pacorus  in  B.C. 
52-50  as  final,  made  preparations  during  the  winter 
of  B.C.  41-40,  for  a  fresh  attack  upon  the  Roman 
territory.  Having  collected  an  imposing  force  from 
all  parts  of  his  dominions,  he  placed  it  under  the  joint 
command  of  his  son,  Pacorus,  and  the  Roman  refugee, 
Q.  Labienus,  and  sent  it  across  the  Euphrates  with  the 
first  blush  of  spring,  while  Antony  was  still  occupied 


192  PARTHIAN   INVASION   OF   SYRIA. 

with  his  Egyptian  dalliance,  and  Octavius,  having  at 
last  captured  Perusia,  was  applying  himself  to  the 
pacification  of  Italy.  Antony  might  perhaps  have 
exchanged  the  soft  delights  of  Cleopatra's  Court 
for  the  perils  of  a  Parthian  campaign,  since  when 
roused  to  action  by  what  seemed  to  him  a  sufficient 
motive,  he  had  all  the  instincts  of  a  soldier  ;  but  it 
happened  that,  just  at  the  time,  messengers  reached 
him  from  his  brother  Lucius,  imploring  him  to  hasten 
to  the  West,  and  arrest  before  it  was  too  late  the 
victorious  progress  of  Octavius.  With  one  regretful 
glance  in  the  direction  of  Syria,  the  self-seeking 
Triumvir  sailed  away  from  Alexandria  to  Italy, 
leaving  the  care  of  Roman  interests  in  the  East  to  the 
incompetent  hands  of  his  lieutenant,  Decidius  Saxa, 
who  had  already  alienated  the  affections  of  the 
provincials  by  his  exactions,  and  was  about  to  lose 
their  respect  by  his  incapacity.  The  Parthian  hordes, 
thus  w  eakly  opposed,  burst  into  Syria  with  irresistible 
force  rapidly  overran  the  open  country  between  the 
Euphrates  and  Antioch,  and  entering  the  rich  valley 
of  the  Orontes,  threatened  the  great  seats  of  Hellenic 
civilisation  in  these  parts,  Antioch,  Apameia,  and 
Epiphaneia.  From  Apameia,  situated  (like  Durham) 
on  a  rocky  peninsula  almost  surrounded  by  the  river, 
they  were  at  first  repulsed  ;  but,  having  shortly 
afterwards  defeated  Decidius  Saxa  and  his  legions 
in  the  open  fields,  they  received  the  submission  of 
Apameia  and  Antioch,  which  latter  city  Saxa 
abandoned  at  their  approach,  flying  precipitately 
into  Cilicia. 

Encouraged    by    these    successes,    Labienus    and 


SUCCESSES   OF  LABIENUS   AND   PACORUS.      193 

Pacorus  agreed  to  divide  their  troops,  and  to  engage 
simultaneously  in  two  great  expeditions.  Pacorus 
undertook  to  carry  the  Parthian  standard  throughout 
the  entire  extent  of  Syria,  Phoenicia,  and  Palestine, 
while  Labienus  took  upon  himself  to  invade  Asia 
Minor,  and  see  if  he  could  not  wrest  some  of  its  more 
fertile  regions  from  the  Romans.  Both  expeditions 
were  crowned  with  extraordinary  success.  Pacorus 
reduced  all  Syria,  and  all  Phoenicia,  except  the  single 
city  of  Tyre,  which  he  was  unable  to  capture  for  want 
of  a  naval  force.  He  then  advanced  into  Palestine, 
which  he  found  in  its  normal  condition  of  intestine 
commotion.  Hyrcanus  and  Antigonus,  two  princes 
of  the  Asmonaean  house,  uncle  and  nephew,  were 
rivals  for  the  Jewish  crown  ;  and  the  latter,  whom 
Hyrcanus  had  driven  into  exile,  was  content  to  make 
common  cause  with  the  invader,  and  to  be  indebted 
to  a  rude  foreigner  for  the  possession  of  the  kingdom 
whereto  he  aspired.  He  offered  Pacorus  a  thousand 
talents — nearly  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  our  money — 
and  five  hundred  Jewish  women,  if  he  would  espouse 
his  cause,  and  seat  him  upon  his  uncle's  throne.  The 
offer  was  readily  embraced,  and  by  the  irresistible 
help  of  the  Parthians  a  revolution  was  effected  at 
Jerusalem.  Hyrcanus  was  deposed  and  mutilated. 
A  new  priest-king  was  set  up  in  the  person  of 
Antigonus,  the  last  Asmonaean  prince,  who  reigned 
at  Jerusalem  for  three  years — B.C.  40-37 — as  a 
Parthian  satrap  or  vitaxa,  the  creature  and  dependant 
of  the  great  monarchy  on  the  further  side  of  the 
Euphrates. 

Meanwhile,    in    Asia   Minor,   Labienus   carried    all 


IQ4  PARTHIAN   INVASION  OF  SYRIA. 

before  him.  Decidius  Saxa,  having  once  more  (in 
Cicilia)  ventured  upon  a  battle,  was  not  only  defeated, 
but  slain.  Pamphylia,  Lycia,  and  Caria — the  whole 
south  coast — were  overrun.  Stratonicea  was  be- 
sieged ;  Mylasa  and  Alabanda  were  taken.  According 
to  some  writers,  the  Parthians  even  pillaged  Lydia 
and  Ionia,  and  were  in  possession  of  Asia  Minor  to 
the  shores  of  the  Hellespont.  It  may  be  said  that 
for  a  full  year  Western  Asia  changed  masters :  the 
rule  and  authority  of  Rome  disappeared  ;  and  the 
Parthians  were  recognised  as  the  dominant  power. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  perhaps  not  sur- 
prising that  Labienus  lost  his  head  ;  that  he  affected 
the  style  and  title  of  "  Imperator ;  "  struck  coins,  and 
placed  his  own  head  and  name  on  them,  and  even 
added  the  ridiculous  title  "  Parthicus,"  which  to  a 
Roman  ear  meant  "  Conqueror  of  the  Parthians  " — 
a  title  of  honour  whereto  he  had  no  possible  claim. 

But  the  fortune  of  war  now  began  to  turn.  In  the 
autumn  of  B.C.  39,  Antony,  having  patched  up  his 
quarrel  with  Octavius  and  set  out  from  Italy  to 
resume  his  command  in  the  East,  sent  his  lieu- 
tenant, Publius  Ventidius,  into  Asia,  with  orders  to 
act  against  Labienus,  and  the  triumphant  Parthians. 
Ventidius  landed  unexpectedly  on  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  so  alarmed  Labienus,  who  happened  to 
have  no  Parthian  troops  with  him,  that  the  latter  fell 
back  hurriedly  towards  Cilicia,  evacuating  all  the 
more  western  provinces,  and  at  the  same  time  send- 
ing urgent  messages  to  Pacorus  to  implore  succour. 
Pacorus  despatched  a  strong  body  of  cavalry  to  his 
aid  ;  but  these  troops,  instead  of  putting  themselves 


PARTHIAN   REVERSES.  195 

under  his  command,  had  the  folly  to  act  indepen- 
dently, and  the  result  was,  that,  in  a  rash  attempt  to 
surprise  the  Roman  camp,  they  were  defeated  by 
Ventidius,  whereupon  they  fled  hastily  into  Cilicia, 
leaving  Labienus  to  his  fate.  The  self-styled  "  Im- 
perator,"  upon  this,  deserted  his  men  and  sought 
safety  in  flight ;  but  his  retreat  was  soon  discovered  ; 
and  he  was  pursued,  captured,  and  put  to  death. 

Meamvhile,  the  Parthians  under  Pacorus,  alarmed 
at  the  turn  which  affairs  had  taken  in  Asia  Minor,  left 
Antigonus,  the  Asmonaean  prince,  to  manage  their 
interests  in  Palestine,  and  concentrated  themselves  in 
Northern  Syria  and  Commagene,  where  they  awaited 
the  approach  of  the  Romans.  A  strong  detachment, 
under  a  general  named  Pharnapates,  was  appointed 
to  guard  the  "  Syrian  Gates,"  a  narrow  pass  over 
Mount  Amanus,  leading  from  Cilicia  into  Syria. 
Here  Ventidius  gained  another  victory.  He  had 
sent  forward  an  officer  called  Pompadius  Silo  with 
some  cavalry  to  endeavour  to  seize  this  post,  and 
Pompaedius  had  found  himself  compelled  to  an  en- 
gagement with  Pharnapates,  in  which  he  was  on  the 
point  of  suffering  defeat,  when  Ventidius  himself, 
who  had  probably  feared  for  his  subordinate's  safety, 
appeared  on  the  scene,  and  turned  the  scale  in  favour 
of  the  Romans.  The  detachment  under  Pharnapates 
was  overpowered,  and  Pharnapates  himself  was 
among  the  slain.  When  news  of  this  defeat  reached 
Pacorus,  he  thought  it  prudent  to  retreat,  and  ac- 
cordingly withdrew  his  troops  across  the  Euphrates, 
This  movement  he  appears  to  have  executed  without 
being    molested    by  Ventidius,   who    thus    recovered 


196         PARTHIAN   INVASION   OF   SYRIA,    ETC. 

Syria  to  the  Romans  towards  the  close  of  B.C.  39,  or 
early  in  B.C.  38. 

But  Pacorus  was  far  from  intending  to  relinquish 
the  contest.  He  had  made  himself  popular  among 
the  Syrians  by  his  mild  and  just  administration,  and 
knew  that  they  preferred  his  government  to  that  of 
the  Romans.  He  had  many  allies  among  the  petty 
princes  and  dynasts,  who  occupied  a  semi-indepen- 
dent position  on  the  borders  of  the  Parthian  and 
Roman  empires,  as,  for  example,  Antiochus,  King  of 
Commagene  ;  Lysanias,  tetrarch  of  Ituraea  ;  Malchus, 
sheikh  of  the  Nabataean  Arabs,  and  others.  More- 
over, Antigonus,  whom  he  had  established  as  king  of 
the  Jews,  still  maintained  himself  in  Judaea  against 
the  efforts  of  Herod,  to  whom  Octavius  and 
Antony  had  assigned  the  throne.  Pacorus  therefore 
arranged  during  the  remainder  of  the  winter  for  a 
fresh  invasion  of  Syria  in  the  spring,  and,  taking  the 
field  earlier  than  his  adversary  expected,  made  ready 
to  recross  the  Euphrates.  We  are  told  that,  if  he  had 
crossed  at  the  usual  point,  he  would  have  come  upon 
the  Romans  quite  unprepared,  the  legions  being  still 
in  their  winter  quarters,  some  of  them  north  and  some 
south  of  the  great  mountain  range  of  Taurus.  Ven- 
tidius,  however,  contrived  by  a  stratagem  to  induce 
him  to  effect  his  passage  at  a  different  point,  consider- 
ably lower  down  the  stream,  and  in  this  way  to  waste 
some  valuable  time,  which  he  himself  employed  in 
collecting  his  scattered  forces.  Thus,  when  the  Par- 
tisans appeared  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Euphrates, 
the  Roman  general  was  prepared  to  engage  them, 
and  was  not  even  loth  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  war 


DEATH  OF  PACORUS.  197 

by  a  single  battle.  He  had  taken  care  to  provide 
himself  with  a  strong  force  of  slingers,  and  had  en- 
trenched himself  in  a  position  on  high  ground  at 
some  distance  from  the  river.  The  Parthians,  finding 
their  passage  of  the  Euphrates  unopposed,  and,  when 
they  fell  in  with  the  enemy,  seeing  him  entrenched, 
as  though  resolved  to  act  only  on  the  defensive, 
became  over  bold  ;  they  thought  the  force  opposed  to 
them  must  distrust  its  own  strength,  or  its  own  fighting 
capacity,  and  would  be  likely  to  yield  its  position 
without  a  blow,  if  suddenly  and  vigorously  attacked. 
Accordingly,  as  on  a  former  occasion,  they  charged 
up  the  hill  on  which  the  Roman  camp  was  placed, 
hoping,  like  the  Boers  at  Majuba,  to  take  it  by  mere 
audacity.  But  the  troops  in  the  camp  were  held 
ready,  and  at  the  proper  moment  issued  forth ;  the 
assailants  found  themselves  in  their  turn  assailed,  and, 
fighting  at  a  disadvantage  on  the  slope,  were  soon 
driven  down  the  declivity.  The  battle  was  continued 
in  the  plain  below,  where  the  mail-clad  horse  of  the 
Asiatics  made  a  brave  and  prolonged  resistance ;  but 
the  slingers  galled  them  severely,  and  in  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  it  happened  by  ill  fortune  that  Pacorus  was 
slain.  The  result  followed  which  is  almost  invariable 
in  the  case  of  an  Oriental  army  :  having  lost  their 
leader,  the  soldiers  almost  everywhere  gave  way  ; 
flight  became  universal,  and  the  Romans  gained  a 
complete  victory.  The  Parthian  army  fled  in  two 
directions.  Part  made  for  the  bridge  of  boats  by 
which  it  had  crossed  the  Euphrates,  but  was  inter- 
cepted by  the  enemy  and  destroyed.  Part  turned 
northwards  into  Commagene,  and  there  took  refuge 


198  PARTHIAN   INVASION   OF  SYRIA,    ETC. 

with  the  king,  Antiochus,  who  refused  to  surrender 
them  to  the  demand  of  Ventidius,  and  no  doubt 
allowed  them  to  return  to  their  own  country.  It 
was  said  that  this  final  encounter  took  place  on  the 
anniversary  of  the  great  disaster  of  Carrhae,  and 
Rome  flattered  herself  that  she  had  at  last  retrieved 
that  disgrace,  having  compensated  for  the  loss  of  her 
own  legions  by  the  destruction  of  a  Royal  Parthian 
army,  and  having  by  the  death  of  the  associated 
monarch,  Pacorus,  more  than  avenged  the  slaughter 
of  Crassus. 

Thus  terminated  the  great  Parthian  invasion  of 
Syria  under  Labienus  and  Pacorus ;  and  with  it 
terminated  the  prospect  of  any  further  spread  of  the 
Arsacid  dominion  towards  the  West.  When  the  two 
great  world-powers,  Rome  and  Parthia,  first  came  into 
collision,  when  the  hard  blow  struck  by  the  latter  in 
the  annihilation  of  the  army  of  Crassus  was  followed 
up  by  the  advance  of  their  clouds  of  horse  into  Syria, 
Palestine,  and  Asia  Minor — when  Apameia,  Antioch, 
and  Jerusalem  fell  into  their  hands,  when  Decidius 
Saxa  was  defeated  and  slain — Cilicia>  Pamphylia, 
Lycia,  and  Caria  occupied,  Lydia  and  Ionia  ravaged 
—  it  seemed  as  if  Rome  had  met,  not  so  much  an 
equal,  as  a  superior  ;  it  looked  as  if  the  power  hitherto 
predominant  would  be  compelled  to  draw  back  and 
retreat,  while  the  new  power,  Parthia,  would  make  a 
long  step  in  advance,  and  push  her  frontier  to  the 
yEgean  and  the  Mediterranean.  The  history  of  the 
contest  between  the  East  and  West,  between  Asia 
and  Europe,  is  a  history  of  re-actions.  At  one  time 
one  of  the  two  continents,  at  another  time  the  other, 


FINAL    FAILURE    OF    THE    EXPEDITION.        1 99 

is  in  the  ascendant.  The  time  appeared  to  have  come 
when  the  Asiatics  were  once  more  to  recover  their 
own,  and  to  beat  back  the  European  aggressor  to  his 
proper  shores  and  islands.  The  triumphs  achieved 
by  the  Seljukian  Turks  between  the  eleventh  and 
the  fifteenth  centuries  would  in  that  case  have  been 
anticipated  by  above  a  thousand  years  through  the 
efforts  of  a  kindred  and  not  dissimilar  people.  But 
it  turned  out  that  the  effort  now  made  was  premature. 
While  the  Parthian  warfare  was  admirably  adapted 
for  the  national  defence  on  the  broad  plains  of  inner 
Asia,  it  was  ill  suited  for  conquest,  and,  comparatively 
speaking,  ineffective  in  more  contracted  and  difficult 
regions.  The  Parthian  military  system  had  not  the 
elasticity  of  the  Roman — it  did  not  in  the  same  way 
adapt  itself  to  circumstances,  or  admit  of  the  addition 
of  new  arms,  or  the  indefinite  expansion  of  an  old 
one.  However  loose  and  seemingly  flexible,  it  was 
rigid  in  its  uniformity  ;  it  never  altered  ;  it  remained 
under  the  thirtieth  Arsaces  such  as  it  had  been  under 
the  first,  improved  in  details  perhaps,  but  essentially 
the  same  system.  The  Romans,  on  the  contrary,  were 
always  modifying  and  improving  their  system,  always 
learning  new  combinations,  or  new  manoeuvres,  or 
new  modes  of  warfare,  from  their  enemies.  They 
met  the  PaVthian  tactics  of  loose  array,  continuous 
distant  missiles,  and  almost  exclusive  employment  of 
cavalry,  with  an  increase  in  the  number  of  their  own 
horse,  a  larger  employment  of  auxiliary  irregulars, 
and  a  greater  i.se  of  the  sling.  At  the  same  time 
they  learnt  t'j  take  full  advantage  of  the  Parthian 
inefficiency    against    walls,    and    to    practise    against 


200  PARTHIAN  INVASION   OF   SYRIA,   ETC. 

them  the  arts  of  pretended  retreat  and  ambush.  The 
result  was  that  Parthia  found  she  could  make  no 
serious  impression  upon  the  dominions  of  Rome,  and 
having  become  persuaded  of  this  by  the  experience 
of  a  decade  of  years,  thenceforth  laid  aside  for  ever 
the  dream  of  Western  conquest.  She  took  up,  in 
fact,  from  this  time  a  new  attitude.  Hitherto  she  had 
been  consistently  aggressive.  She  1iad  laboured  con- 
stantly to  extend  herself  at  the  expense  of  the 
Bactrians,  the  Scythians,  the  Syro- Macedonians,  and 
the  Armenians.  She  had  proceeded,  like  Rome,  from 
one  aggression  to  another,  leaving  only  short  intervals 
between  her  wars,  and  had  always  been  looking  out 
for  some  fresh  enemy.  Henceforth  she  became, 
comparatively  speaking,  pacific.  She  was  content, 
for  the  most  part,  to  maintain  her  limits.  She  sought 
no  new  foe.  Her  contest  with  Rome  degenerated,  in 
the  main,  into  a  struggle  for  influence  over  the  border 
kingdom  of  Armenia  ;  and  her  hopes  were  limited  to 
the  reduction  of  that  kingdom  to  a  subject  position. 

The  grief  of  Orodes  at  the  death  of  Pacorus 
was  something  extreme  and  abnormal,  even  in  the 
emotional  East.  For  many  days  he  would  neither 
eat,  nor  speak,  nor  sleep  ;  then  his  sorrow  took 
another  turn.  He  imagined  that  his  son  had  re- 
turned ;  he  thought  continually  that  he  heard  or  saw 
him  ;  he  could  do  nothing  but  repeat  his  name. 
Every  now  and  then,  however,  he  awoke  to  a  sense  of 
the  actual  fact,  and  mourned  the  death  of  his  favourite 
with  tears.  After  a  while  this  excessive  grief  wore 
itself  out;  and  the  aged  king  began  to  direct  his  atten- 
tion once  more  to  public  affairs,  and  to  concern  him- 


EXTREME   GRIEF  OF  ORODES — HIS  DEATH.      201 

self  about  the  succession.  Of  the  thirty  sons  who 
still  remained  to  him  there  was  not  one  who  had 
made  himself  a  name,  or  was  in  any  way  distinguished 
above  the  remainder.  In  the  absence,  therefore,  of 
any  personal  ground  of  preference,  Orodes  —  who 
seems  to  have  regarded  himself  as  possessing  a  right 
to  nominate  the  son  who  should  succeed  him — thought 
that  the  claims  of  primogeniture  were  entitled  to  be 
considered,  and  selected  as  his  successor,  Phraates,  the 
eldest  of  the  thirty.  Not  content,  however,  with 
nominating  him,  or  perhaps  doubtful  whether  the 
nomination  would  be  accepted  by  the  Megistanes,  he 
proceeded  further  to  abdicate  in  his  favour,  whereupon 
Phraates  became  actual  king.  The  transaction  proved 
a  most  unhappy  one.  Phraates,  jealous  of  some  of 
his  brothers,  who  were  the  sons  of  a  princess  married 
to  Orodes,  whereas  his  own  mother  was  only  a  concu- 
bine, removed  them  by  assassination,  and  when  the 
ex-monarch  ventured  to  express  disapproval  of  the 
act,  added  the  crime  of  parricide  to  that  of  fratricide 
by  putting  to  death  his  aged  father.  Thus  perished 
Orodes,  son  of  Phraates,  the  thirteenth  Arsacid,  after 
a  reign  of  eighteen  or  twenty  years  —  the  most 
memorable  in  the  Parthian  annals.  Though  scarcely 
a  great  king,  he  carried  Parthia  to  the  highest  pitch 
of  her  glory,  less  however  by  his  own  personal  merits, 
than  by  his  judicious  selection  of  able  officers  for  the 
command  of  his  armies.  Exceedingly  ambitious,  he 
allowed  no  scruples  to  interfere  with  his  personal 
aggrandisement,  but,  having  waded  to  power  through 
the  blood  of  a  father  and  a  brother,  maintained  him- 
self in  power  by  the  sacrifice  of  his  foremost  subject. 


202  PARTHIAN   INVASION   OF  SYRIA,   ETC. 

His  affection  for  his  son  Pacorus  is  the  most  amiable 
trait  in  his  character,  and  redeems  it  from  the  charge, 
to  which  it  would  otherwise  be  liable,  of  a  complete 
defect  of  humanity.  Even  here,  however,  he  showed  a 
want  of  balance  and  moderation  ;  and,  by  allowing 
his  mind  to  become  unhinged,  brought  disaster  on 
himself,  and  on  those  dearest  to  him.  It  may  have 
been  a  just  Nemesis,  that  he  should  die  at  the  hands 
of  one  of  his  sons,  but  it  seems  hard  that  affection 
for  one  son  should  have  put  him  altogether  in  the 
power  of  another. 


XII. 

EXPEDITION  OF  MARK  ANTONY  AGAINST  PARTHIA 
— ITS  FAILURE — WAR  BETWEEN  PARTHIA  AND 
MEDIA. 

PHRAATES,  the  son  of  Orodes,  who  is  generally- 
known  as  Phraates  the  Fourth,  ascended  the  Parthian 
throne  in  the  year  B.C.  37.  The  Roman  world  was 
still  in  the  throes  of  revolution.  A  mock  peace  had 
indeed  been  patched  up  between  the  irreconcilable 
rivals,  Octavian  and  Antony,  in  the  year  B.C.  40,  by 
the  sacrifice  of  "  the  fair,  the  modest,  and  the  discreet 
Octavia  " — "  that  marvel  of  a  woman,"  as  Plutarch 
calls  her — to  the  short-lived  passion  of  the  coarse 
Triumvir  ;  but  dissension  had  quickly  broken  out — 
the  bride  and  bridegroom  had  quarrelled — and,  before 
the  year  B.C.  37  was  over,  had  parted,  never  to  come 
together  again.  Antony  and  Octavian  were  once 
more  acknowledged  enemies,  and  felt  it  necessary  to 
place  half  the  world  between  them  in  order  that  they 
might  not  at  once  come  to  blows.  Antony  betook 
himself  to  the  eastern  portion  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
and  renewed  his  dalliance  with  his  Egyptian  mistress. 
Octavian  remained  in  Italy,  launching  recriminations 
against  his  rival,  and  preparing  for  the  deadly  struggle 
which,  he  well  knew,  impended.     Phraates  probably 


204  PARTHIAN  EXPEDITION   OF  ANTONY. 

thought  himself  safe  from  attack  under  the  circum- 
stances, and  felt  himself  free  to  indulge  his  natural 
temperament,  which  was  cruel,  jealous,  and  blood- 
thirsty. Not  content  with  having  brushed  from  his 
path  the  brothers  whose  title  to  the  throne  was 
better  than  his,1  he  proceeded  to  make  a  clean  sweep, 
and  killed  the  remainder  of  the  thirty.  Nor  was 
this  all.  From  the  massacre  of  his  own  relations,  he 
passed  to  executions  of  Parthian  nobles  who  had 
provoked  his  jealousy,  and  at  last  created  such  a 
panic  among  them,  that  numbers  of  them  fled  the 


COIN    OF    PHRAATES    IV. 


country,  and  taking  refuge  in  the  territory  west  of 
the  Euphrates,  filled  the  camps  and  cities  of  the 
Roman  provinces.  Among  these  fugitives  was  a 
certain  Monaeses,  a  nobleman  of  high  distinction,  who 
appears  to  have  gained  more  than  one  military  success 
in  the  Syrian  war  of  Pacorus.2  This  officer  repre- 
sented to  Antony  that  Phraates  had  by  his  tyranni- 
cal and  sanguinary  conduct  made  himself  detested  by 
his  subjects,  and  that  a  revolt  on  the  part  of  large 
numbers  could  easily  be  effected.  "  If  the  Romans 
would  support  him,"  he  said,  "  he  was  quite  willing  to 

1  See  above,  p.  201.  2  Hor.  "  Od.,"  iii.  6  ;  1.  10. 


ATTEMPT   OF   MONAESES.  205 

invade  Parthia,  and  he  made  no  doubt  of  wresting 
the  greater  portion  of  it  from  the  hands  of  the  tyrant, 
and  of  being  himself  accepted  as  king.  In  that  case,  he 
would  consent  to  hold  his  crown  of  the  Romans,  as  their 
dependant  and  feudatory  ;  and  they  might  count  on 
his  fidelity  and  gratitude."  Antony  received  Monaeses 
with  ostentatious  generosity,  and,  affecting  the  munifi- 
ence  of  an  Artaxerxes  towards  a  Themistocles,  made 
him  a  present  of  three  cities  of  Asia,  Larissa,  Arethusa, 
and  Bambyce,  or  Hierapolis.  The  Parthian  monarch, 
alarmed  at  the  prospect,  sought  to  withdraw  his 
traitorous  subject  from  the  enemy's  blandishments 
by  the  offer  of  pardon  and  renewed  favour ;  and 
Monaeses,  after  duly  balancing  the  proposals  made  to 
him  one  against  the  other,  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  his  home  prospects  were  the  more  promising. 
He  therefore  represented  to  Antony  that  he  might 
probably  do  him  better  service  as  a  friend  at  the 
Court  of  Phraates  than  as  a  pretender  to  his  crown, 
and  asked  permission  to  accept  the  overtures  which 
he  had  received,  and  to  return  to  his  native  country. 
It  is  probable  that  the  Triumvir  was  clever  enough  to 
see  through  his  motives,  and  to  understand  that  no 
dependence  was  to  be  placed  on  his  protestations  ; 
but  it  fitted  in  with  his  own  interests  to  amuse 
Phraates  for  a  short  time  longer  with  pacific  pro- 
fessions, and  he  saw  in  the  request  of  Monaeses  an 
opportunity  for  throwing  dust  in  the  eyes  of  a  not  very 
keen-sighted  barbarian.  Monaeses  thus  obtained  per- 
mission to  rejoin  his  sovereign,  and  was  instructed  to 
assure  him  that  the  Roman  commander  desired 
nothing  so  much  as  peace,  and  asked  only  that  the 


206  PARTHIAN  EXPEDITION   OF  ANTONY. 

standards  captured  by  the  Parthians  in  the  war  with 
Crassus  and  Ventidius,  and  such  of  the  prisoners 
taken  as  still  survived,  should  be  handed  over  to  the 
Romans. 

But  while  thus  playing  with  his  adversary,  and  de- 
luding him  with  fond  expectations,  the  Triumvir  had 
fully  made  up  his  own  mind  to  plunge  into  war,  and 
was  leaving  no  stone  unturned  to  perfect  his  prepara- 
tions. It  is  very  unlikely  that  it  had  required  the 
overtures  of  a  Monaeses  to  put  a  Parthian  expedition 
into  his  thoughts.  The  successes  of  his  own  lieutenants 
must  have  been  stimulants  of  far  greater  efficacy.  C. 
Sosius,  as  governor  of  Syria,  had  performed  several 
martial  exploits  on  the  frontiers  of  that  province. 
Canidius  Crassus  had  defeated  the  Armenians,  with 
their  Albanian  and  Iberian  allies,  and  had  once  more 
planted  the  Roman  standards  at  the  foot  of  the 
Caucasus.  Above  all,  the  great  glory  of  Ventidius, 
who  had  been  allowed  the  much-coveted  honour  of  a 
"  triumph  "  at  Rome  on  account  of  his  defeats  of  the 
Parthians  in  Cilicia  and  Syria,  must  have  rankled  in 
his  mind,  and  have  moved  him  to  emulation,  and  caused 
him  to  cast  about  for  some  means  of  outshining  his 
lieutenants  and  exalting  his  own  military  reputation 
above  that  of  his  subordinates.  Nothing,  he  well 
knew,  could  be  so  effectual  for  this  purpose  as  a 
successful  Parthian  expedition — the  infliction  upon 
this  hated  foe  of  an  unmistakable  humiliation,  and 
the  dictating  to  them  of  terms  of  peace  on  their  own 
soil  after  some  great  and  decisive  victory.  Nor  did 
this  now  appear  so  very  difficult.  After  the  successes 
of  Ventidius  and  Canidius  Crassus  the  prestige  of  the 


NUMBER   AND   COMPOSITION   OF  HIS   ARMY.    207 

Parthian  name  was  gone.  The  legionaries  could  be 
trusted  to  meet  them  without  any  undue  alarm,  and 
to  contend  with  them  in  the  usual  Roman  fashion, 
without  excitement  or  flurry.  Time  had  shown  the 
weakness,  as  well  as  the  strength,  of  the  Parthian 
military  system,  and  the  Roman  tacticians  had  suc- 
ceeded in  devising  expedients  by  which  its  strong  points 
might  be  met  and  triumphed  over.  With  the  forces 
at  his  command  Antony  might  well  expect  to  attack 
Parthia  successfully,  and  not  merely  to  avoid  the  fats 
of  Crassus,  but  to  obtain  important  advantages. 

At  the  same  time  he  had  his  eyes  open  to  all  the 
possibilities  of  the  military  situation,  and  was  making 
his  preparations  with  the  greatest  prudence  and 
secrecy.  He  collected  Roman  troops  from  every 
available  quarter,  and  gradually  raised  his  legions  to 
the  number  of  sixteen,  or  (according  to  some)  of 
eighteen.  These  he  disposed  in  the  different  cities  of 
Asia,  and  did  not  begin  to  mass  them  until  he  had  no 
further  need  for  concealment.  He  had  brought  with 
him  from  Europe  Gallic  and  Iberian  horse  to  the 
number  of  ten  thousand  ;  his  Roman  infantry  is 
reckoned  at  sixty  thousand  ;  and  the  cavalry  and 
infantry  of  the  Asiatic  allies  amounted  to  thirty  thou- 
sand. The  Armenian  monarch,  Artavasdes,  was 
secretly  won  over  in  the  course  of  the  winter,  and 
promised  a  contingent  of  seven  thousand  foot  and 
six  thousand  horse.  Thus  the  entire  number  of  all 
arms  on  which  he  could  count  to  begin  the  campaign 
was  113,000. 

Antony  was  in  no  hurry  to  begin.  More  lover 
than  soldier,  he  was  glad  to  defer  the  hour  for  parting 


208  PARTHIAN   EXPEDITION   OE  ANTONY. 

with  the  siren  by  whose  charms  he  was  fascinated, 
and  exchanging  the  delights  of  voluptuous  dalliance 
for  the  hardships  of  life  in  the  field.  Thus  it  was  not 
until  the  midsummer  of  B.C.  36  had  arrived  that  he 
could  bring  himself  to  dismiss  his  mistress  to  her 
Egyptian  home,  and  place  himself  at  the  head  of  his 
legions.  It  was  his  original  intention  to  cross  the 
Euphrates  into  Mesopotamia,  and  to  advance  against 
Parthia  by  the  direct  route,  as  Crassus  had  done  ;  but, 
on  reaching  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  possibly 
at  Zeugma,  he  found  the  attitude  of  defence  assumed 
by  the  enemy  on  his  own  frontier  so  imposing,  that 
he  abandoned  his  first  design,  and,  turning  north- 
wards, entered  Armenia,  resolved  to  attack  Parthia, 
in  conjunction  with  his  Armenian  ally,  from  that 
quarter.  Artavasdes  gladly  welcomed  him,  and 
recommended  that  he  should  begin  the  war,  not  by 
invading  Parthia  itself  but  by  an  attack  on  the 
dominions  of  a  Parthian  feudatory,  the  King  of 
Media  Atropatene,  whose  territories  adjoined  Ar- 
menia on  the  south-east.  The  king,  he  said,  was 
absent,  having  been  summoned  to  join  his  suzerain 
on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  and  having  marched 
away  with  his  best  troops  to  the  rendezvous.  His 
territory,  therefore,  would  be  ill-defended,  and  open  to 
ravage  ;  it  was  even  possible  that  Praaspa,  his  capital, 
might  be  an  easy  prey.  The  prospect  excited  Antony, 
and  he  put  himself  at  the  disposition  of  Artavasdes. 
Dividing  his  army  into  two  portions,  and  ordering 
Oppius  Statianus,  one  of  his  best  officers,  to  follow 
him  leisurely  with  the  more  unwieldly  portion  of  the 
troops,  the  siege-batteries,  and  the  baggage-train,  he 


HIS   INVASION  OF  NORTHERN   MEDIA.         20Q 

himself  proceeded  by  forced  marches  to  Praaspa, 
under  the  guidance  of  Artavasdes,  accompanied  by 
all  the  cavalry  and  infantry  of  the  better  sort.  This 
town  was  situated  at  the  distance  of  nearly  three 
hundred  miles  from  the  Armenian  frontier  ;  but  the 
way  to  it  lay  through  well-cultivated  plains,  where 
food  and  water  were  abundant.  Antony  accomplished 
the  march  without  any  difficulty,  and  sat  himself 
down  before  the  place.  But  the  want  of  his  siege- 
engines  and  battering-train  caused  him  to  make  little 
impres.sion  ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  have  recourse 
to  the  long  and  tedious  process  of  raising  up  a  mound 
against  the  walls.  For  some  time  he  cherished  the 
hope  that  Statianus  would  arrive  to  his  relief ;  but 
this  illusion  was  ere  long  dispelled.  News  arrived 
that  the  Parthian  monarch,  having  been  made  ac- 
quainted with  his  plans  and  proceedings,  had  followed 
on  the  footsteps  of  his  army,  had  come  up  with  Sta- 
tianus, and  made  a  successful  onslaught  on  his  detach- 
ment. Ten  thousand  Romans  were  killed  in  the 
engagement;  many  prisoners  were  taken  ;  all  the- 
baggage- waggons  and  engines  of  war  fell  into  the 
enemy's  hands  ;  and  Statianus  himself  was  among 
the  slain.  A  further  and  still  worse  result  followed. 
The  Armenian  monarch  was  so  disheartened  by  the 
defeat,  that,  regarding  the  Roman  cause  as  desperate, 
he  retired  from  the  contest,  drew  off  his  troops,  and 
left  Antony  to  his  own  resources. 

The  situation  became  now  one  of  great  difficulty. 
Autumn  was  approaching ;  supplies  were  falling 
short ;  the  siege  works  which  Antony  had  attempted 
made  no  progress  ;  and  it  was  impossible  to  construct 


210  PARTHIAN   EXPEDITION   OF  ANTONY. 

a  fresh  battering-train  to  replace  that  which  had  been 
taken.  If  Antony  could  only  capture  the  town 
before  the  winter  set  in,  he  would  feel  himself  in 
safety,  and,  having  a  breathing-space  during  which 
he  might  repair  his  losses,  would  be  able  to  re- 
cruit himself  for  another  campaign.  He  therefore 
made  desperate  efforts  to  overcome  the  resistance 
offered  by  the  besieged,  and  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  city.  But  all  was  in  vain.  The  walls  were  too 
strong  and  too  high.  His  mound  was  never  brought 
to  a  level  with  their  summit.  From  time  to  time  the 
defenders  made  sallies,  drove  off  his  workmen,  and 
inflicted  serious  damage  on  his  construction.  The 
Parthian  monarch,  hovering  about  in  the  neighbour- 
hood, looked  with  scorn  on  his  unavailing  endeavours, 
and  contented  himself  with  hindering  his  supplies 
and  interfering  with  his  foraging  parties.  Efforts 
made  by  Antony  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement 
by  means  of  a  foraging  expedition  on  a  large  scale 
failed,  the  Parthians  retreating  as  soon  as  attacked, 
and  exhibiting  their  marvellous  power  of  getting  out 
of  an  enemy's  reach  almost  without  suffering  any 
losses.  The  Roman  commander,  as  the  equinox 
drew  near,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  must  with- 
draw from  the  siege  and  retire  into  Armenia,  but 
before  making  this  confession  of  failure,  as  a  last 
resource,  he  sought  to  persuade  his  adversary  to 
terms  of  accommodation.  He  would  at  once  relin- 
quish the  siege,  and  recross  the  frontier,  he  said,  if 
Phraates  would  only  yield  up  to  him  the  Crassian 
captives  and  standards.  The  demand  was  prepos- 
terous, and  the  Parthians  simply  laughed  at  it,  feeling 


HIS   FAILURE    TO    TAKE   PR  A  ASP  A.  211 

that  it  was  for  Antony  rather  to  purchase  an  un- 
molested retreat,  than  for  themselves  to  pay  him  for 
retiring.  Each  day  that  he  lingered  placed  him  in 
a  worse  position,  and  made  it  more  certain  that  he 
could  not  escape  serious  disaster. 

At  last  the  equinox  arrived,  and  retreat  became 
imperative.  There  were  two  roads  by  which  it  would 
be  possible  to  reach  the  Araxes  at  the  usual  point  01 
passage.  One  lay  to  the  left,  through  a  plain  and 
open  country,  probably  along  the  course  of  the  Jag- 
hetu  and  the  eastern  shores  of  Lake  Urumiyeh,  which 
is  the  route  that  an  army  would  ordinarily  take  ;  the 
other,  which  was  shorter  but  more  difficult,  lay  to  the 
right,  leading  across  a  mountain  tract,  but  one  fairly 
supplied  with  water,  and  in  which  there  were  a  number 
of  inhabited  villages.  The  Triumvir  was  informed  by 
his  scouts  that  the  Parthians  had  occupied  the  easier 
route  in  the  expectation  that  he  would  select  it,  and 
were  hopeful  of  overwhelming  his  entire  force  with 
their  cavalry  in  the  plains.  He  therefore  took  the 
road  to  the  right,  through  a  rugged  and  inclement 
country— probably  that  between  Takht-i-Sulei'man 
and  Tabriz — and,  guided  by  a  Mardian  who  was  well 
acquainted  with  the  district,  set  out  to  make  his  way 
back  to  the  Araxes.  His  decision  took  the  Parthians 
by  surprise,  and  for  two  whole  days  he  was  unmo- 
lested. By  the  third  day,  however,  they  had  thrown 
themselves  across  his  path.  Antony,  expecting  no 
interference,  was  pursuing  his  march  in  a  somewhat 
disorderly  manner,  when  the  Mardian  guide,  perceiv- 
ing signs  of  recent  injury  to  the  route,  gave  him  warn- 
ing  that  the  enemy  could   not  be  far  off,  and   the 


212  PARTHIAN  EXPEDITION  OF  ANTONY. 

Roman  general  had  just  time  to  make  his  troops 
form  in  battle  array,  and  bring  his  light  armed  and 
slingers  to  the  front,  when  the  Parthian  horsemen 
made  their  appearance  on  all  sides,  and  began  a  fierce 
assault.  But  the  Roman  light  troops,  especially  those 
armed  with  slings  and  darts,  made  a  vigorous  resist- 
ance, the  leaden  missiles  of  the  slingers  being  found 
particularly  effective ;  and,  after  a  short  combat,  the 
Parthians,  following  their  usual  tactics,  drew  off,  only, 
however,  to  return  again  and  again,  until  at  last 
Antony's  Gallic  cavalry  found  an  opportunity  of 
charging  them,  when  they  broke  and  fled  hastily, 
having  received  a  serious  check,  from  which  they  did 
not  recover  during  the  remainder  of  the  day. 

However,  on  the  day  following,  they  reappeared  ; 
and  thenceforth  for  nineteen  consecutive  days  they 
disputed  with  Antony  every  inch  of  his  road,  and 
inflicted  on  him  the  most  grievous  losses.  "  The 
sufferings  of  the  Roman  army  during  this  time,"  says 
a  modern  historian  of  Rome,  "  were  unparalleled  in 
their  military  annals.  The  intense  cold,  the  blinding 
snow  and  driving  sleet,  the  want  sometimes  of  pro- 
visions, sometimes  of  water,  the  use  of  poisonous 
herbs,  and  the  harassing  attacks  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  and  bowmen,  which  could  only  be  repelled 
by  maintaining  the  dense  array  of  the  phalanx  or  the 
tortoise,  reduced  the  retreating  army  by  one-third  of 
its  numbers."  Much  gallantry  was  shown,  especially 
by  some  of  the  officers,  as  Flavius  Gallus ;  and  Antony 
himself  displayed  all  the  finest  qualities  of  a  com- 
mander, except  judgment ;  but  every  effort  was  in 
vain  :  as  the  Roman  army  dwindled  in  numbers,  that 


HIS   RETREAT  AND   LOSSES.  213 

of  the  Parthians  increased  ;  as  the  strength  of  the 
individual  soldiers  failed  through  scantiness  or  un- 
wholesomeness  of  food,  the  courage  and  audacity  of 
their  adversaries  were  augmented  ;  the  Roman  losses 
grew  greater  from  day  to  day,  and  at  last  culminated 
in  one  occasion  of  extreme  disaster,  when  eight  thou- 
sand men  were  placed  hors  de  combat,  three  thousand 
of  them,  including  Gallus,  being  slain.  At  length, 
after  a  march  of  300  Roman,  or  277  British,  miles, 
the  survivors  reached  the  river  Araxes,  probably  at 
the  Jul  fa  ferry,  and,  crossing  it,  found  themselves  in 
Armenia.  But  the  calamities  of  the  return  were  not 
yet  ended.  Although  it  had  been  arranged  with 
Artavasdes  that  the  bulk  of  the  Roman  army  should 
winter  in  Armenia,  yet,  before  the  various  detach- 
ments could  reach  the  quarters  assigned  them  in 
different  parts  of  the  country,  eight  thousand  more 
had  perished,  through  the  effect  of  past  privations  or 
the  severity  of  the  Armenian  winter.  Altogether, 
out  of  the  hundred  thousand  men  whom  Antony  had 
taken  with  him  into  Media  Atropatene  in  the  mid- 
summer of  B.C.  36,  less  than  seventy  thousand  re- 
mained to  commence  the  campaign  of  the  ensuing 
year.  Well  may  the  unfortunate  commander  have 
exclaimed  during  the  later  portion  of  his  march,  as 
he  compared  his  own  heavy  losses  with  the  light  ones 
suffered  by  Xenophon  and  his  Greeks  in  these  same 
regions  :  "  Oh,  those  Ten  Thousand  !  those  Ten  Thou- 
sand ! " 

On  the  withdrawal  of  Antony  into  Armenia,  a 
quarrel  broke  out  between  Phraates  and  his  Median 
vassal.     The  latter  complained  that  he  was  wronged 


V 


214  PARTHIAN  EXPEDITION   OF  ANTONY. 

in  the  division  made  of  the  Roman  spoils,  and  ex- 
pressed himself  with  so  much  freedom  as  seriously  to 
offend  his  suzerain.  Perceiving  this,  he  became 
alarmed  lest  Phraates  should  punish  his  boldness 
by  deposing  him  from  his  office  and  setting  up 
another  vitaxa  in  his  place.  He  thought  it  necessary 
therefore  to  look  out  for  some  powerful  support,  and 
on  carefully  considering  the  political  situation,  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  his  best  hope  lay  in  making  a 
friend  of  his  late  foe  Antony,  and  placing  himself 
under  Roman  protection.  Antony  was  known  to 
have  been  deeply  offended  by  the  conduct  of  his 
Armenian  ally  in  the  late  campaign,  and  to  be 
desirous  of  taking  vengeance  on  him.  He  had 
already  made  an  attempt  to  get  possession  of  his 
person,  which  had  failed  through  the  suspiciousness 
and  caution  of  the  wily  Oriental.  Hostilities  between 
Armenia  and  Rome  were  evidently  impending,  and 
might  break  out  at  any  moment.  It  would  be  clearly 
for  Antony's  interest,  when  war  broke  out,  to  have  a 
friend  on  the  Armenian  frontier,  and  especially  one 
who  was  strong  in  cavalry  and  bowmen.  The  Median 
monarch  therefore  sent  an  ambassador  of  rank  to 
Alexandria,  where  Antony  was  passing  the  winter, 
and  boldly  proposed  an  alliance.  Antony  readily 
accepted  the  offer.  He  was  intensely  angered  by  the 
conduct  of  his  late  confederate,  and  resolved  on 
punishing  hir  disaffection  and  desertion  ;  he  viewed 
the  Median  alliai.~e  as  of  the  utmost  importance,  not 
only  as  against  Arme<  :a,  but  still  more  in  connection 
with  the  design,  which  he  still  entertained,  of  invading 
Parthia  itself;  and  he  saw  in  the  Atropatenian  ruler 


RESULTS   OF   THE   EXPEDITION.  215 

a  prince  whom  it  would  be  well  worth  his  while  to 
bind  to  his  cause  indissolubly.  He  therefore  embraced 
the  overtures  made  to  him  with  joy,  and  even  rewarded 
the  messenger  who  had  brought  them  with  a  princi- 
pality. After  sundry  efforts  to  entice  Artavasdes  into 
his  power,  which  occupied  him  during  the  greater 
part  of  B.C.  35,  but  which  were  unsuccessful,  in  the 
spring  of  B.C.  34  he  suddenlv  made  his  appearance  in 
Armenia.  His  army,  which  had  remained  there  from 
the  previous  campaign,  held  all  the  most  important 
positions,  and,  as  he  professed  the  most  friendly  feel- 
ings towards  Artavasdes,  even  proposing  an  alliance 
between  their  families,  that  prince,  after  some  hesita- 
tion, at  length  ventured  into  his  presence.  He  was 
immediately  seized  and  put  in  chains.  Armenia  was 
rapidly  overrun.  Artaxias,  the  eldest  son  of  Arta- 
vasdes, whom  the  Armenians  made  king  in  the  room 
of  his  father,  was  defeated,  and  forced  to  take  refuge 
with  the  Parthians.  Antony  then  arranged  a  marriage 
between  a  daughter  of  the  Median  monarch  and  his 
own  son  by  Cleopatra,  Alexander  ;  and  leaving  garri- 
sons in  Armenia  to  hold  it  as  a  conquered  province, 
carried  off  Artavasdes,  together  with  a  rich  booty, 
into  Egypt. 

Phraates,  during  these  transactions,  had  remained 
wholly  upon  the  defensive.  He  was  not  a  man  of 
much  enterprise,  and  probably  thought  that  a  waiting 
policy  was,  under  the  circumstances,  the  best  one. 
It  cannot  have  been  displeasing  to  him  to  see  Arta- 
vasdes punished  ;  and  doubtless  he  must  have  been 
gratified  to  observe  how  Antony  was  injuring  his  own 
cause  by  exasperating  the  Armenians,  and  teaching 


2l6  PARTHIAN   EXPEDITION   OF  ANTONY. 

them  to  detest  Rome  even  more  than  they  detested 
Parthia.  But  while  the  Roman  troops  held  possession 
both  of  Syria  and  of  Armenia,  and  the  alliance  be- 
tween Rome  and  Media  Atropatene  continued,  he 
could  not  venture  to  take  any  aggressive  step,  or  think 
of  doing  more  than  protecting  his  own  frontier. 
Almost  any  other  Roman  commander  than  Antony 
would,  after  crushing  Armenia,  have  at  once  carried 
the  war,  in  conjunction  with  his  Median  ally,  into 
Parthia,  and  have  endeavoured  to  strike  a  blow  that 
might  avenge  the  defeat  of  Carrhae.  Phraates  natu- 
rally expected  an  invasion  of  his  territories  both  in 
B.C.  34,  after  Antony's  occupation  of  Armenia,  and  in 
the  following  year,  when  he  again  appeared  in  these 
parts,  and  advanced  to  the  Araxes.  But  Antony's 
attention  was  so  much  engrossed  by  the  proceedings 
of  his  rival,  Octavian,  in  the  West,  and  it  was  so  clear 
to  him  that  the  great  contest  for  the  mastership  of 
the  Roman  world  could  not  be  delayed  much  longer, 
that  Eastern  affairs  had  almost  ceased  to  interest  him, 
and  his  chief  desire  was  to  be  quit  of  them.  The 
object  of  his  advance  to  the  Araxes  in  B.C.  33  was  to 
place  things  in  such  a  position  that  his  presence  might 
be  no  longer  necessary.  '  It  seemed  to  him  that  the 
interests  of  Rome  would  be  sufficiently  safeguarded, 
if  the  Median  alliance  were  assured,  and  he  therefore 
sought  an  interview  with  the  Atropatenian  king,  and 
concluded  a  treaty  with  him.  The  terms  were  very 
favourable  to  the  Median.  He  received  a  body  of 
Roman  heavy  infantry  in  exchange  for  a  detachment 
of  his  own  light  horsemen  ;  his  dominions  were  con- 
siderably enlarged  on  the  side  of  Armenia  ;  and  the 


RESULTS   OF    THE   EXPEDITION.  2iy 

marriage  previously  arranged  between  his  daughter, 
Jotapa,  and  Antony's  son,  Alexander,  was  accom- 
plished. Antony  then  marched  away  to  meet  his 
Roman  rival,  flattering  himself  that  he  had  secured, 
at  any  rate  for  some  years,  the  tranquillity  of  the 
Asiatic  continent. 

But  Phraates  now  saw  his  opportunity.  In  con- 
junction with  Artaxias,  he  attacked  the  Median  king, 
and,  though  at  first  repulsed  by  the  valour  of  the 
Roman  troops  in  the  Median  service,  succeeded,  after 
Antony  had  required  them  to  rejoin  his  standard,  in 
inflicting  on  him  a  severe  defeat,  and  even  making 
him  a  prisoner.  This  success  led  to  another.  Artaxias, 
having  now  only  the  Roman  garrisons  to  contend 
with,  re-entered  and  recovered  Armenia.  The  Roman 
garrisons  were  put  to  the  sword.  Armenia  became 
once  more  wholly  independent  of  Rome  ;  and  it  is 
probable  that  Media  Atropatene  returned  to  the 
Parthian  allegiance. 

The  result  of  the  expedition  of  Antony  was  thus 
rather  to  elevate  Parthia  than  to  depress  her.  An- 
tony, notwithstanding  his  undoubted  courage,  let  it  be 
clearly  seen  that  he  shrank  from  a  direct  encounter 
with  the  full  force  of  the  Parthian  kingdom.  Hence  his 
avoidance  of  any  invasion  of  actual  Parthian  territory, 
and  the  limitation  of  his  efforts  to  the  injuring  of  his 
enemy  by  striking  at  her  through  her  dependencies, 
Media  and  Armenia.  Nor  was  the  timidity  thus  ex- 
hibited compensated  for  by  success  in  the  compara- 
tively small  enterprises  to  which  he  confined  himself. 
The  expedition  against  Media  Atropatene  was  a  com- 
plete failure,  and  resulted  in  the  loss  of  thirty  thousand 


21! 


PARTHIAN   EXPEDITION   OF    ANTONY. 


men.  The  Armenian  campaign  succeeded  at  the  time, 
but  it  alienated  a  nation  which  it  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  conciliate,  and  it  was  followed  almost 
immediately  by  a  revolt  in  which  Rome  suffered  fresh 
disasters,  and  which  drew  Armenia  closer  to  Parthia 
than  she  had  ever  been  drawn  previously.  On  the 
retirement  of  Antony  from  the  East,  Parthia  occupied 
as  grand  a  position  as  had  ever  before  been  hers, 
excepting  during  the  brief  space  of  her  successes  under 
Pacorus  and  Labienus. 


XIII. 

INTERNAL  TROUBLES  IN  PARTHIA — HER   RELATIONS 
WITH    ROME   UNDER   AUGUSTUS   AND   TIBERIUS. 


Phraates,  justly  proud  of  his  successes  against 
Antony,  and  of  the  re-establishment  of  his  authority 
over  Media  Atropatene,  regarding,  moreover,  his  posi- 
tion in  Parthia  as  thereby  absolutely  secured,  pro- 
ceeded to  indulge  the  natural  cruelty  of  his  disposi- 
tion, and  resumed  the  harsh  and  tyrannical  treatment 
of  his  subjects,  by  which  he  had  made  himself  odious 
in  the  early  years  of  his  reign.1  So  far  did  he  push 
his  oppression,  that  ere  long  the  patience  of  the  people 
gave  way,  and  an  insurrection  broke  out  against  his 
authority,  which  compelled  him  to  fly  the  country  (B.C. 
33).  The  revolt  was  headed  by  a  certain  Tiridates,  a 
Parthian  noble,  who,  upon  its  success,  was  made  king 
by  the  insurgents.  Phraates  fled  into  Scythia,  and 
appealed  to  the  nomads  to  embrace  his  cause.  Ever 
ready  for  war  and  plunder,  the  hordes  were  nothing 
loth  ;  and,  crossing  the  frontier  in  force,  they  suc- 
ceeded without  much  difficulty  in  restoring  the  exiled 
monarch  to  the  throne  from  which  his  subjects  had 
deposed  him.     Tiridates  fled  at  their  approach,  and, 

1  See  above,  p.  204. 
219 


220  INTERNAL    TROUBLES   IN   PARTHIA. 

having  contrived  to  carry  off  in  his  flight  the  youngest 
son  of  Phraates,  presented  himself  before  Octavian, 
who  was  in  Syria  at  the  time  (B.C.  30)  on  his  return 
from  Egypt,  surrendered  the  young  prince  into  his 
hands,  and  requested  his  aid  against  the  tyrant. 
Octavian  accepted  the  valuable  hostage,  but,  with  his 
usual  caution,  declined  to  pledge  himself  to  furnish 
any  help  to  the  pretender  ;  he  might  remain,  he  said, 
in  Syria,  if  he  so  wished,  and  while  he  continued 
under  Roman  protection  a  suitable  provision  should 
be  made  for  his  support,  but  he  must  not  expect  to  be 


COIN    OF   TIRIDATES    II. 


replaced  upon  the  Parthian  throne  by  the  Roman 
arms.  Some  years  later  (B.C.  23),  Phraates  in  his  turn 
made  application  to  the  Imperator  for  the  surrender 
of  the  person  of  Tiridates  and  the  restoration  of  his 
kidnapped  son  ;  but  the  application  was  only  partially 
successful.  Octavian  said  he  willingly  restored  to  him 
his  son,  and  would  not  even  ask  a  ransom  ;  but  the 
surrender  of  a  fugitive  was  a  different  matter,  and  one 
that  he  could  not  possibly  consent  to.  Where  would 
be  the  honour  of  Rome,  if  such  a  thing  were  done  ? 
Phraates  would,  no  doubt,  feel  that  some  return  was 
due  on   account  of  his   son.     An  acceptable    return 


PHRAATFS   IV.    AND   AUGUSTUS.  221 

would  be  the  delivery  to  the  Romans  of  the  standards 
and  captives  taken  from  Crassus  and  Antony.  T.he 
Parthian  monarch  made  no  direct  reply  to  this  sug- 
gestion. He  gladly  received  his  son,  but  ignored  the 
rest  of  the  message.  It  was  not  until  three  years 
later,  when  Octavian  (now  become  Augustus)  visited 
the  East,  and  war  seemed  the  probable  alternative  if  he 
continued  obdurate,  that  the  Parthian  monarch  brought 
himself  to  relinquish  the  trophies,  which  were  as  much 
prized  by  the  victors  as  by  the  vanquished.  The  act 
was  one  so  unpatriotic  as  to  be  scarcely  pardonable  ; 
but  we  must  remember  that  Phraates  held  his  crown 
by  a  very  insecure  tenure — he  was  extremely  un- 
popular with  his  subjects,  and  Augustus  had  it  in  his 
power  at  any  moment  to  produce  a  pretender,  who 
had  once  occupied,  and  with  Roman  help  might  easily 
have  ascended  for  a  second  time,  the  throne  of  the 
Arsacids. 

The  remaining  years  of  Phraates — and  he  reigned 
for  nearly  twenty  years  after  restoring  the  standards 
— were  almost  unbroken  by  any  event  of  importance. 
The  result  of  the  twenty  years'  struggle  between 
Rome  and  Parthia  had  been  to  impress  either  nation 
with  a  wholesome  fear  of  the  other.  Both  had 
triumphed  on  their  own  ground  ;  both  had  failed 
when  they  ventured  on  sending  expeditions  into  their 
enemy's  territory.  Each  now  stood  on  its  guard, 
watching  the  movements  of  its  adversary  across  the 
Euphrates.  Both  had  become  pacific.  It  is  a  well- 
known  fact  that  Augustus  left  it  as  a  principle  of 
policy  to  his  successors  that  the  Roman  territory  had 
reached  its  proper  limits,  and  could  not  with  any  ad- 


222  PARTHIA'S    RELATIONS    WITH    ROME. 

vantage  be  extended  further.  This  principle,  followed 
with  the  utmost  strictness  by  Tiberius,  was  accepted 
as  a  rule  by  all  the  earlier  Caesars,  and  only  regarded 
by  them  as  admitting  of  rare  and  slight  exceptions. 
Trajan  was  the  first  who,  a  hundred  and  thirty  years 
after  the  accession  of  Augustus,  made  light  of  it,  and 
set  it  at  defiance.  With  him  re-awoke  the  spirit  of 
conquest,  the  aspiration  after  universal  dominion. 
But  in  the  meantime  there  was  peace — peace  not 
indeed  absolutely  unbroken,  for  border  wars  occurred, 
and  Rome  was  sometimes  tempted  to  interfere  by 
arms  in  the  internal  quarrels  of  her  neighbour  ;  but  a 
general  state  of  peace  and  amity  prevailed  ;  neither 
state  made  any  grand  attack  on  the  other's  dominions  ; 
no  change  occurred  in  the  frontier  ;  no  great  battle 
tested  the  relative  strength  of  the  two  peoples.  Such 
rivalry  as  still  continued  was  exhibited  less  in  arms 
than  in  diplomacy,  and  showed  itself  mainly  in  en- 
deavours on  either  side  to  obtain  a  predominant  in- 
fluence in  Armenia.  There  alone  during  the  century 
and  a  half  that  intervened  between  Antony  and  Trajan 
did  the  interests  of  Rome  and  Parthia  come  into  col- 
lision, and  in  connection  with  this  kingdom  alone  was 
there  during  these  years  any  struggle  between  the  two 
empires. 

After  Phraates  had  yielded  to  Augustus  in  the  im- 
portant matter  of  the  standards  and  the  prisoners,  he 
appears  for  many  years  to  have  studiously  cultivated 
his  good  graces.  In  the  interval  between  B.C.  n  and 
B.C.  7,  having  reason  to  distrust  the  intentions  of  his 
subjects  towards  him,  and  to  suspect  that  they  might 
not  improbably  depose  him  and  place  one  of  his  sons 


PHRAATES   IV.   AND   AUGUSTUS.  223 

upon  the  Parthian  throne,  he  resolved  to  send  these 
possible  rivals  out  of  the  country  ;  and  on  this  occa- 
sion he  paid  Augustus  the  compliment  of  selecting 
Rome  for  his  children's  residence.  The  youths  were 
four  in  number — Vonones,  who  was  the  eldest,  Seras^ 
padanes,  Rhodaspes,  and  Phraates  ;  two  of  them 
were  married  and  had  children.  They  resided  at 
Rome  during  the  remainder  of  their  father's  lifetime, 
and  were  treated  as  became  their  rank,  being  sup- 
ported at  the  public  charge,  and  in  a  magnificent 
manner.  The  Roman  writers  speak  of  them  as 
"  hostages "  given  by  Phraates  to  the  Roman  Em- 
peror ; *  but  this  was  certainly  not  the  intention  of 
the  Parthian  monarch,  and  it  was  scarcely  possible 
that  the  idea  could  be  entertained  by  the  Romans 
at  the  time  of  their  residence. 

The  friendly  relations  thus  established  between 
Phraates  and  Augustus  would  probably  have  con- 
tinued undisturbed  until  the  death  of  the  one  or  the 
other  had  not  a  revolution  broken  out  in  Armenia, 
which  tempted  the  Parthian  king  beyond  his  powers 
of  resistance.  On  the  death  of  Artaxias,  in  the  year 
B.C.  20,  Augustus,  who  was  then  in  the  East,  had  sent 
Tiberius  into  Armenia,  to  arrange  the  affairs  of  the 
nation  ;  and  Tiberius  had  thought  it  best  to  place 
upon  the  throne  a  brother  of  Artaxias,  named  Tigranes. 
Parthia  had  made  no  objection  to  this  arrangement, 
but  had  tacitly  admitted  the  Roman  suzerainty  over 
the  Armenian  nation.  Fourteen  years  afterwards,  in 
B.C.   6,  Tigranes  died  ;  and   the  Armenians,  without 

1  Veil.  Paterculus,  Suetonius,  Tacitus,  Justin,  Eutropius,  Orosius, 
&c. 


224  PARTTIIA'S   RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 

waiting  to  know  the  pleasure  of  the  Roman  Emperor, 
conferred  the  sovereignty  on  his  three  sons,  whom 
their  father  had  previously  designated  for  the  royal 
office  by  associating  them  with  him  in  the  govern- 
ment. But  this  was  a  liberty  which  Augustus  could 
not  possibly  allow.  He  therefore,  in  B.C.  5,  sent  an 
expedition  into  Armenia,  deposed  the  three  sons  of 
Tigranes,  and  established  in  the  kingdom  a  certain 
Artavasdes,  whose  birth,  rank,  and  claims  to  the  royal 
position  are  unknown.  But  the  Armenians  were  dis- 
satisfied and  recalcitrant.  After  enduring  the  rule  of 
Rome's  nominee  for  the  short  space  of  three  years, 
they  rose  in  revolt  against  him,  defeated  the  Romans 
who  endeavoured  to  support  his  authority,  and  drove 
him  out  of  the  kingdom.  Another  Tigranes  was 
placed  upon  the  throne ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  Parthia 
was  called  in  to  give  the  Armenians  their  protection, 
in  case  Rome  should  again  interfere  with  the  choice 
of  the  nation.  Phraates  could  not  bring  himself  to 
reject  the  Armenian  overtures.  Ever  since  the  time 
of  the  second  Mithridates,  it  had  been  a  settled  prin- 
ciple of  Parthia's  policy  that  Armenia  should  be  de- 
pendent on  herself;  and,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  rupture 
with  Rome,  it  seemed  to  Phraates  that  he  must  re- 
spond to  the  appeal  made  to  him.  The  rupture  might 
not  come.  Augustus  was  now  advanced  in  years,  and 
might  submit  to  the  indignity  offered  him  without 
resenting  it.  He  had  lately  lost  the  services  of  his 
best  general — his  stepson,  Tiberius — who,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  slights  put  upon  him,  had  gone  into 
retirement  at  Rhodes.  He  had  no  one  that  he  could 
entrust  with  an  army  but  his  grandsons,  youths  who 


PHRAATES  IV.   AND   AUGUSTUS.  225 

had  not  yet  fleshed  their  maiden  swords.  Phraates 
probably  hoped  that,  under  such  circumstances, 
Augustus  would  draw  back  before  the  terrors  of  a 
Parthian  war,  and  would  allow  without  remonstrance 
— or,  at  any  rate,  without  resistance — the  passing  of 
Armenia  into  the  position  of  a  Parthian  subject-ally. 

But,  if  such  were  his  expectations,  he  had  greatly 
miscalculated.  Augustus  had  as  keen  a  sense  of 
what  the  honour  of  Rome  required  now  that  he  was 
an  old  man  of  sixty  as  when  he  was  a  youth  of 
twenty.  From  the  time  that  he  first  heard  of  the 
Armenian  outbreak,  and  of  the  support  lent  it  by 
Parthia,  he  appears  never  to  have  wavered  in  his 
determination  to  re-assert  the  Roman  claim  to  a  pre- 
ponderating influence  over  Armenia,  but  only  to  have 
hesitated  for  a  time  as  to  the  individual  whose  services 
it  would  be  best  to  employ  in  the  business.  Tiberius 
naturally  presented  himself  to  his  mind  as  by  far  the 
fittest  person  for  such  a  work — a  work  in  which  diplo- 
matic and  military  ability  might  be,  both  of  them, 
almost  equally  required  ;  but  Tiberius  had  recently 
taken  offence  at  certain  slights  which  he  supposed 
himself  to  have  received,  and  had  withdrawn  from  the 
public  service  and  from  official  life  altogether.  In 
default  of  his  brave  and  astute  stepson,  Augustus 
could  only  fall  back  upon  his  grandsons  ;  but  the 
eldest  of  these,  Caius,  was  now,  in  the  year  B.C.  2,  no 
more  than  eighteen  years  of  age,  and  the  policy  of 
employing  so  young  a  man  in  so  difficult  and  impor- 
tant a  business  could  not  but  appear  to  him  extremely 
questionable.  Augustus  therefore  hesitated,  and  it 
was  not  until  late  in  the  year  B.C.  1  that  he  despatched 


226  PART  HI  A"  S   RELATIONS    WITH  ROME. 

Caius  to  the  East,  with  authority  to  settle  the  Parthian 
and  Armenian  troubles  as  it  should  seem  best  to  him. 
Meanwhile,  however,  a  change  had  occurred  in 
Parthia.  Phraates,  when  somewhat  advanced  in  life, 
had  married  an  Italian  slave-girl,  called  Musa,  who 
had  been  sent  to  him  as  a  present  by  Augustus,  and 
had  had  a  son  born  to  him  from  this  marriage,  who, 
as  he  grew  up,  came  to  hold  an  important  position 
in  the  Parthian  state.  It  was  perhaps  through  the 
influence  of  this  youth's  mother,  Musa,  that  Phraates 
was  induced  to  send  his  four  elder  boys  to  Rome,  there 
to  receive  their  education.  At  any  rate,  their  absence 
left  an  opening  for  her  son,  Phraataces,  of  which  she 
took  care  that  he  should  have  the  full  advantage  ;  and 
the  youth,  becoming  his  father's  sole  support  in  his 
declining  years,  came  to  look  upon  himself,  and  to 
be  looked  upon  by  others,  as  his  natural  successor. 
Conscious,  however,  of  the  weakness  of  his  claim  to 
the  throne,  and  doubtful  of  his  father's  intentions  with 
regard  to  him,  if  he  allowed  events  to  take  their 
natural  course,  the  ambitious  youth  resolved  to  become 
the  shaper  of  his  own  future,  and,  in  conjunction  with 
his  mother,  administered  poison  to  the  aged  monarch, 
from  the  effects  of  which  he  died.  Phraataces  then 
seized  the  throne,  and  reigned  as  joint  sovereign  with 
his  mother,  to  whom  he  allowed  the  titles  of  "  Queen  " 
and  "  Goddess,"  and  whose  image  he  placed  upon  the 
reverse  of  most  of  his  coins. 

Among  the  first  acts  of  Phraataces  as  king  was  the 
sending  of  an  embassy  to  Augustus,  whom  he  pro- 
fessed to  regard  as  still  friendly  to  Parthia,  though  he 
must  have  known  that  the  Parthian  attitude  towards 


PHRAATACES   AND   AUGUSTUS.  227 

Armenia  had  alienated  him.  He  informed  Augustus 
of  his  accession  to  the  throne  of  the  Arsacidae,  apolo- 
gised for  the  circumstances  under  which  it  had  taken 
place,  and  proposed  a  renewal  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
which  had  subsisted  between  Augustus  and  his  father, 
adding  a  request  that  the  Roman  Emperor  would,  in 
consideration  of  the  peace,  kindly  surrender  to  him 
his  four  brothers,  whose  proper  place  of  residence  was 
not  Rome,  but  Parthia.  With  respect  to  Armenia  he 
observed  a  discreet  silence,  leaving  it  to  Augustus  to 
initiate  negotiations  on  the  subject  or  to  accept  the 
status  quo.  Augustus  replied  to  this  message  in  terms 
of  extreme  severity.     Addressing  Phraataces  by  his 


COIN    OF    PHRAATACES    AND    MUSA. 

bare  name,  without  adding  the  title  of  king,  he  re- 
quired him  to  lay  aside  the  royal  appellation,  which 
he  had  so  arrogantly  and  unwarrantably  assumed,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  evacuate  all  the  portions  of 
Armenia  which  his  troops  wrongfully  occupied.  With 
respect  to  the  surrender  of  the  Parthian  princes,  the 
brothers  of  Phraataces,  and  their  families,  he  said 
nothing.  Nor  did  he  respond  to  the  appeal  concern- 
ing the  formal  renewal  of  a  treaty  of  peace.  He  left 
Phraataces  to  infer  that  his  brothers  wrould  be  retained 
at  Rome,  as  pretenders  to  the  throne  of  Parthia,  whom 
it  might  be  convenient  at  some  future  time  to  bring 


228  rARTHIA'S   RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 

forward  ;  and  he  not  obscurely  intimated  that  no  treaty 
of  peace  would  be  concluded  until  the  Parthian 
troops  were  withdrawn  across  the  Armenian  frontier. 
Phraataces,  however,  was  not  to  be  cowed  by  mere 
words.  He  repaid  Augustus  in  his  own  coin,  sending 
him  a  contemptuous  message,  in  which,  while  assum- 
ing to  himself  the  high-sounding  Oriental  designation 
of  "  King  of  Kings,"  he  curtly  addressed  the  Roman 
Emperor  as  "  Caesar." 

It  is  probable  that  this  attitude  of  defiance  would 
have  been  maintained,  and  that  the  Parthian  troops 
would  have  continued  to  garrison  Armenia,  had 
Augustus  refrained  from  active  measures,  and  been 
content  with  menaces.  But  when,  in  B.C.  I,  the 
Emperor  proceeded  from  words  to  acts,  and  des- 
patched his  grandson,  Caius,  to  the  East  at  the  head 
of  a  large  force,  with  orders  to  re-establish  the  Roman 
influence  in  Armenia,  even  at  the  cost  of  a  Parthian 
war,  and  when  Caius  showed  himself  in  Syria  with  all 
the  magnificent  surroundings  of  the  Imperial  dignity, 
Phraataces  became  alarmed.  It  was  arranged  during 
the  winter  that  an  interview  should  be  held  between 
the  two  princes  in  the  spring  of  A.D.  I,  on  an  island 
in  the  Euphrates,  where  the  terms  of  an  arrangement 
between  the  two  empires  should  be  discussed  and 
settled.  For  the  first  and  almost  the  last  time  a 
Parthian  monarch  and  a  scion  of  the  Roman  Imperial 
House  met  amicably  for  the  purpose  of  negotiation, 
and  discussed  the  terms  on  which  the  two  empires 
could  be  friends.  On  either  bank  of  the  "  great  river  " 
were  drawn  up  the  mighty  hosts,  which,  within  a  few 
days,  if  no  agreement  were  come  to,  would  be  loosed  at 


PHRAATACES   AND    CAIUS.  220. 

each  other's  throats.  The  two  chiefs,  accompanied  by 
an  equal  number  of  attendants,  passed  from  their 
respective  banks  to  the  island,  and  there,  in  the  full 
sight  of  both  armies,  proceeded  to  hold  the  conference. 
An  arrangement  satisfactory  to  both  sides  was  made, 
the  chief  proviso  of  which  was  the  evacuation  of 
Armenia  by  the  Parthians.  Feasting  and  banqueting 
followed.  The  Parthian  king  was  first  entertained  by 
Caius  on  the  Roman  side  of  the  river,  after  which  Caius 
was  in  his  turn  feasted  by  the  Parthian  on  the  opposite 
bank.  Cordial  relations  were  established.  For  once 
in  the  course  of  the  long  struggle  with  Rome,  Parthia 
seems  to  have  actually  made  up  her  mind  to  relinquish 
Armenia  to  her  adversary.  She  gave  up  her  claims, 
withdrew  her  troops,  and,  during  the  serious  troubles 
which  followed — troubles  wherein  Caius  lost  his  life — 
honourably  abstained  from  all  interference,  either  by 
intrigue  or  arms,  in  Armenian  affairs,  and  allowed 
Rome  to  settle  them  at  her  pleasure. 

The  willingness  of  Phraataces  thus  to  efface  himself, 
and  concede  to  Rome  the  foremost  position  in  Asia, 
arose  probably  from  the  unsettled  state  of  the  king- 
dom, and  the  internal  difficulties  which  threatened  him. 
To  be  a  parricide  was  not  in  Parthia  an  absolute  bar 
to  popularity  and  a  quiet  reign,  as  had  been  proved 
by  the  prosperous  reign  of  Phraates  IV.,  but  there  were 
circumstances  connected  with  the  recent  palace  revo- 
lution, which  threw  special  discredit  upon  the  prin- 
cipal agent  in  it,  and  grievously  offended  the  pride  of 
the  Parthian  nobles.  Private  and  selfish  motives  had 
alone  actuated  the  young  prince,  who  could  not  even 
pretend  any  public  ground  for  the  extreme  step  that 


230  PARTHIA'S   RELATIONS     WITH   ROME. 

he  had  taken.  His  subjection  to  female  influence, 
especially  when  the  female  was  a  foreign  slave-girl, 
enraged  the  nobles  and  drew  down  their  contempt. 
The  exalted  honours  which  he  heaped  on  her 
offended  their  pride.  Rumours,  which  may  have  had 
no  foundation  in  fact,  increased  his  unpopularity,  and 
covered  his  companion  on  the  throne  with  even  a 
deeper  shade  of  disgrace.  The  Megistanes  consulted 
together,  and  within  a  few  years  of  his  establishment 
as  king  raised  a  revolt  against  his  authority,  which 
terminated  in  his  deposition  or  death.     An  Arsacid, 


COIN   OK   ORODES   II. 

named  Orodes,  was  chosen  in  his  place  ;  but  he  too, 
in  a  short  time,  displeased  his  subjects,  and  was  mur- 
dered by  them,  either  at  a  banquet  or  during  a  hunt- 
ing expedition.  It  then  occurred  to  the  Megistanes 
to  fall  back  on  the  legitimate  heir  to  the  throne,  who 
was  still  at  Rome,  whither  he  had  been  sent  by  his 
father  some  fifteen  years  previously.  Accordingly, 
they  despatched  an  embassy  to  Augustus  (A.D.  5),  and 
asked  to  have  Vonones,  the  eldest  son  of  Phraates 
IV.,  sent  back  to  Parthia,  that  he  might  receive  his 
father's  kingdom.  Augustus  readily  complied,  since 
he  regarded  it  as  for  the  honour  of  Rome  to  give  a 


ACCESSION   OF    VO NONES   I.  23 1 

king  to  Parthia,  and  Vonones  was  sent  out  to  Asia 
with  much  pomp  and  many  presents,  to  occupy  a 
position  which  was  the  second  highest  that  the  world 
had  to  offer. 

It  is  said  that  princes  are  always  popular  on  their 
coronation  day  ;  and  certainly  Vonones  was  no  ex- 
ception to  the  general  rule.  His  subjects  received 
him  with  every  demonstration  of  joy,  pleased  like 
children  with  a  new  plaything.  But  this  state  of 
feeling  did  not  continue  very  long.  The  foreign  train- 
ing of  the  young  monarch  soon  showed  itself.  Bred 
up  at  Rome,  amid  the  luxuries  and  refinements  of 
Western  civilisation,  the  rough  sports  and  coarse 
manners  of  his  countrymen  displeased  and  disgusted 
him.  He  took  no  pleasure  in  horses,  seldom  ap- 
peared in  the  hunting-field,  absented  himself  from  the 
rude  feastings  which  formed  a  marked  feature  of  the 
national  manners,  and,  when  he  showed  himself  in 
public,  was  usually  seen  reclining  in  a  litter.  He  had 
brought  with  him,  moreover,  from  the  place  of  his 
exile,  a  number  of  Greek  companions,  whom  the 
Parthians  despised  and  ridiculed.  The  favour  which 
he  showed  these  interlopers  excited  their  jealousy  and 
rage.  It  was  to  no  purpose  that  he  sought  to  con- 
ciliate his  angry  subjects  by  the  openness  and 
affability  of  his  demeanour,  or  by  the  readiness  with 
which  he  allowed  access  to  his  person.  Virtues  and 
graces,  unknown  to  the  nation  hitherto,  were,  in  the 
eyes  of  the  courtiers,  not  merits  but  defects.  Dislike 
of  the  monarch  led  them  to  look  back  with  dissatis- 
faction on  the  part  which  they  had  taken  in  placing 
him  upon  the  throne.     "  Parthia  had  indeed  degene- 


232 


PART II I A 'S   RELATIONS     WITH  ROME. 


rated,"  they  said,  "  in  asking  for  a  king  who  belonged 
to  another  world,  and  into  whom  there  had  been 
engrained  a  foreign  and  hostile  civilisation.  All  the 
glory  gained  by  destroying  Crassus  and  repulsing 
Antony  was  utterly  lost  and  gone,  if  the  country  was 
to  be  ruled  by  Caesar's  bond-slave,  and  the  throne  of 
the  Arsacidae  to  be  treated  as  if  it  were  a  Roman 
province.  It  would  have  been  bad  enough  to  have 
had  a  prince  imposed  upon  them  by  the  will  of  a 
superior,  if  they  had  been  conquered  ;  it  was  worse, 
in  all  respects  worse,  to  suffer  such  an  insult,  when 
they  had  not  even  had  war  made  upon  them."  Under 


COIN    OF   VONONES    I. 


the  influence  of  these  feelings,  the  Parthians,  after 
they  had  tolerated  Vonones  for  a  few  years,  rose  in 
revolt  against  him  (about  A.D.  10),  and  summoned 
Artabanus,  an  Arsacid,  who  had  grown  to  manhood 
among  the  Dahae  of  the  Caspian  region,  but  was  at 
this  time  subject-king  of  Media  Atropatene,  to  rule 
over  them. 

A  crown,  when  it  is  offered,  is  not  often  declined, 
though  a  few  crowns  may  have  gone  begging  in  the 
modern  world,  now  that  kingship  has  lost  its  glamour  ; 
and  Artabanus,  on  receiving  the  overture  from  the 
Parthian  nobles,  at  once  expressed  his  willingness  to 


WAR    OF    VONONES   AND   ARTABANUS.  233 

accept  the  proffered  dignity.  He  invaded  Parthia  at 
the  head  of  an  army  consisting  of  his  own  subjects, 
and  engaged  Vonones,  to  whom  in  his  difficulties 
the  bulk  of  the  Parthian  people  had  rallied.  This 
engagement  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  Median 
monarch  ;  and  Vonones  was  so  proud  of  his  victory 
that  he  immediately  had  a  coin  struck  to  commemo- 
rate it,  bearing  on  the  obverse  his  own  head,  with  the 
legend  of,  BASIAEYS  ONQNHS,  and  on  the  reverse  a 
Victory  with  the  legend— BASIAEYS  ONQNHS  NEI- 
KH2A2  APTABANON— "Kingr  Onones  on  his  defeat 


COIN    OF   ARTABANUS    III. 


of  Artabanus."  But  the  self-gratulation  was  prema- 
ture. Artabanus  had  made  good  his  retreat  into  his 
own  country,  and,  having  there  collected  a  larger  army 
than  before,  returned  to  the  attack.  This  time  he 
was  successful.  The  forces  of  Vonones  were  defeated, 
and  he  himself,  escaping  from  the  battle  with  a  few 
followers,  fled  on  horseback  to  Seleucia,  while  his 
vanquished  army,  following  more  slowly  in  his  track, 
was  pressed  upon  by  the  victorious  Mede,  and  suffered 
great  losses.  Artabanus,  entering  Ctesiphon  in 
triumph,  was  immediately  acclaimed  king.  Vonones 
took  refuge  in  Armenia,  and,  the  throne  happening  to 


234         parthia's  RELATIONS   WITH  ROME. 

be  vacant,  was  not  only  given  an  asylum,  but  ap- 
pointed to  the  kingly  office.  Artabanus  naturally 
remonstrated,  and  threatened  war  unless  Vonones 
were  surrendered  to  him.  Armenia  was  alarmed,  and 
began  to  waver  ;  whereupon  Vonones  withdrew  him- 
self from  the  country,  and  sought  the  protection  of 
Creticus  Silanus,  the  Roman  governor  of  Syria,  who 
received  him  with  favour,  gave  him  a  guard,  and 
allowed  him  the  state  and  title  of  king,  but  at  the 
same  time  kept  him  in  a  sort  of  honourable  captivity. 
It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  Roman 
Emperor,  Tiberius,  who  had  recently  succeeded 
Augustus,  determined  to  entrust  the  administration 
and  pacification  of  the  East  to  a  personage  of  impor- 
tance— one  who  should  combine  the  highest  rank  with 
considerable  experience,  and  should  strfke  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  Orientals,  and  command  their  attention, 
at  once  by  the  dignity  of  his  office,  and  by  the  pomp 
and  splendour  of  his  surroundings.  It  may  be  that, 
in  his  selection  of  the  individual,  he  was  actuated  by 
motives  of  jealousy,  and  by  the  wish  to  separate  one, 
whom  he  could  not  but  regard  as  a  rival,  from  an  army 
which  had  grown  too  much  attached  to  him.  But  it 
seems  scarcely  fair  to  attribute  these  motives  to  him 
upon  mere  suspicion,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  what 
better  choice  than  the  one  he  made  was  open  to  him 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  period.  Germanicus 
was,  at  the  time,  the  second  man  in  the  State.  He 
had  knowledge  of  affairs  ;  he  was  a  good  soldier 
and  general  ;  his  manners  were  courteous  and  agree- 
able ;  and  he  was  popular  with  all  classes.  At 
once  the  nephew  and  the  adopted  son  of  the  sove- 


ARTABANUS   III.   AND    TIBERIUS.  235 

reign,  he  would  scarcely  seem  to  the  Orientals  to 
shine  with  a  reflected  radiance  ;  they  would  see 
in  him  the  alter  ego  of  the  great  Western  autocrat, 
and  would  be  awed  by  the  grandeur  of  his  posi- 
tion, while  fascinated  by  the  charm  of  his  person- 
ality. The  more  to  affect  their  minds,  Tiberius 
conferred  on  his  representative  none  of  the  ordinary 
and  well-worn  titles  of  Roman  administrative  em- 
ployment, but  coined  for  him  a  phrase  unknown 
in  official  language  previously,  investing  him  with 
an  extraordinary  command  over  all  the  Roman 
dominions  east  of  the  Hellespont.  Full  powers  were 
granted  him  for  making  peace  or  war,  for  levying 
troops,  annexing  provinces,  appointing  subject  kings, 
concluding  treaties,  and  performing  other  sovereign 
acts  without  referring  back  to  Rome  for  instructions. 
A  train  of  unusual  magnificence  accompanied  him  to 
his  charge,  calculated  to  impress  the  Orientals  with 
the  conviction  that  this  was  no  common  negotiator. 
Germanicus  arrived  in  Asia  in  the  spring  of  A.D.  18, 
and  within  the  space  of  a  single  year  completed  the 
task,  which  he  had  undertaken,  satisfactorily.  Having 
visited  Artaxata  in  person,  and  ascertained  the  feel- 
ings and  disposition  of  the  Armenians,  he  made  up 
his  mind  not  to  demand  the  re-instatement  of  Vonones, 
which  would  have  been  throwing  down  the  gauntlet 
to  Parthia,  nor  yet  to  allow  the  establishment  of  an 
Arsacid  on  the  Armenian  throne,  which  would  have 
been  exalting  Parthia  to  the  shame  and  dishonour  of 
Rome,  but  to  pursue  a  middle  course,  at  which  neither 
the  Armenians  nor  the  Parthians  could  take  offence, 
while  Roman  dignity  would  be  upheld,  Roman  tradi- 


236  PARTHIA'S   RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 

tions  maintained,  and  something  done  to  soothe  the 
feelings  and  gratify  the  wishes  of  both  the  irritated 
Asiatic  nations.  There  was  in  Armenia,  where  he  had 
grown  up,  a  foreign  prince,  named  Zeno,  the  son  of 
Polemo,  once  king  of  the  curtailed  Pontus,  and  after- 
wards of  the  Lesser  Armenia,  who  was  in  very  good 
odour  among  the  Armenians,  since  he  had,  during  a 
long  residence,  conformed  himself  in  all  respects  to 
their  habits  and  usages  Finding  that  it  would  please 
the  Armenians,  Germanicus  determined  on  giving 
them  this  man  for  ruler,  and  at  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment, Artaxata,  in  the  presence  of  a  vast  multitude 
of  the  people,  and  with  the  consent  and  approval  of 
the  principal  nobles,  he  placed  with  his  own  hand 
the  diadem  on  the  brow  of  the  favoured  prince,  and 
saluted  him  as  king  under  the  Armenian  name,  which 
he  had  never  hitherto  borne,  of  "  Artaxias."  For  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Parthian  monarch,  who  required 
that  Vonones  should  either  be  delivered  into  his  hands 
or  removed  to  a  greater  distance  from  the  Parthian 
frontier,  he  "  interned "  the  unhappy  prince  in  the 
Cilician  city  of  Pompeiopolis — a  change  of  residence 
so  much  disliked  by  the  prince  himself  that  the  next 
year  he  endeavoured  to  escape  from  it,  but,  his 
attempt  being  discovered,  he  was  pursued,  overtaken, 
and  slain  in  a  skirmish  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
Pyramus.  The  pacification  of  the  East  was  thus, 
with  some  difficulty,  effected  ;  and  Germanicus,  quit- 
ting Asia,  indulged  himself  in  the  luxury  of  a  pleasure 
trip  to  Egypt. 

The    dispositions    which    Germanicus    had     made 
sufficed  to  preserve  the  tranquillity  of  the  East  for  the 


ART AB ANUS   III.    AND    TIBERIUS.  237 

space  of  fifteen  years.  Artabanus,  at  peace  with 
Rome  and  with  Armenia,  employed  the  time  in  the 
chastisement  of  border-tribes,  and  in  petty  wars, 
which  however  increased  his  reputation.  Success 
followed  on  success  ;  and  by  degrees  his  opinion  of 
his  own  military  capacity  was  so  much  raised  that  he 
began  to  look  upon  a  rupture  with  Rome  as  rather  to 
be  desired  than  dreaded.  He  knew  that  Germanicus 
was  dead  ;  that  Tiberius  was  advanced  in  years,  and 
not  likely  to  engage  in  a  distant  military  expedition  ; 
and  that  the  East  was  under  the  rule  of  an  official 
who  had  never  yet  distinguished  himself  as  a  com- 
mander. When,  therefore,  in  A.D.  34,  the  Armenian 
throne  was  made  vacant  by  the  death  of  Artaxias 
III.,  the  nominee  of  Germanicus,  he  boldly  occupied 
the  country,  and  claiming  the  disposal  of  the  vacant 
dignity,  bestowed  it  upon  his  own  eldest  son,  a  prince 
who  bore  the  name  of  Arsaces.  Nor  did  he  rest 
content  with  this.  Insult  must  be  added  to  injury. 
Ambassadors  were  despatched  to  Rome  with  a 
demand  for  the  restoration  of  the  treasure  which 
Vonones  had  carried  off  from  Parthia  and  taken  with 
him  into  Roman  territory  ;  and  a  threat  was  held 
out  that  Artabanus  was  about  to  reoccupy  all  the 
territory  which,  having  been  once  Macedonian  or 
Persian,  was  now  properly  his,  since  he  was  the 
natural  successor  and  representative  of  Cyrus  and 
Alexander.  According  to  one  writer,1  the  Parthian 
monarch  actually  commenced  military  operations 
against  Rome  by  the  invasion  of  Cappadocia,  which 
had  been  for  some  time  a  Roman  province. 

1  Dio  Cassius. 


238  PARTHTA\S   RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 

It  is  uncertain  what  response  Tiberius  would  have 
made  to  these  demands  and  proceedings  had  the 
internal  condition  of  Parthia  been  sound  and  satisfac- 
tory. He  was  certainly  averse  to  war  at  this  period 
of  his  life,  and  had  actually  sent  instructions  to 
Vitellius,  the  governor  of  Syria,  after  the  seizure  of 
Armenia  by  Artabanus,  that  he  was  to  cultivate 
friendly  relations  with  Parthia.  But  the  Parthian 
kingdom  was  internally  in  a  state  of  extreme  disquiet ; 
insurrection  was  threatened  ;  and  the  nobles  were  in 
active  correspondence  with  the  Imperial  court  on  the 
subject  of  bringing  forward  a  pretender.  "  Arta- 
banus." they  said,  "  had,  among  his  other  cruelties, 
put  to  death  all  the  adult  members  of  the  royal  family 
who  were  in  his  power,  and  there  was  not  an  Arsacid 
in  Asia  of  age  to  reign  ;  but  for  a  successful  revolt  an 
Arsacid  leader  was  absolutely  necessary  :  would  not 
Rome  supply  the  defect  ?  Would  she  not  send  them 
one  of  the  surviving  sons  of  Phraates  IV.,  to  head  the 
intended  insurrection,  which  would  then  be  sure  to 
succeed  ?  One  son,  named  Phraates,  like  his  father, 
was  still  living,  and  was,  they  understood,  at  Rome  ;  if 
Tiberius  would  only  send  him,  and  he  were  once  seen 
on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates,  they  guaranteed  a 
successful  outbreak — Artabanus  would  be  driven  from 
his  throne  without  difficulty.  Tiberius  was  prevailed 
upon  to  do  as  they  desired.  He  furnished  Phraates 
wilh  all  things  necessary  for  his  journey,  and  sent 
him  into  Asia,  to  lay  claim  to  his  father's  kingdom. 

Phraates,  however,  was  unequal  to  the  task 
assigned  him.  The  sudden  change  in  his  life  and 
habits,    which    his  new    position   necessitated,   broke 


ARTABANUS   III.   AND    TIBERIUS.  239 

down  his  health,  and  he  was  but  just  arrived  in  Syria 
when  he  sickened  and  died.     Tiberius   replaced  him 
by  a  nephew,  named  Tiridates,  probably  a  son  either 
of  Rhodaspes  or  of  Seraspadanes,  and  proceeded  to 
devote  to  the  affairs  of  the  East  all  the  energies  of  a 
mind  eminently  sagacious  and    fertile    in    resources. 
At  his  instigation,    Pharasmanes,  king  of    Iberia,   a 
portion  of  the  modern  Georgia,  was  induced  to  take 
the  field,  and  invade  Armenia  ;  where,  after  removing 
the  reigning  Parthian  prince,  Arsaces,  by  poison,  he 
occupied  the  capital,  and  established  his  own  brother, 
Mithridates,  as  king.     Artabanus  met  this  movement 
by    giving    the    direction    of  affairs    in    Armenia    to 
another  son,  Orodes,  and  sending  him  with  all  speed 
to    maintain     the    Parthian    cause    in    the   disputed 
province  ;  but  Orodes  proved  no  match  for  his  adver- 
sary, who  was  superior  in  numbers,  in  the  variety  of 
his  troops,  and   in     familiarity    with    the    localities. 
Pharasmanes  had    obtained    the    assistance    of    his 
neighbours,  the  Albanians,  and  opening  the  passes  of 
the  Caucasus,  had  admitted  through  them  a  number 
of    the    Scythic     or     Sarmatian    hordes,  who    were 
always  ready,  when  their  services  were  well  paid,  to 
take  a  part  in   the  quarrels  of  the  south.      Orodes 
failed  to  secure  either  mercenaries  or  allies,  and  had 
to  contend  unassisted  against  the  three  enemies  who 
had  joined  their  forces  to  oppose  him.     For  some  time 
he   prudently   declined   an   engagement  ;   but   it   was 
impossible  to  restrain  the  ardour  of  his  troops,  whom 
the  enemy  exasperated  by  their  reproaches.     After  a 
while  he  was  compelled  to  accept  the  battle  which 
Pharasmanes  incessantly  offered.     The  troops  at  his 


240  PARTHIA'S   RELATIONS    WITH  ROME. 

disposal  consisted  entirely  of  cavalry,  while  Pharas- 
manes  had,  besides  his  horse,  a  powerful  body  of 
infantry.  The  conflict  was  nevertheless  long  and 
furious  ;  the  Parthians  and  Sarmatians  were  very 
equally  matched  ;  and  the  victory  might  have  been 
doubtful,  if  it  had  not  happened  that  in  a  hand-to- 
hand  combat  between  the  two  commanders,  Orodes 
was  struck  to  the  ground  by  his  antagonist,  and 
thought  by  most  of  his  own  side  to  be  killed.  As 
usual  under  such  circumstances  in  the  East,  a  rout  fol- 
lowed. If  we  are  to  believe  Josephus,  "  many  tens 
of  thousands  "  were  slain.  Armenia  was  wholly  lost 
to  Parthia  ;  and  Artabanus  found  himself  left  with 
diminished  resources  and  tarnished  reputation  to 
meet  the  intrigues  of  his  domestic  foes. 

Still,  he  would  not  succumb  without  an  effort.  In 
the  spring  of  A.D.  36,  having  levied  the  whole  force  of 
the  empire,  he  took  the  field  in  person,  and  marched 
northwards,  with  the  intention  of  avenging  himself 
on  the  Iberians  and  recovering  his  lost  province.  But 
his  first  efforts  were  unsuccessful  ;  and  before  he 
could  renew  them  the  Roman  general,  Vitellius,  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  his  legions,  and,  moving 
towards  the  Euphrates,  threatened  Mesopotamia  with 
invasion.  Placed  thus  between  two  dangers,  the 
Parthian  monarch  felt  that  he  had  no  choice  but  to 
abandon  Armenia  and  return  to  the  defence  of  his 
own  proper  territories,  which  in  his  absence  must 
have  lain  temptingly  open  to  an  invader.  His  return 
caused  Vitellius  to  change  his  tactics.  Instead  of 
challenging  Artabanus  to  an  engagement,  and  letting 
the  quarrel  be  decided  by   a  trial   of  strength  in  the 


ARTABANUS   III.    AND    TIBERIUS.  241 

open  field,  he  fell  back  on  the  weapon  of  intrigue  so 
dear  to  his  master,  and  proceeded  by  a  lavish  ex- 
penditure of  money  to  excite  disaffection  once  more 
among  the  Parthian  grandees.  This  time  the  con- 
spiracy was  successful.  The  military  disasters  of  the 
last  two  years  had  alienated  from  Artabanus  the 
affections  of  those  whom  his  previous  cruelties  had 
failed  to  disgust  or  alarm  ;  and  he  found  himself 
without  any  armed  force  whereon  he  could  rely, 
beyond  a  small  number  of  the  foreign  guards  whom 
he  maintained  about  his  person.  It  seemed  to  him 
that  his  only  safety  was  in  flight  ;  and  accordingly 
he  quitted  his  capital,  and  removed  himself  hastily  to 
Hyrcania,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Scythian 
Dahae,  among  whom  he  had  been  brought  up.  Here 
the  population  was  friendly  to  him,  and  he  lived  a 
retired  life,  waiting  (as  he  said)  until  the  Parthians, 
who  could  judge  an  absent  prince  with  fairness, 
although  they  could  not  long  continue  faithful  to  a 
present  one,  should  repent  of  their  behaviour  to  him. 

When  the  flight  of  Artabanus  became  known  to 
the  Romans,  Vitellius  immediately  advanced  to  the 
banks  of  the  Euphrates,  and  introduced  Tiridates 
into  his  kingdom.  Fortunate  omens  were  said  to 
have  accompanied  the  passage  of  the  river,  and  these 
were  followed  by  adhesions,  the  importance  of  which 
was  undoubted.  Ornospades,  satrap  of  Mesopotamia, 
and  a  former  comrade  of  Tiberius  in  the  Dalmatic 
war,  was  the  first  to  join  the  standard  of  the  pretender 
with  a  large  body  of  horse.  Next  came  Sinnaces, 
who  had  long  been  in  correspondence  with  the 
Romans,  with  a  contingent  ;  then  his  father,    Abda- 


242 


PARTHIA'S   RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 


gescs — "  the  pillar  of  the  party,"  as  Tacitus  calls 
him— and  the  keeper  of  the  royal  treasures,  together 
with  other  persons  of  high  position.  Vitellius,  on 
seeing  the  pretender  thus  warmly  welcomed  by  his 
countrymen,  regarded  his  mission  as  accomplished, 
and  returned  with  his  troops  into  Syria.  Tiridates 
proceeded  through  Mesopotamia  and  Assyria,  re- 
ceiving on  his  way  the  submission  of  many  Greek 
and  some  Parthian  cities,  as  Halus  and  Artemita. 
The  Greeks  saw  in  his  Roman  breeding  a  guarantee 
of  the  politeness  and  refinement  which  had  been 
wholly  wanting  in  Artabanus,  brought  up  among  the 
uncivilised  Scyths.  In  the  great  city  of  Seleucia  he 
was  received  with  an  obsequiousness  that  bordered  on 
adulation.  Besides  paying  him  all  the  customary 
royal  honours,  both  old  and  new,  they  flatteringly 
compared  him  with  his  predecessor,  who,  they  said, 
had  been  no  true  Arsacid.  Tiridates  was  pleased  to 
reward  these  unseemly  compliments  by  a  modification 
of  the  Seleucian  constitution  in  a  democratic  sense. 
From  Seleucia  he  crossed  the  Tigris  to  Ctesiphon, 
where,  after  a  short  delay,  caused  by  the  absence  01 
some  important  governors  of  provinces,  he  was 
crowned  King  of  Parthia  according  to  the  established 
forms  by  the  Surena,  or  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
period. 

Tiridates  thought  that  now  all  was  secure.  Arta- 
banus was  in  hiding  in  Hyrcania,  leading  a  miserable 
existence.  The  whole  of  the  western  provinces  had 
declared  for  him,  and  no  signs  of  hostility  appeared 
in  the  East.  He  deemed  his  rule  acquiesced  in 
generally,  and  there    is    reason    to  suppose   that  his 


ARTABANUS   III.    AND    TIBERIUS.  243 

anticipations  would  have  proved  correct,  had  not 
discontent  shown  itself  at  the  Court  and  among  the 
higher  officials.  There  had  been  many  who  had  hoped 
for  the  office  of  Grand  Vizier,  and  in  nominating  one 
to  it  Tiridates  had  displeased  all  the  rest.  There 
were  also  many,  who  through  accident  or  hesitation 
in  making  up  their  minds  had  been  absent  from  the 
coronation  ceremonial,  and  who  believed  themselves 
to  be  on  that  account  suspected  of  disaffection,  or 
at  any  rate  of  lukewarmness.  It  is  also  more  than 
probable  that  the  "  Roman  breeding "  of  the  new 
monarch,  which  delighted  his  Grecian,  offended  his 
Parthian  subjects.  At  any  rate,  however  we  may 
account  for  it,  disaffection  certainly  broke  out. 
Emissaries  from  the  nobles  sought  the  dethroned 
monarch  in  his  obscure  retirement,  and  placed 
before  him  the  prospect  of  a  restoration,  which  they 
declared  themselves  anxious  to  bring  about.  Dis- 
trustful at  first  of  what  seemed  to  him  mere  levity 
and  fickleness,  Artabanus  was  ultimately  persuaded 
that  the  overtures  made  to  him  were  sincere,  and  that 
if  he  himself  were  not  the  object  of  any  very  devoted 
affection  on  the  part  of  the  malcontents,  Tiridates 
at  any  rate  was  the  object  of  a  very  real  and  pro- 
nounced hostility.  He  therefore  placed  himself  in 
the  hands  of  the  conspirators,  and,  having  first 
secured  the  services  of  a  body  of  Dahae  and  other 
Scyths,  marched  westward  with  all  speed,  anxious  at 
once  to  cut  short  the  preparations  which  were  being 
made  to  resist  him  by  his  enemies,  and  to  forestall 
the  desertions,  which  he  could  not  but  anticipate,  on 
the  part  of  his  friends.     The  good  policy  of  this  rapid 


244  P  ART  II I  A*  S    RELATIONS    WITH   ROME. 

movement  is  unquestionable.  It  startled  and  greatly 
discomposed  Tiridates  and  his  counsellors.  Of  these, 
some  recommended  an  immediate  attack  on  the 
troops  of  Artabanus  before  they  were  recovered  from 
the  fatigues  of  their  long  march  ;  while  others,  and 
among  them  Abdageses,  the  chief  vizier,  advised  a 
retreat  into  Mesopotamia,  and  a  junction  with  the 
Armenian  levies,  and  with  the  Roman  troops,  which 
Vitellius,  on  the  first  news  of  the  insurrection,  had 
thrown  across  the  Euphrates.  The  more  timid 
counsel  prevailed,  and  a  retreat  was  determined 
on.  But  reader  pour  mieux  sauter  is  a  maxim  only 
suited  to  the  West.  In  the  East  the  first  step  in 
retreat  is  the  first  step  towards  ruin.  No  sooner  was 
the  Tigris  crossed  and  the  march  through  Mesopo- 
tamia begun  than  the  host  of  Tiridates  melted  away 
like  an  iceberg  in  the  Gulf  Stream.  The  Arabs  of 
the  Mesopotamian  desert  were  the  first  to  break  up 
and  disband  themselves,  the  nearness  of  their  homes 
offering  an  irresistible  attraction  ;  but  their  example 
was  soon  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  army,  which  had 
no  such  excuse.  Some  directed  their  steps  home- 
wards ;  others  joined  the  enemy  ;  Tiridates  was  at 
last  left  with  a  mere  handful  of  adherents,  and, 
hastening  into  Syria,  put  himself  once  more  under 
Roman  protection. 

The  attempt  to  establish  the  influence  of  Rome 
over  the  Parthian  kingdom,  by  fixing  a  Roman  puppet 
on  the  throne  of  the  Arsacidae,  thus  proved  altogether 
a  failure.  But  the  general  effect  of  the  struggle  was 
advantageous  to  Rome,  and  reflects  credit  on  the 
prince  who,  at  the  age  of  seventy-seven,  at  once  vin- 


CONCESSIONS   MADE   BY   ARTABANUS.         245 

dicated  the  Roman  honour  and  baffled  the  schemes 
of  one  of  the  ablest  of  the  Parthian  monarchs. 
Artabanus,  when  after  his  various  vicissitudes  he 
recovered  his  throne,  had  no  longer  any  stomach  for 
great  enterprises.  He  took  no  further  steps  to  disturb 
Mithridates  in  his  possession  of  Armenia,  and  he 
left  Vitellius  unmolested  on  the  Euphrates.  When, 
towards  the  close  of  A.D.  36,  or  very  early  in  A.D.  37, 
he  had  an  interview  with  the  Roman  proconsul  half- 
way between  the  two  banks  of  the  river,  he  distinctly 
renounced  all  claims  to  the  Armenian  kingdom  ;  at 
the  same  time  agreeing  to  send  one  of  his  sons, 
Darius,  to  Rome  in  a  position  which  Rome  regarded 
as  that  of  a  hostage,  and  further  consenting  to  offer 
incense  to  the  emblems  of  Roman  sovereignty — an 
act,  as  the  Romans  understood  it,  of  submission  and 
homage.  Artabanus,  by  these  concessions,  the 
meaning  of  which  he  did  not  perhaps  fully  under- 
stand, decidedly  lowered  the  prestige  of  his  nation, 
and  yielded  to  Rome  a  pre-eminence  which  was 
scarcely  admitted  by  any  other  monarch,  or  at  any 
other  period.  We  cannot  be  surprised  that  the 
credit  of  concluding  such  a  peace,  though  belonging 
really  to  Tiberius,  was  falsely  claimed  by  his  flatterers 
for  Caligula,  the  new  emperor,  soon  after  whose 
accession  in  March,  A.D.  37,  the  news  of  the  success- 
ful negotiations  reached  Rome. 


XIV. 

ASINAI     AND    ANILAI — AN     EPISODE     OF     PARTHIAN 
HISTORY. 


It  was  during  the  troubled  reign  of  Artabanus  the 
Third,  when  the  state  was  distracted  between  foreign 
war  and  domestic  feud,  that  disturbances  broke  out 
in  Mesopotamia,  which  have  been  graphically  de- 
scribed by  the  Jewish  writer  Josephus,  and  which 
serve  to  throw  considerable  light  on  the  internal 
condition  of  the  Parthian  Empire  at  this  period. 
There  was  a  large  Jewish  element  in  the  population 
of  the  more  western  provinces  of  the  empire,  an 
element  which  dated  from  a  time  anterior  to  the  rise, 
not  only  of  the  Parthian,  but  even  of  the  Persian 
monarchy.  That  system  of  "  transplantation  of 
nations,"  which  was  pursued  on  so  large  a  scale  by 
the  Assyrian  and  Babylonian  sovereigns  of  the 
eighth,  seventh,  and  sixth  centuries  before  Christ, 
had  introduced  into  the  heart  of  Asia  a  number  of 
strange  nationalities,  and  among  these  there  was 
none  more  remarkable  than  that  of  the  Hebrews. 
Whatever  had  become  of  the  descendants  of  the  Ten 
Tribes — whether  in  any  places  they  still   constituted 

distinct    communities,    or    had     long    ere    this    been 

246 


THE   JEWS   IN   PARTHIA.  247 

absorbed  into  the  general  population  of  the  country 
— at  any  rate,  colonies  of  Jews,  dating  from  the  time 
of  Nebuchadnezzar's  Captivity,  maintained  them- 
selves, often  in  a  flourishing  condition,  in  various 
parts  of  Babylonia,  Armenia,  Media,  Mesopotamia, 
Susiana,  and  probably  in  other  Parthian  provinces. 
These  colonies  exhibited  very  generally  the  curious 
but  well-known  tendency  of  the  Jewish  race  to  a  rate 
of  increase  quite  disproportionate  to  that  of  the 
population  among  which  they  are  settled.  The 
Hebrew  element  became  continually  larger  and 
more  important  in  Babylonia,  Mesopotamia,  and  the 
the  adjacent  countries,  notwithstanding  the  large 
draughts  which  from  time  to  time  were  made  upon 
it  by  Seleucus  Nicator,  and  others  of  the  Syrian 
princes.  And  this  alien  element  in  the  population, 
for  the  most  part  prospered.  The  Jewish  settlers 
seem  to  have  enjoyed  under  the  Parthians  the  same 
sort  of  toleration,  and  the  same  permission  to 
exercise  a  species  of  self-government,  which  both 
Jews  and  Christians  enjoy  now  in  several  parts  of 
Turkey.  In  many  cities  they  formed  a  recognised 
Community  under  their  own  magistrates  ;  some 
towns  they  had  wholly  to  themselves  ;  those  who 
dwelt  in  Mesopotamia  possessed  a  common  treasury  ; 
and  it  was  customary  for  them  to  send  up  to 
Jerusalem  from  time  to  time  the  offerings  of  the 
faithful,  escorted  by  a  convoy  of  thirty  thousand  or 
forty  thousand  armed  men.  The  Parthian  kings 
treated  them  well,  and  probably  regarded  them  as  a 
valuable  counterpoise  to  the  disaffected  Greeks  and 
Syrians  of  this  part  of  the  empire.     They  laboured 


248  AN   EPISODE    OF   PARTHIAN   HISTORY. 

under  no  disabilities  ;  suffered  no  oppression  ;  had 
no  grievances  of  which  to  complain  ;  and  it  would 
have  seemed  beforehand  very  improbable  that  they 
would  ever  become  the  cause  of  trouble  or  dis- 
turbance to  the  state  ;  but  circumstances  seemingly 
trivial  threw  the  whole  community  into  commotion, 
and  led  on  to  disasters  of  an  unusual  and  lamentable 
character. 

There  were  two  young  Jews,  named  respectively 
Asinai  and  Anilai,  brothers,  natives  of  Nearda,  the 
city  in  which  the  general  treasury  of  the  community 
was  established,  who,  on  suffering  some  ill-usage  at 
the  hands  of  the  manufacturer  in  whose  service  they 
were,  threw  up  their  employment,  and,  retiring  to  a 
marshy  district  enclosed  between  two  arms  of  the 
Euphrates,  made  up  their  minds  to  exchange  the  dull 
career  of  honest  labour  for  the  more  exciting  one  of 
robbery.  The  vagabonds  of  the  neighbourhood,  by 
the  attraction  which  draws  like  to  like,  soon  gathered 
about  them,  and  a  band  was  formed  which  in  a  little 
time  became  the  terror  of  the  entire  vicinity.  They 
exacted  a  black  mail  from  the  peaceable  population 
of  shepherds  and  others  who  lived  near  them,  occa- 
sionally made  plundering  raids  to  a  distance,  and 
required  a  contribution  from  all  travellers  and  mer- 
chants who  passed  through  their  district.  Their 
proceedings  having  become  notorious  and  intolerable, 
the  satrap  of  Babylonia  thought  it  his  duty  to  put 
them  down,  and  marched  against  them  with  the 
troops  at  his  disposal,  intending  to  take  them  by 
surprise  on  the  Sabbath  day,  when  it  was  supposed 
that  Hieir  religious  scruples  would  prevent  them  from 


ARTABANUS   III.    AND   ASINAT.  249 

making  any  resistance.  But  his  intentions  got  wind, 
and  the  robber  band,  having  agreed  among  themselves 
to  disregard  the  obligation  of  the  Sabbatical  rest, 
turned  the  tables  upon  their  assailant,  and,  instead  of 
allowing  themselves  to  be  surprised,  surprised  him, 
and  inflicted  on  him  a  severe  defeat.  Tidings  of  the 
affair  having  reached  Artabanus,  who  had  his  hands 
already  sufficiently  occupied,  he  thought  it  best  to 
make  pacific  overtures  to  the  victors,  and  having 
induced  them  to  pay  him  a  visit  at  his  Court,  instead 
of  inflicting  any  punishment,  assigned  to  Asinai,  the 
elder  of  the  two  brothers,  the  entire  government  of 
the  Babylonian  satrapy.  At  first  the  experiment 
appeared  to  be  a  success.  Raised  from  the  condition 
of  an  outlaw  to  that  of  a  vitaxa,  or  Persian  provincial 
governor,  Asinai  was  perfectly  content,  and  adminis- 
tered his  province  with  zeal,  diligence,  and  ability.  For 
the  space  of  fifteen  years  all  things  went  smoothly  in 
Babylonia,  and  no  complaint  was  raised  against  the 
administration.  At  the  end  of  that  time,  however, 
the  lawless  temper  which  from  the  first  had  charac- 
terised the  two  brothers,  reasserted  itself,  .not,  how- 
ever, in  Asinai,  but  in  Anilai.  Having  fallen  in  love 
with  the  wife  of  a  Parthian  nobleman,  who  seems  to 
have  been  the  commander  of  the  Parthian  troops 
stationed  in  Babylonia,  and  not  knowing  how  other- 
wise to  accomplish  his  purpose,  he  made  an  open 
attack  upon  the  chieftain  and  killed  him.  Having 
thus  removed  the  obstacle  to  a  marriage,  he,  within  a 
short  space,  made  the  object  of  his  affections  his  wife, 
and  having  established  her  as  the  mistress  of  his 
house,  allowed  her  to  introduce  into  it  the  heathen 


250  AN  EPISODE    OF   PARTHIAN  HISTORY. 

rites  whereto  she  had  always  been  accustomed.  But 
this  gave  great  offence  to  the  entire  Jewish  com- 
munity, who  were  shocked  that  idolatrous  practices 
should  be  permitted  in  a  Hebrew  household,  and  laid 
their  complaint  before  Asinai,  calling  upon  him  to 
interfere  in  the  matter,  and  compel  Anilai  to  divorce 
his  Parthian  wife.  Asinai  came  into  their  views,  and 
would  probably  have  enforced  them  upon  his  brother, 
had  not  the  lady,  alarmed  at  her  impending  disgrace, 
and,  it  may  be,  sincerely  attached  to  her  Jewish 
husband,  anticipated  the  accomplishment  of  the 
project  by  secretly  poisoning  her  brother-in-law. 
On  the  death  of  Asinai  the  authority  which  he  had 
wielded  with  so  much  satisfaction  to  all  concerned, 
passed,  apparently  without  any  fresh  appointment  by 
the  crown,  into  Anilai's  hands,  who  thus  became 
satrap  of  the  extensive  province  of  Babylonia,  at 
this  time  the  most  important  in  the  empire. 

Anilai,  however,  possessed  unfortunately  none  of 
his  brother's  capacity  for  administration  and  govern- 
ment. His  instincts  were  those  of  a  mere  ordinary 
freebooter,  and  he  was  no  sooner  settled  in  his  pro- 
vince than  he  proceeded  to  give  them  free  vent  by 
invading,  without  so  much  as  a  pretext,  the  territory 
of  a  neighbouring  satrap,  named  Mithridates,  who 
was  not  only  a  Parthian  noble  of  the  highest 
rank,  but  was  connected  with  the  Royal  house,  being 
married  to  a  daughter  of  Artabanus.  Mithridates 
flew  to  arms  in  defence  of  his  province,  but  Anilai, 
who  had  military  if  he  had  no  other  talent,  fell 
suddenly  upon  his  encampment  in  the  night,  com- 
pletely routed  his  troops,  and  took  Mithridates  himself 


ASlNAt  SUCCEEDED   BY  ANILAI.  251 

prisoner.  The  unhappy  captive  was  subjected  to  ex- 
treme indignity  ;  by  the  orders  of  Anilai,  he  was 
stripped  naked,  set  upon  an  ass,  and  in  this  guise  con- 
ducted from  the  battlefield  to  the  camp  of  the  victors, 
where  he  was  paraded  before  the  eyes  of  the  soldiery. 
Not  daring,  however,  to  put  to  death  a  connection  of 
the  Great  King,  of  whose  vengeance  he  had  a  whole- 
some dread,  Anilai  felt  compelled  after  a  time  to  release 
his  captive  and  allow  him  to  return  to  his  satrapy. 
There  the  account  which  he  gave  of  his  sufferings  so 
exasperated  his  wife,  that  she  set  herself  to  make 
his  life  a  burden  to  him,  and  never  rested  until  he 
consented  to  collect  a  second  army  and  continue 
the  war.  His  forces  advanced  against  Anilai's 
stronghold,  but  the  Jewish  captain  was  too  proud 
to  remain  within  it.  Quitting  the  marshes,  he  led  his 
troops  a  distance  of  ten  miles  through  a  hot  and 
arid  plain  to  meet  the  enemy,  thus  foolishly  and 
quite  unnecessarily  exhausting  them,  and  exposing 
them  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy  under  circumstances 
of  the  greatest  disadvantage.  The  natural  conse- 
quence followed.  Anilai  was  defeated  with  great 
loss,  but  he  himself  escaped,  and  having  enrolled 
fresh  troops  of  a  worthless  character,  proceeded  to 
revenge  himself  by  carrying  fire  and  sword  over  the 
lands  of  his  own  Babylonian  subjects,  whom  he  must 
have  looked  upon  as  on  the  point  of  escaping  from 
his  jurisdiction.  The  unfortunate  natives  sent  to 
Nearda  and  required  that  Anilai  should  be  given  up 
to  them  ;  but  the  Jews  of  Nearda,  even  supposing 
them  to  have  had  the  will,  had  not  the  power  to  com- 
ply.    Negotiations  were  then  tried,  but  with  no  better 


252  AN   EPISODE   OF  PARTHIAN   HISTORY. 

result,  except  that,  in  the  course  of  them,  the  Baby- 
lonians contrived  to  obtain  an  exact  knowledge  of 
the  position  which  Anilai  and  his  troops  occupied, 
together  with  a  general  notion  of  their  habits. 
Taking  advantage  of  the  knowledge  thus  acquired, 
they  one  night  fell  suddenly  upon  them,  when  they 
were  all  either  drunk  or  asleep,  and  at  one  stroke 
exterminated  the  whole  band.  Such  was  the  end  of 
Anilai. 

Up  to  this  point,  though  the  occurrences  had  been 
strange  and  abnormal,  indicative  of  extreme  dis- 
organisation and  weakness  on  the  part  of  the  Par- 
thian government,  yet  no  very  great  harm  had  been 
done.  Two  Jewish  bandits  had  been  elevated  into 
the  position  of  Parthian  satraps,  and  had  borne 
rule  over  an  important  province,  with  the  result,  in 
the  first  place,  of  fifteen  years  of  peace  and  prosperity, 
and  subsequently  of  a  short  civil  war,  terminating  in 
the  destruction  of  the  surviving  robber  chief  and  the 
annihilation  of  the  entire  band  of  marauders.  But 
worse  consequences  were  to  follow.  The  bonds  of 
civil  order  cannot  be  relaxed  or  disturbed  without 
extreme  danger  to  the  whole  social  edifice.  There 
had  long  been  a  smouldering  feud  between  the  native 
Babylonian  population  and  the  Jewish  colonists  in 
Babylon,  which  from  time  to  time  had  broken  out 
into  actual  riot  and  commotion.  Diverse  in  race,  in 
manners,  and  in  religion,  the  two  nationalities  were 
always  ready  to  fly  at  each  other's  throats  when  a 
fitting  occasion  offered.  The  present  seemed  an  occa- 
sion not  to  be  missed  ;  authority  was  relaxed  ;  the 
Jewish   element   in    the  population  of   Mesopotamia 


ANTI-SEMITIC   DISTURBANCES.  253 

was  at  once  disgraced  and  weakened.  It  had  made 
itself  obnoxious  to  the  dominant  power  in  the  state, 
and  was  not  likely  to  receive  government  support  or 
protection.  Moved  by  these  considerations,  the 
native  Babylonian  population,  very  shortly  after  the 
destruction  of  Anilai,  rose  up  against  the  Hebrews 
settled  in  their  midst  and  threatened  them  with 
extermination.  Finding  themselves  unable  to  make 
an  effectual  resistance,  and  receiving  no  assistance 
from  the  government,  the  Hebrews  came  to  a  de- 
termination to  withdraw  from  the  conflict  by  retiring 
altogether  from  a  city  where  they  provoked  such 
hostility  and  were  subjected  to  such  ill-usage.  Not- 
withstanding the  enormous  pecuniary  loss  which  such 
a  migration  necessarily  entails,  and  the  vast  difficulty 
of  finding  new  homes  for  a  population  of  many  scores 
of  thousands,  they  quitted  Babylon  in  a  body  and 
transferred  themselves  to  Seleucia.  Seleucia,  origi- 
nally a  Hellenic  city,  had  at  this  time  a  tripartite 
population,  consisting  of  Greeks,  Syrians,  and  Jews. 
The  Greeks  and  Syrians  were  opposed  to  each  other, 
but  hitherto  the  Hebrew  element  had  managed  to  live 
on  tolerably  friendly  terms  with  both  the  other  na- 
tionalities. Now,  however,  the  new-comers  felt  them- 
selves drawn  to  the  Syrians,  who  were  a  kindred  race, 
and,  uniting  with  them  against  the  Greeks,  forced 
these  last  to  succumb,  and  to  accept  a  subordinate 
position.  But  such  a  condition  of  things  could  not 
last  ;  the  Greeks  found  it  insupportable  ;  and  before 
many  months  were  past  they  succeeded  in  gaining 
over  the  Syrians  to  their  side,  and  persuading  them 
to  join   in  an  organised   attack   upon   the  Hebrews. 


254  AN  EPISODE   OF  PARTHIAN  HISTORY. 

Too  weak  to  make  head  against  so  powerful  a  combi- 
nation, the  Hebrews  were  utterly  overpowered,  and 
in  the  massacre  that  ensued  they  lost,  it  is  said, 
above  fifty  thousand  men.  Those  who  escaped 
crossed  the  Tigris,  and  transferred  their  abode  to 
Ctesiphon,  but  the  malice  of  their  enemies  was  still 
unsatisfied.  The  persecution  continued,  and  did  not 
come  to  an  end  until  the  entire  Jewish  population,  de- 
serting the  metropolitan  cities,  withdrew  to  the  smaller 
provincial  towns,  which  had  no  other  inhabitants. 

The  series  of  events  here  related  derives  its  in- 
terest, partly  from  its  connection  with  the  Jewish 
people,  whose  history  will  always,  more  or  less, 
command  our  sympathies,  but  parti}'-  also,  and  indeed 
mainly,  from  the  light  which  it  throws  on  the  cha- 
racter of  the  Parthian  rule,  and  the  condition  of  the 
countries  under  Parthian  government.  Once  more 
the  resemblance  between  the  Parthian  and  the  Tur- 
kish systems  is  brought  vividly  to  our  notice,  and  the 
scenes  enacted  in  Syria  and  the  Lebanon  before  our 
own  eyes — the  mutual  animosities  of  Christian  and 
Druse  and  Maronite,  the  terrible  conflicts,  and  the 
bloody  massacres  that  have  been  an  indelible  dis- 
grace to  Turkish  administration,  present  themselves 
to  our  thoughts  and  memories.  The  picture  has  the 
same  features  of  antipathies  of  race,  unsoftened  by 
time  and  contact,  of  perpetual  feud  bursting  out  into 
occasional  conflict,  of  undying  religious  hatreds,  of 
strange  combinations,  of  massacres,  of  fearful  out- 
rages, and  of  a  government  looking  tamely  on,  and 
allowing  things  for  the  most  part  to  take  their  course. 
It  is  clear  that  the  Parthian  system  failed  utterly  to 


PARTHIAN   AND    TURKISH   GOVERNMENT.      255 

blend  together  or  amalgamate  the  conquered  races  ; 
and  not  only  so,  but  that  it  rubbed  off  none  of  their 
angles,  rendered  them  after  the  lapse  of  centuries  not 
one  whit  more  friendly,  or  better  disposed  one  to- 
wards another  than  they  had  been  at  the  first,  did 
absolutely  nothing  towards  producing  the  "  unity, 
peace,  and  concord,"  which  ought  to  knit  together 
the  subjects  of  a  single  government,  the  constituent 
elements  of  a  single  kingdom.  Moreover,  the  Par- 
thian system,  as  set  before  us  in  the  events  which  we 
are  considering,  was  impotent  even  to  effect  the  first 
object  of  civil  government,  the  securing  of  quiet  and 
tranquillity  within  its  borders.  If  we  were  bound  to 
regard  the  events  of  the  Asinai  and  Anilai  episode  as 
representing  to  us  truthfully  the  normal  condition  of 
the  peoples  and  countries  with  which  it  is  concerned, 
and  to  take  the  picture  as  a  fair  sample  of  the  general 
condition  of  the  empire,  we  should  be  forced  to 
conclude  that  Parthian  government  was  merely  a 
euphemistic  name  for  anarch}',  and  that  it  was  a  rare 
good  fortune  which  prevented  the  State  from  falling 
to  pieces  at  this  early  period,  within  three  centuries 
of  its  establishment.  But,  on  the  whole,  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  the  reign  of  Artabanus  III. 
puts  before  us,  not  the  normal,  but  an  exceptional 
state  of  things — a  state  of  things  which  could  only 
arise  in  Parthia  when  the  machinery  of  government  was 
deranged  in  consequence  of  rebellion  and  civil  war. 
We  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  Artabanus  III.  was 
actually  twice  driven  from  his  kingdom,  and  that 
during  the  greater  part  of  his  reign  he  lived  in 
perpetual  fear  of  revolt  and  insurrection.     It  is  not 


2=>C) 


AN  EPISODE   OF  PARTHIAN   HISTORY. 


at  all  improbable  that  the  culminating  atrocities  of 
the  struggle  which  we  have  described,  synchronised 
with  the  second  expulsion  of  the  Parthian  monarch, 
and  are  thus  not  so  much  a  sign  of  the  ordinary 
weakness  of  the  Parthian  rule,  as  an  indication  of 
the  terrible  strength  of  the  forces  which  that  rule  for 
the  most  part  restrained  and  held  under  control. 


XV. 


END  OF   THE   REIGN    OF  ARTABANUS  III.— GOTARZES 
AND   HIS    RIVALS. 

ARTABANUS  did  not  continue  on  the  throne  very- 
long  after  his  undignified  submission  to  Vitellius.1 
His  proceedings  probably  disgusted  his  subjects,  who 
vented  their  indignation  in  murmurs  and  threats  of 
revolt.  These  threats  coming  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  king,  provoked  him  to  adopt  severe  measures 
against  the  malcontents;  who  thereupon  banded 
themselves  together,  and  from  malcontents  became 
open  conspirators.  Artabanus  felt  himself  unequal 
to  the  task  of  coping  with  the  movement,  and, 
quitting  his  capital,  fled  to  the  Court  of  Izates,  tribu- 
tary king  of  Adiabene,  who  received  him  hospitably, 
and  undertook  to  replace  him  upon  the  throne  from 
which  he  had  been  driven.  It  lends  an  interest  to 
this  portion  of  Parthian  history  to  learn  from 
Josephus,  who  relates  it,  that  Izates,  and  his  mother, 
Helena,  were  converts  to  Judaism,  and  entertained  so 
much  affection  for  the  Jewish  people  as  to  send 
supplies  of  corn  to  Jerusalem,  when  (about  A.D.  44) 
that  city  was  threatened  with  famine.2     Meanwhile, 

1  See  above,  p.  245.  2  Compare  Acts  xi.  28-30. 

257 


258      END   OF    THE   REIGN   OF  ARTABANUS  III. 

however,  the  Parthian  Megistanes  had  deposed 
Artabanus,  and  elected  in  his  place  a  certain 
Kinnamus,  or  Cinnamus,  a  distant  relation  of  the 
cashiered  monarch,  brought  up  by  him  in  his  house. 
War  would  probably  have  broken  out  had  not 
Cinnamus,  who  was  of  a  gentle  disposition,  waived  his 
claim  in  favour  of  his  benefactor,  and  written  to  him, 
inviting  him  to  return.  Artabanus  upon  this  remounted 
his  throne,  while  Cinnamus  carried  his  magnanimity 
so  far  as  to  take  the  diadem  from  his  own  head,  and, 
replacing  it  on  that  of  the  old  monarch,  to  salute 
him  as  king.  It  was  a  condition  of  the  restoration, 
guaranteed  both  by  Artabanus  and  Izates,  that  the 
transaction  should  be  accompanied  by  a  complete 
amnesty  for  all  political  offences.  Such  mildness, 
very  unusual  among  the  Parthians,  may  perhaps  be 
ascribed  to  the  gentle  councils  of  the  Judaean  Izates. 

It  seems  that  Artabanus  died  very  shortly  after  his 
restoration  to  the  throne.  His  last  days  were 
clouded  by  the  calamity  of  the  revolt  of  Seleucia, 
far  the  most  important  of  the  Hellenic  cities  of  the 
empire.  We  may  assume  that  the  disturbed  condi- 
tion of  the  Parthian  kingdom,  the  frequent  revolts, 
the  occasional  civil  wars,  the  manifest  tendency  to 
disruption  which  the  empire  about  this  time  showed, 
had  raised  among  the  Hellenic  subjects  of  the 
Parthian  crown,  always  disaffected,  a  belief,  or  at 
any  rate  a  hope,  that  they  might  succeed  in  shaking 
off  the  yoke  of  their  barbaric  lords.  Seleucia,  natu- 
rally, took  the  lead.  Had  she  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing her  independence,  other  lesser  towns,  as 
Apollonia,     Nicephorium,     Edessa,    Carrhae,     might 


VARDANES   AND   GOTARZES.  259 

have  followed  her  example.  Rome  might  have  been 
called  in  as  a  protector,  and  might  perhaps  have 
undertaken  the  charge.  An  imperium  in  imperio 
might  conceivably  have  been  established.  But,  as 
the  event  proved,  the  attempt  now  made  was  ill- 
judged.  Though  Artabanus  himself  failed  to  recover 
the  revolted  city,  which  maintained  a  precarious 
independence  for  the  space  of  over  six  years  (A.D. 
40-46),  yet  there  was  at  no  time  any  reasonable 
prospect  of  a  prosperous  issue.  Rome  held  aloof. 
The  unhappy  Greeks  were  overmatched.  Though 
Parthia  was  thought  to  have  incurred  some  dis- 
grace T  by  her  inability  to  reduce  a  single  rebel  city 
to  subjection  for  the  space  of  nearly  seven  years, 
yet  ultimately  she  prevailed.  Seleucia  succumbed  to 
a  son  of  Artabanus  in  A.D.  46,  and  resumed  a  subject 
position  under  her  old  masters. 

On  the  death  of  Artabanus,  the  succession  was 
disputed  between  two  of  his  sons,  Vardanes  and 
Gotarzes.  According  to  Josephus,  the  crown  was 
left  by  his  father  to  the  former,  who  was  probably 
the  elder  of  the  two  ;  but,  as  he  happened  to  be  at  a 
distance,  while  Gotarzes  was  present  in  the  capital, 
or  close  at  hand,  the  last  named  had  the  opportunity 
of  occupying  the  throne,  and,  being  an  ambitious 
prince,  availed  himself  of  it.  He  reigned,  however, 
at  this  time  only  for  a  few  weeks.  Having  put  to 
death  a  brother,  named  Artabanus,  together  with  his 
wife  and  son,  and  otherwise  shown  a  tyrannical 
disposition,  he  so  alarmed  his  subjects,  that  they  sent 
hurriedly  for  Vardanes,  and  offered  him  the  post  of 
1  Tacit.  "  Ann.,"  xi.  9  :  "  Non  sine  dedecore  Parthorum.' 


260  REIGN   OF    VARDANES   I. 

king.  Vardanes,  a  man  of  prompt  action,  instantly 
complied,  and,  having  accomplished  a  journey  of  350 
miles  in  two  days,  drove  Gotarzes  from  the  kingdom  ; 
after  which  he  received  the  submission  of  the  pro- 
vinces and  cities  generally,  the  only  exception  being 
Seleucia,  which  maintained  its  revolt,  and  resisted  all 
his  efforts  to  reduce  it.  Meantime  Gotarzes  had  fled 
to  the  Dahae  of  the  Caspian  region,  and  thrown  him- 
self upon  their  support  and  protection.  The  Dahse, 
who  were  not  Parthian  subjects,  willingly  gave  him 
an  asylum  ;  and  from  this  secure  retreat  he  proceeded 
to  seduce  the   neighbouring    Hyrcanians    from  their 


COIN   OF   VARDANES    I. 


allegiance  to  his  brother,  and  drew  together  so  large 
a  power,  that  Vardanes  felt  himself  under  the  neces- 
sity of  raising  the  siege  of  Seleucia,  and  marching  in 
person  to  the  distant  East.  The  two  armies  con- 
fronted each  other  in  the  plain  country  of  Bactria,  but 
before  they  came  to  an  engagement,  the  commanders 
on  either  side  thought  it  expedient  to  hold  a  con- 
ference, and  arrange,  if  possible,  terms  of  peace.  It 
had  come  to  the  knowledge  of  Gotarzes,  that  there 
was  a  design  afloat  among  the  chief  nobles  in  either 
army  to  get  rid  of  both  the  brothers,  and  elect  to  the 


HIS  DESIGNS   ON  ARMENIA.  26 1 

throne  a  wholly  new  king.  Having  informed  his 
brother  of  this  alarming  discovery,  he  succeeded  in 
arranging  a  secret  meeting  with  him,  where  pledges 
were  interchanged,  and  an  understanding  come  to 
with  respect  to  the  future.  Gotarzes  agreed  to  relin- 
quish his  claims  to  the  Parthian  crown,  and  was 
assigned  a  residence  in  Hyrcania,  which  was  probably 
made  over  to  his  government.  Vardanes  returned  to 
the  West,  and  resuming  his  siege  operations,  finally 
compelled  Seleucia  to  a  surrender  in  the  year  A.D.  46, 
the  seventh  year  of  the  insurrection. 

Regarding  himself  now  as  firmly  settled  in  his 
kingdom,  and  as  having  nothing  more  to  fear  from  his 
brother,  Vardanes  thought  that  the  time  was  come  for 
taking  in  hand  a  new  and  important  enterprise.  This 
was  no  less  than  the  recovery  of  Armenia  from  the 
Roman  influence.  That  country,  relinquished  to 
Tiberius  by  Artabanus  III.  in  A.D.  37,  and  placed 
by  Rome  under  the  government  of  Mithridates,  an 
Iberian,  had  suffered  various  vicissitudes,  and  was  now 
(A.D.  46)  extremely  discontented  with  its  ruler,  as  well 
as  with  his  Roman  patrons  and  upholders.  Var- 
danes thought  that  there  would  be  no  great  difficulty 
in  driving  out  Mithridates  from  the  kingdom  upon 
which  he  had  so  weak  a  hold,  and  replacing  Armenia 
within  the  sphere  of  the  Parthian  rule  and  influence. 
But  for  success  in  such  an  enterprise  he  required  the 
hearty  concurrence  and  support  of  his  principal 
feudatories,  and  especially  of  the  great  Izates,  whose 
services  to  Artabanus  had  been  rewarded  by  an 
important  enlargement  of  his  dominions,  and  who 
was  now  king  both  of  Adiabene  and  of  Gordyene  or 


262  ACCESSION   OF  GOTARZES. 

Upper  Mesopotamia.  Accordingly,  he  took  this 
prince  into  his  councils,  and  requested  his  opinion  as 
to  the  prudence  of  the  course  which  he  was  contem- 
plating. Izates  gave  the  project  his  most  strenuous 
opposition.  He  was  profoundly  convinced  of  the 
military  strength  and  greatness  of  Rome,  and  on  that 
account  wholly  disinclined  to  quarrel  with  her,  while 
further  he  had  a  private  and  personal  motive  for 
desiring  to  maintain  amicable  relations  with  the 
great  Western  power  from  the  fact  that  five  of  his 
sons  were  residing  in  Rome,  whither  he  had  sent 
them  in  order  that  they  might  receive  a  polite  educa- 
tion. He  refused,  therefore,  to  abet  Vardanes  in  his 
design,  and  the  latter,  indignant  at  a  refusal,  which 
he  regarded  as  an  act  of  rebellion,  proceeded  to 
engage  in  hostilities  against  his  feudatory. 

It  was  probably  this  condition  of  things  which 
induced  Gotarzes  suddenly  to  come  forth  from  his 
retirement,  and  again  assert  his  claim  to  the  Parthian 
throne — a  claim  which  he  had  only  withdrawn  under 
the  pressure  of  necessity.  The  quarrel  of  Vardanes 
with  Izates  had  weakened  his  power,  and  inclined 
even  the  nobles  who  had  hitherto  supported  his 
cause  to  desert  him,  and  go  over  to  his  adversary. 
Many  of  them  invited  Gotarzes  to  resume  the 
struggle  ;  and  Vardanes  found  himself  compelled 
for  the  second  time  to  march  eastward.  Several 
battles  were  fought  between  the  two  pretenders  to 
the  throne  in  the  country  between  the  Caspian  and 
Herat,  in  which  the  advantage  mostly  rested  with 
Vardanes  ;  but  his  successes  in  the  field  failed  to 
overcome  the  aversion  in  which  he  was  held  by  his 


DISCONTENT   OF   HIS    SUByECTS.  26) 

subjects  ;  and  on  his  return  from  the  war  a  number 
of  them,  in  spite  of  the  glory  which  he  had  acquired, 
conspired  against  him,  and  treacherously  slew  him  in 
the  hunting  field. 

Gotarzes  was  then  unanimously  accepted  as  king, 
and  reigned  for  some  years  in  peace.  But  he  had 
the  common  Parthian  defect  of  a  cruel  and  suspicious 
temper,  while  he  added  to  this  defect  the  compara- 
tively unusual  faults  of  indolence  and  addiction  to 
luxury.  In  a  short  time  he  alienated  the  affections 
of  his  subjects    from    him,  partly    by  his    severities, 


COIN    Ob    GOI'ARZES. 


partly  by  his  luxurious  living,  and  to  some  extent  by 
his  ill-success  in  some  small  military  expeditions. 
In  the  year  A.D.  49.  steps  were  taken  by  those  especi- 
ally opposed  to  him,  for  relieving  their  country  from 
the  incubus  of  a  thoroughly  bad  king.  Claudius,  the 
Roman  Emperor,  was  approached,  and  entreated  to 
come  to  the  aid  of  his  Parthian  "  friends  and  allies." 
"  The  rule  of  Gotarzes,"  they  said,  "  had  become  in- 
tolerable, alike  to  the  nobility  and  the  common 
people.  He  had  murdered  all  his  male  relations,  or 
at  least  all  those  who  were  within  his  reach — first  his 


264  REIGN   OF   GOTARZES. 

brothers,  then  his  near  kinsmen,  finally  even  those 
whose  relationship  was  more  remote  ;  nor  had  he 
stopped  there ;  he  had  proceeded  to  put  to  death 
their  young  children  and  their  pregnant  wives.  He 
was  sluggish  in  his  habits,  unfortunate  in  his  wars, 
and  had  betaken  himself  to  cruelty,  that  men  might 
not  utterly  despise  him  for  his  want  of  manliness. 
They  knew  that  Rome  and  Parthia  were  bound 
together  by  the  terms  of  a  treaty,  and  they  wanted 
no  infringement  of  it.  Let  Rome  send  them  an 
Arsacid  worthy  of  reigning  in  the  place  of  the  un- 
worthy scion  of  the  house  under  whose  tyranny  they 
groaned.  They  asked  for  Meherdates,  the  son  of 
Vonones,  and  grandson  of  Phraates  IV.,  who  was 
resident  at  Rome,  and,  having  been  so  long  accus- 
tomed to  Roman  manners,  might  be  expected  to 
rule  justly  and  moderately."  This  speech  was  de- 
livered in  the  Roman  Senate,  Claudius  being  present, 
and  also  Meherdates,  the  candidate  for  the  Parthian 
throne.  The  Emperor  made  a  favourable  response — 
"  He  would  follow  the  example  of  the  Divine 
Augustus,  and  allow  the  Parthians  to  receive  from 
Rome  the  monarch  whom  they  requested.  That 
prince,  bred  up  in  the  City,  had  always  been  remark- 
able for  his  moderation.  He  would  (it  was  to  be 
hoped)  regard  himself  in  his  new  position,  not  as  a 
master  of  slaves,  but  as  a  ruler  of  citizens.  He 
would  find  that  clemency  and  justice  were  the  more 
appreciated  by  a  barbarous  people,  the  less  they  had 
experience  of  them.  Meherdates  might  accompany 
the  Parthian  envoys  ;  and  a  Roman  of  rank,  Caius 
Cassius,  the  prefect  of  Syria,  should  be  instructed  to 


WAR    OF   GOTARZES    WITH   MEHERDATES.      265 

receive  them  on  their  arrival  in  Asia,  and  to  see  them 
safely  across  the  Euphrates." 

Meherdates  thus  set  out  for  his  proposed  kingdom 
under  the  fairest  auspices.  He  had  a  large  party 
devoted  to  his  cause  in  Parthia  itself ;  he  was  backed 
by  the  great  name  of  Rome  ;  and  he  had  the  active 
support  of  a  Roman  of  distinction,  well  acquainted 
with  the  East,  and  of  good  antecedents.  Moreover, 
when  he  arrived  at  Zeugma  on  the  Euphrates,  he 
found  himself  welcomed,  not  only  by  a  number  of 
the  Parthian  nobles,  but  by  a  personage  of  great 
importance  in  those  parts,  no  other  than  Abgarus, 
the  Osrhoenian  king,  who  commanded  the  passages 
of  the  Euphrates,  and  held  the  country  to  the  east 
of  the  river,  probably  as  far  as  the  Khabour,  or  at 
any  rate  of  the  Ras-el-Ain,  its  western  tributary. 
The  parting  advice  of  Cassius  to  his  young  protege 
was,  that  he  should  lose  no  time  in  pressing  forward 
against  his  rival,  Gotarzes,  since  the  barbarians  were 
always  impetuous  at  the  commencement,  but  lost 
their  energy,  or  even  grew  perfidious,  if  there  was 
delay.  Meherdates,  however,  fell  entirely  under  the 
influence  of  the  Osrhoenian  monarch,  who  seems  to 
have  been  a  traitor,  like  his  predecessor  in  the  time 
of  Crassus,1  and  to  have  determined  from  the  first 
to  lure  the  young  prince  to  his  destruction.  By  the 
persuasions  of  Abgarus,  Meherdates  was  induced, 
first  of  all,  to  waste  precious  time  while  he  indulged 
in  a  series  of  feasts  and  banquets  at  Edessa,  the' 
Osrhoenian  capital,  and  then  to  proceed  against  his 
antagonist  by  the  difficult  and  circuitous  Armenian 

1  See  p.  164. 


266  REIGN   OF   GOTARZES. 

route,  which  followed  the  course  of  the  Tigris  by 
Diarbekr,  Til,  and  Jezireh,  instead  of  striking  directly 
across  Mesopotamia  to  Ctesiphon.  The  rough  moun- 
tain passes  and  the  snow-drifts  of  Armenia  harassed 
his  troops  and  seriously  delayed  his  progress,  ample 
time  being  thus  given  to  Gotarzes  for  collecting  a 
strong  force  and  disposing  it  in  the  most  convenient 
situations.  Fortune,  however,  still  continued  to  smile 
on  the  pretender.  When  he  reached  Adiabene, 
Izates,  the  powerful  monarch  of  that  tract,  openly 
embraced  his  cause,  and  brought  a  body  of  troops  to 
his  assistance.  Pressing  forward  towards  Ctesiphon, 
Meherdates  possessed  himself  of  the  fort  which 
occupied  the  ancient  site  of  Nineveh,  as  well  as  of 
the  strong  post  of  Arbela,  and  there  found  himself 
in  the  near  vicinity  of  his  adversary.  But  Gotarzes 
was  unwilling  to  risk  all  on  the  fate  of  a  battle.  He 
stood  on  the  defensive,  with  the  river  Corma  in  his 
front,  and  would  not  suffer  himself  to  be  provoked, 
or  tempted,  to  an  engagement.  Reinforcements  were 
still  reaching  him,  and  he  had  a  good  hope  of  drawing 
to  his  own  side,  or  at  any  rate  persuading  to  neutrality, 
a  portion  of  his  adversary's  adherents,  if  he  could 
set  his  emissaries  at  work  among  them.  These  tactics 
were  crowned  with  success.  After  a  brief  hesitation, 
Izates,  the  Adiabenian,  and  Abgarus,  the  Osrhoenian 
monarch,  proved  faithless  to  the  cause  which  they 
had  professedly  espoused,  and  drew  off  their  troops. 
Meherdates  feared  that  other  desertions  might  follow, 
and  resolved,  before  losing  more  of  his  army,  to  pre- 
cipitate a  fight.  Gotarzes  being  also  willing  to  engage, 
since  he  was  no  longer  outnumbered,  the  battle  took 


ROCK    TABLET  OF   GOTARZES.  267 

place.  It  was  stoutly  contested.  For  a  long  time 
neither  side  could  boast  any  decided  advantage  ; 
but  at  last  Carrhenes,  the  chief  general  on  the  side  of 
Meherdates,  having  repulsed  the  troops  opposed  to 
him,  was  tempted  to  pursue  them  too  far,  and  being 
intercepted  by  the  enemy  on  his  return  was  either 
killed  or  made  prisoner.  His  misfortune  decided  the 
engagement.  The  loss  of  their  principal  commander 
caused  a  general  panic  among  the  soldiers  of  Meher- 
dates, who  dispersed  in  all  directions.  The  pretender 
might  perhaps  have  escaped  ;  but  having  entrusted 
his  person  to  a  certain  Parrhaces,  a  dependent  of  his 
father's,  who  promised  to  conduct  him  to  a  place  of 
safety,  he  was  seized,  bound,  and  delivered  up  to 
Gotarzes.  Gotarzes  seems  to  have  been  touched  with 
compassion  by  his  rival's  youth  and  helplessness. 
Instead  of  awarding  him  the  usual  punishment  of 
rebels  and  pretenders  who  fall  into  their  enemies' 
hands,  he  contented  himself  with  inflicting  on  him 
a  slight  mutilation,  sufficient,  according  to  Oriental 
ideas,  to  incapacitate  him  from  ever  exercising 
sovereignty. 

This  victory  which  brought  the  troubles  of  Gotarzes 
with  his  rivals  to  an  end,  was  regarded  by  him  as 
worthy  of  commemoration  in  an  unusual  way.  The 
Parthians  had  but  little  taste  for  mimetic  art,  and 
seldom  indulged  in  artistic  representations  of  any  of 
the  events  of  their  history.  But  Gotarzes  on  this 
occasion  took  the  exceptional  course  of  commemo- 
rating his  achievement  by  a  rock  tablet.  On  the 
great  and  sacred  mountain  of  Behistun  (originally, 
Baghistan,  "  The   Place  of   the    Gods "),  which   was 


268  DEATH  OF  GOTARZES. 

already  adorned  by  a  sculptured  tablet  representing 
the  Achaemenian  monarch,  Darius,  the  son  of 
Hystaspes,  with  two  attendants,  receiving  a  number 
of  conquered  rebels,  he  caused  to  be  engraved  a 
second,  though  much  smaller  tablet,  representative 
of  his  own  exploit.  In  this  he  appeared  seated  on 
horseback,  with  a  heavy  spear  in  his  right  hand,  while 
a  Victory  flying  in  the  air  crowned  him  with  a  wreath 
or  diadem,  and  behind  him  his  army  galloped  over 
the  plain  in  pursuit  of  the  flying  foe.  Some  of  the 
figures  formed,  apparently,  a  walking  procession  ; 
while  an  inscription  in  the  Greek  character  and 
language  explained  the  intention  of  the  monument. 
This  inscription  is  now  almost  illegible,  but,  when 
first  found,  contained  in  two  places  the  name 
"  Gotarzes,"  and  in  one  the  name  "  Mithrates,"  an 
undoubted  equivalent  of  "  Meherdates." 

It  appears  that  the  successful  monarch  did  not 
long  survive  his  victory.  His  death,  which  is  assigned 
by  the  best  authorities  to  the  year  AD.  50,  is  variously 
related  by  the  historians.  According  to  Tacitus,  it 
was  natural,  the  result  of  disease  ;  but  according  to 
Josephus  it  was  violent,  and  effected  by  a  conspiracy. 
There  would  be  nothing  surprising  in  this,  since 
through  his  whole  reign  he  was  unpopular,  and  must 
have  had  many  bitter  enemies.  But  Tacitus  is  an 
authority  who  cannot  be  lightly  set  aside  ;  and  his 
emphatic  words  —  "  morbo  obiit  "  —  have  generally 
been  accepted  as  closing  controversy  on  the  subject. 
The  reign  of  Gotarzes  must  be  considered  to  have 
helped  forward  in  no  small  degree  the  disorganisation 
of  the  Parthian  state.      It  showed  Rome  how  easy  it 


ILL  EFFECTS   OF  HIS    RETGN. 


269 


was  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  her  eastern 
neighbour,  and  to  paralyse  her  action  beyond  her 
frontier,  by  raising  troubles  within  it.  It  accustomed 
the  Parthians  themselves  to  intrigue,  civil  war,  and  con- 
fusion. It  must  have  tended,  moreover,  to  exhaust  the 
resources  of  the  empire.  At  any  rate  the  downward 
course  of  the  state  from  this  time,  though  not  rapid, 
is  marked  and  continuous  ;  and,  though  the  tenacity 
of  the  race  enables  it  to  prolong  its  independent 
existence  for  nearly  two  centuries  longer,  yet  the 
student  of  the  history  clearly  sees  that  a  decline 
has  set  in  from  which  any  real  recovery  is  impossible. 


XVI. 

PARTHIA   IN   THE   TIME   OF    NERO — VOLOGASES   I. 
AND   CORBULO. 


GOTARZES  was  succeeded  by  a  distant  relative,  an 
Arsacid  called  Vonones,  and  known  in  Parthian 
history  as  "  Vonones  the  Second."  This  prince  did 
not  occupy  the  throne  more  than  about  two  months, 
and  is  chiefly  remarkable  as  the  father  of  three  kings 
much  more  celebrated  than  himself — Vologases  I., 
King  of  Parthia,  Tiridates,  King  of  Armenia,  and 
Pacorus,  dependent  King  of  Media.  Tiridates  appears 
to  have  been  the  eldest,  Pacorus  the  second,  and 
Vologases  the  third  son  ;  but,  on  the  death  of  their 
father,  the  two  elder  princes  agreed  to  cede  the 
Parthian  throne  to  their  younger  brother.  This 
was  the  more  remarkable  as  Vologases  was  the  son 
of  Vonones  by  a  Greek  concubine,  whereas  his  two 
brothers  were  legitimate.  Probably  he  had  given 
indications  of  an  ability,  which  they  did  not  recognise 
in  themselves,  and  for  which  he  may  have  been  in- 
debted to  the  foreign  blood  that  flowed  in  his  veins. 
At  any  rate  he  found  himself,  in  A.D.  50  or  51, 
established  upon  the  throne,  and  able  to  reward 
Pacorus  for  his  complaisance  by  bestowing  on  him 


ACCESSION   OF    VOLOGASES   I.  271 

the  quasi-royal  government  of  Media.  For  Tiridates 
something  more  was  needed,  and  Vologases  may  be 
presumed  to  have  been  anxiously  on  the  watch, 
during  the  earlier  portion  of  his  reign,  for  an  oppor- 
tunity of  conferring  on  his  other  brother  a  dignity 
worthy  of  his  acceptance.  The  opportunity  came 
in  A.D.  51,  through  circumstances  which  had  lighted 
up  the  flames  of  war  in  the  neighbouring  territory  of 
Armenia. 

The  origin  of  the  strife  was  the  following.     Rhada- 
mistus,   the    eldest    son    of    Pharasmanes,    King    of 


COIN   OF   VOLOGASES   I. 


Iberia,  was  a  youth  of  such  recklessness,  and 
possessed  with  such  a  lust  for  power,  that,  for  the 
security  of  his  own  crown,  his  father  thought  it 
necessary  to  divert  his  son's  thoughts  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  another.  He  therefore  pointed  out  to  him 
that  his  uncle,  Mithridates,  King  of  Armenia  under 
the  Romans,  was  a  most  unpopular  ruler,  and  that 
it  might  not  be  difficult  to  supplant  him,  if  he  took 
up  his  residence  at  his  court  and  gave  his  mind  to 
ingratiating  himself  with  the  Armenian  people.  The 
ambitious  youth  followed  the  advice  offered  him,  and 


272  PARTHIA    IN   THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

ere  long  succeeded  in  making  himself  a  general 
favourite,  after  which,  having  contrived  to  get 
Mithridates  into  his  power,  he  ruthlessly  put  him  to 
death,  together  with  his  wife  and  children.  This  was 
a  challenge  to  the  Romans,  who  had  established 
Mithridates  in  his  kingdom  ;  but  the  Roman  officer, 
Ummidius  Quadratus,  president  of  Syria,  whose 
business  it  was  to  take  up  the  challenge,  neglected 
to  do  so,  and  another  official,  Julius  Pelignus,  pro- 
curator of  Cappadocia,  even  went  further,  and 
authorised  Rhadamistus  to  assume  the  title  and 
insignia  of  king.  A  large  party  in  Armenia  was, 
however,  adverse  to  the  new  rule,  distrusted  Rhada- 
mistus, and  condemned  the  course  which  he  had 
pursued.  The  country  was  accordingly  thrown  into 
a  ferment  ;  and  Vologases,  having  recently  ascended 
the  Parthian  throne,  and  needing  a  principality  for 
his  brother  Tiridates,  thought  he  saw  in  the  situation 
of  Armenia  an  excellent  opportunity  of  at  once 
gratifying  his  brother  and  advancing  his  own  repu- 
tation. To  detach  Armenia  once  more  from  the 
dominion  of  Rome  and  re-attach  it  to  Parthia  would 
be  a  happy  inauguration  of  h's  reign,  and  one  that 
would  draw  down  upon  him  the  open  applause  and 
secret  envy  of  his  neighbours. 

Accordingly,  Vologases,  in  A.D.  51,  the  year  of  his 
accession,  having  collected  a  large  force,  led  an 
expedition  into  Armenia.  At  first  it  seemed  as  if 
he  would  effect  an  easy  conquest.  The  Iberian 
garrison,  on  whose  support  Rhadamistus  principally 
relied,  quitted  the  field  without  risking  a  battle  ;  his 
Armenian    troops    made     but    a    poor     resistance  ; 


VOLOGASES   I.   INVADES  ARMENIA.  273 

Artaxata  and  Tigrano-certa,  his  two  principal  cities, 
opened  their  gates  to  the  foe  ;  Vologases  took 
possession  of  Armenia,  and  established  Tiridates  at 
Artaxata,  the  capital.  But  this  fair  beginning  was  soon 
clouded  over.  A  severe  winter,  and  some  defect  in  the 
commissariat  arrangements,  caused  the  outburst  of  a 
pestilence,  which  so  thinned  the  Parthian  garrisons 
that  Vologases  was  compelled  to  withdraw  them. 
Rhadamistus  returned,  and,  though  ill-received  by 
his  subjects,  and  occasionally  in  danger  of  losing  his 
life,  on  the  whole  contrived  to  maintain  himself 
during  the  three  years  extending  from  A.D.  5 1  to  54, 
and  was  still  in  possession  when  Vologases,  in  the 
last-named  year,  having  brought  some  other  wars  to 
an  end,  found  himself  in  a  position  to  resume  his 
designs  upon  Armenia. 

The  delay  in  grappling  with  the  Armenian  difficulty 
had  had  a  double  origin.  In  A.D.  52  a  dispute  had 
arisen  between  Vologases  and  one  of  his  principal 
feudatories,  Izates,  vitaxa  of  Adiabene,  whose  preten- 
sions to  exclusive  privileges  appeared  to  his  feudal 
lord  excessive  and  even  dangerous.  After  fruitless 
negotiations,  Izates  appealed  to  arms,  and  took  up  a 
position  on  the  Lower  Zab,  which  was  the  southern 
limit  of  his  territory.  Vologases  had  advanced  to  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  river,  and  was  on  the  point  of 
crossing,  and  attacking  his  adversary  when  tidings 
reached  him  of  the  invasion  of  his  own  dominions 
by  a  foreign  enemy.  The  Daha?,  and  the  Scythians 
in  their  neighbourhood,  had  passed  into  Parthia 
Proper  from  the  Caspian  region,  and  were  threatening 
to  carry  fire  and  sword  through  the  entire  province. 


274  PART  HI  A    IN   THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

Domestic  revolt  could  be  chastised  at  any  time,  but 
a  foreign  foe  must  be  met  as  soon  as  he  showed 
himself.  Vologases,  accordingly,  marched  away  from 
Adiabene  to  the  Parthian  and  Hyrcanian  frontier, 
east  of  the  Caspian  sea,  where  he  met  and  repulsed 
the  band  of  marauders,  who  had  probably  only  ven- 
tured to  invade  his  territory  because  they  knew  him 
to  be  engaged  in  a  serious  quarrel  at  a  considerable 
distance,  and  imagined  that  they  would  therefore  be 
unresisted.  Successful  in  this  quarter,  he  was  about 
to  resume  his  operations  in  Adiabene,  when  infor- 
mation reached  him  of  the  death  of  Izates,  which 
brought  his  domestic  difficulties  to  an  end.  The 
pretensions  of  the  deceased  monarch  had  been 
personal,  being  grounded  upon  special  privileges 
granted  him  by  Artabanus  III.,  which  would  not 
pass  to  a  successor,  and  Vologases  had  consequently 
no  quarrel  with  Monobazus,  Izates'  brother,  who  had 
inherited  his  throne.  He  thus  found  himself,  at  the 
close  of  A.D.  53,  wholly  his  own  master,  and  free  to 
engage  in  whatever  enterprise  might  seem  to  him 
most  promising. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  surprising 
that,  in  A.D.  54,  he  turned  his  attention  once  more 
to  Armenian  affairs,  and  resumed  his  project  of 
establishing  his  brother,  Tiridates,  upon  the  throne 
of  that  ancient,  and  still  semi-independent,  kingdom. 
Rhadamistus,  though  he  continued  in  possession  of 
the  nominal  sovereignty,  had  failed  to  establish  his 
power,  or  to  obtain  any  firm  hold  on  the  affections  ot 
his  subjects,  and  might  be  attacked  with  a  good 
prospect    of    success,    unless    he    received    external 


TIKIDATES  ESTABLISHED   IN   ARMENIA.        2J$ 

assistance.  The  real  question  was,  would  Rome 
interfere  ?  Would  she  come  to  the  aid  of  a  monarch, 
who  had  not  received  his  throne  from  herself,  but  had 
obtained  it  by  supplanting,  and  finally  murdering,  her 
protege}  Vologases  was  probably  aware  that  a  new 
sovereign  had  recently  ascended  the  Imperial  throne, 
a  youth  not  yet  eighteen  years  of  age,  one  wholly 
destitute  of  military  tastes  or  training,  devoted  to 
music  and  the  arts,  who  could  not  be  credited  with 
very  keen  patriotic  feelings,  or  with  a  very  full 
comprehension  of  the  niceties  of  the  political  situa- 
tion. Would  this  raw  youth  grasp  the  meaning  of 
a  diminution  of  Roman  influence  in  the  far  East, 
or  rush  to  arms  because  a  border  kingdom — not 
a  Roman  province — wavered  in  its  allegiance  ? 
Vologases,  it  would  seem,  answered  three  questions 
in  the  negative  :  or  perhaps,  while  recognising  the 
risk,  he  may  have  thought  the  immediate  advantage 
so  great  as  to  make  it  worth  his  while  to  encounter 
the  hazard.  At  any  rate,  early  in  A.D.  54,  he  made 
his  invasion,  drove  Rhadamistus  out  of  Armenia, 
reduced  the  whole  country  to  subjection,  and 
established  his  brother,  Tiridates,  as  king  in  the 
capital  city  of  Artaxata. 

The  boldness  of  this  stroke  took  the  Romans  by 
surprise,  and  produced  something  like  a  panic  in  the 
Imperial  city.  But  the  traditions  of  Imperial  policy 
were  too  firmly  fixed  in  the  minds  of  the  official 
class  for  any  doubt  to  be  entertained  as  to  the 
necessity  of  meeting  and  resisting  the  aggression. 
Orders  went  forth  at  once  for  recruiting  the  Oriental 
legions  up  to  their  full  strength,  and  for  moving  them 


276  PARTHIA    IN   THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

nearer  to  the  Armenian  frontier  ;  preparations  were 
made  for  bridging  the  Euphrates  ;  Agrippa  II., 
King  of  Chalcis,  and  Antiochus,  King  of  Commagen£, 
were  ordered  to  raise  troops  and  make  ready  for  an 
invasion  of  Parthia  ;  new  governors  were  appointed 
over  Sophene  and  the  Lesser  Armenia  ;  above  and 
beyond  all,  the  brave  and  experienced  Corbulo, 
universally  allowed  to  be  the  best  general  of  the 
time,  was  summoned  from  his  command  in  Germany, 
and  given  the  general  superintendence  of  the  war  in 
Armenia,  with  Cappadocia  and  Galatia  as  his  pro- 
vinces. Ummidius  Ouadratus  was  maintained  in 
the  proconsulship  of  Syria,  but  required  to  co-operate 
with  Corbulo,  and  made  practically  his  second  in 
command.  Four  legions,  together  with  numerous 
auxiliaries  were  concentrated  on  the  Armenian 
frontier  ;  and  it  seemed  as  if  the  next  year  would 
see  the  contest  between  Rome  and  Parthia  renewed 
on  a  scale  which  would  recall  the  times  of  Antony 
and  Phraates  IV. 

But  to  ardent  spirits  the  new  year  brought  nothing 
but  disappointment.  Instead  of  rushing  to  arms, 
and  pouring  their  combined  legions  into  Armenia  or 
Parthia,  the  two  Roman  commanders  suddenly 
showed  a  disposition  for  peace.  Emissaries  from 
both  sought  the  Court  of  Vologases  with  offers  of 
peace — offers  which  implied  an  acceptance  of  the 
status  quo,  provided  that  the  Parthian  monarch  would 
take  no  further  steps  in  opposition  to  Rome,  and 
would  place  some  Parthians  of  importance  in  the 
hands  of  the  Romans  as  hostages.  This  he  was 
quite  willing  to  do,  as  he  knew  many  of  the  nobles 


REVOLT   OF    VARDANES.  2JJ 

to  be  disaffected,  and  their  absence  from  his  Court 
would  relieve  him  of  the  necessity  of  watching  them. 
Internal  troubles,  probably  fomented  by  Rome 
had  commenced  by  the  open  revolt  of  his  son, 
Vardanes,  whose  defection  from  his  father  Tacitus 
places  in  A.D.  54,1  and  whose  coins  show  that  he  had 
assumed  the  royal  title,  and  set  himself  up  as  a  rival 
to  Vologases,  certainly  before  the  end  of  the  next 
year.  A  truce  with  Rome  was,  consequently,  what 
the  Parthian  monarch  must  earnestly  have  desired  ; 
and   we    can    only  feel    surprised    that  the    Roman 


COIN    OF    VaRDANES    II. 

commanders  should  have  consented  to  play  into  his 
hands,  and  have  left  him  wholly  unmolested  in  the 
time  of  his  greatest  difficulties.  Probably  they  were 
already  jealous  of  each  other,  and  disinclined  to  press 
forward  a  war  in  which  each  felt  that  mere  accident 
might  give  the*chief  laurels  to  the  other. 

Vologases  was  thus  able  to  give  his  whole  attention, 
during  the  three  years  from  A.D.  55  to  A.D.  58,  to  the 
contest  with  his  son.  Its  details  have  not  come  down 
to  us  ;  but  it  appears  to  be  certain  that  by  the  spring 
of  A.D.  58  he  had  succeeded  in  crushing  the  revolt, 

1  Tacit.,  "Ann.,"  xiii.  7,  ad  Jin. 


278  PARTHIA    IN    THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

and  re-establishing  his  authority  over  the  whole 
kingdom.  As  Vardanes  is  no  more  heard  of,  we  may 
presume  that  he  either  perished  in  battle,  or  was 
executed.  His  coins,  which  are  numerous,  belong  to 
the  years  A.D.  55-58,  and  show  a  strong,  masculine, 
type  of  face,  with  an  expression  that  is  fierce  and 
determined. 

The  Great  King,  being  now  at  liberty  to  resume 
the  projects  and  plans,  which  his  son's  rebellion 
had  compelled  him  to  drop,  took  up  once  more  the 
Armenian  question,  which  was  still  unsettled  between 
his  own  Court  and  that  of  Rome,  and  by  his  envoys 
pressed  for  a  final  arrangement.  He  claimed  that  of 
right,  and  by  ancient  possession,  Armenia  was  a 
Parthian  province,  or  at  least  a  Parthian  dependency, 
and  required  that  not  only  should  Tiridates  be  left  in 
undisturbed  possession  of  it,  but  that  there  should  be 
a  distinct  understanding  that  he  held  it,  not  as  a 
Roman,  but  as  a  Parthian,  feudatory.  To  this  the 
Romans,  and  especially  Corbulo,  demurred.  Armenia, 
they  said,  had  been  added  to  the  Roman  Empire  by 
Lucullus,  or  at  any  rate  by  Pompey,  and  it  was  not 
consistent  with  the  greatness  of  Rome  to  surrender 
territory  which  she  had  once  acquired.  Let  Tiridates 
remain  quiet,  and  the  matter  be  settled  by  negotia- 
tion ;  otherwise  Rome  would  be  compelled  to  use 
force.  Corbulo  had  utilised  the  three  years  of  waiting 
by  recruiting  his  legions  from  Cappadocia  and  Galatia, 
by  tightening  their  discipline,  and  by  accustoming 
them  to  the  hardships  of  winter  marches  and  move- 
ments ;  he  had  also  obtained  an  additional  legion 
from  Germany  ;  and  he  now  felt  ready  for  a  campaign. 


VOLOGASES   I.    AND    CORBULO.  2JCJ 

Tiridates  soon  gave  him  the  opportunity  which  he 
seems  to  have  desired.  Having  received  a  contingent 
of  troops  from  Vologases,  he  commenced  proceedings 
against  the  Roman  partisans  in  Armenia,  harrying 
them  with  fire  and  sword;  whereupon  Corbulo  crossed 
the  frontier  to  their  relief.  A  number  of  partial  engage- 
ments were  fought  in  which  Rome  had  the  advantage, 
and  at  last,  after  three  years'  fighting,  Tiridates, 
having  lost  his  capital  city,  Artaxata,  in  A.D.  58, 
and  Tigrano-certa,  the  second  city  of  his  kingdom, 
in  A.D.  60,  withdrew  from  the  contest,  and  yielded  the 
entire  possession  of  Armenia  to  the  Romans.  By  the 
favour  of  Nero,  Tigranes,  grandson  of  Archelaus,  a 
former  monarch  of  Cappadocia,  was  made  king  ;  but, 
as  his  ability  to  administer  so  large  a  territory 
was  doubted,  portions  of  it  were  detached  from  his 
rule,  and  made  over  to  the  neighbouring  princes. 
Pharasmanes  of  Iberia,  Polemo  of  Pontus,  Aristo- 
bulus  of  the  Lesser  Armenia,  and  Antiochus  of 
Commagene,  profited  by  the  new  arrangement, 
which  could  not,  however,  but  be  distasteful  .to  the 
Armenians,  who  saw  the  country  of  which  they  were 
so  proud,  not  merely  conquered,  but  broken  into 
fragments. 

Corbulo's  success  must  be  attributed  in  a  great 
measure  to  the  absence  of  Vologases  from  the  scene 
of  contest.  The  Armenian  monarch  had  been  called 
away  in  A.D.  58  to  his  north-eastern  frontier  by  a 
revolt,  perhaps  fomented  by  Rome,1  of  the  distant 
province  of  Hyrcania,  and  had  found  full  occupation 
there  for  his  utmost  energies,  so  that  he  was  wholly 

1  So  Dean  Merivale,  "Roman  Empire,"  vol.  vii.  p.  23. 


280  PARTHIA    IN    THE    TIME   OF   NERO. 

unable  to  lend  effectual  aid  to  his  brother.  But 
about  the  year  A.D.  62,  the  Hyrcanian  troubles  came 
to  an  end,  and,  the  hands  of  Vologases  being  once 
more  free,  he  had  to  consider  and  determine  whether 
he  should  accept  the  state  of  things  established  in 
Armenia  by  Corbulo,  or  interfere  by  force  of  arms  to 
modify  it.  To  what  conclusion  he  would  have  come, 
had  his  own  dominions  been  left  unmolested,  it  is  im- 
possible to  say  :  as  it  was,  the  intolerable  aggressions 
of  Tigranes  upon  his  rich  province  of  Adiabene,  and 
the  bitter  complaints  of  his  subjects,  who  threatened 
to  transfer  their  allegiance  to  Rome,  left  him  no  choice. 
His  own  interests  and  the  honour  of  his  country 
alike  required  him  to  assert  his  cause  in  arms  ;  and 
Vologases,  having  made  up  his  mind  to  declare  war, 
announced  his  intention  to  a  council  of  his  nobles  in 
a  speech  which  is  reported  as  follows  :  "  Parthians, 
when  I  obtained  the  sovereignty  of  Parthia  by  the 
cession  of  my  brothers'  claims,  my  intention  was  to 
substitute  for  the  old  system  of  fraternal  hatred  and 
strife,  a-new  one  of  domestic  affection  and  agreement ; 
my  brother  Pacorus,  accordingly,  received  Media 
from  my  hands  at  once  ;  and  Tiridates,  whom  you 
see  now  present  before  you,  I  shortly  afterwards 
inducted  into  the  royal  appanage  of  Armenia,  a 
dignity  reckoned  the  third  in  the  Parthian  kingdom. 
Thus  I  put  my  family  matters  on  a  peaceful  and 
satisfactory  footing.  Rut  these  arrangements  are 
now  disturbed  by  the  Romans,  who  have  never 
hitherto  gained  anything  by  breaking  faith  with  us, 
and  will  scarcely  do  so  on  the  present  occasion.  I 
shall  not  deny  that  up  to  this  time  I  have  proposed 


VOLOGASES   I.    AND    CORBULO.  281 

to  maintain  my  right  to  the  dominions  left  me  by  my 
ancestors  by  fair  dealing  rather  than  by  shedding  of 
blood,  by  negotiation  rather  than  by  arms  ;  if  how- 
ever I  have  erred  in  this,  and  have  been  weak  to 
delay  so  long,  I  will  now  amend  my  fault  by  showing 
the  more  vigour.  You  at  any  rate  have  lost  nothing 
by  my  holding  back  ;  your  strength  is  intact,  your 
glory  undiminished.  Nay,  you  have  added  to  your 
other  well-known  merits,  the  credit  of  moderation — a 
virtue  which  not  even  the  highest  among  men  can 
afford  to  despise,  and  which  the  gods  view  with  special 
favour?"  His  speech  ended,  Vologases  placed  a 
diadem  on  the  brow  of  Tiridates,  in  token  of  his 
determination  to  restore  him  to  the  Armenian  throne, 
at  the  same  time  commanding  Moneses,  a  Parthian 
noble,  and  Monobazus,  the  Adiabenian  king,  to  take 
the  field  and  invade  Armenia,  while  he  himself 
collected  the  whole  strength  of  the  empire,  and 
marched  to  attack  the  Roman  legions  on  the 
Euphrates. 

The  campaign  which  followed  was  of  less  impor- 
tance than  might  have  been  anticipated  from  these 
preparations  for  it.  Vologases,  instead  of  invading 
Syria,  marched  no  further  than  Nisibis,  which  was 
well  within  the  limits  of  his  own  dominions.  Moneses 
and  Monobazus,  on  the  other  hand,  carried  out  the 
concerted  programme,  and  having  invaded  Armenia, 
and  advanced  to  Tigrano-certa,  which  had  now  become 
the  capital  of  the  kingdom,  besieged  Tigranes  in  that 
city  (A.D.  62).  But  the  Parthian  attack  on  walled 
places  was  always  ineffective,  and  Tigrano-certa  hap- 
pened to  be  exceptionally  strong.     The  walls  are  said 


282  PARTHIA   IN    THE    TIME    OF  NERO. 

to  have  been  seventy-five  feet  in  height,  the  river 
Nicephorius,  a  broad  stream,  washed  a  portion  of 
them  ;  a  huge  moat  protected  the  remainder  ;  the 
town  was  strongly  garrisoned  ;  and  the  besieging 
force,  though  not  wanting  in  gallantry,  proved  unable 
to  make  any  serious  impression  upon  the  place. 
Vologases,  as  time  went  on,  began  to  despair  of 
effecting  very  much  under  existing  circumstances  by 
force  of  arms,  and  leant  towards  negotiation,  which 
Corbulo  invited.  His  army,  which  consisted  almost 
entirely  of  cavalry,  was  reduced  to  inaction  by  want 
of  forage,  Mesopotamia  having  recently  suffered  from 
a  plague  of  locusts.  Hence  he  consented  to  con- 
clude a  truce  with  his  antagonist,  and  to  send  a  fresh 
embassy  to  Rome  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  satis- 
factory arrangement.  The  truce  was  to  last  until  the 
ambassadors  returned  ;  and,  meanwhile,  Armenia  was 
to  be  evacuated  by  both  parties,  and  care  was  to  be 
taken  that  no  collision  should  occur  between  the 
soldiers  of  the  two  nations. 

But  this  well-meant  effort  at  pacification  was 
entirely  without  result.  Nero  gave  the  envoys  no 
answer  ;  and,  indeed,  he  had  made  arrangements  be- 
fore their  arrival,  from  which  he  anticipated  a  trium- 
phant issue  to  the  contest  instead  of  a  mere  patched-up 
ind  unstable  convention.  At  the  request  of  Corbulo, 
who  was  anxious  not  to  arouse  his  jealousy,  he  had 
sent  out  a  second  commander  to  the  East,  a  special 
favourite  of  his  own,  and  from  the  conduct  of  the  war 
by  this  new  leader  he  looked  for  immediate  results  of 
the  most  important  character.  L.  Caesennius  Paetus 
was  a  man  of  energy  and  boldness,  confident  in  him- 


CAMPAIGN   OF   C&SENNIUS   PMTUS.  283 

self,  and  contemptuous  of  the  prudence  and  caution 
of  his  colleague.  He  held  a  separate  command,  with 
forces  equal  to  those  led  by  Corbulo,  and  soon  let  it 
be  known  that  he  was  about  to  carry  on  the  war  in  a 
new  fashion.  "  Corbulo,"  he  said,  "  had  shown  no 
dash  or  vigour  ;  he  had  neither  plundered  nor  massa- 
cred ;  if  he  had  besieged  cities,  it  had  been  in  name 
rather  than  in  reality.  His  own  method  would  be 
different.  Instead  of  setting  up  shadowy  kings  he 
would  bring  Armenia  under  Roman  law,  and  reduce 
it  to  the  condition  of  a  province."  These  brave  words 
were  followed  up  by  a  show  of  brave  deeds.  Cross- 
ing the  Euphrates,  Psetus  invaded  Armenia  with  two 
legions,  and  spreading  his  troops  over  a  wide  extent 
of  country,  burnt  the  strongholds,  ravaged  the  terri- 
tory, and  carried  off  a  considerable  booty.  But  he 
neither  fought  a  single  battle,  nor  ventured  to  besiege 
a  single  town.  As  winter  approached,  he  withdrew 
his  troops  into  Cappadocia,  but,  intent  on  pleasing  his 
Imperial  master,  he  gave  in  his  despatches  an  exag- 
gerated account  of  what  he  had  achieved  in  his  short 
campaign,  and  spoke  as  if  the  war  was  well-nigh  over. 
Corbulo,  on  his  part,  maintained  the  prudent  atti- 
tude habitual  to  him.  He  bridged  the  Euphrates  in 
the  face  of  a  large  opposing  force  by  anchoring  vessels 
laden  with  military  engines  in  mid-stream.  He  then 
passed  his  troops  across,  and  occupied  a  strong  posi- 
tion in  the  hills  at  a  little  distance  from  the  river, 
where  he  caused  his  legions  to  construct  an  entrenched 
camp,  and  remained  on  the  defensive.  He  greatly 
distrusted  Paetus,  and  would  not  allow  himself  to  be 
so  entangled  in  military  operations  as  not  to  be  able 


284  PARTHIA   IN   THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

at  any  moment  to  march  to  his  colleague's  assistance 
if  he  should  hear  that  he  was  in  any  danger. 

The  prudence  of  this  course  soon  became  evident. 
Paetus,  regarding  the  season  for  war  as  over,  sent  one 
of  his  legions  to  winter  in  Pontus,  while  he  himself 
with  the  other  two  took  up  his  quarters  in  the  country 
between  the  Taurus  and  the  Euphrates,  and  allowed 
free  furloughs  to  all  the  soldiers  who  applied  for  them. 
While  his  legions  were  in  this  way  much  weakened, 
he  suddenly  heard  that  Vologases,  braving  the  in- 
clemency of  the  season,  was  advancing  against  him 
at  the  head  of  a  strong  force.  The  crisis  revealed  his 
incapacity.  He  was  uncertain  whether  to  await  the 
enemy  in  quarters  or  to  take  the  field  against  him, 
whether  to  concentrate  his  troops  or  to  disperse 
them.  Now  he  adopted  one  course,  now  another. 
The  only  consistency  that  he  showed  was  in  imploring 
aid  from  Corbulo,  to  whom  he  sent  messenger  after 
messenger.  That  general,  however,  was  in  no  hurry 
to  render  help,  since  he  did  not  wish  to  appear  upon 
the  scene  as  deliverer  until  it  was  clear  that  the  danger 
threatening  Paetus  was  imminent.  Vologases,  mean- 
while, steadily  pursued  his  way.  Without  attempting 
any  rapid  movements,  he  closed  in  upon  Paetus,  his 
adversary,  swept  away  the  small  force  that  Paetus  had 
detached  to  guard  the  passes  of  Taurus,  and  blocked  up 
the  remainder  of  his  army  in  a  position  from  which 
extrication,  unless  his  colleague  came  to  his  aid,  was 
almost  impossible.  Corbulo  was  now  on  his  march,  and 
pressing  forward  with  all  speed,  but  a  panic  had  seized 
on  Paetus  and  his  soldiers.  Though  he  had  abundant 
provisions,  and    might    have    prolonged  the    defence 


CORBULO   ONCE   MORE   IN   COMMAND.  285 

for  weeks,  or  even  for  months,  yet  in  his  cowardly 
alarm  he  preferred  to  precipitate  matters,  and  having 
entered  into  negotiations  with  Vologases,  he  practically 
capitulated  to  him.  The  terms  granted  were,  that  the 
blockaded  army  should  be  allowed  to  quit  its  entrench- 
ments, and  be  free  to  march  away,  but  that  it  must 
at  once  quit  Armenia  ;  its  stores  and  its  fortified  posts 
must  be  surrendered  ;  no  further  hostilities  must  be 
engaged  in  ;  and  Paetus  should  obtain  from  Nero  the 
exact  conditions  on  which  he  would  now  be  willing  to 
make  peace.  These  terms  were  carried  out,  not  how- 
ever without  the  addition  of  some  further  insults  and 
indignities.  The  Parthians  entered  the  Roman  en- 
trenchments before  the  legionaries  had  quitted  them, 
claiming  and  seizing  whatever  they  professed  to 
recognise  as  Armenian  spoil  ;  they  even  took  posses- 
sion of  the  soldiers'  arms  and  clothes,  which  were 
tamely  relinquished  to  them  with  the  object  of  avoid- 
ing a  conflict.  Armenia  was  then  quitted  hastily,  and 
not  without  disorder,  Paetus  setting  the  example  of 
unseemly  hurry.  Corbulo  was  reached  after  a  three 
days'  march,  and  received  the  fugitives  without  re- 
proaches, and  with  every  demonstration  of  sympathy. 
Vologases  followed  up  his  success  against  Paetus  by 
at  once  re-establishing  his  brother,  Tiridates,  in  the 
Armenian  kingdom.  At  the  same  time  he  devised  a 
plan  whereby,  he  thought,  the  interminable  quarrel 
between  the  two  empires  of  Rome  and  Parthia  might 
be  made  up,  and  a  modus  vivendi  arrived  at.  Rome, 
under  Nero  at  any  rate,  was  not  really  bent  upon  fur- 
ther conquests.  It  was  rather  her  honour  for  which  she 
was  jealous  than  her  power  which  she  desired  to  see 


286  PARTHIA    IN    THE    TIME   OF  NERO. 

augmented.  Vologases  therefore  sent  an  embassy  to 
the  Court  of  Nero,  and  explained  that,  so  long  as  his 
brother  was  accepted  and  acknowledged  by  Rome  as 
Armenian  king,  he  would  offer  no  objection  to  his 
going  in  person  to  Rome  and  receiving  investiture 
from  the  Imperial  hands.  Nero  and  his  counsellors 
in  reality  approved  this  compromise,  but  they  felt  that 
it  would  be  too  palpable  a  surrender  of  former  claims, 
and  too  manifestly  a  concession  extorted  by  recent  dis- 
aster, if  they  closed  with  the  suggestion  of  the  Parthian 
monarch  at  once.  No  ;  Rome  must  not  make  an  open 
confession  of  defeat  ;  her  recession  from  a  claim  must 
be  glossed  over,  cloaked.  Dust  must  be  thrown  in 
the  eyes  of  the  nations,  and  they  must  be  induced  to 
think  that,  whatever  change  Rome  made  in  her  politi- 
cal arrangements  was  made  of  her  own  free  will,  and 
because  she  regarded  it  as  for  her  advantage.  Accord- 
ingly, the  envoys  of  Vologases  were  dismissed  with 
an  ambiguous  answer.  Partus  was  recalled  from  the 
East,  and  Corbulo  reinstated  in  sole  command,  and 
invested  with  a  new  and  almost  unlimited  authority. 
The  number  of  his  troops  was  augmented,  and  their 
quality  improved  by  draughts  from  Egypt  and  Illyri- 
cum.  He  was  bidden  once  more  to  take  the  offensive, 
and,  in  the  spring  of  A.D.  6$,  he  crossed  the  frontier, 
and  penetrated  to  the  heart  of  Armenia  by  the  road 
formerly  opened  by  Lucullus.  Tiridates  met  him,  not 
however  in  arms,  but  for  negotiation.  On  the  site  of 
the  camp  of  Paetus,  an  interview  was  held  between  the 
Roman  general  and  the  Aimenian  monarch,  where 
the  terms  suggested  by  the  envoys  of  Vologases  at 
Rome  were    accepted.       It   was    agreed    that    Rome 


COMPROMISE  SUGGESTED   BY   VOLOGASES.      287 

should  withdraw  her  support  from  Tigranes,  and  ac- 
knowledge Tiridates  as  rightful  monarch,  while  Tiri- 
dates  should  perform  an  act  of  homage  to  Rome  for 
his  kingdom,  and  be  nominally  Rome's  feudatory. 
To  indicate  his  acceptance  of  these  terms,  Tiridates, 
in  the  presence  of  Corbulo  and  his  suite,  divested  him- 
self of  the  regal  ensigns,  and  placed  them  at  the  foot 
of  the  statue  of  Nero,  undertaking  not  to  resume 
them  except  at  Nero's  hands.  For  actual  investiture 
he  undertook  to  journey  to  Rome  as  soon  as  circum- 
stances permitted,  and  meanwhile  he  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Corbulo  one  of  his  daughters  as  a  hostage. 
Corbulo,  on  his  part,  undertook  that  Tiridates  should 
be  treated  with  the  utmost  honour  and  respect,  both 
during  his  stay  at  Rome  and  on  his  journey  to  and 
from  Italy,  should  be  entitled  to  wear  his  sword,  and 
have  free  access  to  all  the  provincial  authorities  upon 
the  route.  Peace  was  made  upon  these  terms  to  the 
satisfaction  of  both  parties,  and  it  only  remained  that 
the  terms  should  be  faithfully  executed. 

The  execution  was  delayed  for  the  space  of  above 
two  years  ;  but  in  the  spring  of  A.D.  66,  Tiridates, 
having  set  the  affairs  of  Armenia  in  order,  started 
upon  his  promised  journey,  accompanied  by  his  wife, 
by  a  number  of  the  Parthian  princes  and  nobles, 
including  sons  of  Vologases,  Pacorus,  and  Mono- 
bazus,  and  by  an  escort  of  three  thousand  Parthian 
cavalry  in  all  the  glittering  array  of  their  gold 
ornaments  and  bright-gleaming  panoplies.  The  long 
cavalcade  passed,  like  a  magnificent  triumphal  pro- 
cession, through  two-thirds  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
and    was    everywhere    received     with    warmth,    and 


288  PART  HI  A    IN    THE    TIME    OF  NERO. 

entertained  with  profuse  hospitality.  The  provincial 
cities  which  lay  upon  the  line  of  route  selected  were 
gaily  decorated  to  receive  their  unwonted  visitors, 
and  the  loud  acclamations  of  the  assembled  multi- 
tudes showed  that  they  fully  appreciated  the  novel 
spectacle.  The  whole  journey,  except  the  passage  of  the 
Hellespont,  was  made  by  land,  the  cavalcade  proceed- 
ing through  Thrace  and  Illyricum  to  the  head  of  the 
Adriatic  Gulf,  and  then  descending  the  peninsula. 
The  Roman  Treasury  defrayed  the  entire  expenses  of 
the  travellers,  which  are  said  to  have  amounted  to 
an  average  daily  cost  of  800,000  sesterces,  or  about 
£6250  of  English  money.  As  this  outlay  was 
continued  for  nine  months,  the  entire  sum  expended 
by  the  Treasury  must  have  exceeded  a  million  and 
a  half  pounds  sterling.  Audience  was  given  to  the 
Parthian  prince  at  Naples,  where  Nero  happened  to 
be  residing,  and  passed  off  without  serious  difficulty. 
At  first,  indeed,  an  obstacle  presented  itself;  it  was 
the  etiquette  of  the  Roman  Gourt  that  those  intro- 
duced to  the  Emperor  were  to  be  unarmed,  and 
consequently  the  usher,  when  Tiridates  approached 
the  Hall  of  Audience,  requested  him  to  lay  aside  his 
sword.  This  he  refused  to  do,  since  he  was  entitled 
to  wear  it  by  the  terms  of  his  agreement .  with 
Corbulo.  The  affair  might  have  ended  in  a  dead- 
lock, had  not  it  been  ingeniously  suggested,  that  the 
Emperor's  safety  might  be  assured  and  the  Parthian 
prince's  honour  saved,  by  the  simple  expedient  of 
fastening  the  obnoxious  weapon  to  its  scabbard  with 
half  a  dozen  nails.  This  done,  Tiridates  was  intro- 
duced   into   the    Imperial   presence,  where    he    made 


NERO'S   INVESTITURE    OF    TIRIDATES.  289 

obeisance,  bending  one  knee  to  the  ground,  interlacing 
his  hands,  and  at  the  same  time  saluting  the  Emperor 
as  his  "  lord." 

The  investiture  was  reserved  for  a  subsequent 
occasion,  and  was  made  a  spectacle  to  the  Roman 
populace.  On  the  night  preceding,  all  the  streets  of 
the  city  were  illuminated  and  decorated  with  garlands; 
as  morning  approached,  "  the  Tribes,"  clothed  in  long 
white  robes  and  bearing  branches  of  laurels  in  their 
hands,  entered  the  Forum  and  filled  all  the  middle 
space,  arranged  as  was  customary  ;  next  came  the 
Praetorians,  in  their  splendid  arms  and  with  their 
glittering  standards,  stationing  themselves  in  two 
lines  which  reached  from  the  further  extremity  of 
the  Forum  to  the  Rostra,  to  maintain  the  avenue  of 
approach  clear  ;  all  the  roofs  of  the  houses  which 
gave  upon  the  Forum  were  hidden  beneath  the  masses 
of  spectators  ;  at  break  of  day  Nero  himself  entered, 
accompanied  by  the  Senate  and  by  his  own  body- 
guard, wearing  the  garb  appropriated  to  Triumphs, 
and,  passing  down  between  the  two  lines  of  Prae- 
torians, ascended  a  raised  platform  near  the  Rostra, 
and  took  his  seat  in  an  archaic  curule  chair.  Tiridates 
was  then  introduced  ;  silence  was  proclaimed  ;  and 
in  a  short  speech  of  a  sufficiently  abject  character, 
the  Parthian  prince  placed  himself  at  the  Roman 
Emperor's  disposal.  Nero  responded  haughtily,  but 
executed  the  covenanted  investiture.  Saluting  Tiri- 
dates as  king  of  Armenia,  he  handed  him  to  a  seat 
prepared  for  the  purpose  at  his  own  feet,  gave  him 
the  kiss  which  sovereigns  only  gave  to  sovereigns, 
and    with   his  own  hand   placed   upon   his   brow  the 


290  PARTHIA    IN    THE    TIME    OF  NERO. 

coveted  diadem,  the  symbol  of  Oriental  sovereignty. 
Magnificent  entertainments  followed,  with  shows  and 
games  of  various  kinds,  in  which  the  emperor  himself 
took  part ;  but  this  condescension  astonished,  more 
than  it  pleased,  the  Asiatic.  However,  he  doubtless 
appreciated  better  the  closing  act  of  the  entire  drama, 
which  was  a  parting  gift  from  his  nominal  suzerain  of 
not  much  less  than  a  million  sterling  ! 

Tiridates  returned  to  Asia  across  the  Adriatic,  and 
by  the  ordinary  route  through  Greece,  no  doubt  well 
pleased  with  his  visit.  At  the  cost  of  a  formal  sub- 
mission, and  a  certain  amount  of  personal  humiliation, 
he  had  obtained  a  sum  which  not  even  a  king  could 
despise,  and  an  assured  title  to  the  throne  of  a  con- 
siderable kingdom.  Vologases,  who  must  be  regarded 
as  the  moving  spirit  throughout  the  whole  transaction, 
may  also  well  have  been  satisfied.  He  had  firmly 
established  his  brother  upon  the  Armenian  throne, 
and  if  he  had  conceded  to  Roman  vanity  the  honour 
and  glory  of  the  arrangement,  yet  he  had  secured  for 
himself  the  substantial  advantage.  As  Dean  Merivale 
well  observes,  "  While  Tiridates  did  homage  for  his 
kingdom  to  Nero,  he  was  allowed  to  place  himself 
really  under  the  protection  of  Vologases."  x 

1  "  Roman  Empire,"  vol.  vii.  p.  26. 


XVII. 


VOLOGASES    T.    AND    VESPASIAN — PACORUS 
DECEBALUS   OF   DACIA. 


II.   AND 


The  establishment  of  peace  between  Rome  and 
Parthia,  while  no  doubt  a  fortunate  circumstance  for 
the  subjects  of  the  two  empires,  is  one  vexatious  to 
the  modern  historian  of  the  Parthians,  since  it  places 
him  at  a  considerable  disadvantage.  Until  the  con- 
clusion of  the  peace,  he  is  able  to  obtain  tolerably 
ample  materials  for  his  narrative  from  the  Greek  and 
Roman  writers  who  describe  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  the  East  under  the  early  Roman  Emperors,  and 
who  have  to  trace  the  causes  and  course  of  the 
hostilities  in  which  the  two  countries  were  engaged 
almost  continuously.  From  the  date  of  the  paci- 
fication he  wholly  loses  the  benefit  of  this  consecutive 
history,  and  has  nothing  to  rely  upon  except  a  few 
scattered  and  isolated  notices,  not  always  very  in- 
telligible, occurring  here  and  there  in  the  pages  of  the 
classical  authors,  together  with  the  series,  which  now 
becomes  very  confused  and  confusing,  of  the  Parthian 
coins.  The  view  obtainable  of  Parthian  history  is 
thus,  for  the  space  of  above  half  a  century,  most  im- 
perfect and   disjointed.     Even   the    succession  of  the 


292  VULOGASES   I.   AND    VESPASIAN. 

kings  is  uncertain  ;  and  the  attribution  of  the  coins  to 
this  or  that  monarch,  rests  frequently  on  conjecture. 

The  latest  authorities  seem  to  be  of  opinion  that 
Vologases  I. — the  monarch  who  ascended  the  Parthian 
throne  in  a.d.  50  or  51 — continued  to  reign  until 
about  A.D.  yj.  If  so,  he  must  have  been  contemporary 
with  six  Roman  Emperors — Claudius,  Nero,  Galba, 
Otho,  Vitellius  and  Vespasian— reigning  contempo- 
raneously with  the  last  named  of  these  for  about 
eight  years.  The  relations  between  the  two  rulers 
were,  for  the  most  part,  friendly.  When  Vespasian  first 
came  forward  as  a  candidate  for  empire  (A.D.  70),  Volo- 
gases went  so  far  as  to  offer  him  the  services  of  forty 
thousand  horse-archers  to  assist  in  his  establishment 
upon  the  throne  ;  but  the  successes  of  his  generals  in 
Italy  enabled  the  Emperor  to  decline  this  magnificent 
proposal,  and  so  to  escape  the  odium  of  employing 
foreign  troops — "barbarians,"  the  Romans  would  have 
said — against  his  own  countrymen.  In  the  same  spirit, 
when,  a  year  later,  Titus  paid  a  visit  to  the  Roman 
station  of  Zeugma  on  the  Euphrates,  the  Parthian 
monarch  sent  to  congratulate  him  on  his  successful 
conclusion  of  the  Jewish  war,  and  begged  him  to 
accept  at  his  hands  a  crown  of  gold.  Titus,  with  his 
usual  amiability,  consented  ;  and,  to  show  his  appre- 
ciation of  the  compliment  paid  him,  invited  the  envoys 
of  Vologases  to  a  banquet  and  sumptuously  enter- 
tained them. 

Shortly  after  this,  however,  by  the  machinations  of 
Caesennius  Paetus,  the  unsuccessful  general  in  the  last 
Armenian  campaign,  who  had  been  recently  pro- 
moted to  the  office  of  Syrian  proconsul,  these  pleasing 


MACHINATIONS   OF    CMSENNIUS   PJETUS.      293 

prospects  were  overclouded,  and  a  rupture  in  the 
amicable  relations  that  had  hitherto  subsisted  be- 
tween the  two  monarchs,  appeared  to  be  imminent. 
Caesennius  Paetus — on  what  grounds  it  is  impossible  to 
say,  perhaps  on  no  reasonable  grounds  at  all — sent 
a  report  to  Vespasian,  in  A.D.  72,  of  a  most  important 
and  alarming  character.  He  had  discovered  a  plot,  he 
said,  for  the  transfer  of  the  Roman  dependency  of 
Commagene,  a  portion  of  Upper  Syria,  from  the 
Roman  to  the  Parthian  allegiance — a  plot  concerted, 
he  declared,  between  Vologases  and  the  Commagenian 
king,  Antiochus,  and  about  to  be  almost  immediately 
put  into  execution.  Samosata,  the  capital  of  Comma- 
gene,  which  commanded  the  passage  of  the  Euphrates, 
was  to  be  put  into  the  hands  of  the  Parthian  monarch 
by  the  Commagenians,  and  a  ready  access  thereby 
given  him  to  the  Roman  provinces  of  Cappadocia, 
Cilicia,  and  Syria  itself,  which  could  all  be  easil) 
invaded  from  the  important  site.  Unless  he  were 
authorised  at  once  to  take  steps  to  prevent  the 
transfer,  it  would  within  a  very  short  space  be  ac- 
complished, and  the  East  once  more  thrown  into 
confusion.  Vespasian,  who  had  no  reason  to  doubt 
the  correctness  of  the  proconsul's  information,  replied 
to  him  without  delay,  and  gave  him  full  liberty  of 
acting  as  he  thought  best.  Hereupon,  Paetus,  who 
had  made  every  preparation  in  anticipation  of  such 
a  response,  immediately  marched  a  strong  force  into 
Commagene,  and  meeting  with  no  resistance,  pro- 
ceeded against  Samosata,  which  he  carried  by  a 
coup  de  main.  It  cannot  but  be  suspected  that  the 
whole  story  told  to  Vespasian  was  the  invention  of 


294  VOLOGASES   I.   AND    VESPASIAN. 

Paetus,  who  desired  war  as  a  field  for  his  energies. 
His  sudden  invasion  only  failed  to  produce  the  crisis 
that  he  sought  to  bring  about,  owing  to  the  moderation 
and  prudence  of  the  two  sovereigns  against  whom  his 
charges  had  been  made.  Antiochus,  the  Comma- 
genian  monarch,  refused  altogether  to  assume  the 
part  of  rebel  which  had  been  assigned  him,  and, 
though  his  sons  took  arms  against  Paetus,  himself 
withdrew  from  the  country,  and  passing  into  the 
Roman  province  of  Cilicia,  took  up  his  abode  at 
Tarsus.  Vologases  declined  to  give  the  action  taken 
by  the  sons  of  Antiochus  any  support.  He  folded 
his  arms,  and  simply  looked  on  while  they  contended 
with  Paetus  ;  when,  on  their  father's  withdrawal  into 
Cilicia,  their  troops  abandoned  them,  and  they  were 
forced  to  take  to  flight,  he  contented  himself  with 
allowing  them  a  temporary  refuge  in  Parthia,  and 
writing  a  letter  to  Vespasian  on  their  behalf.  It  was 
probably  this  letter  which  induced  Vespasian  so  far 
to  pardon  the  young  princes  as  to  allow  them  to 
reside  in  Rome  with  their  father,  while  at  the  same 
time  he  made  the  family  an  ample  allowance  from  his 
privy  purse. 

It  was  not  long  after  he  had  escaped  the  danger 
of  a  Roman  war  that  Vologases  was  attacked  by  a 
savage  enemy  from  another  quarter.  The  Alani,  a 
Scythic,  or  more  probably  a  Finnish  tribe  from  the 
regions  east  of  the  Caspian,  having  made  alliance 
with  the  important  nation  of  the  Hyrcanians,  which 
in  later  Parthian  history  gave  many  signs  of  being 
disaffected,  burst  through  the  Caspian  Gates  suddenly 
in  the  year  A.D.  75,  and,  pouring   into   Media,  drove 


PARTHIA    IMPLORES   ROMAN  AID.  2Q5 

King  Pacorus,  the  brother  of  Vologases,  to  take  refuge 
in  the  fastnesses  of  the  mountains,  while  they  carried 
fire  and  sword  over  the  open  country.  From  Media 
they  passed  on  into  Armenia,  which  was  still  held  by 
Tiridates,  defeated  him  in  a  pitched  battle,  and  very 
nearly  succeeded  in  making  him  prisoner  by  means 
of  a  lasso.  Vologases,  in  great  alarm,  sent  an  embassy 
to  Vespasian,  and  relying  on  his  own  offer,  a  few  years 
previously,  to  lend  the  Roman  Emperor,  if  he  required 
it,  a  body  of  forty  thousand  horse  archers,  asked 
that  an  efficient  contingent  of  Roman  troops  might 
now  be  placed  at  his  disposal.  He  further  requested 
that  their  commander  might  be  either  Titus  or  Do- 
mitian.  The  latter  prince,  jealous  of  his  brother's 
military  fame,  was  most  anxious  to  be  selected,  and 
to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  a  powerful  army,  so  that 
he  might  have  an  opportunity  of  rivalling  the  great 
achievements  of  Titus.  But  Vespasian,  with  the 
caution  of  old  age,  felt  averse  from  embarking  the 
State  in  fresh  adventures,  and  bluntly  declared  that 
he  saw  no  reason  for  making  himself  a  busybody  in 
affairs  that  no  way  concerned  him.  Had  he  accepted 
the  proffered  support  of  Vologases  in  years  previously, 
the  case  would  have  been  different,  but,  as  he  had 
declined  it,  his  hands  were  unshackled,  and  he  was 
free  either  to  consent  or  to  refuse  as  he  chose.  The 
best  interests  of  the  State  seemed  to  him  to  require 
abstention,  and  he  therefore  sent  a  negative  reply  to 
Vologases.  The  Parthian  prince  was  not  only  dis- 
appointed, but  angered,  and  vented  his  spleen  by 
withholding  from  the  Emperor,  in  subsequent  diplo- 
matic correspondence,  his  rightful  titles.     Vespasian, 


296  VOLOGASES  I.   AND    VESPASIAN. 

with  a  sense  of  humour  rare  in  persons  so  highly 
placed,  made  no  remonstrance  beyond  the  ironic  one 
of  adopting  in  his  reply  the  humble  style  assigned 
him  by  his  correspondent.  To  the  salutation — 
"  Arsaces,  King  of  Kings,  to  Flavius  Vespasianus 
sends  greeting,"  he  answered,  "  Flavius  Vespasianus, 
to  Arsaces,  King  of  Kings,  sends  greeting." 

A  coolness  in  the  relations  between  the  two  powers 
now  set  in.  Parthia,  thrown  on  her  own  resources, 
was  forced  to  submit  to  considerable  loss  in  the  way 
of  booty  at  the  hands  of  the  Alani  and  their  allies, 
and  was  unable  to  take  any  revenge  upon  them  for 
their  unprovoked  attack  ;  but  she  succeeded  in  main- 
taining her  western  territories  intact,  and  in  recover- 
ing both  Media  and  Armenia.  Hyrcania,  it  may  be 
suspected,  was  from  this  time  detached  from  her  rule, 
and  the  cause  of  continual  trouble  and  disturbance, 
falling  under  the  dominion  of  pretenders  who  claimed 
Arsacid  descent,  and  even  took  the  full  titles  of  Par- 
thian sovereignty. 

Vologases  died  about  A.D.  78,  and  was  succeeded 
by  a  certain  Pacorus,  not  his  brother,  but  probably 
his  son,  who  appears  by  his  coins  to  have  been,  at 
his  accession,  a  very  young  man,  and  seems  to  have 
reigned  for  thirty  years,  from  A.D.  78  to  A.D.  108. 
This  prince  was  thus  contemporary  with  five  Roman 
Emperors — Vespasian,  Titus,  Domitian,  Nerva,  and 
Trajan — but  with  none  of  these  does  he  seem  to  have 
held  any  communications.  The  "  coolness  "  which 
had  set  in  under  his  father  gradually  deepened  into 
hostility  ;  and,  when  the  warlike  Trajan  came  to  the 
throne,  it   was   soon  apparent   that   an   open  quarrel 


ACCESSION   OF  PACORUS    II.  297 

could  not  be  long  avoided.  Rome's  pretensions  to  a 
predominating  influence  in  Armenia  were  revived,  and 
Parthia,  not  knowing  how  soon  she  might  be  attacked, 
began  to  look  out  for  allies  among  the  avowed 
enemies  of  the  Roman  Empire.  Relations  were 
established  between  Pacorus  and  Decebalus,1  the 
Dacian  monarch,  who  had  been  at  war  with  Rome  in 
the  reign  of  Domitian  (A.D.  81-90),  and  was  now  (A.D. 
10 1 )  again  threatened  by  Trajan.  Pacorus,  however, 
had  not  the  courage  to  lend  his  ally  any  active 
assistance,  either  by  sending  troops  to  his  aid  in  the 


COIN    OK    PACORUS    II. 


struggle  that  went  on  upon  the  Danube,  or  by  effect- 
ing a  diversion  in  his  favour  upon  the  Euphrates. 
When  Decebalus  fell,  in  A.D.  104,  and  Dacia  became 
a  Roman  province,  Pacorus  must  have  felt  that  he 
stood  alone,  and  that,  having  provoked  the  hostility 
of  Rome  by  his  relations  with  her  enemy,  he  might 
expect  at  any  moment  an  attack.  Trajan,  however, 
was  too  wise  and  too  cautious  to  precipitate  matters  ; 
an  invasion  of  the  East  needed  careful  preparation  ; 
and  the  invasion  which  he  contemplated  was  one  of 

1  Plin.,   "  Epist.,"  x.  16;  Merivale,  "  Roman  Empire,"  vol.  viii.  p. 
154- 


2Q' 


PACORUS   AND    ART  A  BAN  US   IV. 


unusual  importance  and  magnitude :  he  therefore 
abstained  for  the  present  from  all  offensive  measures, 
and  contented  himself  with  paving  the  way  for  his 
intended  expedition  by  intrigues  in  Armenia  and 
elsewhere,  by  accumulating  warlike  stores,  and 
increasing  the  strictness  of  military  discipline. 
Pacorus  was  thus  left  in  peace  to  the  termination  of 
his  long  reign  (A.D.  108),  and  the  storm  which  had  so 
long  threatened  did  not  burst  until  the  time  of  his 
successor.  A  pretender,  however,  Artabanus  IV.; 
who  has  left  coins,  falls  into  this  reign. 


COIN   OF  ARTABANUS   IT. 


XVIII. 

CHOSROES  AND  TRAJAN — TRAJAN'S  ASIATIC  CON- 
QUESTS—RELINQUISHMENT  OF  THESE  CON- 
QUESTS  BY   HADRIAN. 

PACORUS  the  Second  was  succeeded  upon  the 
throne  by  Chosroes,  his  brother,  whom  the  Parthian 
Megistanes  preferred  over  the  heads  of  Exedares  and 
Parthamasiris,  Pacorus's  two  sons,  as  more  fit  to  rule 
under  the  difficult  circumstances  of  the  period.     It 


COIN    OF   CHOSROES. 


was  known,  or  at  any  rate  suspected,  that  the  warlike 

and    experienced     Trajan     designed    an    expedition 

against  the  East,  and   it  therefore  seemed  necessary 

to  entrust  the  government  of  the  Parthian  state  to  a 

man  of  mature  age  and  sound  judgment.    The  sons  of 

Pacorus  were  young  and  rash,  certainly  incompetent 

to  cope  with  so  dangerous  an  antagonist  as  Trajan. 

299 


300  CH0SR0ES   AND    TRAJAN. 

Chosroes  was  of  ripe  age,  at  any  rate,  and,  though 
untried,  was  believed  to  possess  ability,  a  belief  which 
after  events,  on  the  whole,  justified. 

The  ostensible  cause  of  quarrel  between  Rome  and 
Parthia  was,  as  so  frequently  before,  Armenia.  On 
the  death  of  Tiridates,  in  or  about  the  year  a.d.  ioo, 
Pacorus  appears,  without  any  consultation  with  Rome, 
to  have  placed  his  own  son,  Exedares,  upon  the 
Armenian  throne.  This  was  certainly  throwing  out 
a  challenge  to  Trajan,  and  was  a  high-handed  pro- 
ceeding, not  justified  by  the  previous  relations  of  the 
countries.  On  the  last  occasion  of  the  throne  being 
vacant,  though  Parthia  had  nominated  the  prince, 
Rome's  right  to  give  investiture  had  been  admitted, 
and  Tiridates  had,  in  fact,  received  his  diadem  from 
the  hands  of  Nero.  But  Pacorus  probably  knew  that 
Trajan  had  his  hands  fully  occupied  with  the  Dacian 
troubles,  and  was  therefore  not  likely  to  engage  in 
another  war,  while  he  may  perhaps  have  thought 
that  the  right  of  investiture  was  too  shadowy  a 
matter  for  Rome  greatly  to  value  it.  Events  so  fa 
justified  his  expectations  that  Trajan  made  neither 
remonstrance  nor  threat  at  the  time,  but  seemingly 
acquiesced  in  the  new  departure.  When,  however, 
the  Dacian  War  was  over,  and  the  country  reduced 
into  the  form  of  a  Roman  province  (about  A.D.  114), 
the  Emperor,  whose  appetite  for  conquest  was 
whetted  rather  than  satisfied  by  his  Danubian  suc- 
cesses, considered  that  the  time  was  come  for  taking 
the  affairs  of  the  East  into  his  serious  consideration, 
and  for  placing  them  on  a  footing  which  should  give 
Rome  security  against  the  troubles  that  had  now,  for 


TRAJAN    ON    THE   EASTERN   QUESTION.         30I 

about  a  century  and  a  half,  threatened  her  from  this 
quarter. 

Two  views  might  be  taken  of  the  Oriental  ques- 
tion. It  might  be  regarded  in  the  light  in  which  the 
greatest  of  the  Roman  Emperors — Augustus,  Tiberius, 
Vespasian — had  hitherto  regarded  it,  as  chronic — a 
fatal  necessity  involving  continuous  trouble,  con- 
tinuous effort,  and  at  the  best  of  times  only  admitting 
of  a  sort  of  patched-up  arrangement.  Or  it  might  be 
viewed  in  a  more  heroic  light,  as  Alexander  the 
Great  had  viewed  it  in  his  day,  as  an  evil  to  be  con- 
quered, a  difficulty  to  be  overcome,  an  intolerable 
state  of  things,  which  might  be  brought  to  an  end, 
and  ought  to  be  brought  to  an  end  as  soon  as 
possible.  Ordinary  minds  would  naturally  see  it  in 
the  former  light.  There  had  always  been  an  East, 
there  would  necessarily  always  be  an  East,  set  in 
antagonism  to  the  West,  with  a  perpetual  quarrel 
going  on  between  them.  The  case  would  then  only 
admit  of  palliatives,  partial  remedies,  modi  vivendi, 
such  expedients  as  a  wise  diplomacy  might  suggest, 
andt.carry  out,  for  avoiding  collisions  or  minimising 
them,  and  carrying  on  such  intercourse  as  was  neces- 
sary with  as  little  friction  as  possible.  The  other 
view  opened  a  wider  range  both  of  thought  and 
action.  Might  it  be  practicable  to  crush  the  East,  to 
get  rid  of  the  constant  antagonism  ;  and  if  so,  by 
what  means,  and  at  what  cost  ? 

That  this  latter  alternative  was  not  an  altogether 
hopeless  one  had  been  shown  by  Alexander  himself. 
Alexander  had  conquered  the  East,  and  for  a  cen- 
tury and    a    half  there  had    been  no   great  barbaric 


302  CH0SR0&S   AND    TRAJAN. 

Oriental  monarchy  standing  over  against  the  West, 
thwarting  it  and  threatening  it.  The  ambition  of 
Trajan  seems  to  have  been  fired  by  the  thought  of 
what  Alexander  had  achieved,  and  an  idea  of  rivalry 
seems  to  have  taken  possession  of  him.  Without 
divulging  his  intentions  even  to  his  intimates,  much 
less,  like  Crassus,1  making  an  open  boast  of  them,  he 
determined  on  an  attempt  to  bring  the  Eastern  ques- 
tion to  an  end  by  the  subjugation  of  Parthia.  At 
first,  however,  he  veiled  his  designs  under  a  cloak  of 
pretended  moderation.  He  professed  that  his  sole 
object  was  the  vindication  of  the  Roman  honour  in 
respect  of  Armenia.  Both  Pacorus  and  Chosroes,  he 
said,  had  insulted  Rome  by  dealing  with  Armenia  as 
if  its  government  were  altogether  a  Parthian,  and  not 
a  Roman,  affair.  He  maintained,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  authority  of  Rome  was  paramount.  It  was 
in  vain  that  Chosroes  offered  to  fall  back  upon  the 
modus  vivendi  which  had  been  accepted  by  Nero,  and 
to  allow  Trajan  to  invest  his  nephew,  Parthamasiris, 
a  son  of  Pacorus,  and  younger  brother  of  Exedares, 
with  the  diadem.  Trajan  replied  ambiguously^that 
he  would  see  what  was  fittest  to  be  done  when  he 
arrived  in  Syria,  and  proceeded  to  hasten  his  march, 
to  augment  the  number  of  his  troops,  and  to  make 
preparations  of  an  unusual  character.  The  autumn 
of  A.D.  114  saw  him  at  Antioch,  and  in  the  spring  of 
the  ensuing  year,  undaunted  by  the  terrible  earth- 
quake which  had  almost  destroyed  the  Syrian  capital 
in  the  winter  of  A.D.  1 14-5,  he  set  out  upon  his  march 
from  Antioch  to  the  Armenian  frontier.     The  satraps 

1  See  above,  pp.  149,  150. 


SEIZURE   OF    PARTHAMASIRIS.  303 

and  petty  princes  of  the  region  made  submission  as 
he  advanced,  and  sought  his  favour  with  gifts  of 
various  kinds,  which  he  was  pleased  to  receive 
graciously,  while  he  made  his  way  from  Zeugma,  the 
Roman  outpost,  to  the  passages  of  the  Euphrates  at 
Samosata  and  Elegia.  Here,  on  the  frontier  of  the 
Greater  Armenia,  he  awaited  the  arrival  of  Partha- 
masiris,  who,  after  attempting  to  negotiate  with  him 
as  an  equal,  and  being  treated  with  disdain,  had  been 
encouraged  to  present  himself  as  a  suppliant  in  the 
Roman  camp,  and  to  ask  his  crown  of  Trajan.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Armenian  prince  understood 
that  the  scene  was  to  be  a  repetition  of  that  enacted 
at  Rome  in  A.D.  66,  when  Tiridates  received  the 
diadem  from  Nero.  But  Trajan  was  otherwise 
minded.  When  the  young  prince,  having  ridden 
into  the  camp  at  the  head  of  a  small  retinue,  stript 
the  diadem  from  his  own  brows  and  laid  it  at  the  feet  of 
the  Roman  Emperor,  then  stood  in  dignified  silence, 
expecting  that  his  mute  submission  would  be 
graciously  accepted,  and  that  the  emblem  of  sove- 
reignty would  be  returned  to  him,  Trajan  made  no 
movement.  The  army,  which  stood  around,  pre- 
pared, no  doubt,  for  the  occasion,  shouted  with  all 
their  might,  and,  saluting  Trajan  anew  as  Imperator, 
congratulated  him  on  his  "  bloodless  victory."  Par- 
thamasiris  saw  that  he  had  fallen  into  a  trap,  and 
would  fain  have  fled  ;  but  the  troops  had  closed  in 
upon  him  on  all  sides,  and  he  found  his  retreat  inter- 
cepted. Hereupon  he  once  more  confronted  the 
Emperor,  and  demanded  a  private  audience,  which 
was  "ranted  him.     A  short  conference  was  held  be- 


304  CH0SR0ES   AND    TRAJAN. 

tween  the  two  in  the  Emperor's  tent,  but  the  pro- 
posals of  Parthamasiris  were  rejected.  He  was  given 
to  understand  that  he  must  submit  to  the  forfeiture 
of  his  crown,  and  summoned  a  second  time  before  the 
Imperial  tribunal,  to  show  cause,  if  he  desired  to  do 
so,  against  the  proposed  forfeiture,  and  to  hear  the 
Emperor's  decision.  Parthamasiris,  justly  indignant, 
spoke  at  some  length,  and  with  much  boldness. 
"  He  had  neither  been  defeated,"  he  said,  "  nor  made 
prisoner  by  the  Romans,  but  had  come  of  his  own 
free  will  to  hold  a  conference  with  the  chief  of  the 
Roman  State,  in  full  assurance  that  he  would  suffer  no 
wrong  at  his  hands,  but  would  be  invested  by  him  with 
the  Armenian  sovereignty,  just  as  Tiridates  had  been 
invested  by  Nero.  He  demanded  to  be  set  at  liberty, 
together  with  his  retinue."  Trajan  answered  curtly 
that  he  did  not  intend  to  give  the  sovereignty  of 
Armenia  to  any  one.  The  country  belonged  to  Rome, 
and  should  have  a  Roman  governor.  Parthamasiris 
might  go  where  he  pleased  with  his  Parthians  ;  but 
any  Armenians  that  he  had  brought  with  him  must 
remain — they  were  Roman  subjects.  Parthamasiris, 
upon  this,  rode  off;  but  Trajan  had  no  intention  of 
allowing  him  to  escape,  and  become  the  leader  in  an 
Armenian  war.  He  ordered  some  of  his  troops  to 
follow  and  arrest  him,  and,  if  he  resisted,  to  put  him 
to  death.  These  instructions  were  carried  out,  and 
Parthamasiris  wras  killed,  as  a  recent  historian  says, 
"  brutally." 

Cruel  and  brutal  acts  are  frequently  successful — at 
any  rate,  for  a  time.  Trajan's  "  sharp  and  sudden 
blow  "  was  effective,  and   produced  the  prompt  and 


ARMENIA   MADE   A   ROMAN   PROVINCE.  305 

complete  submission  of  Armenia  No  resistance  was 
made.  It  did  not,  perhaps,  much  matter  to  the  bulk 
of  the  inhabitants  whether  a  Parthian  vitaxa  or  a 
Roman  proconsul  governed  them.  Trajan  found  no 
difficulty  in  carrying  out  his  intention  of  absorbing 
Armenia  into  the  empire.  The  two  Armenias — 
the  Greater  and  the  Less — were  united  together, 
placed  under  a  Roman  governor,  and  reduced  into 
the  form  of  a  province. 

Attention  was  then  turned  to  the  neighbouring 
countries.  Friendly  relations  were  established  with 
Anchialus,  king  of  the  Heniochi  and  Macheloni,  and 
gifts  were  sent  him  in  return  for  those  which  his 
envoys  had  brought  to  Trajan.  A  new  king  was 
given  to  the  Albanians.  Alliances  were  concluded 
with  the  Iberi,  Sauromatae,  Colchi,  and  even  with  the 
distant  tribes  sett.ed  on  the  Cimmerian  Bosphorus. 
These  names  recalled  to  the  Romans  the  glorious 
times  of  the  great  Pompey,  and  made  it  evident  to 
them  that  Roman  influence  was  now  paramount  in 
the  entire  region  between  the  Caucasus,  the  Caspian, 
and  the  Araxes. 

Still,  the  Emperor  viewed  what  he  had  achieved 
as  a  mere  prelude  to  what  he  was  bent  on  achieving. 
It  was  Parthia,  not  Armenia,  against  which  his  ex- 
pedition had  been  really  aimed.  Accordingly,  having 
arranged  matters  in  the  north-east,  and  left  garrisons 
in  the  principal  Armenian  strongholds,  he  made  a 
counter-movement  towards  the  south-west,  on  which 
side  Parthia  seemed  to  him  most  assailable.  Station- 
ing himself  at  Edessa,  the  capital  of  the  province  of 
Osrhoene,  which  was  still  administered  by  a  Parthian 


306  CHOSROES   AND    TRAJAN. 

vassal,  bearing  the  usual  name  of  Abgarus,  he  partly 
terrified,  partly  coaxed,  that  shifty  prince  into  sub- 
mission, after  which  he  entered  into  negotiations  with 
Sporaces,  phylarch  of  Anthemusia,  Mannus,  an 
Arabian  chieftain,  and  Manisares,  a  Parthian  satrap, 
who  had  a  quarrel  of  his  own  with  Chosroes.  Having 
drawn  these  chiefs  to  his  side,  he  commenced  his 
attack  on  the  great  Parthian  kingdom  by  a  double 
movement.  Part  of  his  troops  marched  southward, 
by  the  route  which  Crassus  had  followed,  and  made 
themselves  masters  of  the  tract  known  as  Anthemusia, 
or  that  between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Khabour  ;  part 
proceeded  eastward  against  Batnae,  Nisibis,  and 
Gordyene,  or  the  country  of  the  Kurds.  No  serious 
resistance  was  offered  to  the  invaders  on  either  route. 
Chosroes  had  withdrawn  his  forces  to  the  further  side 
of  the  Tigris,  and  left  the  defence  of  the  provinces  to 
his  vassals,  who  wyere  for  the  most  part  too  weak  to 
venture  on  opposing  the  march  of  a  well-appointed 
Roman  army.  By  the  end  of  the  year  the  whole  tract 
between  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  as  far  south  as 
the  town  of  Singara  and  the  modern  range  of  Sinjar, 
had  been  overrun,  and  occupied  ;  Upper  Mesopotamia, 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term,  had  become 
Roman  ;  and  the  conqueror,  pursuing  the  system 
which  he  had  resolved  on  adopting  from  the  first, 
absorbed  the  newly  won  territory  into  the  empire 
and  made  Mesopotamia  a  Roman  province.  At 
Rome  these  successes  were  greeted  with  enthusiasm 
medals  were  struck,  on  which  the  subjected  countries 
were  represented  as  prostrate  under  the  foot  of  their 
conqueror,  and  the  Senate  conferred  on  him  the  titles, 


TRAJAN    INVADES   PARTHIA.  307 

which    now  appear  upon  his  coins,  of  "  Armeniacus  " 
and  "  Parthicus." 

As  winter  approached,  the  Emperor  quitted  his 
army,  and  retired  to  Edessa  or  Antioch,  leaving  his 
generals  to  maintain  possession  of  the  conquered 
regions,  and  giving  them  very  special  instructions 
with  respect  to  the  preparations  that  they  were  to 
make  for  the  campaign  of  the  ensuing  year.  As 
Trajan  had  resolved  not  to  attempt  the  passage 
through  the  desert  which  intervenes  between  the 
Sinjar  range  and  Babylonia,  the  crossing  of  the 
Tigris  would  be  the  first  important  operation  to  be 
accomplished.  But  the  banks  of  the  Tigris  were,  as 
Trajan  knew,  very  deficient  in  "wood,  or  at  any  rate 
in  wood  suitable  for  the  construction  of  such  boats 
as  were  required  for  the  building  of  a  bridge 
across  the  river.  He  therefore  gave  orders  that, 
during  the  winter,  a  large  fleet  should  be  prepared  at 
Nisibis,  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  where  timber 
was  excellent  and  abundant,  so  constructed  that  the 
vessels  could  be  readily  taken  to  pieces  and  put 
together  again.  These,  when  the  spring  came,  were 
conveyed  in  waggons  to  the  western  bank  of  the 
Tigris,  probably  at  the  point  where  it  debouches  from 
the  mountains  upon  the  low  country,  a  little  above 
Jezireh.  Trajan  and  his  army  accompanied  them, 
meeting  with  no  resistance  until  they  reached  the 
river  and  began  their  preparations  for  passing  it. 
Then,  however,  the  inhabitants  of  the  opposite  bank 
— not  disciplined  soldiers,  but  brave  mountaineers 
—gathered  together  in  force,  to  dispute  the  passage. 
It   was  only  by  launching  a  number  of  his  boats  at 


308  CHOSROES   AND    TRAJAN. 

different  points,  laden  with  companies  of  heavy-armed 
and  archers,  which  advanced  into  mid-stream  and 
engaged  the  enemy,  while  at  the  same  time  they 
threatened  to  land  at  many  different  points,  that 
Trajan  was  able,  slowly  and  with  difficulty,  to  com- 
plete his  construction,  and  finally  bridge  the  river. 
His  troops  then  effected  their  passage,  the  enemy 
dispersing  ;  and  the  Emperor  rapidly  overran  the 
whole  of  the  rich  country  of  Adiabene,  between  the 
river  and  the  hills,  occupying  in  succession  Nineveh, 
Arbela,  and  Gaugamela,  and  nowhere  meeting  with 
any  resistance.  Chosroes  remained  aloof,  waiting  till 
he  had  drawn  his  enemy  further  away  from  his  base 
of  operations,  and  nursing  his  own  resources.  Mebar- 
sapes,  the  vitaxa  or  subject-king  of  Adiabene,  who 
had  hoped  to  be  able  to  defend  the  line  of  the  Tigris, 
finding  that  forced,  appears  to  have  despaired,  and 
withdrew  from  the  struggle.  One  after  another  the 
forts  and  strongholds  of  the  district  were  taken  and 
occupied.  Adenystrae,  a  place  of  great  strength,  was 
captured  by  a  small  knot  of  Roman  prisoners,  who, 
when  they  found  their  friends  near,  rose  upon  the 
garrison,  killed  the  commandant,  and  opened  the 
gates  to  their  countrymen.  In  a  few  weeks  all 
Adiabene,  the  heart  of  the  ancient  Assyria,  was 
conquered  ;  and  a  third  province  was  added  to  the 
empire. 

It  might  now  have  been  expected  that  the  Roman 
army  would  advance  directly  upon  Ctesiphon.  The 
way  was  open  ;  and  Trajan  might  well  have  antici- 
pated, as  Napoleon  did  in  1812,  that  the  capture  of 
the  enemy's  main   capital  would    conclude    the  war. 


THE   ROMANS   OCCUPY   CTESIPHON.  309 

But  for  reasons  that  are  not  made  clear  to  us,  the 
Emperor  determined  otherwise.  Having  repassed  the 
Tigris  into  Mesopotamia,  he  took  Hatra,  one  of  the 
most  considerable  towns  of  the  Middle  Mesopotamia!! 
region,  and,  crossing  to  the  Euphrates,  visited  the 
bitumen  pits  at  Hit,  so  famous  in  the  world's  history, 
whence  the  march  was  easy  to  Babylon.  As  still  no 
enemy  showed  himself,  Babylon  was  approached,  in- 
vested, and  taken — so  far  as  appears — without  a  blow 
being  struck.  Seleucia  soon  afterwards  submitted  ; 
and  it  only  remained  to  attack  and  reduce  the  capital 
in  order  to  have  complete  possession  of  the  entire 
region  watered  by  the  two  rivers.  Here  a  fleet  was 
again  needful  ;  and  Trajan,  accordingly,  transported 
the  flotilla,  which  he  had  taken  care  to  have  in  readi- 
ness on  the  Euphrates,  across  the  narrow  tract  be- 
tween the  streams  in  N.  lat.  330,  on  rollers,  and 
launched  it  upon  the  Tigris.  He  was  prepared  for  a 
vigorous  resistance,  but  once  more  found  himself 
unopposed.  Ctesiphon  opened  its  gates  to  him. 
Chosroes  had  some  time  previously  evacuated  it,  with 
his  family  and  his  chief  treasures,  withdrawing  further 
into  the  interior  of  his  vast  empire,  and  seeking  to 
weary  out  his  assailant  by  means  of  distance,  natural 
obstacles,  and  guerilla  warfare.  The  tactics  pursued 
resemble  those  which  have  not  uncommonly  been 
adopted  by  a  comparatively  weak  enemy  when 
attacked  by  superior  force,  and  remind  us  of  the 
method  by  which  Idanthyrsus  successfully  defended 
Scythia  against  Darius  Hystaspis  in  the  sixth  century 
B.C.,  and  by  which  the  Russian  Alexander  baffled  the 
Great  Napoleon  in  the  days  of  our  own  fathers  or  grand- 


3IO  CHOSROES   AND    TRAJAX. 

fathers.  But  Trajan  may  be  excused  if  he  took  his 
enemy's  retreat  for  entire  withdrawal  from  the  contest, 
and  the  apathy  of  the  Western  provinces  for  the 
complete  submission  of  the  empire.  Ctesiphon  was 
his  ;  Babylon  was  his  ;  Susa,  the  old  capital  of  the 
Achaemenidae,  was  his  ;  the  war  might  be  regarded 
as  over  ;  and  so,  not  troubling  himself  to  pursue  his 
flying  foe  into  the  remote  and  barbarous  regions  of 
the  far  East,  he  proceeded  to  enjoy  his  triumph, 
embarked  on  a  pleasure  voyage  down  the  Tigris,  and 
even  launched  his  bark  upon  the  waters  of  the 
Persian  Gulf.  The  career  of  Alexander  the  Great 
presented  itself  vividly  to  his  imagination  ;  and  he 
sighed  to  think  that,  at  his  age,  he  could  not  hope 
to  reach  the  limits  which  had  been  attained  by  the 
Macedonian.  He  instituted  inquiries,  however,  with 
respect  to  India,  and  may  have  contemplated  sending 
an  expedition  there,  when  he  had  had  time  to  settle 
and  arrange  his  Parthian  conquests,  and  to  place 
Mesopotamian  affairs  on  a  satisfactory  footing.  No 
suspicion  seems  to  have  crossed  his  mind  that  the 
conquests  which  he  had  so  rapid ly  effected  were 
insecure — no  prevision  of  coming  trouble  appears 
to  have  disturbed  his  self-complacency.  In  a  fool's 
paradise  he  dreamed  away  the  closing  weeks  of  the 
summer  of  A.D.  116,  and  was  still  lazily  floating  on 
the  waters  of  the  Southern  Sea,  when  intelligence  of 
a  startling  character  was  suddenly  brought  to  him. 

Revolt  had  broken  out  in  his  rear.  At  Seleucia,  at 
Hatra,  at  Nisibis,  at  Edessa,  the  natives  had  flown  to 
arms,  had  ejected  the  Roman  garrisons  from  their  cities, 
or  in  some  instances  massacred  them.     His  whole  line 


REVOLTS   IN   THE   EMPERORS    REAR.  311 

of  retreat  was  beset  by  foes,  and  he  ran  a  great  risk 
of  having  his  return  cut  off,  and  of  perishing  in  the 
distant  region  which  he  had  invaded.  The  occasion 
called  for  the  most  active  exertions  and  for  the 
greatest  energy  ;  fortunately  for  the  Romans,  Trajan 
was  equal  to  it.  Personally,  he  hastened  northwards, 
while  he  issued  peremptory  orders  to  his  generals  that 
they  should  everywhere  take  the  most  active  measures 
against  the  rebels,  and  do  their  utmost  to  check  the 
spread  of  insurrection.  The  chastisement  of  Seleucia 
was  intrusted  to  Erucius  Clarus  and  Julius  Alexander, 
who  stormed  the  city,  and  ruthlessly  delivered  it  to 
the  flames.  Lucius  Quietus  succeeded  in  recovering 
Nisibis,  and  punished  its  rebellion  in  the  same  way. 
He  also  plundered  and  burnt  Edessa.  Maximus, 
however,  one  of  Trajan's  most  trusted  officers,  on 
coming  to  an  engagement  with  the  enemy,  was  de- 
feated and  slain.  A  Roman  army  with  its  legate  was 
cut  to  pieces.  Trajan  himself,  having  returned  to 
Ctesiphon,  and  made  himself  acquainted  with  the 
whole  condition  of  affairs,  woke  up  from  his  dream  of 
an  easy  conquest,  and  saw  that  a  complete  change  of 
policy  was  necessary.  Parthia  must  not  be  treated 
like  Armenia  and  Mesopotamia — its  people  must  be 
humoured  and  conciliated.  A  native  king  and  a 
show  of  independence  must  be  allowed  them.  Ac- 
cordingly, he  selected  a  certain  Parthamaspates,  a 
man  of  Arsacid  descent,  who  had  embraced  the 
side  of  Rome  in  the  recent  struggle,  and  summoning 
the  Parthians  of  the  capital  and  its  neighbourhood  to 
a  great  meeting  in  a  plain  near  Ctesiphon,  he  pro- 
duced before  them  the  individual  whom  he  favoured, 


312  CHOSROltS   AND    TRAJAN. 

commended  him  to  their  loyal  affection  in  a  speech  of 
considerable  length,  and,  after  magnifying  somewhat 
injudiciously  the  splendour  of  his  own  achievements, 
placed  the  diadem  with  his  own  hand  upon  his  brow. 
He  then  commenced  his  retreat.  Taking  the  direct 
line  through  Mesopotamia,  he  marched,  in  the  first 
instance,  upon  Hatra,  one  of  the  towns  which  had  re- 
volted from  him,  and  had  not  yet  been  reduced.  The 
place  was  small,  but  strongly  fortified.  It  lay  in  the 
desert  between  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates,  nearer  to 
the  former,  and  was  protected,  by  the  scantiness  of  its 
water,  and  the  unproductiveness  of  the  region  around, 
from  attack  except  by  a  small  force.  Trajan  battered 
down  a  portion  of  the  wall,  and  attempted  to  enter  by 
the  breach  ;  but  his  troops  met  with  a  decided  repulse, 
and  he  himself,  having  rashly  approached  too  near 
the  walls,  was  in  the  greatest  danger  of  being  wounded. 
The  horseman  nearest  to  him  was  actually  struck  by 
an  arrow  and  slain.  After  this  the  siege  did  not  last 
long.  As  autumn  approached  the  weather  broke  up, 
and  thunderstorms  prevailed,  with  rain  and  violent 
hail.  It  was  believed  that  whenever  the  Romans 
proceeded  to  the  assault,  the  fury  of  the  elemental 
war  increased  in  severity.  Moreover,  a  plague  of 
insects  set  in.  Gnats  and  flies  disputed  with  the 
soldiers  every  morsel  of  their  food  and  every  drop  of 
their  drink.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Emperor 
felt  compelled  to  relinquish  the  siege  and  beat  a  re- 
treat. He  retired  through  Mesopotamia  upon  Syria, 
and  took  up  his  quarters  at  Antioch,  having  suffered, 
it  would  seem,1  considerable  loss  upon  the  way.     At 

1  So  Fronto,  "  Princip.  Hist."  p.  338. 


RETREAT  AND   DEATH   OF   TRAJAN.  313 

Antioch  the  effects  of  his  heavy  toils  and  exertions 
began  to  show  themselves.  He  fell  sick,  and  quitting 
his  army,  made  an  attempt  to  reach  Rome,  but  suc- 
cumbed to  his  malady  before  he  had  proceeded  very 
far,  and  died  at  Selinus,  in  Cilicia,  August,  A.D.  117. 

On  the  retirement  of  Trajan,  the  Parthian  monarch, 
quitting  Media,  returned  to  Ctesiphon,  expelled 
Parthamaspates  without  difficulty,  and  re-established 
his  own  rule  over  the  regions  which  Trajan  had  over- 
run, but  had  not  reduced  into  the  form  of  provinces. 
Armenia,  however,  Upper  Mesopotamia,  and  Assyria, 
or  Adiabene,  were  still  held  in  force  by  the  Romans, 
and  might  probably  have  been  maintained  against 
any  attack  that  Parthia  could  have  made,  had  the 
new  Emperor,  Hadrian,  who  had  succeeded  Trajan, 
regarded  their  retention  as  desirable.  But  Hadrian, 
who,  as  prefect  of  Syria,  had  been  a  near  witness  of 
Trajan's  campaigns,  and  possessed  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  the  general  condition  of  the  East, 
was  deeply  convinced  that  the  attempt  of  Trajan  had 
been  a  mistake,  and  that  the  true  policy  for  Rome 
was  that  laid  down  in  principle  by  Augustus — that 
the  possession:  of  the  empire  should  not  be  extended 
beyond  their  natural  and  traditional  limits.  He  re- 
solved, therefore,  to  withdraw  the  Roman  legions  once 
more  within  the  Euphrates,  and  to  relinquish  the 
newly-conquered  provinces,  of  which  so  great  a  boast 
had  been  made — Armenia,  Mesopotamia,  Adiabene. 
It  is  generally  allowed  by  modern  historians,  that  the 
resolution  was  a  wise  one.  "  There  was  no  soil  be- 
yond the  Euphrates,"  says  Dean  Merivale  with  excel- 
lent judgment,  "in  which  Roman  institutions  could 


314         TRAJAN'S   CONQUESTS   RELINQUISHED. 

take  root,  while  the  expense  of  maintaining  them 
would  have  been  utterly  exhausting."  1  As  far  as 
the  Euphrates  Greek  colonisation  had  so  leavened 
the  original  Asiatic  mass  as  to  render  it  semi- Euro- 
pean, and  so  to  prepare  it  to  a  large  extent  for  the 
reception  of  Roman  ideas  and  Roman  principles  of 
government  :  beyond,  the  Greek  infusion  had  been 
too  weak  to  produce  much  effect — Orientalism  pure 
prevailed — and  Western  institutions,  if  introduced, 
would  have  found  themselves  in  an  alien  soil,  where 
they  could  only  have  withered  and  died.  Even  apart 
from  this,  the  Roman  Empire  was  already  so  large  as 
to  be  unwieldy,  and  to  endanger  its  continued  cohesion. 
The  chiefs  of  provinces  east  of  the  Euphrates  would 
have  been  so  far  removed  from  the  seat  of  government 
as  to  be  practically  exempt  from  effectual  control  and 
supervision.  They  would  have  had  enormous  forces 
in  men  and  money  at  their  command,  and  have  been 
under  a  perpetual  temptation  to  revolt  and  endeavour 
to  secure  for  themselves  an  independent  position.  The 
garrisoning,  moreover,  of  such  extensive  countries 
would  have  been  a  severe  drain  upon  the  military 
resources  of  the  empire,  and  would  have  exercised  a 
demoralising  influence  upon  the  soldiery,  such  as  was 
already  felt  to  some  extent  with  regard  to  the  legions 
quartered  in  Syria.  Altogether,  it  is  clear  that  the 
course  pursued  by  Hadrian  in  contracting  once  more 
the  eastern  limits  of  the  empire  was  a  prudent  one, 
and  entitles  the  prince  who  adopted  it,  not  only  to  the 
praise  of  "  moderation,"  but  to  that  of  political  insight 
and  sagacity. 

1  "  Roman  Empire,"  vol.  viii.  p.  192. 


CHOSROES   AND   HADRIAN.  3I5 

The  evacuation  of  the  conquered  countries  brought 
about  a  return  to  the  condition  of  things  in  the  East 
which  had  prevailed  ever  since  the  time  of  Augustus. 
Rome  and  Parthia  resumed  their  ancient  boundaries. 
Armenia  reverted  to  its  old  condition  of  a  kingdom 
nominally  independent,  but  too  weak  to  stand  alone, 
and  necessarily  leaning  on  external  support,  at  one 
time  practically  dependent  on  Rome,  at  another  on 
Parthia.  Its  first  ruler,  after  it  ceased  to  be  a  Roman 
province,  was  Parthamaspates,  to  whom  Hadrian 
seems  to  have  handed  it  over,  and  in  whose  appoint- 
ment Chosroes  must  have  acquiesced.  Chosroes  could 
not  but  be  well  disposed  towards  the  ruler  who,  with- 
out being  compelled  to  do  so  by  a  defeat,  had  restored 
to  Parthia  the  two  most  important  and  valuable  of  her 
provinces  ;  and  the  consolidation  of  his  power  in  them 
probably  gave  him  ample  occupation,  and  made  him 
satisfied  to  have  a  time  of  repose  from  external 
troubles.  He  seems  to  have  continued  on  friendly 
terms  with  Hadrian  during  the  remainder  of  his  life. 
Once  only,  in  A.D.  122,  was  the  good  understanding 
threatened.  The  exact  causes  of  complaint  have  not 
come  down  to  us  ;  but  it  appears  that^  in  that  year 
rumours  of  an  intended  Parthian  invasion  reached  the 
Emperor,  and  induced  him  to  make  a  journey  to  the 
far  East,  in  order,  by  his  personal  influence  and  as- 
surances, to  avert  the  danger.  An  interview  was  held 
between  the  two  monarchs  upon  the  frontier,  and  ex- 
planations were  given  and  received,  which  both  parties 
regarded  as  satisfactory  The  Parthian  prince  gave  up 
his  intention  of  troubling  the  peace  of  Rome,  and  the 
two  empires  continued,  not  only  during  the  rest  of  the 


316 


LATER  YEARS   OF   CHOSROES. 


reign  of  Chosroes,  but  till  some  time  after  the  death 
of  Hadrian,  on  terms  of  friendship  and  amity.  Hadrian 
went  so  far  as  to  restore  to  Chosroes  (about  A.D.  130)  a 
daughter  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  at  Susa  by  the 
generals  of  Trajan  fourteen  years  before,  and  had  re- 
mained at  Rome  in  captivity  ;  and  he  is  even  said  to 
have  promised  the  restoration  of  the  golden  throne 


COINS   OF  VOLOGASES   II. 


COIN   OF   MITHRIDATES   IV.        COIN   OF   ARTABANUS   IV. 

captured  at  the  same  time,  on  which  the  Parthians  set 
a  special  value. 

Chosroes,  during  his  later  years,  had  to  contend 
with  a  pretender  to  his  throne,  who  bore  the  name,  so 
common  at  this  time,  of  Vologases.  The  Parthian 
empire  showed,  more  and  more  as  time  went  on,  a 
tendency  to  disintegration  ;  and  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that,  during  the  space  commonly  assigned  to 
Chosroes  (A.D.   108-130),  different  monarchs  reigned, 


TROUBLES    CAUSED    BY   PRETENDERS. 


3*7 


not  infrequently,  in  different  parts  of  Parthia  at  the 
same  time.  The  coins  of  Vologases  II.  run  parallel 
for  many  years  with  those  of  Chosroes.  A  coin  of  a 
Mithridates,  and  another  of  an  Artabanus,  fall  into 
the  same  interval.  The  classical  writers  make  no 
mention  of  these  rival  kings  ;  and  the  native  remains 
are  so  scanty  that  it  is  impossible  to  draw  any  con- 
tinuous narrative  from  them.  We  can  only  say, 
generally,  that  Parthia  has  entered  the  period  of  her 
decadence,  and  that,  even  apart  from  foreign  attack, 
she  would,  if  left  to  herself,  have  probably  expired 
within  little  more  than  a  century. 


XIX. 

VOLOGASES    II.   AND   ANTONINUS    PIUS — VOLOGASES 
III.   AND   VERUS. 


The  Vologases  who  had  for  so  many  years  dis- 
puted the  crown  with  Chosroes,  appears,  on  the 
decease  of  the  latter,  to  have  been  generally  ac- 
knowledged as  king.  He  was  an  aged  prince,  in- 
disposed to  any  unnecessary  exertion,  and  quite 
content  to  continue  on  the  friendly  terms  with  Rome 
which  had  been  established  under  his  predecessor. 
He  had  not,  however,  been  settled  more  than  three 
years  upon  the  throne,  when  hostilities  came  upon 
him  from  an  unexpected  quarter.  Pharasmanes,  who 
enjoyed  the  sovereignty  of  Iberia  under  Roman  pro- 
tection, but  chafed  at  his  dependent  position,  and  had 
private  grounds  of  quarrel  with  Hadrian,  in  the  year 
A.D.  133,  suddenly  threw  the  whole  of  the  East  into 
a  blaze.  Inviting  into  Asia  a  great  horde  of  the 
northern  barbarians  from  the  tracts  beyond  the  Cau- 
casus, he  induced  them  to  precipitate  themselves  upon 
Armenia,  Cappadocia,  and  Media  Atropatene,  which 
was  once  more  a  dependency  of  Parthia,  and  to  carry 
fire  and  sword  into  the  midst  of  those  fertile  regions. 
Vologases  at  once  complained  to  Rome  of  the  injury 

3'8 


REIGN   OF    VOLOGASES  II.  319 

done  him  by  her  feudatory,  and  requested  assistance  ; 
but  Hadrian  regarded  troubles  in  so  distant  a  region  as 
unimportant,  and,  satisfied  that  Cappadocia  would  be 
sufficiently  protected  by  its  governor,  who  was  Arrian, 
the  historian  of  Alexander,  he  left  Vologases  to 
struggle  with  his  difficulties  as  he  best  might.  The 
aged  monarch,  under  these  circumstances,  had  recourse 
to  an  expedient  at  once  impolitic  and  disgraceful — 
he  bribed  the  horde  of  Alans,  which  had  invaded  his 
province,  to  quit  the  country,  and  turn  their  arms  in 
another  direction.  Such  a  policy,  though  occasionally 
adopted  by  the  Romans  themselves,  can  never  be 
other  than  mistaken  and  ruinous.  Once  entered 
upon,  it  is  almost  certain  to  be  continued,  and  to  bring 
about  at  once  the  exhaustion  and  the  degradation  of 
the  people  that  condescends  to  it. 

It  is  not  perhaps  surprising  that  Hadrian,  always 
studious  of  peace,  abstained  from  taking  any  active 
part  in  the  Alanic  war  ;  but  it  certainly  seems  strange 
that,  instead  of  inflicting  any  punishment  on  Pharas- 
manes  for  his  reckless  action  in  introducing  the  bar- 
barians into  Asia,  and  actually  letting  them  loose 
upon  the  empire,  he  should  have  shortly  afterwards 
loaded  him  with  honours  and  benefits.  He  summoned 
him  indeed  to  Rome,  to  answer  for  his  conduct,  but, 
having  done  this,  accepted  his  explanations,  condoned 
his  crimes,  and  not  only  so,  but  rewarded  him  by  an 
enlargement  of  his  dominion,  and  by  various  other 
marks  of  favour.  He  permitted  him  to  sacrifice  in 
the  Capitol,  placed  his  equestrian  statue  in  the  temple 
of  Bellona,  and  was  present  at  a  sham  fight  in  which 
the   Iberian   monarch,  his  son,  and   his  chief  nobles 


320   VOLOGASES   II.    AND    ANTONINUS   PIUS. 

exhibited  their  skill  and  prowess.  It  is  not  likely 
that  Vologases  can  have  been  much  pleased  at  these 
results  of  his  complaints  ;  but  he  seems  to  have  sub- 
mitted to  them  without  a  murmur  ;  and,  when  Hadrian 
died  (in  A.D.  138),  and  was  succeeded  by  his  adopted 
son,  Titus  Aurelius,  better  known  as  Antoninus  Pius, 
he  sent  to  Rome  an  embassy  of  congratulation,  and 
presented  his  Roman  brother  with  a  crown  of  gold. 
The  medal,  which  records  this  event,  was  struck  in 
the  first  year  of  Antoninus,  and  exhibits  on  the 
reverse  a  female  figure  holding  a  bow  and  quiver  in 
the  left  hand,  and  with  the  right  presenting  a  crown, 
while  underneath  is  the  inscription,  PARTHIA. 

Having  thus,  as  he  thought,  secured  the  good-will 
of  the  new  monarch  by  a  well-timed  compliment, 
Vologases  ventured  on  intruding  upon  him  with  an 
unpleasant  demand.  Hadrian,  in  a  moment  of  weak- 
ness, had  promised  that  the  golden  throne,  captured 
by  Trajan  in  his  great  expedition,  should  be  given 
back  to  its  proper  owners  ;  but,,  finding  that  the  act 
would  be  unpalatable  to  his  subjects,  had  delayed  the 
performance  of  his  promise,  and  finally  died  without 
giving  effect  to  it.  Vologases  hoped  that  his  successor 
might  be  more  accommodating,  and  instructed  his 
envoys  to  bring  the  matter  before  Antoninus,  to 
remind  him  of  Hadrian's  pledged  word,  and  make  a 
formal  request  for  the  delivery  to  them  of  the  much- 
prized  relic.  But  Antonine  was  as  much  averse  to 
relinquishing  the  trophy  as  his  predecessor  had  been, 
and  positively  refused  to  grant  the  request  made  of 
him.  The  envoys  had  to  return  re  iufecta,  and  to 
report  to  their  master  that,  for  the   present  at  any 


ACCESSION   OF    VOLOGASES  III.  321 

rate,  all  hope  must  be  laid  aside  of  recovering  the 
emblem  of  Arsacid  sovereignty. 

The  remainder  of  the  reign  of  Vologases  II.  was 
tranquil  and  unmarked  by  any  striking  incident.  No 
pretensions  were  put  forward  by  the  Parthians  with 
respect  to  Armenia,  to  which,  probably  on  the  death 
Parthamaspates,  Rome  was  suffered,  without  protest, 
to  appoint  a  new  monarch.  No  further  attempt  was 
made  to  obtain  the  surrender  of  the  "  golden  throne." 
The  coolness  between  the  two  states,  which  had 
followed  on  Antonine's  rejection  of  the  demand  pre- 
ferred by  Vologases,  merely  tended  to  keep  the  rival 
powers  apart,  and  to  prevent  occasions  of  collision, 
while  Antonine's  truly  peaceful  policy  preserved 
Parthia  even  from  internal  disturbance,  and  allowed 
the  successor  of  Chosroes  to  enjoy  his  throne,  un- 
threatened  by  any  pretender,  for  the  comparatively 
long  term  of  nineteen  years  (A.D.  130  to  149).  The 
aged  monarch  left  his  crown  to  a  successor  of  the 
same  name  as  himself,  who  was  probably  his  son, 
though  of  this  there  is  no  direct  evidence. 

The  third  Vologases  ascended  the  Parthian  throne 
either  in  A.D.  148  or  149.  He  took  the  same  titles  as  his 
predecessor, but  added  to  them, upon  his  coins,a  Semitic 
legend — either  &ota  imb)>  "  Vologases,  King,"  or  •>l,,3^i 
Nsta  p^£  -|ens,  "  Volagases,  Arsaces,  King  of  Kings." 
The  dates  on  his  coins  extend  from  A.D.  148-9  to 
A.D.  1 90- 1,  showing  that  he  held  the  throne  for  the 
long  space  of  forty-two  years.  During  the  earlier 
portion  of  the  time  (A.D.  148-161)  he  was  contemporary 
with  Antoninus  Pius,  and,  though  discontented  with 
the  exclusion  of  Parthia  from  all  influence  in  Armenia, 


322  VOLOGASES   III.   AND    VERUS. 

and  meditating  a  war  with  Rome  on  this  account,  he 
suffered  himself  to  be  persuaded,  by  letters  from  the 
pacific  Emperor,  to  keep  the  peace  as  long  as  he 
occupied  the  Imperial  throne,  and  to  defer  his  con- 
templated outbreak  until  the  reign  of  his  successor. 
On  the  death  of  Antoninus,  however,  he  was  not 
further  to  be  restrained,  but  at  once  took  the  field,  and 
marching  an  army  suddenly  into  Armenia,  carried 
all  before  him,  expelled  Soasmus,  Rome's  vassal  and 
creature,  from  the  kingdom,  and  placed  upon  the 
throne  a  protege  of  his  own,  a  certain  Tigranes,  a  scion 


COIN   OF   VOI.OGASES   III. 


of  the  old  royal  stock,  whose  name  recalled  to  the 
Armenians  the  period  of  their  greatest  glory.  The 
Roman  governors  of  the  adjacent  provinces  learnt  with 
surprise  and  alarm  that  Armenia  was  detached  from 
the  empire  ;  and  Severianus,  prefect  of  Cappadocia, 
the  nearest  to  the  scene  of  action,  and  a  man  of  an 
impetuous  disposition,  being  a  Gaul  by  birth,  hurried 
to  the  scene  at  the  head  of  a  single  legion,  partly 
moved  by  his  own  hot  temper,  partly  yielding  to  the 
persuasions  of  a  pseudo-prophet  of  those  parts  named 
Alexander,  who  promised  him  a  signal  victory.     But 


ARMENIA    SEIZED    BY    VOLOGASES.  323 

the  result  signally  falsified  the  prophecy.  Scarcely 
had  Severianus  crossed  the  Euphrates  into  Armenia, 
when  he  found  himself  in  the  presence  of  a  superior 
force  under  the  command  of  a  Parthian  general  called 
Chosroes,  and  was  under  the  necessity  of  throwing 
himself  into  the  city  of  Elegeia,  where  he  was  immedi- 
ately besieged  and  blockaded.  Though  he  offered  a 
strenuous  resistance,  it  was  unavailing.  His  troops 
were  not  of  good  quality,  and,  unable  to  break  through 
the  cordon  which  surrounded  them,  they  were  in  a 
short  time  shot  down  by  the  Parthian  archers,  and 
perished  almost  to  a  man.  Severianus  shared  their 
fate  ;  and  the  Parthians  obtained  a  success  which  was 
paralleled  with  that  of  Surenas  against  Crassus,  or  of 
Arminius  against  Varus.  Their  mastery  over  Armenia 
was  confirmed,  and  the  Roman  provinces  were  laid 
wholly  open  to  their  attacks.  Their  squadrons  crossed 
the  Euphrates,  and  marched  into  Syria,  where  they 
obtained  a  second  success.  L.  Attidius  Cornelianus, 
the  proconsul,  gathered  together  the  forces  of  his 
province,  and  gave  battle  to  the  invaders,  but  was 
repulsed.  The  situation  became  nearly  such  as  had 
obtained  after  the  defeat  of  Crassus,  or  when  Pacorus 
and  Labienus,  in  the  year  B.C.  40,  carried  ravage 
and  ruin  over  the  region  between  the  Euphrates  and 
the  Orontes.  The  Parthians  passed  from  Syria  into 
Palestine,  and  the  whole  of  the  Roman  East  seemed 
to  lie  open  to  them.  Intelligence  of  what  had 
happened  was  rapidly  carried  to  Rome,  and  threw 
the  Senate  into  consternation.  Aurelius  felt  that  he 
could  not  be  spared  from  Italy,  but  deputed  Verus  to 
represent  him  in  the  East,  and  bade  him  hasten  to  the 


324  VOLOGASES   III.    AND    VERUS. 

scene  of  action  with  such  forces  as  could  be  gathered. 
Verus,  however,  was  a  lover  of  pleasure.  First  he 
loitered  on  his  way  in  Apulia,  then  proceeded  at  a 
leisurely  pace  to  Syria,  finally  settled  himself  in  the 
luxurious  Antioch,  and,  giving  himself  up  to  its 
pleasures  and  amusements,  handed  over  the  cares  of 
war  to  his  lieutenants.  Fortunately  for  Rome,  there 
were  among  these  several  generals  of  the  antique  type, 
as  especially  Statius  Priscus,  Avidius  Cassius,  and 
Martius  Verus.  Cassius,  even  before  the  arrival  of 
Verus  and  his  army,  had  begun  an  effective  resistance. 
He  had,  by  almost  incredible  efforts,  brought  the 
Syrian  legions  into  a  state  of  order  and  discipline,  had 
with  them  checked  the  advance  of  Vologases,  and  had 
finally  found  himself  in  a  condition  to  take  the 
offensive.  In  A.D.  163  he  fought  a  great  battle  with 
the  Parthians,  defeated  them,  and  drove  them  across 
the  Euphrates.  Meanwhile,  Statius  Priscus  and 
Martius  Verus  had  undertaken  the  recovery  of 
Armenia.  Statius  had  advanced  without  a  check 
from  the  frontier  to  the  capital,  Artaxata,  had  taken 
the  city,  and  burnt  it  to  the  ground,  after  which  he 
built  a  new  city,  which  he  strongly  garrisoned  with 
Roman  troops,  and  sent  intelligence  to  Rome  that 
Armenia  was  now  ready  to  welcome  back  her  expelled 
prince,  Soaemus.  Soaemus  upon  this  returned,  and, 
though  some  further  disturbances  were  made  by  the 
anti-Roman  party,  yet  these  were  successfully  dealt 
with,  chiefly  by  Martius  Verus,  and,  in  a  short  time, 
the  Roman  nominee  was  recognised  as  undisputed 
king,  and  the  entire  country  brought  into  a  state  of 
tranquillity. 


GREAT  EXPEDITION   OF  AVIDIUS   CASSIUS.     325 

The  success  which  had  attended  the  first  rush  to 
arms  of  Vologases  III.  was  thus  completely  neutralised. 
In  the  space  of  two  years  Rome  had  made  good  all 
her  losses,  and  shown  that  she  was  fully  able  to  main- 
tain the  position  in  Western  Asia  which  she  had 
acquired  by  the  victories  of  Trajan.  But  the  ambi- 
tious generals,  into  whose  hands  the  conduct  of  the 
war  had  fallen  through  the  incapacity  of  Verus,  were 
far  from  satisfied  with  the  mere  recovery  of  what  had 
been  lost.  Personal,  rather  than  patriotic,  motives 
actuated  them.  In  the  circumstances  of  the  time 
military  distinction  was  more  coveted  than  any  other, 
and  was  looked  upon  as  opening  a  path  to  the  very 
highest  honours.  The  successful  general  became,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  by  virtue  of  his  position,  a  candi- 
date for  the  Imperial  dignity.  If,  under  the  great 
Napoleon,  every  conscript  felt  that  he  carried  a 
marshal's  baton  in  his  knapsack,  still  more,  under  the 
Middle  Empire,  was  every  victorious  commander  per- 
suaded that  each  step  in  the  path  of  victory  brought 
him  sensibly  nearer  to  the  throne.  Of  all  the  officers 
engaged  in  the  Parthian  war,  nominally  under  Verus, 
the  most  capable  and  the  most  ambitious  was  Avidius 
Cassius.  Sprung  from  the  family  of  the  great 
"  Liberator,"  who  had  contended  for  the  supreme 
power  in  the  state  with  Augustus  and  Antony,  he 
had  a  hereditary  bias  towards  pushing  himself  to  the 
front,  and  might  be  counted  upon  to  let  slip  no  occa- 
sion which  fortune  should  put  in  his  way.  His  posi- 
tion in  Syria  gave  him  a  splendid  opportunity.  After 
his  first  successes  against  Vologases,  Aurelius  had 
made  him  a  sort  of  generalissimo  ;  and,  having  thus 


326  VOLOGASES   III.    AND    VERUS. 

perfect  freedom  of  action,  he  resolved  to  carry  the  war 
into  the  enemy's  country,  and  see  if  he  could  not  rival, 
or  even  outdo,  the  achievements  of  Trajan  half  a 
century  earlier.  No  continuous  history  of  his  cam- 
paign has  reached  our  time,  but  from  the  fragmentary 
notices  of  it  which  are  still  extant  we  may  gather  a 
good  general  idea  of  its  course  and  character.  Cross- 
ing the  Euphrates  into  Mesopotamia  at  Zeugma,  the 
most  important  of  the  Roman  stations  upon  the  river, 
he  proceeded  first  to  Nicephorium,  near  the  junction 
of  the  Belik  with  the  Euphrates,  and  thence  made  his 
way  down  the  course  of  the  stream  to  Sura  (probably 
Sippara)  and  Babylon.  At  Sura  a  battle  was  fought, 
in  which  the  Romans  were  victorious,  but  it  was  after 
this  that  the  great  successes  took  place  which  covered 
Cassius  with  glory.  The  vast  city  of  Seleucia  upon 
the  Tigris,  which  had  at  the  time  a  population  of 
four  hundred  thousand  souls,  was  besieged,  taken,  and 
burnt,  to  punish  an  alleged  treason  of  the  inhabitants. 
Ctesiphon,  upon  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river, 
the  summer  residence  of  the  Parthian  kings,  was 
occupied,  and  the  royal  palace  there  situated  was 
pillaged,  and  levelled  with  the  ground.  The  vari- 
ous fanes  and  temples  were  stripped  of  their 
treasures  ;  and  search  was  made  for  buried  riches 
in  all  the  places  which  were  thought  likely  to  have 
been  utilised,  the  result  being  that  an  immense 
booty  was  carried  off.  The  Parthians,  worsted  in  every 
encounter,  after  a  time,  ceased  to  resist,  and  all  the 
conquests  made  by  Trajan,  and  relinquished  by 
Hadrian,  were  recovered.  Further,  an  expedition  was 
made  into  the  Zagros  mountain  tract,  and  a  portion  of 


RESULTS    OF    THE   EXPEDITION.  327 

it,  considered  to  lie  within  the  limits  of  Media,  and 
never  yet  possessed  by  Rome,  was  occupied.  Aurelius 
owed  it  to  the  valour  and  good  fortune  of  his  general 
that  he  was  thus  entitled  to  add  to  the  epithets  of 
"  Armeniacus"  and  "  Parthicus,"  which  he  had  already 
•assumed,  the  further  and  wholly  novel  epithet  of 
"  Medicus." 

The  victories  of  Avidius  Cassius,  unlike  those  of 
Trajan,  were  followed  by  no  reverses,  and  they  had 
further  the  effect,  denied  to  Trajan's,  of  making 
the  permanent  addition  of  a  large  tract  to  the  Roman 
Empire.  When  Vologases,  after  five  years  of  un- 
successful warfare,  finally  sued  for  peace  to  his  too 
powerful  antagonist,  he  was  compelled  to  surrender,  as 
the  price  of  it,  the  extensive  and  valuable  country  of 
Western  Mesopotamia.  The  entire  region  between 
the  Euphrates  and  the  Khabour  passed  under  the 
dominion  of  Rome  at  this  time,  and  though  not 
formally  made  into  a  province,  became  wholly  lost  to 
Parthia.  The  coins  of  the  Greek  cities  within  the 
area  bear  henceforth  on  the  obverse  the  head  of  a 
Roman  Emperor,  and  on  the  reverse  some  local  token 
or  legend  ;  every  trace  of  Patthian  influence  is  removed 
from  them. 

But,  if  Rome  thus  carried  off  all  the  honours  of  the 
war  with  Vologases  III.,  still  she  did  not  escape  the 
Nemesis  which  usually  attends  upon  the  over-fortu- 
nate. During  its  stay  in  the  marshy  regions  of 
Lower  Mesopotamia,  the  army  of  Cassius  was  deeply 
infected  with  the  germs  of  a  strange  and  terrible 
malady,  which  clung  to  it  on  its  return,  and  was 
widely   disseminated    along    the    whole    line    of   the 


328  VOLOGASES    III.    AND    VERUS. 

retreat.  The  superstition  of  the  soldiers  assigned  to 
the  pestilence  a  supernatural  origin.  It  had  crept 
forth,  they  said,  from  a  subterranean  cell,  or  a  golden 
coffer,  in  the  temple  of  the  Comaean  Apollo  at 
Seleucia,  during  the  time  that  a  portion  of  the  army 
was  engaged  in  plundering  the  temple  treasures. 
Placed  there  in  primeval  times  by  the  spells  of  the 
Chaldaeans,  it  raged  with  the  more  virulence  on 
account  of  its  long  confinement,  and  amply  avenged 
the  Parthians  for  the  many  woes  inflicted  on  them  by 
Roman  hands.  Every  town  that  lay  upon  the  route 
of  the  returning  army  was  smitten  by  it ;  and  from 
these  centres  it  diverged  in  every  direction,  east  and 
west,  and  north  and  south,  into  the  adjacent  districts. 
At  Rome,  the  number  of  victims  amounted  to  tens 
of  thousands.  "  Not  the  vulgar  herd  of  the  Suburra 
only,  the  usual  victims  of  a  pestilence,  were  stricken, 
but  many  of  the  highest  rank  also  suffered." x 
According  to  Orosius,2  in  Italy  generally  the  whole 
country  was  so  devastated,  that  the  villas,  towns,  and 
fields  were  everywhere  left  without  inhabitant  or 
cultivation,  and  fell  to  ruin,  or  relapsed  into  wilder- 
nesses. The  army  suffered  especially,  and  is  said  to 
have  been  almost  annihilated.  In  the  provinces  more 
than  half  the  population  was  carried  off,  and  the 
pestilence,  overleaping  the  Alps,  spread  as  far  as  the 
Rhine  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

The  remainder  of  the  reign  of  Vologases  III.  was 
uneventful.     He   continued    to   occupy  the    Parthian 

1  Merivale,  "  Roman  Empire,"  vol.  viii.  p.  333. 
s  Paul.  Oros.,  "Hist.,"  vii.  15. 


VOLOGASES   III.   AND    COM  MODUS.  329 

throne  until  A.D.  190  or  191,  but  took  no  further  part, 
so  far  as  we  know,  in  any  military  operations.  Once 
only  does  he  seem  to  have  been  so  far  stirred  from 
his  inaction  as  to  contemplate  resuming  the  struggle 
against  his  powerful  enemy.  This  was  in  A.D.  174  or 
175,  when,  Aurelius  being  detained  upon  the  Danube, 
the  inordinate  ambition  of  Avidius  Cassius  drove  him 
into  open  rebellion,  and  the  prospect  of  a  Roman 
civil  war  seemed  to  offer  a  chance  of  Parthia  being 
able  to  reassert  herself.  But  the  opportunity  passed 
before  Vologases  could  bring  himself  to  make  any 
serious  movement.  The  revolt  of  Cassius  collapsed 
almost  as  soon  as  it  had  broken  out,  and  the  East 
returned  to  its  normal  condition.  Vologases  repented 
of  his  warlike  intention  ;  and  when  (in  A.D.  176) 
Aurelius  visited  Syria,  sent  ambassadors  to  him 
with  friendly  assurances,  who  were  received  with 
favour. 

Four  years  later  the  reign  of  the  philosophic 
Emperor  came  to  an  end  ;  and  the  Imperial  power 
passed  into  the  hands  of  his  weak  and  unworthy  son, 
Lucius  Aurelius  Commodus.  A  second  opportunity 
for  an  aggressive  movement  offered  itself ;  but,  again, 
Vologases  resisted  the  temptation  to  rush  into 
hostilities,  and  remained  passive  within  the  limits  of 
his  own  dominions.  The  reign  of  Commodus  (A.D. 
180-192)  was,  from  first  to  last,  untroubled  by  any 
Parthian  outbreak.  Vologases  was  probably  by  this 
time  an  old  man,  since  he  had  held  the  Parthian 
throne  for  thirty-two  years  when  Commodus  suc- 
ceeded his  father,  and  may  naturally  have  been  dis- 
inclined   to    further    warlike   exertion.       Rome    was 


3^> 


VOLOGASES    III.    AND    COM  MODUS. 


therefore  still  allowed  to  maintain  her  Mesopotamian 
conquests  unchallenged  ;  and  when  Vologascs  died 
(in  A.D.  190  or  191),  the  condition  of  things  continued 
as  established  by  Aurelius  in  A.D.  165. 


XX. 


VOLOGASES   IV.   AND   SEVERUS. 

The  third  Vologases  was  succeeded  by  another 
prince  of  the  same  name,  who  is  usually  regarded  as 
his  son,  though  there  is  no  distinct  evidence  of  the 
fact.  His  coins,  which  generally  present  his  full  face 
upon  their  obverse,  instead  of  the  customary  profile, 
have  dates  which  run  from  A.D.  191  to  208.  He  thus 
appears  to  have  been  contemporary  with  the  Roman 


COIN    OF    VOLOGASES    IV. 


Emperors — Commodus,  Pertinax,  Didius  Julianus, 
Pescennius  Niger,  and  Septimius  Severus.  The  great 
Parthian  war  of  Severus  fell  entirely  within  his  reign, 
and  it  is  as  the  antagonist  of  this  distinguished  prince 
that  he  is  chiefly  known  to  history. 

It  was  very  shortly  after  the  accession  of  Vologases 
IV.    that   the   officers   of  the    Court   of  Commodus, 


332  VOLOGASES   IV.    AND    SEVERUS. 

unable  any  longer  to  endure  his  excesses  and 
cruelties,  conspired  against  the  unworthy  son  of  the 
good  Aurelius  and  assassinated  him  in  his  bed- 
chamber. This  murder  was  soon  followed  by  another 
—  that  of  the  virtuous,  but  perhaps  over-strict, 
Pertinax.  The  Praetorians,  after  this,  put  up  the 
office  of  Roman  Emperor  to  public  auction,  and 
knocked  it  down  to  Didius  Julianus,  a  rich  senator, 
who  is  said  to  have  paid  for  his  prize  no  less  than 
three  millions  of  our  money.  But  this  indignity 
exhausted  the  patience  of  the  legions,  and  threw  the 
entire  empire  into  confusion.  In  three  places — in 
Britain,  in  Pannonia,  and  in  Syria — revolt  broke  out, 
and  the  soldiers  invested  their  respective  leaders, 
Clodius  Albinus,  Septimius  Severus,  and  Pescennius 
Niger,  with  the  purple.  Niger,  who,  as  prefect  of 
Syria,  held  the  second  dignity  in  the  empire,  imagined 
that  his  elevation  would  not  be  disputed,  and,  instead 
of  straining  every  nerve  to  raise  forces,  and  strengthen 
himself  by  alliances,  declined  at  first  the  offers  of 
assistance  made  him  by  various  Parthian  feudatories, 
and  remained  inactive  in  the  East,  expecting  the 
Senate's  confirmation  of  his  appointment.  But  the 
unpleasant  intelligence  soon  reached  him  that  Sep- 
timius Severus,  proclaimed  Emperor  in  Pannonia  and 
acknowledged  at  Rome,  was  on  his  way  to  Syria, 
determined  to  dispute  with  him  the  prize,  whereof  he 
had  somewhat  rashly  thought  himself  assured.  Under 
these  changed  circumstances,  Niger  felt  compelled  to 
alter  his  own  policy,  and  to  implore  the  assistance 
which  so  shortly  before  he  had  rejected.  Towards 
the  close  of  the  year  A.D.  193   he  despatched  envoys 


PRETENSIONS   OF   PESCENNIUS   NIGER.         333 

to  the  courts  of  the  chief  princes  beyond  the 
Euphrates,  and  especially  to  the  kings  of  Armenia, 
Parthia,  and  Hatra,  entreating  them  to  send  con- 
tingents to  his  aid  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Armenian 
monarch — Vologases,  the  son  of  Sanatrceces — made 
answer  that  it  was  not  his  intention  to  ally  himself 
with  either  side ;  he  should  stand  aloof  from  the 
conflict  and  simply  defend  his  own  kingdom  if  any 
attack  were  made  upon  it.  The  reply  from  the 
Parthian  Vologases  was  more  favourable.  He  could 
not  send  troops  at  once,  he  said,  as  his  army  was 
disbanded,  but  he  would  issue  an  order  to  his  satraps 
for  the  collection  of  a  strong  force  as  soon  as  possible. 
Barsemius,  king  of  Hatra,  went  further  even  than  his 
suzerain,  and  actually  despatched  to  Niger's  aid  a 
body  of  archers,  which  reached  his  camp  in  safety, 
and  took  part  in  the  war.  Vologases  IV.  must  have 
given  his  sanction  to  this  movement  on  the  part  of 
his  feudatory,  who  could  certainly  not  have  ventured 
on  such  a  proceeding  against  the  will  of  his  lord 
paramount.  Still  Vologases  was  not  prepared  to 
commit  himself  unreservedly  to  either  side  in  the 
impending  conflict,  and  refrained  from  taking  any 
active  steps  in  furtherance  of  his  professed  design  to 
collect  an  army,  waiting  to  see  to  which  side  the 
fortune  of  war  would  incline. 

The  struggle  between  the  rival  Emperors  was  soon 
terminated.  Niger  passed  from  Asia  into  Europe, 
and  took  up  a  position  near  Byzantium,  but,  having 
suffered  a  defeat  at  Cyzicus,  was  soon  forced  to  fall 
back  upon  his  reserves,  and,  passing  through  Asia 
Minor,  gave  his  adversary  battle  for  the  second  time 


334  VOLOGASES   IV.    AND    SEVERUS. 

near  Issus,  where  his  army  was  completely  routed, 
and  he  himself  captured  and  put  to  death.  Mean- 
while, however,  the  nations  of  the  East  had  flown  to 
arms.  The  newly-subjected  Mesopotamians  had  risen 
in  revolt,  had  massacred  most  of  the  Roman  detach- 
ments stationed  in  their  country,  and  had  even  laid 
siege  to  Nisibis,  which  was  the  headquarters  of  the 
Roman  power  in  the  district.  Their  kindred  tribes 
from  the  further  side  of  the  Euphrates,  particularly 
the  people  of  Adiabene,  had  assisted  them,  and  taken 
part  in  the  attack.  The  first  object  of  Severus  after 
the  defeat  and  death  of  Niger  was  to  raise  the  siege, 
and  to  chastise  the  rebels,  with  their  aiders  and 
abettors.  He  marched  hastily  to  Nisibis,  defeated 
the  combined  Osrhoeni  and  Adiabeni,  relieved  the 
distressed  garrison,  and  took  up  his  own  quarters  in 
the  place.  He  then  proceeded  to  re-subject  Meso- 
potamia. The  inhabitants  sought  to  disarm  his 
resentment  by  representing  that  they  had  taken 
up  arms,  not  against  him,  or  against  the  Romans 
generally,  but  against  Niger,  his  rival  and  foe,  whom 
they  had  endeavoured  to  distress  for  his  (Severus's) 
benefit.  They  professed  a  readiness  to  surrender  the 
Romans  whom  they  had  taken  prisoners,  and  such 
portion  of  the  Roman  spoil  as  remained  still  in  their 
hands  ;  but  it  was  observed  that  they  said  nothing  about 
giving  up  the  strongholds  that  they  had  taken,  or  about 
resuming  the  position  of  Roman  tributaries.  On  the 
contrary, they  put  forward  a  demand  that  all  the  Roman 
troops  still  in  their  country  should  be  withdrawn  from 
it,  and  that  their  independence  should  be  respected 
in    the  future.     Severus  was  not  prepared  to  accept 


flRST  EXPEDITION   OF   SEVERUS.  335 

these  terms,  or  to  sanction  the  retreat  of  Terminus. 
His  immediate  adversaries — the  kings  of  Osrhocinc, 
Adiabene,  and  Hatra — were  of  small  account,  and  he 
might  expect  to  defeat  them  without  difficulty.  Even 
if  the  Parthian  monarch  espoused  the  cause  of  his 
feudatories,  he  was  not  indisposed  to  cross  swords 
with  him.  The  expeditions  of  Trajan  and  Avidius 
Cassius  had  done  much  to  diminish  the  terror  of  the 
Parthian  name  ;  and  to  ambitious  Romans  the  East 
presented  itself  as  the  quarter  in  which,  without  any 
serious  danger,  the  greatest  glory  was  to  be  won. 

Accordingly,  the  Emperor  rejected  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  proposals,  and  applied  himself  to  the  task  of 
reducing  their  country  to  complete  subjection.  From 
the  central  position  of  Nisibis,  where  he  himself 
remained,  he  sent  out  his  forces  under  his  three  best 
commanders — Laternus,  Candidus,  and  Laetus — in 
three  directions,  with  orders  to  carry  fire  and  sword 
through  the  entire  region,  and  to  re-establish  every- 
where the  Imperial  authority.  His  commands  were 
executed.  Resistance  was  everywhere  crushed  ;  the 
old  administration  was  restored  ;  and  Nisibis,  raised 
to  the  dignity  of  a  Roman  colony,  once  more  became 
the  metropolis  of  the  country.  Nor  was  Severus 
contented  with  the  mere  restoration  of  the  Roman 
power.  He  caused  his  troops  to  cross  the  Tigris 
into  Adiabene,  and  though  the  inhabitants  offered  a 
stout  resistance,  succeeded  in  overrunning  the  district 
and  occupying  it.  Further  aggressions  and  further 
conquests  would  probably  have  followed,  but  the 
attitude  of  Albinus  in  the  West  made  it  imperative 
on  Severus  to  quit  these  distant  lands  and  return  to 


336  VOLOGASES   IV.    AND   SEVERUS. 

his  capital,  which  was  menaced  on  the  side  of  Gaul 
by  the  commander  of  the  Western  legions.  The 
Emperor  left  Nisibis,  and  returned  to  Rome  early  in 
the  year  A.D.  196. 

No  sooner  had  he  retired  than  the  flames  of  war 
burst  out  more  fiercely  than  before.  Vologases,  roused 
from  his  inaction  by  the  threatened  loss  of  a  second 
province,  poured  his  troops  into  Adiabene,  drove  out 
the  Roman  garrisons,  and,  crossing  the  Tigris  into 
Mesopotamia,  swept  the  Romans  from  the  whole  of 
the  open  country.  Even  the  cities  submitted  them- 
selves, excepting  only  Nisibis,  which  was  saved  from 
capture  by  the  courage  and  capacity  of  Laetus.  Ac- 
cording to  Spartianus,  the  victorious  Parthians,  not 
content  with  recovering  Mesopotamia,  even  passed 
the  Euphrates,  and  spread  themselves  once  more  over 
the  fertile  plains  of  Northern  Syria,  as  they  had  done 
in  the  times  of  Pacorus  and  Labienus.  Severus, 
engaged  in  his  doubtful  contest  with  Albinus  on  the 
western  side  of  the  empire,  could  do  nothing  co 
relieve  the  pressure  upon  the  east,  and  the  Syrian 
prefecture  continued  open  to  the  Parthian  raids  for 
the  space  of  nearly  a  full  year.  An  enterprising 
monarch  might  have  done  much  during  this  interval  ; 
but  Vologases  frittered  away  hjs  opportunity,  and  at 
length  the  victory  of  Lyons  set  Severus  free,  and 
allowed  him  again  to  turn  his  attention  to  Oriental 
affairs.  In  the  summer  of  A.D.  197  he  made  a  second 
Eastern  expedition  for  the  purpose  of  recovering  his 
lost  laurels,  and  of  justifying  the  titles,  which  he  had 
already  assumed,  of  "  Arabicus  "  and  "  Adiabenicus."  It 
is  probable  that  in  his  own  mind  he  entertained  still 


SECOND    EXPEDITION   OF  SEVERUS.  337 

loftier  aspirations,  and,  like  Trajan,  had  hopes  of 
reducing  the  whole  Parthian  Empire  under  the  Roman 
yoke. 

One  of  the  most  important  points  to  be  secured  by 
an  assailant  of  Parthia  from  the  west,  was  the  friend- 
ship, or  at  any  rate  the  neutrality,  of  the  two  kings 
of  Armenia  and  Osrhoene.  Armenia  had  professed 
itself  neutral  when  the  quarrel  between  Severus  and 
Niger  first  broke  out,  but  had  subsequently,  in  some 
way  or  other,  offended  the  former,  and  on  his  arrival 
in  the  East,  was  viewed  as  hostile  to  the  Roman 
designs.  The  first  intention  of  Severus  was  to  fall 
with  his  full  force  on  Armenia,  and  to  endeavour  to 
reduce  it  to  subjection  ;  but,  before  the  fortune  of  war 
had  been  tried,  the  Armenian  monarch,  Vologases, 
son  of  Sanatrceces,  made  overtures  for  peace,  sent 
gifts  and  hostages,  assumed  the  attitude  of  a  suppliant, 
and  so  wrought  upon  Severus  that  he  not  merely 
consented  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  him,  but  even 
granted  him  a  certain  extension  of  his  dominions. 
The  Arab  king  of  Osrhoene,  who  is  called,  as  usual, 
Abgarus,  made  a  more  complete  and  unqualified  sub- 
mission. He  rode  into  the  Roman  camp  at  the  head 
of  a  large  body  of  archers,  whose  services  he  offered 
to  the  Emperor,  and  accompanied  by  a  number  of  his 
sons,  whom  Severus  was  requested  to  look  upon  as 
hostages.  All  being  prosperous  thus  far,  Severus  had 
only  to  determine  by  which  line  of  route  he  should 
advance  against  the  Parthian  monarch,  who  had  taken 
up  his  position  at  Ctesiphon,  and  to  make  his  pre- 
parations accordingly.  He  fixed  on  the  line  of  the 
Euphrates,  but  at  the  same  time  masked  his  intention 


338  VOLOGASES    IV.    AND    SEVERUS. 

by  sending  a  strong  body  of  troops  under  generals 
across  the  Tigris  to  ravage  Adiabene,  and  create  an 
impression  that  the  main  attack  would  come  from 
that  quarter.  Meanwhile,  following  the  example  of 
Trajan,  he  was  causing  a  fleet  to  be  built  in  Upper 
Mesopotamia,  where  timber  was  plentiful,  and  was 
preparing  to  march  his  main  army  down  the  left 
bank  of  the  Euphrates,  while  his  transports,  laden 
with  stores,  descended  the  stream.  In  this  way  he 
reached  the  neighbourhood  of  Seleucia  and  Ctesiphon 
without  suffering  any  loss,  or  even  incurring  any 
danger,  and  took  the  Parthians  by  surprise,  when, 
having  captured  the  cities  of  Babylon  and  Seleucia, 
which  were  deserted  by  their  defenders,  he  made  his 
appearance  before  the  capital.  His  fleet,  which  he 
could  easily  transfer  from  one  river  to  the  other  by 
means  of  the  great  canals  that  traversed  the  alluvium, 
would  give  him  the  complete  command  of  the  Tigris, 
and  enable  him  to  attack  the  city  on  either  side,  or 
indeed  entirely  to  invest  it.  Vologases  appears  to 
have  fought  a  single  battle  in  defence  of  his  capital, 
but,  being  defeated,  shut  himself  up  within  its  walls. 
The  defences,  however,  were  not  strong  ;  and,  after  a 
short  siege,  Severus  took  the  city,  by  assault,  without 
much  difficulty,  the  king  escaping  with  a  few  horse- 
men in  the  confusion  of  the  capture.  Thus  the 
Parthian  capital  fell  easily — a  third  time  within  the 
space  of  eighty-two  years  —  into  the  hands  of  a 
foreign  invader.  On  the  first  occasion  it  had  opened 
its  gates  to  the  conqueror,  and  had  experienced 
gentle  treatment  at  the  hands  of  a  benignant  emperor. 
On  the  second  it  had  suffered  considerably.      Now  it 


SACK  OF    CTESIPHON.  339 

was  to  learn  what  extreme  severity  meant  at  the  hands 
of  a  monarch  whose  character  accorded  with  his  name. 
The  captured  city  was  given  up  to  massacre  and 
pillage.  The  soldiers  were  allowed  to  plunder  both 
the  public  and  the  private  buildings  at  their  pleasure. 
The  precious  metals  accumulated  in  the  royal  treasury 
were  seized,  and  the  rich  ornaments  of  the  royai 
palace  were  taken  from  their  places  and  carried  off. 
All  the  adult  male  population  was  slaughtered  ;  while 
the  women  and  children,  torn  from  their  homes  with- 
out compunction,  were  led  into  captivity  by  the 
victorious  army,  to  the  number  of  a  hundred  thousand. 
Thus  far  the  expedition  of  Severus  had  been  com- 
pletely successful.  He  stood  where  Trajan  stood  in 
A.D.  116,  master  of  the  whole  low  region  between  the 
Arabian  desert  and  the  Zagros  mountains,  lord  of 
Mesopotamia,  of  Assyria,  of  Babylonia,  of  the  entire 
tract  watered  by  the  two  great  rivers  from  the  Arme- 
nian highlands  to  the  shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 
What  use  would  he  make  of  his  conquests  ?  Would 
he,  like  Trajan,  endeavour  to  retain  them,  or  would 
he,  like  the  wiser  Hadrian,  relinquish  them  ?  He 
endeavoured  to  take  an  intermediate  course.  Recog- 
nising the  fact,  that  to  retain  the  more  southern 
districts  was  impossible,  and  that  the  more  eastern 
portions  of  the  Parthian  Empire  were  beyond  his 
reach,  he  neither  pursued  the  flying  Vologases  into 
the  remote  tracts  in  which  he  had  taken  refuge  nor 
attempted  to  organise  his  southern  conquests  into 
provinces,  but  resolved  at  once  to  evacuate  them. 
Notwithstanding  the  elaborate  preparations  which 
he  had  made  for  his  invasion,  and  the  care  which  he 


340  V0L0GASES   IV.    AND    SEVERUS. 

had  taken  to  carry  supplies  with  him,  he  found  hirm- 
self,  about  the  time  that  he  captured  Ctesiphon,  in 
want  of  provisions.  He  had  exhausted  the  immense 
stores  of  grain  which  Lower  Mesopotamia  commonly 
furnished,  or  else  the  inhabitants  had  destroyed  or 
hidden  them,  and  his  troops  had,  we  are  told,  to 
subsist  for  some  days  on  roots,  which  produced  a 
dangerous  dysentery.  He  was  obliged  to  retreat 
before  famine  overtook  him.  Moreover,  as  the  march 
of  his  army  along  the  course  of  the  Euphrates  had 
stripped  that  region  of  its  supplies  of  corn  and  fodder, 
he  could  not  return  as  he  had  come,  but  was  com- 
pelled to  confront  the  perils  of  a  new  route.  The  line 
of  the  Tigris  was  the  only  route  open  to  him,  and 
along  this  he  advanced,  still  supported  by  his  fleet, 
which  with  some  difficulty  made  its  way  against  the 
current  up  the  course  of  the  stream.  It  does  not 
appear  that  any  opposition  was  offered  to  him  ;  but, 
after  he  had  proceeded  a  moderate  distance,  he  found 
himself  in  the  vicinity  of  Hatra,  the  capital  of  a  small 
state  subject  to  Parthia,  which  had  given  him  special 
offence  by  lending  active  support  to  the  cause  of  his 
rival,  Niger.  His  troops  had  now  obtained  sufficient 
supplies  of  food  in  an  unexhausted  country,  and  were 
ready  for  a  fresh  enterprise.  Severus  regarded  his 
honour  as  concerned  in  the  chastisement  of  a  state 
which,  without  provocation,  had  declared  itself  his 
enemy.  He  may  also  have  remembered  that  Trajan 
had  attacked  Hatra  unsuccessfully,  and  have  hoped  to 
place  himself  above  that  conqueror  by  the  capture  of 
a  town  which  had  defied  the  utmost  efforts  of  his 
predecessor.     At  any  rate,   whatever  his  motives,  it 


SEVERUS   BESIEGES   HATRA.  34I 

seems  certain  that,  when  in  the  latitude  of  Hatra,  he 
diverged  from  his  previous  line  of  march,  and,  pro- 
ceeding westward,  encamped  under  the  walls  of  the 
city  which  had  given  him  such  dire  offence,  and 
engaged  in  its  siege.  He  had  brought  with  him  a 
number  of  military  engines — probably  those  employed 
with  complete  success  at  Ctesiphon,  and,  putting  them 
in  position,  made  a  fierce  attack  upon  the  place.  But 
the  inhabitants  were  not  daunted  ;  the  walls  of  the 
town  were  strong,  its  defenders  brave  and  full  of 
enterprise.  They  contrived  to  set  on  fire  and  destroy 
the  siege  machines  brought  against  them,  and  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss  the  attacking  soldiers.  The  army, 
upon  this,  grew  discontented,  and  threatened  mutiny  ; 
Severus  was  obliged  to  punish  with  death  some  of  his 
leading  officers,  among  them  his  best  general,  Laetus. 
This,  however,  only  increased  the  exasperation  ;  and, 
to  smooth  matters  over,  he  had  to  pretend  that  the 
execution  of  this  officer  had  taken  place  without  his 
knowledge.  Even  so  the  soldiers'  minds  were  not 
calmed  down,  and  at  last,  in  order  to  bring  about  a 
better  state  of  feeling,  he  had  to  discontinue  the  siege 
and  remove  his  camp  to  a  distance. 

He  had  not,  however,  abandoned  his  enterprise. 
Recu/er  pour  mieux  sauter  was  among  the  principles 
that  guided  his  actions,  and  it  was  in  the  hope  of 
returning  and  renewing  the  attack  ere  many  weeks 
were  past,  that  he  had  drawn  off  his  army.  In  the 
tranquillity  and  security  of  the  place  whereto  he  had 
removed,  he  constructed  fresh  engines  in  increased 
numbers,  collected  vast  stores  of  provisions,  and  made 
every  preparation  possible  for  a  repetition  of  his  attack 


342  VOLOGASES   IV.   AND   SHVERUS. 

and  for  bringing  it  to  a  successful  issue.  It  was  not 
merely  that  his  honour  was  concerned  in  overcoming 
the  resistance  offered  to  him  by  what  had  always  been 
regarded  as  no  more  than  a  second-rate  town — his 
cupidity  was  also  excited  by  reports  of  the  rich 
treasures  that  were  stored  up  in  the  city,  and  espe- 
cially of  those  which  the  piety  of  successive  genera- 
tions had  accumulated  in  the  Temple  of  the  Sun.  He 
therefore,  when  his  preparations  were  complete,  once 
more  put  his  troops  in  motion,  and  proceeded  to 
renew  the  siege  with  a  more  efficient  siege-train,  and 
a  better  appointed  army  than  before.  But  the  inhabi- 
tants met  him  with  a  determination  equal  to  his 
own.  They  had  a  powerful  cavalry  which  hung  upon 
the  skirts  of  his  army  and  crippled  his  movements 
in  every  way,  often  inflicting  severe  loss  upon  his 
foragers ;  they  were  excellent  archers,  and  shot 
further  and  with  greater  force  than  the  Romans ; 
they  possessed  military  engines  of  their  own,  of  no 
contemptible  character  ;  and  they  had  at  their  disposal 
a  particular  kind  of  fire,  which  did  considerable 
damage,  and  created  yet  greater  alarm.  Flames 
believed  to  be  inextinguishable  were  hurled  both 
against  the  Roman  machines  and  against  their  soldiers 
with  an  effect  that  is  said  to  have  been  remarkable. 
A  great  number  of  the  machines  were  burnt  ;  and  if 
the  soldiers  were  more  frightened  than  hurt,  the 
advantage  to  the  defenders  was  still  almost  as  great. 
Still  the  Romans  persevered.  The  presence  of  the  Em- 
peror, who  watched  the  combat  from  a  lofty  platform, 
encouraged  every  man  to  do  his  best  ;  and  at  length 
it  was  announced  that  a  practicable  breach  had  been 


FAILURE    OF    THE    SIEGE.  343 

effected  in  the  outer  wall  of  the  place,  and  the  soldiers 
were  ready,  and  indeed  eager,  to  be  led  at  once  to  the 
assault.  But  now  Severus  hung  back.  By  Roman 
usage  a  town  taken  by  storm  must  be  given  up  to  the 
soldiery  for  indiscriminate  pillage  ;  and  thus,  if  the 
soldiers  had  their  way,  he  would  lose  the  great 
treasures  on  which  his  heart  was  set.  He  therefore 
refused  to  give  the  word,  and  resolved  to  wait  a  day, 
and  see  whether  the  Hatreni  would  not  now,  seeing 
further  resistance  to  be  useless,  surrender  their  town. 
The  delay  was  fatal.  In  the  night  the  Hatreni  rebuilt 
the  wall  where  it  had  been  battered  down,  and  man- 
ning the  battlements,  stood  boldly  on  their  defence. 
Severus,  seeing  that  they  had  no  intention  of  sur- 
rendering, repented  of  his  resolve  of  the  day  before, 
and  commanded  the  soldiers  to  attack.  But  the  legion- 
aries declined.  They  probably  suspected  the  Emperor's 
motive.  At  any  rate  they  were  unwilling  to  imperil 
their  lives  for  an  object  which  but  yesterday  they 
might  have  attained  without  incurring  any  peril  at  all. 
Severus,  not  to  lose  a  chance,  commanded  his  Asiatic 
auxiliaries  to  see  if  they  could  not  force  an  entrance, 
but  with  no  other  result  than  the  slaughter  of  a  vast 
number.  At  last  he  desisted  from  his  attempt.  The 
summer  was  far  advanced  ;  the  heat  was  intense ;  and 
disease  had  broken  out  among  his  troops,  who  suffered 
from  drought,  from  malaria,  and  from  a  plague  of 
insects.  Above  all,  his  army  was  thoroughly  demo- 
ralised, and  could  not  be  depended  on  to  carry  out 
the  orders  given  it.  Severus  himself  told  one  of  his 
officers  that  he  had  not  six  hundred  European  troops 
on  whom   he  could  place  any  reliance.     The  second 


344  VOLOGASES    IV.   AND    SEVERUS. 

siege  of  Hatra  by  Severus  lasted  twenty  days,  and 
terminated  in  an  ignominious  withdrawal.  Severus 
returned  to  Rome  with  a  slur  upon  his  military  repu- 
tation which  was  not  regarded  as  cancelled  by  all 
his  previous  successes. 

Still,  actual  disaster  was  escaped.  Had  Vologases 
been  an  active  and  energetic  prince,  or  had  the  spirit 
and  audacity  of  the  Parthian  nation  been  such  as 
once  characterised  it,  the  result  might  have  been 
widely  different.  The  prolonged  resistance  of  Hatra, 
the  sufferings  of  the  Romans,  their  increasing  diffi- 
culties with  respect  to  provisions,  the  injurious  effect 
of  the  summer  heats  upon  their  unacclimatised  con- 
stitutions, would  have  presented  irresistible  tempta- 
tions to  a  prince,  or  even  a  general,  of  any  boldness 
and  capacity,  inducing  him  to  pursue  the  retreating 
enemy,  to  hang  upon  their  flanks  and  upon  their 
rear,  to  fall  on  their  stragglers,  to  cut  off  their 
supplies,  to  harass  and  annoy  them  in  ten  thousand 
ways,  and  render  their  withdrawal  to  their  own 
territory  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty.  A  Surena 
of  the  temper  and  calibre  of  the  general  opposed  to 
Crassus  might  not  improbably  have  annihilated  the 
Imperial  army,  and  the  disaster  of  Carrhae  might 
have  repeated  itself  at  the  distance  of  between  two 
and  three  centuries.  But  Vologases  IV.  was  a 
degenerate  descendant  of  the  great  Arsacids,  and 
remained  inert  and  apathetic  when  the  circumstances 
of  the  time  called  for  the  most  vigorous  action. 

As  it  was,  the  expedition  of  Severus  must  be 
pronounced  glorious  for  Rome  and  disastrous  for 
Parthia.     It    exposed    for   the    third    time    within    a 


CONQUESTS   OF  SEVERUS.  345 

century  the  extreme  weakness  of  the  great  Asiatic 
power.  It  lost  her  such  treasures  as  had  escaped 
the  cupidity  of  Avidius  Cassius.  It  both  exhausted 
and  disgraced  her.  Moreover,  it  cost  her  a  second 
and  most  valuable  province.  Severus  was  not 
content  with  fully  re-establishing  the  Roman  sway 
in  Mesopotamia.  He  overstepped  the  Tigris,  and 
firmly  planted  Roman  authority  in  the  rich  and 
fertile  region  between  that  river  and  the  Zagros 
mountains.  Henceforth  the  title  of  "  Adiabenicus  " 
became  no  empty  boast.  Adiabene,  or  the  tract 
between  the  two  Zab  rivers — the  most  productive 
and  valuable  part  of  the  ancient  Assyria — became  a 
Roman  dependency  under  Severus,  and  continued 
to  be  Roman  till  after  the  destruction  of  the  Parthian 
Empire.  For  the  remainder  of  the  time  during 
which  Parthia  maintained  her  independence,  the 
Roman  standards  were  planted  within  less  than  two 
degrees  of  her  capital. 

Vologases  reigned  for  the  space  of  about  eleven 
years  (a.d.  197-208)  after  his  defeat  by  Severus. 
Parthian  history  is  for  this  interval  a  blank.  The 
decline  of  national  feeling  and  of  the  military  spirit 
went  on,  no  doubt,  without  a  pause,  and  the  power 
of  Parthia  must  continually  have  grown  .  less  and 
less.  No  pretenders  arose,  since  there  was  probably 
no  one  who  coveted  the  position  of  ruler  over  a  state 
evidently  nodding  to  its  fall.  Rome  abstained  from 
further  attack,  content,  it  would  seem,  with  the  gains 
which  she  had  made,  and  a  brief  calm  heralded  the 
storm  in  which  Parthian  nationality  was  to  perish. 


XXI. 

ARTABANUS     V.    AND   CARACALLUS — THE   LAST  WAR 
WITH   ROME— DEFEAT   OF   MACRINUS. 

The  death  of  Vologases  IV.  was  immediately 
followed  by  a  dispute  between  his  two  sons,  Volo- 
gases V.  and  Artabanus  V.,  for  the  succession.  We 
do  not  know  which  was  the  elder;   but  it  would  seem 


COIN   OF   VOLOGASES   V. 


COIN   OF   ARTABANUS   V. 


that  at  first  the  superiority  in  the  struggle  rested 
with  Vologases,  who  was  recognised  by  the  Romans 
as  sole  king  in  A.D.  212,  and  must  have  then  ruled 
in  the  western  capital,  Ctesiphon.  Afterwards  Arta- 
banus acquired  the  preponderance,  and  from  the 
year  A.D.  216  we  find  no  more  mention  of  Vologases 
by  the  classical  writers.  It  is  Artabanus  who 
negotiates    with    Caracallus,    who    is    treacherously 

346 


AMBITION   OF   CARACALLUS.  347 

attacked  by  him,  who  contends  with  Macrinus,  and 
is  ultimately  defeated  and  slain  by  the  founder  of 
the  New  Persian  monarchy,  Artaxerxes.  Similarly, 
the  Persian  historians  ignore  Vologases  altogether, 
and  represent  the  contest  for  empire,  which  once 
more  carried  Persia  to  the  front,  as  one  between 
Ardeshir  and  Ardevan.  Still,  the  Parthian  coins 
show  that  Vologases,  equally  with  his  brother,  both 
claimed  and  exercised  sovereignty  in  Parthia  to  the 
close  of  the  kingdom.  The  probability  would  there- 
fore appear  to  be  that  about  A.D.  216  a  partition  of 
the  kingdom  was  amicably  made,  and  that  while 
Artabanus  reigned  over  the  western  provinces,  the 
eastern  were  ceded  to  Vologases. 

It  was  while  the  struggle  between  the  two  brothers 
continued  that  the  Emperor  Severus  died,  and  the 
period  of  tranquillity  inaugurated  by  him,  on  his 
return  from  the  East  in  A.D.  198,  came  to  an  end. 
His  son  and  successor,  Caracallus,  a  weak  and  vain 
prince,  nourished  an  inordinate  ambition,  and  was 
scarcely  seated  on  the  throne  when  he  let  it  be 
known  that  in  his  own  judgment  he  was  a  second 
Alexander,  and  that  he  was  bent  on  imitating  the 
marvellous  exploits  of  that  mighty  hero.  He 
adopted  the  Macedonian  costume,  formed  his  best 
troops  into  a  "  Macedonian  phalanx,"  made  the 
captains  of  the  phalanx  take  the  names  of 
Alexander's  best  generals,  and  caused  statues  to 
be  made  with  a  double  head,  presenting  the  counte- 
nance of  Alexander  on  one  side  and  his  own  upon 
the  other.  As  Alexander,  he  was  bound  to  conquer 
the  East  ;  and,  as  early  as  his  second  year,  he  began 


348  ARTABANUS      V.   AND    CARACALLUS. 

his  predetermined  aggressions.  Summoning  Abgarus, 
the  tributary  monarch  of  Osrhoene,  or  north-western 
Mesopotamia,  into  his  presence,  he  seized  upon  his 
person,  committed  him  to  prison,  declared  his  terri- 
tories forfeited,  and  reduced  Osrhoene  into  the 
form  of  a  Roman  province.  Soon  afterwards  he 
attempted  to  repeat  the  proceeding  with  Armenia  ; 
but,  although  the  Armenian  king  was  weak  enough 
to  fall  into  the  trap,  the  nation  was  on  the  alert,  and 
frustrated  his  efforts.  No  sooner  did  they  learn  that 
their  king  was  arrested  and  imprisoned  than  they 
flew  to  arms,  placed  their  country  in  a  position  of 
defence,  and  made  themselves  ready  to  resist  all 
aggression.  Caracallus  hesitated,  and  when,  three 
years  later  (A.D.  215),  he  sent  Theocritus,  one  of  his 
favourites,  to  effect  their  subjugation,  they  met  him 
in  arms,  and  inflicted  a  severe  defeat  on  the  utterly 
incompetent  general.  It  was  perhaps  this  disaster 
which  suggested  to  Caracallus  a  change  in  his 
method  of  proceeding.  Professing  to  put  away  from 
him  all  thoughts  of  war  and  conquest,  he  propounded 
a  grand  scheme  for  the  permanent  pacification  of  the 
East,  and  the  establishment  of  a  reign  of  universal 
happiness  and  tranquillity.  Having  transferred  his 
residence  from  Nicomedia  to  Antioch,  the  luxurious 
capital  of  the  Roman  Oriental  provinces,  he  sent  am- 
bassadors with  presents  of  unusual  magnificence  to 
the  Parthian  monarch,  Artabanus,  who  were  to  make 
him  a  proposal  of  a  novel  and  unheard-of  character. 
"  The  Roman  Emperor,"  said  the  despatch  in  question, 
could  not  fitly  wed  the  daughter  of  a  subject,  or 
accept  the  position  of  son-in-law  to  a  private  person. 


MAD    PROPOSAL    OF   CARACALLUS.  349 

No  one  could  be  a  suitable  wife  for  him  who  was  not 
a  princess.  He  therefore  asked  the  Parthian  monarch 
for  the  hand  of  his  daughter.  Rome  and  Parthia 
divided  between  them  the  sovereignty  of  the  world  ; 
united,  as  they  would  be  by  this  marriage,  no  longer 
recognising  any  boundary  as  separating  them,  they 
would  constitute  a  power  which  could  not  but  be 
irresistible.  It  would  be  easy  for  them  to  reduce 
under  their  sway  all  the  barbarous  races  on  the  skirts 
of  their  empires,  and  to  hold  them  in  subjection  by 
a  flexible  system  of  administration  and  government. 
The  Roman  infantry  was  the  best  in  the  world,  and 
in  steady  hand-to-hand  fighting  must  be  allowed  to 
be  unrivalled.  The  Parthians  surpassed  all  nations 
in  the  number  of  their  cavalry  and  the  excellence  ot 
their  archers.  If  these  advantages,  instead  of  being 
separated,  were  combined,  and  the  various  elements 
on  which  success  in  war  depends  were  thus  brought 
into  harmonious  union,  there  could  be  no  difficult} 
in  establishing  and  maintaining  a  universal  monarchy. 
Were  that  done,  the  Parthian  spices  and  rare  stuffs, 
as  also  the  Roman  metals  and  manufactures,  would 
no  longer  need  to  be  imported  secretly  and  in  small 
quantities  by  merchants,  but,  as  the  two  countries 
would  form  together  but  one  nation  and  one  stace, 
there  would  be  a  free  interchange  among  all  the 
citizens  of  their  various  products  and  commodities." 
To  the  Parthian  king  and  his  advisers  the  proposition 
was  as  unwelcome  as  it  was  strange.  The  whole 
project  appeared  to  them  monstrous.  Artabanus 
himself  misdoubted  the  Emperor's  sincerity,  and  d'd 
not  believe  that  he  would    persevere  in    it     But  it 


350  ARTABANUS      V.    AND    CARACALLUS. 

threw  him  into  a  state  of  extreme  perplexity. 
Bluntly  to  reject  the  overture  was  to  offend  the 
master  of  thirty-two  legions,  and  to  provoke  a  war 
the  results  of  which  might  be  ruinous.  To  accept  it 
was  to  depart  from  all  Parthian  traditions,  and  to 
plunge  into  the  unknown  and  the  unconjecturable. 
Artabanus  therefore  temporised.  Without  giving  a 
positive  refusal,  he  stated  certain  objections  to  the 
proposal,  which  made  it,  he  thought,  inexpedient, 
and  begged  to  be  excused  from  complying  with  it. 
"  Such  a  union  as  was  suggested  could  scarcely,"  he 
said,  "  prove  a  happy  one.  The  wife  and  husband, 
differing  in  language,  habits,  and  modes  of  thought, 
could  not  but  become  estranged  one  from  another. 
There  was  no  lack  of  patricians  at  Rome,  possessing 
daughters  with  whom  the  Emperor  might  wed  as 
suitably  as  the  Parthian  kings  did  with  the  females 
of  their  own  royal  house.  It  was  not  fit  that  either 
family  should  sully  its  blood  by  mixture  with  a 
foreign  stock." 

Upon  this  answer  reaching  him,  Caracallus,  accord- 
ing to  the  Court  historian,  Dio  Cassius,  immediately 
declared  war,  and  invaded  the  Parthian  territory  with 
a  large  army.  Herodian,  however,  who  seems  here 
to  be  more  trustworthy,  gives  a  different  account. 
Caracallus,  he  declares,  instead  of  quarrelling  with 
Artabanus  for  his  qualified  refusal,  followed  up  his 
first  embassy  with  a  second  ;  his  envoys  brought  rich 
gifts  to  Ctesiphon,  and  assured  the  Parthian  monarch 
that  the  Emperor  was  serious  in  his  proposals,  and 
had  the  most  friendly  intentions  possible.  Hereupon 
Artabanus  yielded,  either  satisfied  with  the  assurances 


FESTIVE    MEETING   AT   CTESIPHON.  351 

given  him,  or  else  afraid  to  give  offence  ;  he  addressed 
Caracallus  as  his  future  son-in-law,  and  invited  him 
to  come  with  all  speed,  and  fetch  home  his  bride. 
"  And  then,"  continues  the  historian,  "when  this  was 
noised  abroad,  the  Parthians  made  ready  to  give  the 
Roman  Emperor  a  fit  recepti:  n,  being  transported 
with  joy  at  the  prospect  of  an  eternal  peace.  Cara- 
callus thereupon  crossed  the  rivers  without  hindrance 
and  entered  Parthia,  just  as  if  it  were  his  own  land. 
Everywhere  along  his  route  the  people  greeted  him 
with  sacrifices,  and  dressing  their  altars  with  garlands, 
offered  upon  them  all  manner  of  spices  and  incense, 
whereat  he  made  pretence  of  being  vastly  pleased. 
As  his  journey  now  approached  its  close,  and  he 
drew  near  to  the  Parthian  Court,  Artabanus,  instead 
of  awaiting  his  arrival,  went  out  and  met  him  in  the 
spacious  plain  before  the  city,  with  intent  to  enter- 
tain his  daughter's  bridegroom  and  his  own  son-in- 
law.  Meanwhile,  the  whole  multitude  of  the  bar- 
barians, crowned  with  freshly  gathered  flowers,  and 
clad  in  garments  embroidered  with  gold  and  variously 
dyed,  were  keeping  holiday,  and  dancing  gracefully 
to  the  sound  of  the  flute,  the  pipe,  and  the  drum  — 
an  amusement  wherein  they  take  great  delight  after 
they  have  indulged  freely  in  wine.  Now,  when  all 
the  people  had  come  together,  they  dismounted  from 
their  horses,  hung  up  their  quivers  and  their  bows, 
and  gave  themselves  wholly  to  libations  and  revels. 
The  concourse  of  barbarians  was  very  great,  and 
they  stood  arranged  in  no  sort  of  order,  since  they 
did  not  apprehend  any  danger,  but  were  all  en- 
deavouring   to    catch    a    sight    of    the    bridegroom. 


352  ARTABANUS      V.    AND    CARACALLUS. 

Suddenly  the  Emperor  gives  his  men  the  signal  to 
fall  on  and  massacre  the  barbarians.  These,  amazed 
at  the  attack,  and  finding  themselves  struck  and 
wounded,  forthwith  took  to  flight.  Artabanus  was 
hurried  away  by  his  guards,  and  lifted  on  a  horse, 
whereby  he  escaped  with  a  few  followers.  The  rest 
of  the  barbarians  were  cut  to  pieces,  since  they  could 
not  reach  their  horses,  which,  when  they  dismounted, 
they  had  allowed  to  graze  freely  over  the  plain  ;  nor 
were  they  able  to  make  use  of  their  legs,  since  these 
were  entangled  in  the  long  flowing  garments  which 
descended  to  their  heels.  Many,  too,  had  come 
without  quivers  or  bows,  which  were  not  wanted  at 
a  wedding.  Caracallus,  when  he  had  made  a  vast 
slaughter,  and  taken  a  multitude  of  prisoners  and  a 
rich  booty,  moved  off  without  meeting  with  any 
resistance.  In  his  retreat  he  allowed  his  soldiers  to 
burn  all  the  cities  and  villages,  and  to  carry  away  as 
plunder  whatever  they  chose." 

The  advance  of  Caracallus  had  been  through 
Babylonia,  probably  along  the  course  of  the 
Euphrates ;  his  return  was  through  Adiabene  and 
Mesopotamia.  In  Adiabene'  he  still  further  out- 
raged and  offended  the  Parthians  by  violating  the 
sanctity  of  the  royal  burial-place  at  Arbela,  where,  as 
a  rule,  the  Parthian  kings  were  interred.  Arbela 
had  been  regarded  from  of  old  as  a  City  of  the 
Dead  ;  and  the  Arsacidae  had  made  it  their  ordinary 
place  of  sepulture.  Caracallus  caused  the  tombs  to 
be  opened,  the  bodies  dragged  forth  from  them,  and 
the  remains  dispersed  to  the  four  winds.  No  insult 
could  be  greater  than  this,  and  the  act  seems  rather 


RETREAT   OF   CARACALLUS — HIS    DEATH.       353 

that  of  a  madman  than  of  a  mere  ordinary  tyrant. 
We  are  reminded  of  Aristotle's  observation,  that 
"  families  of  brilliant  talents  go  off  after  a  time  into 
dispositions  bordering  upon  madness,"  and  see  that 
that  of  the  Antonines  was  no  exception.  Caracallus 
can  scarcely  have  been  in  his  senses  to  have  com- 
mitted an  action  from  which  no  possible  good  could 
arise,  and  for  which,  as  he  might  have  anticipated,  a 
severe  reckoning  was  afterwards  to  be  exacted. 

Meanwhile,  however,  he  was  pursuing  his  gay 
career, no  whit  alarmed, and  no  whit  abashed.  He  wrote 
to  the  Senate  in  the  lightest  possible  tone,  to  declare, 
without  giving  any  details,  that  the  whole  East  was 
subject  to  him,  and  that  there  was  not  a  kingdom  in 
those  parts  but  had  submitted  to  his  authority.  The 
Senate,  though  not  imposed  upon,  wrote  back  in 
flattering  terms  and  granted  him  all  the  honours  that 
would  have  been  suitable  to  a  veritable  conqueror. 
For  his  own  part,  he  remained  in  Mesopotamia,  pass- 
ing the  winter  there,  and  amusing  himself  with  hunting 
and  chariot-driving.  There  were  still  lions  in  the 
Mesopotamian  region,  as  in  Assyrian  times,  and 
the  young  Antonine,  though  a  poor  soldier,  seems  to 
have  been  a  bold  hunter.  He  had,  apparently, 
persuaded  himself  that  no  external  danger  threatened 
him,  and  was  content  to  idle  away  his  time  in  the 
grassy  Mesopotamian  plains,  which  now — in  early 
spring — must  have  been  an  earthly  paradise.  April 
was  reached,  and  it  was  high  time  for  an  active 
commander  to  have  commenced  the  marshalling  and 
exercising  of  his  troops,  or  even  the  initiatory  move- 
ments of  the  designed  campaign  ;  but  Caracallus  con- 


354  THE   LAST    WAR    WITH  ROME. 

tinued  impassive,  occupied  in  his  amusements,  his 
suspicions  of  his  officers,  and  his  consultations  of 
augurs,  magicians,  and  oracles  as  to  what  fate  was  in 
store  for  him.  He  was  on  his  way  to  visit  an  oracle 
in  the  Temple  of  the  Moon-God,  near  Carrhas,  when 
some  of  his  inquiries  having  leaked  out,  a  conspiracy 
was  formed  against  him  in  the  camp,  and  he  was 
murdered  by  Julius  Martialis,  one  of  his  guards,  on 
April  8,  A.D.  217. 

In  the  place  of  Caracallus,  a  new  emperor  had  to  be 
appointed.  The  choice  of  the  soldiery  fell  upon  Macri- 
nus,  one  of  the  Praetorian  Prefects,  the  chief  mover  in 
the  recent  conspiracy.  His  elevation  almost  exactly 
coincided  with  the  advance  of  Artabanus,  who,  having 
reunited  and  increased  his  army  during  the  course  of 
the  winter  months,  and  brought  it  into  excellent  con- 
dition, had  now  conducted  it  into  Roman  Mesopo- 
tamia, and  was  anxious  to  engage  the  Romans  in  a 
pitched  battle,  in  order  to  exact  a  heavy  retribution 
for  the  treacherous  massacre  of  Ctesiphon  and  the 
wanton  impiety  of  Arbela.  But  Macrinus  was  scarcely 
prepared  to  meet  him.  Though  Praetorian  Prefect, 
he  had  none  of  the  instincts  of  a  soldier,  but  was  far 
more  versed  in  civil  affairs,  and  adapted  to  hold  office 
in  the  civil  administration  or  in  the  judiciary.  Ac- 
cordingly, no  sooner  did  he  find  himself  menaced  by 
the  Parthian  monarch  than  he  hastily  sent  am- 
bassadors to  his  camp  with  an  offer  to  surrender  all 
the  prisoners  carried  off  in  the  late  campaign  as  the 
price  of  peace.  But  Artabanus  had  higher  aims. 
"  The  Roman  Emperor,"  he  said  in  reply,  "  must  not 
only  restore  the  prisoners  unjustly  captured  in  a  time 


BATTLE   OF  NISI  BIS.  355 

of  peace,  but  must  also  consent  to  rebuild  all  the 
towns  and  castles  which  Caracallus  had  laid  in  ruins, 
must  make  compensation  for  the  wanton  injury  done 
to  the  tombs  of  the  kings,  and  must  further  cede 
Mesopotamia  to  the  Parthians,  and  retire  behind  the 
line  of  the  Euphrates."  It  was  morally  impossible 
for  a  Roman  Emperor  to  consent  to  such  demands  as 
these  without  first  trying  the  fortune  of  war  ;  and 
accordingly  Macrinus  felt  himself  compelled,  much 
against  his  will,  to  risk  a  battle.  He  had  with  him 
a  large  army,  which,  if  not  exactly  flushed  with 
victory,  had  at  any  rate  not  known  defeat  ;  and  he 
had,  besides,  the  prestige  of  the  Roman  name,  always 
a  source  of  confidence  to  those  who  boasted  it,  and  of 
terror  to  their  adversaries. 

Artabanus,  on  his  part,  had  done  his  best  to  make 
his  army  formidable.  He  had  collected  it  from  all 
quarters,  had  made  it  strong  in  cavalry  and  archers, 
and  had  attached  to  it  a  novel  force  of  considerable 
importance,  consisting  of  a  corps  of  picked  soldiers, 
clad  in  complete  armour,  and  carrying  spears  or 
lances  of  unusual  length,  who  were  mounted  on 
camels.  The  Romans  had,  besides  the  ordinary 
legionaries,  in  which  their  strength  mainly  consisted, 
a  large  number  of  light-armed  troops,  and  a  powerful 
body  of  Mauretanian  cavalry.  The  battle,  which 
lasted  three  days,  and  was  fought  near  Nisibis,  in 
Upper  Mesopotamia,  began  at  daybreak  on  the  first 
day  by  a  rapid  advance  of  the  Parthians,  who,  after 
saluting  the  rising  sun,  rushed  with  loud  shouts  to  the 
combat,  and,  under  cover  of  a  sleet  of  arrows,  delivered 
charge  after  charge.       The  Romans,    receiving  their 


356  THE   LAST    WAR    WITH  ROME. 

own  light-armed  within  the  ranks  of  the  legionaries, 
stood  firm,  but  suffered  greatly  from  the  bows  of  the 
horse-archers  and  from  the  lances  of  the  corps 
mounted  on  camels  ;  and  though,  whenever  they 
could  reach  their  enemy,  and  engage  in  close  combat, 
they  had  always  the  advantage,  yet  after  a  while  their 
losses  from  the  cavalry  and  the  camels  forced  them 
to  retreat.  As  they  retired  they  strewed  the  ground 
with  spiked  balls  (or  caltrops)  and  other  contrivances 
for  injuring  the  feet  of  animals,  and  this  stratagem 
was  so  far  successful  that  the  pursuers  soon  found 
themselves  in  difficulties,  and  the  two  armies  re- 
spectively returned,  without  any  decisive  result,  to 
their  camps. 

On  the  following  day  there  was  again  a  combat, 
which  is  said  to  have  lasted  from  morning  till  night, 
and  to  have  been  equally  indecisive  with  the  pre- 
ceding one  ;  but  of  this,  which  is  wholly  ignored  by 
Dio,  we  do  not  possess  any  description.  The  third 
day  arrived,  and  the  fight  was  once  more  renewed  ; 
but  this  time  the  Parthians  had  recourse  to  new 
tactics.  Hitherto  it  had  been  their  aim  to  rout  and 
disperse  their  enemies  ;  now  they  directed  all  their 
efforts  towards  surrounding  them,  and  so  capturing 
the  entire  force.  Their  troops,  which  were  far  more 
numerous  than  those  of  the  Romans,  spread  themselves 
to  right  and  left,  threatening  to  turn  the  Roman 
flanks  and  envelop  the  whole  army.  Macrinus,  to 
meet  these  tactics  and  baffle  them,  was  forced  more 
and  more  to  extend  his  own  line,  and  consequently 
to  attenuate  it  unduly,  so  that  at  last  it  broke  up. 
Confusion  once  begun  was  speedily  increased  by  the 


TERMS   ACCEPTED    BY   MACRINUS.  2>57 

cowardice  of  the  Roman  Emperor,  who  was  among 
the  first  to  take  to  flight,  and  hurry  back  to  his  camp. 
As  a  matter  of  course  his  army  followed  his  example, 
and  having  a  refuge  so  close  at  hand,  suffered  no  very 
severe  losses.  The  defeat,  however,  was  acknow- 
ledged, even  by  the  Romans  themselves  ;  and,  in  the 
negotiations  which  followed  the  battle,  Macrinus  had 
to  accept  terms  of  peace,  which,  though  less  disgrace- 
ful than  those  at  first  proposed,  must  be  regarded  as 
sufficiently  onerous.  The  cession  of  Mesopotamia 
was  not,  indeed,  insisted  on  ;  but,  besides  restoring 
the  captives  and  the  booty  carried  off  by  Caracallus 
in  his  raid,  Macrinus  had  to  pay,  as  compensation  for 
the  damages  inflicted,  no  less  a  sum  than  a  million 
and  a  half  of  our  money.  The  transactions  of  Rome 
with  Parthia  were  thus  brought  to  an  end,  after  nearly 
three  centuries  of  struggle,  by  the  ignominious  pur- 
chase of  a  peace.  Macrinus  retired  within  his  own 
frontier  in  the  summer  of  A.D.  217,  and  before  Rome 
was  again  called  upon  to  make  war  in  these  parts  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Parthians  had  terminated. 


XXII. 

REVOLT    OF    THE     PERSIANS — DOWNFALL    OF     THE 
PARTHIAN    EMPIRE. 

The  tendency  of  the  Parthian  Empire  to  disin- 
tegration has  been  frequently  noted  in  these  pages. 
From  the  first  there  was  a  want  of  attachment  among 
its  parts,  and  a  looseness  of  organisation  which  boded 
ill  for  the  prolonged  existence  of  the  body  politic.  It 
was  not  only  that  the  races  composing  it  were  so 
various,  the  character  and  conditions  of  the  provinces 
so  unlike,  the  ideas  prevalent  in  different  parts  so 
diverse,  but  the  entire  system  by  which  it  was  sought 
to  give  compactness  and  unity  to  the  disjecta  membra 
was  so  deficient  in  vigour  and  efficacy,  that  a  long 
continuance  of  cohesion  was  almost  impossible. 
"  Kingdom- Empires,"  as  they  have  been  called,  are 
always  unstable ;  and,  unless  the  dominant  power 
possesses  a  very  marked  preponderance,  they  are 
sure  sooner  or  later  to  break  up.  In  the  widespread 
empire  built  up  by  the  Arsacidae  the  Parthians  could 
not  really  claim  any  very  decided  superiority  over  the 
other  principal  component  parts,  either  in  physical  or 
in  mental  characteristics.  They  were  not  braver  than 
the    Medes,   the   Hyrcanians,  the   Armenians,  or  the 

358 


TENDENCY   OF    THE    EMPIRE    TO    BREAK    UP.  359 

Persians  ;  they  were  not  more  intelligent  than  the 
Babylonians,  the  Bactrians,  or  the  Assyrians.  That 
they  had  some  qualities  which  brought  them  to  the 
front,  cannot,  of  course,  be  denied;  but  these  were  not 
such  as  to  strike  the  minds  of  men  very  strongly,  or 
to  obtain  universal  and  unqualified  recognition.  Their 
rule  was  acquiesced  in  so  long,  rather  because  the 
Oriental  appreciates  the  advantages  of  settled  and 
quiet  government,  than  because  the  subject  races  re- 
garded them  as  having  any  special  aptitude  or  capacity 
for  governing.  Each  of  the  principal  nations  probably 
thought  itself  quite  as  fit  to  hold  the  first  place  in  the 
commonwealth  as  the  Parthians  ;  and  under  favour- 
able circumstances  each  secondary  monarch  was  quite 
ready  to  assert  and  maintain  his  independence. 

Revolts  of  subject  kingdoms  or  tribes  were  thus 
of  frequent  occurrence  during  the  entire  period  of  the 
Parthian  monarchy  ;  but,  as  time  went  on,  they 
became  more  frequent,  more  determined,  and  more 
difficult  to  subdue.  It  has  been  already  related  how, 
as  early  as  the  time  of  Vologases  I.,  Hyrcania  broke 
off  from  the  empire,  and  was  probably  not  reduced 
subsequently.1  Bactria  was  also  from  time  to  time 
a  sort  of  separate  appanage,  conceded  to  a  prince  of 
the  Royal  House,  who  accepted  it  in  satisfaction  of 
his  claims  to  the  chief  authority.  Armenia  was  still 
more  loosely  attached  to  the  empire,  being  more  often 
and  for  longer  periods  reckoned  an  independent  state 
than  a  subjected  one.  At  one  time  Babylonia  is 
found  almost  independent  under  Hymerus.2  The 
single   tie    of    a    nominal    subjection   to    a    distant 

1  Supra,  p.  296.  2  Page  119. 


j60      DOWNFALL,  OF    THE    PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

suzerain  proved  a  weak  bond  when  any  strain  was 
put  upon  it,  and  there  was  constant  danger  of  this  or 
that  province  detaching  itself  from  the  great  mass  of 
the  empire,  and  entering  upon  a  separate  existence. 

We  are  thus  entitled  to  say  that  there  was  some- 
thing like  a  general  discontent  of  the  provinces  with 
their  condition  und'T  the  central  government,  at  any 
rate  for  the  last  century  and  a  half  of  Parthian  rule. 
It  is  difficult,  however,  to  analyse  the  grounds  of  this 
discontent,  or  to  decide  what  elements  in  it  had  the 
greater  weight,  and  which  were  of  minor  importance. 
An  alien  rule  must  always  be  more  or  less  irksome  to 
those  who  have  to  submit  to  it,  and  must  more  or  less 
chafe  and  gall  them,  as  they  exceed  or  fall  short  in 
pride  and  sensibility.  The  friction  will  be  increased 
or  diminished  by  the  character  of  the  rule,  its  con- 
sonance with  justice,  its  regard  for  promises  and 
engagements,  its  care  for  its  subjects,  its  clemency, 
its  power  and  will  to  protect,  its  general  fairness  and 
equity.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Parthians  fell 
flagrantly  short  in  any  of  these  particulars,  or  deserve 
to  be  regarded  as  either  on  the  one  hand  weak  and 
careless,  or  on  the  other  harsh,  unjust,  and  oppressive. 
They  no  doubt  took  the  lion's  share  of  pomp,  power, 
and  privilege  ;  but  beyond  this  advantage,  which  is 
one  taken  by  all  dominant  peoples,  it  does  not  appear 
that  their  subjects  had  any  special  grievances  of  which 
to  complain.  The  Parthians  were  tolerant  ;  they  did 
not  interfere  with  the  religious  prejudices  of  their 
subjects,  or  attempt  to  enforce  uniformity  of  creed  or 
worship.  Their  military  system  did  not  press  over- 
heavily  on  the  subject  races  ;  nor  is  there  any  reason 


CAUSES   OF   GENERAL   DISCONTENT.  361 

to  believe  that  the  scale  of  their  taxation  was  ex- 
cessive. Such  tyranny  as  is  charged  upon  certain 
Parthian  monarchs  is  not  of  a  kind  that  would  have 
been  sensibly  felt  by  the  conquered  nations,  since  it 
was  exercised  on  none  who  were  not  Parthians.  If 
at  any  time  the  rulers  of  the  country  failed  to  perform 
the  great  duties  of  civil  government,  it  was  rather  in 
the  way  of  laxity  that  they  erred  than  of  tension, 
rather  by  loosening  the  bonds  of  authority  than  by 
over-tightening  them. 

Some  tangible  ground  for  the  general  discontent, 
beyond  the  "  ignorant  impatience  "  of  a  dominant  race 
which  is  so  usual,  may  perhaps  be  made  out  by  careful 
consideration,  in  two  respects,  but  in  two  only.  In 
the  first  place,  there  were  times  when  the  Parthian 
government  very  imperfectly  accomplished  its  great 
duty  of  preserving  internal  order  and  tranquillity. 
The  history  of  Anilai  and  Asinai,  which  has  been 
dwelt  upon  at  some  length  in  a  former  chapter,1 
brings  out  very  strongly  this  defect  in  the  Parthian 
governmental  system,  and  reveals  a  condition  of 
things  which,  if  it  had  been  permanent,  must  have 
been  intolerable.  We  can  only  suppose  that  the 
anarchical  times,  of  which  we  have  so  melancholy  a 
picture,  were  occasional  and  exceptional,  the  result  of 
internal  disorders,  which  ere  long  came  to  a  head,  and 
then  passed  away  ;  or  we  should  have  to  imagine  a 
government,  which  fulfilled  none  of  the  functions  of  a 
government,  lasting  for  centuries,  and  some  of  the 
most  spirited  nations  on  the  earth  submitting  to  it 
and  seeking  no  better. 

1  Chap.  XIV.  pp.  246-256. 


362      DOWNFALL    OF    THE   PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

The  other  failure  of  the  Parthians  belongs  to  the 
later  period  only  of  their  history.  It  consisted  in  the 
general  decline  of  the  vigour  of  the  nation,  which 
rendered  it  less  competent,  than  it  had  been  previously, 
to  afford  adequate  protection  to  the  conquered  states 
— especially  protection  against  the  wholly  alien  power, 
which  had  intruded  itself  into  Asia,  and  which  sought 
to  bring  all  the  nations  of  Asia  under  subjection. 
The  suzerainty  of  Parthia  had  been  accepted  by  the 
other  Asiatic  powers  as  that  of  the  one  out  of  their 
number  which  was  most  competent  to  make  head 
against  European  invaders,  and  to  secure  the  native 
races  in  continued  independence  of  an  influence  which 
they  recognised  as  antagonistic,  and  felt  to  be  hateful. 
It  may  well  have  appeared  at  this  time  to  the  various 
vassal  states  that  the  Parthian  vigour  had  become 
effete,  that  the  qualities  which  had  advanced  the  race 
to  the  leadership  of  Western  Asia  were  gone,  and 
that  unless  some  new  power  could  be  raised  up  to  act 
energetically  against  Rome,  the  West  would  obtain 
complete  dominion  over  the  East,  and  Asia  be 
absorbed  into  Europe.  Vague  thoughts  would  arise 
as  to  which  nation  might  be  conceived  to  be  the  fittest 
to  take  the  lead,  if  Parthia  had  to  be  deposed  ;  and 
the  instinct  of  self-aggrandisement  would  lead  the 
more  eminent  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  them- 
selves aspiring  to  the  position,  if  not  even  to  take 
measures  to  push  their  claims.  Probably  for  some 
considerable  time  before  the  movement  headed  by 
Artaxerxes,  son  of  Babek,  commenced,  such  thoughts 
had  been  familiar  to  the  wiser  men  among  many  of 
the  Asiatic  nations,  and  a  long  preparation  had  thus 


SPECIAL   GRIEVANCES    OF    THE    PERSIANS.     363 

been  made  for  the  revolution,  which  seemed  to  break 
out  so  suddenly  at  last. 

If,  ay  a  in,  we  ask,  what  peculiar  grounds  of  grievance 
had  the  Persians  above  the  other  subject  races,  or  why 
did  the  burden  of  raising  the  standard  of  revolt  fall 
especially  upon  them,  we  have  a  further  difficulty  in 
obtaining  an  answer.  There  is  no  appearance  of  the 
Persians  having  been  in  any  way  singled  out  by  the 
Parthians  for  oppression,  or  having  had  any  more 
grounds  of  complaint  against  them  than  any  other  of 
the  subject  nations.  The  complaints  which  are  made 
are  negative  rather  than  positive,  and  amount  to  little 
more  than  the  following: — 1.  That  high  offices, 
whether  civil  or  military,  were  for  the  most  part  con- 
fined to  those  of  Parthian  blood,  and  not  thrown  open  in 
any  fair  proportion  to  the  Persians.  2.  That  the  priests 
of  the  Persian  religion  were  not  held  in  sufficient 
honour,  being  even  less  accounted  of  in  the  later  than 
in  the  earlier  times  ;  and  3.  That  no  advantage  in 
any  respect  was  allowed  to  the  Persians  over  the  rest 
of  the  conquered  peoples,  notwithstanding  that  they 
had  for  so  many  years  exercised  supremacy  over 
Western  Asia,  and  given  to  the  list  of  Asiatic  worthies 
such  names  as  those  of  Cyrus  and  Darius  Hystaspis. 
It  was  thus  not  because  they  were  worse  treated  than 
their  brother  subjects  that  the  Persians  were  dissatis- 
fied, but  because  their  pretensions  were  higher.  They 
thought  themselves  deserving  of  exceptional  treat- 
ment, and,  since  they  did  not  receive  it,  they  murmured. 
In  fact,  the  Persians  had  at  no  time  ever  forgotten 
that  they  had  once  been  "  lords  of  Asia,"  and  it 
angered  them  that  their  conquerors  seemed  to  have 


364      DOWNFALL    OF    THE   PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

forgotten  it.  They  had  at  all  times  submitted  to 
Parthian  hegemony  as  it  were  under  protest ;  now 
they  were  no  longer  inclined  to  submit  to  it.  They 
believed,  and  probably  with  justice,  that,  under  the 
changed  circumstances  of  the  time,  they  were  better 
suited  than  the  Parthians  to  direct  the  affairs  of 
Western  Asia,  and  they  resolved  at  any  rate  to  make 
the  attempt.  Their  justification  is  to  be  found  in 
their  success.  As  the  Parthians  had  no  right  to  their 
position  but  such  as  arose  out  of  the  law  of  the 
strongest,  so,  when  the  time  came  that  they  had  lost 
this  pre-eminence,  superiority  in  strength  having 
passed  to  a  nation  hitherto  counted  among  their 
subjects,  it  was  natural  and  right  that  the  seat  of 
authority  should  shift  with  the  shift  in  the  balance  of 
power,  and  that  the  leadership  of  the  Persians  should 
be  once  more  recognised. 

In  one  respect  the  Parthian  rule  must  always  have 
grated  upon  the  feelings  of  their  Persian  subjects 
more  than  upon  those  of  the  generality,  since  there 
was  in  the  Parthians  an  ingrained  coarseness  and 
savagery  which  could  not  but  be  especially  distasteful 
to  a  people  of  such  comparative  refinement  as  the 
Persians.  Persian  art,  Persian  manners,  Persian 
literature  had  a  delicacy  and  a  polish  which  the  rude 
Parthians,  with  their  Tatar  breeding,  could  not 
appreciate  ;  and  the  countrymen  of  Cyrus  and  Darius, 
of  Firdausi  and  Hafiz,  must  have  had  an  instinctive 
aversion  from  the  nomadic  race  whose  manners  were 
still  deeply  tinged  with  Scythicism. 

It  may  also  be  suspected,  though  of  this  there  is 
less  evidence,  that  the  revolution  which  transferred  the 


PERSIAN   RELIGIOUS    ZEAL.  365 

dominion  of  Western  Asia  from  the  Parthians  to  the 
Persians,  from  the  Arsacid?e  to  the  Sassanidae,  was  to 
some  extent  a  religious  one.  The  "  Book-Religion  " 
of  Zoroaster,  with  its  dualism,  its  complicated  spirit- 
ualism, and  its  elaborate  ritual,  was  unsuited  for  the 
rough  times  through  which  Western  Asia  had  to  pass 
between  the  invasion  of  Alexander  and  the  foundation 
of  the  Neo-Persian  state,  and  it  appears  to  have  been 
superseded,  except  in  Persia  Proper,  by  a  ruder  system, 
of  which  the  principal  elements  were  devotion  to  the 
Sun  and  Moon  and  the  worship  of  ancestral  images. 
But  the  time  was  now  again  come  when  more  com- 
plicated ideas  were  in  the  ascendant.  The  various 
forms  of  Gnosticism  show  how  mysticism  once  more 
asserted  itself  among  the  Western  Asiatics  in  the  first 
and  second  centuries  of  our  era,  and  how  speculations 
were  rife  which  reopened  all  the  deepest  problems  of 
spiritual  religion.  The  stir  had  begun  which  issued 
ultimately  in  Manicheism,  and  the  Persian  aspirations 
after  leadership  may  have  been  partly  caused  by  a 
desire  to  push  their  religion  to  the  front,  and  to  take 
advantage  of  the  popular  favour  with  which  dualistic 
tenets  were  beginning  to  be  regarded.  It  is  certain 
that  among  the  principal  changes  consequent  upon 
the  success  of  the  Persians  was  a  religious  revolution 
in  Western  Asia — the  substitution  for  Parthian  toler- 
ance of  all  faiths  and  worships,  of  a  rigidly  enforced 
uniformity  in  religion,  the  establishment  of  the  Magi 
in  power,  and  the  bloody  persecution  of  all  such  as 
declined  obedience  to  the  precepts  of  Zoroaster. 

The  space  of  about   six  or  seven   years  seems  to 
have  separated  the  conclusion   of  peace  with   Rome 


366      DOWNFALL    OF   THE    PARTHIAN   EMPIRE. 

from  the  outbreak  of  rebellion  under  Artaxerxes. 
During  this  time  the  division  of  sovereignty  between 
Artabanus  V.  and  Vologases  V.  continued  without  in- 
terruption, and  the  power  of  Parthia  was  still  further 
weakened  by  Arsacid  intrigues  originating  with 
branches  of  the  royal  family  which  were  settled  in 
Bactria.  No  doubt  internal  debility  showed  itself  in 
various  ways,  and  the  tributary  king  of  Persia,  a  young, 
active,  and  energetic  prince,  became  daily  more  con- 
vinced of  his  ability,  if  not  to  recover  the  empire  of 
Cyrus,  at  any  rate  to  shake  off  the  rude  yoke  which 
had  galled  and  chafed  his  nation  for  so  many  centuries. 
Independence  was  probably  all  that  he  originally 
looked  for  ;  but,  in  course  of  time,  as  the  struggle 
went  on,  wider  views  with  respect  to  the  possibilities 
of  the  situation  opened  themselves  before  him,  and 
the  contest  became  one  for  life  or  death  between  the 
two  kingdoms.  After  establishing  his  authority  in 
Persia  Proper,  he  turned  his  arms  eastward  against 
Carmania  (Kerman),  and  in  a  short  space  of  time 
easily  reduced  that  sparsely  peopled  and  not  very 
desirable  country.  He  next  took  in  hand  a  more 
daring  enterprise.  The  valuable  and  fertile  country 
of  Media  adjoined  Persia  to  the  north.  Artaxerxes 
proceeded  to  make  war  in  this  quarter,  and  to  annex 
to  his  dominions  portions  of  the  Median  territory.  But 
this  was  to  attack  the  Parthian  kingdom  at  its  heart, 
since  Media,  Assyria  (Adiabene),  and  Babylonia 
formed  the  main  strength  and  the  central  mass  of  the 
Empire.  Artabanus,  who  had  thought  but  lightly  of 
a  Persian  revolt,  and  had  probably  regarded  incursions 
into  Carmania  with  absolute  indifference,  as  concern- 


LAST   EFFORTS   OF  ARTAVASDES.  367 

ing  his  brother  rather  than  himself,  was  now  effectu- 
ally roused.  Collecting  his  forces,  he  took  the  field  in 
person,  invaded  Persia  Proper,  and  engaged  in  a 
desperate  struggle  with  his  rival.  Three  great  battles 
are  said  to  have  been  fought  between  the  contending 
powers.  In  the  last,  which  took  place,  according  to 
the  Persian  authorities,  in  the  plain  of  Hormuz, 
between  Bebahan  and  Shuster,  on  the  course  of  the 
Jerahi  river,  Artabanus  was,  after  a  desperate  conflict, 
completely  defeated  by  his  antagonist  (A.D.  226),  and 
lost  his  life  in  the  battle. 

The  struggle,  however,  was    not   yet  over.     Arta- 


COIN    OK    ARTAVASDES. 


vasdes,  the  eldest  son  of  Artabanus,  claimed  the  crown, 
and  was  supported  by  a  large  number  of  adherents. 
His  uncle,  Chosroes,  who  had  received  the  throne  of 
Armenia  from  Artabanus,  espoused  his  cause,  gave  the 
Parthian  refugees  an  asylum  in  his  kingdom,  and  even 
fought  a  battle  with  Artaxerxes  in  their  defence.  In 
this  he  was  so  far  victorious  that  the  Persian  found 
it  necessary  to  retreat,  and  retire  to  his  own  dominions 
in  order  to  augment  his  forces.  But  the  struggle  was 
too  unequal  for  long  continuance.  Within  a  very  few 
years  of  its  commencement  the  contest  was  everywhere 
ended  ;  the  arms  of  Artaxerxes  prevailed,  and  the 
Parthian  Empire  was  overthrown.     All  the  provinces 


358      DOWNFALL   OF   THE   PARTHIAN  EMPIRE, 

submitted  ;  the  last  Arsacid  prince  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Persian  king  ;  and  the  founder  of  the  new 
dynasty  sought  to  give  legitimacy  to  his  rule  by  taking 
to  wife  an  Arsacid  princess. 

The  duration  of  the  Parthian  monarchy  was  a  little 
short  of  five  centuries.  It  commenced  about  B.C.  250, 
and  it  terminated  in  A.D.  227.  It  was  the  rule  of  a 
vigorous  tribe  of  Tatar  or  Turkic  extraction  over  a 
mixed  population,  chiefly  of  Semitic  or  Arian  race, 
and,  for  the  most  part,  more  advanced  in  civilisation 
than  their  rulers.  Though  its  organisation  was  loose,- 
it  was  not  ill -adapted  for  Orientals,  who  prefer  a  flexible 
system  to  one  where  everything  is  "cut  and  dry," and 
are  opposed  to  all  that  is  stiff  and  bureaucratic. 
Western  Asia  must  be  considered  to  have  enjoyed 
a  time  of  comparative  rest  under  the  Parthian 
sovereignty,  and  to  have  been  as  prosperous  as  at 
almost  any  other  period  of  its  history.  The  savage 
hordes  of  Northern  Asia  and  Europe  were,  in  the 
main,  kept  off;  and,  though  the  arms  of  Rome  from 
time  to  time  ravaged  the  more  western  provinces,  and 
even  occasionally  penetrated  to  the  capital,  yet  this 
state  of  things  was  exceptional  ;  for  the  most  part 
European  aggression  was  averted,  or  quickly  repulsed  ; 
very  few  conquests  were  made,  and  when  they  were 
made,  they  were  not  always  retained  ;  and  to  the  last 
the  limits  of  the  Parthian  dominion  remained  almost 
the  same  as  they  had  been  under  the  first  Mithridates. 
Still,  there  was  no  doubt  a  gradual  internal  decay, 
which  worked  itself  out  especially  in  two  directions. 
The  Arsacid  race,  with  which  the  idea  of  the  empire 
was  closely  bound  up,  instead  of  clinging  together  in 


ITS   DURATION  AND    CHARACTER.  369 

that  close  "  union  "  which  constitutes  true  "  strength," 
allowed  itself  to  be  torn  to  pieces  by  dissensions,  to 
waste  its  force  in  quarrels,  and  to  be  made  a  handle 
of  by  every  foreign  invader  or  domestic  rebel  who 
chose  to  use  its  name  in  order  to  cloak  his  own  selfish 
projects.  The  race  itself  does  not  seem  to  have  become 
exhausted.  Its  chiefs,  the  successive  occupants  of  the 
throne,  never  sank  into  mere  weaklings  or  fainecuits, 
never  shut  themselves  up  in  their  seraglios,  or  ceased 
to  take  an  active  and  leading  part,  alike  in  civil  broils 
and  in  struggles  with  foreign  princes.  Artabanus,  the 
adversary  of  Artaxerxes,  was  as  brave  and  capable  a 
monarch  as  had  ever  sat  upon  the  Parthian  throne  in 
previous  ages.  But  the  hold  which  the  race  had  on 
the  population,  native  and  foreign,  was  gradually 
weakened  by  the  feuds  which  raged  within  it,  by  the 
profusion  with  which  the  sacred  blood  was  shed  by 
those  in  whose  veins  it  ran,  and  the  difficulty  of 
knowing  which  living  member  of  it  was  its  true  head, 
and  so  entitled  to  the  allegiance  of  all  those  who 
wished  to  be  faithful  Parthian  subjects.  Further,  the 
vigour  of  the  Parthian  soldiery  must  have  gradually 
declined,  and  their  superiority  over  the  mass  of  the 
nations  under  their  dominion  must  have  diminished. 
Marked  evidence  was  given  of  this  when,  about  A.D. 
75,  Hyrcania  became  independent ;  and  it  is  possible 
that  there  may  have  been  other  cases  of  successful 
rebellions  in  the  remoter  eastern  regions.  Oriental 
races,  when  they  are  suddenly  lifted  to  power,  almost 
always  decline  in  strength,  and  sometimes  with 
extreme  rapidity.  The  Parthians  cannot  be  said  to 
have  experienced  a  rapid  deterioration  ;  but  they  too, 


370      DOWNFALL    OF    THE   PARTHIAN  EMPIRE. 

like  the  dominant  races  of  Western  Asia,  both  before 
and  after  them,  felt  in  course  of  time  the  softening 
influence  of  luxury,  and  had  to  yield  their  place 
to  those  who  had  maintained  manlier  and  hardier 
habits. 


XXIII. 


PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,   AND   CUSTOMS. 


"  The  Parthians,"  according  to  one  writer  of  high 
repute,  "  have  left  no  material  traces  of  their  exis- 
tence." x  When  the  Achaemenian  Persians  were 
struck  down  by  Alexander,  "  the  old  arts,"  he  says, 
"  disappeared  from  the  Mesopotamian  world."  It 
would  be  strange  indeed  if  so  broad  a  statement 
could  be  justified,  when  made  of  any  time  or  of  any 
distinguished  people.  Roughly  and  coarsely,  no 
doubt,  it  embodies  a  certain  curious  and  important 
fact — the  fact,  namely,  that  the  Parthians  were,  in  no 
full  or  pregnant  sense  of  the  terms,  either  builders  or 
proficients  in  any  of  the  fine  arts.  But  it  is  an  over- 
statement, a  very  considerable  exaggeration.  The 
position  held  by  the  Parthians  in  numismatics  should, 
alone  have  been  sufficient  to  save  them  from  the 
undeserved  reproach,  since  numismatists  have  long 
had  under  their  notice  many  hundred  types  of  coins 
issued  from  Parthian  mints  during  the  five-centuries 
of  their  sovereignty,  and  have  assigned  to  several  of 
them  a  fair  amount  of  merit.  Careful  inquiry  shows, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  that  in  other  branches 

1  See  Fergusson,  "  History  of  Architecture,"  vol.  ii.  p.  422. 

372 


PARTHIAN   ARCHITECTURE.  373 

of  art  also,  and  especially  in  architecture,  Parthia 
made  efforts  and  produced  results  not  wholly  des- 
picable. 

The  remains  at  Hatra,  or  El  Hadhr,  are  the  most 
imposing  which  can  reasonably  be  assigned  to  the 
Parthian  period.  Hatra  first  comes  into  notice  in  the 
?arly  part  of  the  first  century  before  Christ,  and  is 
then  a  place  of  no  small  importance.  It  successfully 
resists  Trajan  in  A.D.  116,  and  Severus  in  A.D.  198. 
It  is  then  described  as  a  large  and  populous  city, 
defended  by  strong  and  extensive  walls,  and  contain- 
ing within  it  a  famous  Temple  of  the  Sun,  celebrated 
for  the  great  value  of  its  accumulated  offerings.  The 
people  are  regarded  as  of  the  Arabian  stock,  and 
they  have  their  own  kings,  who  are  tributary  monarchs 
under  Parthia.  By  the  year  A.D.  363,  Hatra  has 
gone  to  ruins,  and  it  is  then  described  as  "  long  since 
deserted." x  It  plays  no  part  at  all  in  Sassanian 
history,  and  clearly  has  for  its  most  flourishing 
period  the  last  century,  or  century  and  a  quarter,  of 
the  Parthian  rule,  from  A.D.  100  to  A.D.  226. 

The  ruins  of  El  Hadhr  have  been  carefully  described 
by  two  English  travellers,  Mr.  Ross  and  Mr.  Ains- 
worth,  whose  accounts  will  be  found  in  the  ninth 
and  eleventh  volumes  of  the  "  Geographical  Society's 
Journal."  They  have  also  attracted  the  attention  of 
a  professional  critic,  Mr.  James  Fergusson,  who  has 
given  a  description  of  them,  with  one  or  two  wood- 
cuts, in  his  "  History  of  Architecture."  The  following 
account  rests  especially  on  the  two  former — the  only 
original — authorities. 

1  Ammianus  Maicellinus,  xxv.  8. 


374      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,    AND   CUSTOMS. 

The  city  of  Hatra  was  circular  in  shape,  and  nearly 
an  English  mile  in  diameter.  It  was  enclosed  by  a  wall, 
ten  feet  in  thickness,  built  of  large  square-cut  stones, 
and  strengthened  at  intervals  of  about  a  hundred  and 
seventy  yards  by  square  towers  or  bastions.  Its  cir- 
cumference considerably  exceeded  three  miles.  Out- 
side the  bastioned  wall  was  a  broad  and  deep  ditch, 


of  tlie  City-  0p 


Tfcdc,  Eamparf 

and  on  the  further  side  of  the  ditch  an  earthen 
rampart  of  considerable  size  and  thickness.  The 
wall  was  pierced  by  four  gateways,  of  which  the 
principal  faced  the  east.  Two  detached  forts,  situated 
on  eminences,  commanded  the  approaches  to  the  city, 
one  of  them  lying  towards  the  east  and  the  other 
towards  the  north. 


BUILDINGS   AT  AL   HADHR,   OR   HA  IRA.        375 

Within  the  walled  enclosure  the  circular  space  was 
divided    into    two    parts     by    a    water-course,    which 
crossed   it    from    north   to    south,  nearly   midway  in 
the  circle,  but  somewhat   more    towards   its    eastern 
portion.     The   city    proper   lay   west   of  the   water- 
course.     Here    were    the    public    edifices,    and     the 
houses   of  the  more  opulent  inhabitants.     The  space 
towards    the   east   was  used    chiefly  as  a  necropolis, 
though  a  certain  number  of  buildings  were  interspersed 
among  the  graves.     Almost  in  the  centre  of  the  circle 
stood  a  walled  enclosure,  nearly  square  in  plan,  and 
fronting  the  cardinal  points,  having  a  length  of  about 
eight  hundred  feet  from  west  to  east,  with  a  width  01 
about   seven    hundred.      Strong  bastions,   similar    in 
character  to  those  of  the  outer  circle,  flanked  the  wall 
at  intervals  along  its  entire  course.     The  space  within 
was   again  subdivided  by  a  wall   running    north  and 
south   into   an   outer  and  an  inner  court.     The  outer, 
which  lay  towards  the  east,  and  was  rather  the  larger 
of  the  two,  was  wholly  unencumbered  by  buildings, 
while  the  inner  contained  two  considerable  edifices. 
One    of  these,  and    the   less    important  of  the  two, 
stretched    from    north    to    south    across    the    entire 
enclosure,  and  abutted  upon    the  wall  which  divided 
the  two  courts.      It  was  confused   in  plan,  and  seems 
to  have  consisted   only  of  a  number  of  small  apart- 
ments, which  have   been   conjectured    to    have    been 
"guard-rooms."     The    other    building  was,    however, 
one  of  considerable  pretension  ;  and    it  is   from   this 
mainly   that   we   must    form    our  conception  of  Par- 
thian architecture. 

The  great  Palace,  or  "  Palace-Temple  "  of  Hatra,  as 


3/6      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

it  has  .been  called,  was  an  edifice  three  hundred  and 
sixty  feet  long  by  two  hundred  and  ten  feet  broad  in 
the  broadest  part.  It  consisted  of  a  series  of  seven 
oblong  vaulted  halls,  placed  side  by  side  longi- 
tudinally, with  a  certain  number  of  smaller  apart- 
ments, and  one  large  building  at  the  back.  The 
halls  were  of  various  dimensions.     The  smaller  ones, 


PLAN   OF   THE   PALACE-TEMPLE   OF   HATRA. 

of  which  there  were  four  (Nos.  I.,  III.,  IV.,  and  VI. 
on  the  plan),  measured  about  sixty  feet  long  by 
twenty  wide,  and  had  a  height  of  thirty  feet.  Two 
of  the  larger  ones  (Nos.  II.  and  V.  on  the  plan) 
measured  ninety  feet  in  length,  and  were  from  thirty- 
five  to  forty  feet  broad,  with  a  height  of  sixty  feet. 
One  (No.  VII.  on  the  plan),  with  a  width  of  forty- 


BUILDINGS   AT  AL   HADIIR,    OR   HATRA.        3JJ 

five,  had  a  length  of  not  much  above  seventy  feet. 
Variety  in  the  size  of  the  halls  was  thus  carefully 
studied,  while  the  shape  was  almost  identical,  and 
the  plan  of  construction  the  same  throughout.  "  All 
the  halls  were  roofed  by  semicircular  tunnel-vaults, 
without  ribs  or  other  ornaments  ;  and  they  were  all 
entirely  open  in  front,  all  the  light  and  air  being 
admitted  from  the  one  end."  *  Trte  outer  and  party 
walls  were  alike  thick  ;  the  doorways  connecting 
apartments  were  awkwardly  narrow,  and  their 
position  in  the  walls  which  they  pierced  was  irregular 
and  unsymmetrical.  The  small  apartments  behind 
the  halls  received  no  light,  except  from  these  narrow 
doorways,  and  must  have  been  almost  absolutely 
dark. 

The  large  building  attached  to  the  series  of  halls 
at  the  back  lay  directly  behind  the  second  hall,  from 
which  there  was  an  opening  into  it.  This  building 
consisted  of  a  single  chamber,  square  in  shape,  and 
measuring  about  forty  feet  each  way,  surrounded  on 
all  sides  by  a  vaulted  passage,  into  which  light 
penetrated  from  two  windows,  situated  at  its  south- 
west and  north-west  angles,  and  from  a  doorway  in 
the  middle  of  the  western  wall.  The  chamber,  how- 
ever, which  the  passage  surrounded,  could  only  be 
entered  from  the  east,  where,  directly  opposite  to 
the  communication  with  Hall  No.  II.,  was  a  doorway 
surmounted  by  a  magnificent  frieze.  Above  a  row 
of  acanthus  leaves,  delicately  carved,  was  placed  an 
ornamentation  of  inverted  gradines,  on  which  followed 
a  line  of  oval  rings,  each  containing  an  oval  ball  in  the 

1  Fergusson,  "  History  of  Architecture,"  vol.  ii.  p.  424. 


3j8      PARTHIAN    ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 


centre.  Immediately  over  this  was  a  line  of  emblematic 
figures — griffins,  eagles,  human  and  animal  heads,  and 
the  like — as  will  be  best  understood  by  the  accompany- 
ing representation,  which  is  taken  from  a  drawing  by 
Mr.  Ross.  Crowning  the  whole  was  a  cornice  projecting 
slightly,  and  covered  with  a  sort  of  arabesque  or  scroll- 
work. Among  the  emblematic  heads  is  one,  which 
so  manifestly  represents  the  Sun-God,  that  the  build- 
ing has  been  generally  recognised  as  a  temple  to  that 
deity.     Mr.  Fergusson,  however,  thinks  that  it  "  more 


^E^a^^^^^^^^^^^^p 


FRIEZE   IN   THE   PALACE-TEMPLE    OF   HATRA. 

probably  contained  a  stair  or  inclined  plane,  leading 
to  the  roof  or  upper  rooms,  which  almost  certainly 
existed  over  the  smaller  halls  at  least."  l 

The  chief  ornamentation,  however,  of  the  Hatra 
"  Palace-Temple  "  was  on  its  eastern  facade,  which 
was  evidently  its  main  front.  Here  the  seven  con- 
secutive arches  of  the  basement  storey,  which  is  all 
that  now  exists,  formed  in  themselves  no  mean  adorn- 
ment, and  this  was  heightened  in  several  ways  by 
artistic  additions.  In  the  first  place,  the  arches 
2  Fergusson's  "  History  of  Architecture,"  vol.  ii.  p.  424. 


BUILDINGS  AT  AL    HADHk,   OR   HATRA.        379 

sprang  from  pillars,  or  rather  pilasters,  having  bases 
and  capitals  of  some  elegance,  the  number  of  such 
pilasters  along  the  entire  front  amounting  to  sixteen. 
Secondly,  the  stones  composing  the  archivolts  of  the 
arches  bore  a  human  head,  or  mask,  under  a  cornice 
of  ovals  and  acanthus  leaves,  which  gave  a  very- 
peculiar  character  to  the  edifice,  and  has  no  exact 
parallel  elsewhere.  "  The  only  thing  known  at  all 
similar,"  says  Mr.  Fergusson,  "  is  the  celebrated  arch 
at  Vol  terra  with  three  masks ;  but  here  these  are 
infinitely  more  numerous  over  all  the  arches,  and 
form  in  fact  the  principal  features  of  the  decora- 
tions." 1  Further,  in  the  spaces  be- 
tween the  pilasters  were,  in  some 
cases,  sculptures  representing  embla- 
matic  figures,  as  griffins,  and  the  like. 
Internally,  the  halls  had,  for  the 
most  part,  no  ornamentation.  The 
four  smaller  ones  were  absolutely  stones  of  archi- 
devoid  of  it,  while    even    the    larger  volts. 

ones  had  only  a  scanty  amount.  The  longer  sides  of 
the  halls  II.  and  V.  were  broken  by  three  squared 
pilasters,  rising  to  the  commencement  of  the  vaulting, 
and  terminated  by  a  quasi-capital  of  ornamental  work, 
consisting  of  a  series  of  alternate  ovals  and  lozenges, 
each  oval  containing  in  its  centre  a  ball  of  dark  stone. 
Underneath  these  quasi-capitals,  at  the  distance  of 
between  two  and  three  feet,  ran  a  cornice,  which 
crossed  the  pilasters,  and  extended  the  whole  length 
of  the  apartment,  sometimes  ornamented  with  flowers 
and  half-ovals,  sometimes  with  alternate  ovals  and 
1  Fergusson's  "  History  of  Architecture,"  vol.  ii.  p.  425. 


380      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,    AND    CUSTOMS. 

lozenges.  Finally,  on  the  pilasters,  immediately 
below  the  cornice,  were  sculptured  either  two  or 
three  human  heads,  the  length  of  each  head  being 
about  two  feet,  and  the  faces  representing  various 
types  of  humanity,  some  old  and  some  young,  some 


PILASTER    AT   HATRA,    WITH    CORNICE   AND    CAPITAL. 

male  and  some  female,  some  apparently  realistic,  some 
idealised  and  more  or  less  grotesque  in  their  accompani- 
ments.    The  drawing  of  the  heads  is  said  to  be  full 
of  spirit  and  their  general  effect  lifelike  and  striking. 
No.  VII.  had  a  peculiar  ornamentation.     In  lieu  of 


BUILDINGS   AT   AL   HADHR,   OR   HATRA.        381 

pilasters  and  cornices,  the  two  side  walls  appear  to 
have  been  decorated  with  two  rows  of  eight  human- 
headed  bulls  standing  out  from  the  wall  as  far  as  their 
shoulders  at  a  distance  from  the  ground  of  about  ten 
feet.  Similar  figures  of  lions  are  found  occasionally 
in  Phoenicia,  but  otherwise  the  ornamentation  is  very 
unusual. 

It  is    believed  by  Mr.  Fergusson  and  others,  that 


PROPOSED    RESTORATION    OF   THE   HATRA   BUILDING. 

the  entire  edifice,  or  at  any  rate  the  greater  portion  of 
it,  had  originally  an  upper  story.  At  present  the 
ruins  nowhere  attain  a  height  much  exceeding  sixty 
feet  ;  but  it  is  thought  that  this  height  was,  originally, 
at  least  doubled,  either  a  single  story,  or  two  stories, 
containing  apartments,  being  superimposed  upon  the 
existing  range  of  vaulted  halls.  One  explorer * 
thought  that  he  found  some  remains  of  the  staircase, 
which  conducted  to  these  upper  apartments,  at  the 
southern   extremity  of  the  building.      If  we   accept 

1  Mr.  Ross. 


382      PARTHIAN  ART,    RELIGION,   AND   CUSTOMS. 

the  view  of  this  traveller,  we  may  suppose,  with 
another  explorer,1  that  the  entire  eastern  facade  of  the 
edifice  presented  some  such  appearance  as  shown  on 
page  381,  and  conclude  that  the  type  of  architecture, 
which  is  entirely  different  from  any  previously  known 
in  the  country,  either  under  the  Assyrians,  the  Baby- 
lonians, or  the  Achaemenian  Persians,  was  an  inven- 
tion of  the  Parthian  period,  though  whether  struck 
out  by  the  Parthians  themselves,  or  by  one  of  the 
nations  subjected  to  their  sway,  may  be  doubted.  The 
type  appears  to  be  the  germ  out  of  which  the  Sas- 
sanian  architecture,  well  known  for  its  magnificence, 
grew  up,  and  may  be  said  to  have  held  possession  of 
Mesopotamia  and  the  adjacent  countries  from  about 
A.D.  150  to  A.D.  640,  when  it  was  superseded  by  the 
architecture  of  the  Arabs. 

The  general  style  of  the  buildings  at  Hatra  has  been 
said  to  have  been  "  Roman  or  Bvzantine,"  and  the 
details  are  declared  to  be  in  many  cases  "almost  literal 
imitations  of  Roman  models."  2  This  may  well  be, 
since  Rome  was,  at  the  time  of  their  erection, 
universally  recognised  as  standing  at  the  head  of 
civilisation  and  the  arts,  so  that  the  builders  of  other 
nations  naturally  went  to  her  for  instruction.  But  the 
plan  of  the  Hatra  building  is  certainly  not  Roman  ; 
and  it  is  allowed  that  the  execution  of  the  ornaments  is 
too  rude  to  admit  of  the  idea,  that  the  work  was  done 
under  the  superintendence  of  a  Roman  artist.  Native 
talent  alone  can  have  been  employed  ;  and  there  is 
every  reason  for  considering  that  we  may  regard  the 

1  Mr.  Ainsworth. 

2  Fergusson,  "  History  of  Architecture,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  424-5. 


ARCHITECTURAL    FRAGMENTS  AT    WARKA.    ^83 

work  as  a  fair  specimen  of  what  was  achieved  by  the 
native  builders  of  the  Parthian  period  during;  the  latter 
times  of  the  empire.  The  palace  of  Vologases  III. 
at  Ctesiphon,  which  Avidius  Cassius  destroyed  in  his 
invasion,1  was  probably  of  the  same  general  character, 
a  combination  of  lofty  halls,  suitable  for  ceremonies 
and  audiences,  with  small  and  dark  sleeping  or  living 
rooms,  opening  out  of  them,  the  whole  placed  in  the 
middle  of  a  paved  court,  with  ready  access  to  a  chapel 
or  temple,  where  the  devotions  of  the  Court  might  be 
performed. 

It  must  be  added  that  the  halls  and  rooms  of  the 
Hatra  edifice  are  divided  into  two  groups.  Halls  I., 
II.,  and  III.,  with  the  apartments  in  their  rear,  are 
inter-connected,  and  form  one  group.  Halls  IV.,  V., 
VI.,  and  VII.,  form  the  other.  A  low  fence,  starting 
from  the  wall  separating  between  Halls  III.  and  IV., 
was  carried  in  a  straight  line,  eastward,  across  the 
court  in  front  of  the  building,  to  the  wall  separating 
the  inner  court  from  the  outer.  Thus  there  could  be 
no  communication  between  the  two  groups  of  apart- 
ments excepting  by  making  a  long  circuit  round  almost 
the  entire  edifice.  It  is  thought  that  the  two  groups 
formed,  respectively,  the  male  and  the  female  apart- 
ments. 

Some  architectural  fragments,  discovered  by  Mr. 
Loftus  at  Warka  (the  ancient  Erech),  in  combination 
with  a  large  number  of  Parthian  coins,  and  therefore 
possessing  a  claim  to  be  regarded  as  Parthian,  seem 
to  deserve  mention  in  this  place.  They  consisted 
of  fragments  of  cornices,  capitals,  bases  of  columns, 
1  See  above,  p.  326. 


384      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

friezes,  fragments  of  open -screen  work,  with  compli- 
cated geometric  designs  of  different  patterns  on  the 
opposite  sides,  large  flakes  of  painted  plaster,  and  the 
like.  Most  of  the  capitals  resembled  those  of  the 
Greek  Ionic  order,  but  presented  peculiarities  in  the 
proportions  of  the  volutes  and  other  members.  Some, 
however,  were  of  an  altogether  peculiar  type.  One  in 
particular,  which,  though  square  at  the  summit,  must 
have  crowned  a  round  column,  is  especially  remarkable. 
"  A  large  and  elegant  leaf  rises  from  the  necking,  and 
bends  under  each  corner  of  the  abacus.     Springing 


ARCHITECTURAL    tRAGMENTS   AT   WARKA. 

from  behind  a  smaller  curled  leaf  in  the  centre  is  the 
bust  of  a  human  figure,  wearing  the  same  preposter- 
ous head-dress  which  is  characteristic  of  the  (Parthian) 
slipper  coffins,  and  the  Parthian  coins." *  Other 
capitals  had  crowned  square  pillars,  and  were  orna- 
mented with  ovals,  and  half- ovals,  rosettes,  leaves 
resembling  those  of  the  oak,  circles  containing  geome- 
trical tracery,  and  the  like.  One  large  fragment  of  a 
cornice  bore,  among  other  devices,  a  spirited  crouch- 
ing  griffin,    which    reminded    the   discoverer   of  the 

1  Loftus,  "  Chaldsea  and  Susiana,"  p.  226. 


PARTHIAN    FICTILE    ART.  385 

similar  figures  sculptured  on  the  Temple  frieze  at 
Hatra.1  Some  of  the  friezes  had  a  decoration  con- 
sisting of  alternate  vine-leaves  and  bunches  of  grapes. 

The  building,  within  which  these  fragments  were 
discovered,  was  a  rectangular  chamber  forty  feet  long 
by  twenty-eight  feet  wide,  the  mud  walls  of  which, 
still  standing  to  the  height  of  four  feet,  had  been 
covered  originally  with  painted  plaster  of  various 
hues,  and  further  adorned  with  small  Ionic  half 
columns.  The  columns  had  half-smooth  and  half- 
fluted  shafts.  The  lower  portion  of  each  was  smooth, 
and  had  been  striped  diagonally  with  bands  of  red, 
green,  yellow,  and  black  ;  the  upper  portion  was 
fluted,  the  flutes  being  painted  black,  red,  and  yellow 
alternately,  while  the  level  ridges  between  them  were 
painted  white.  Underneath  the  floor  of  the  chamber) 
at  the  depth  of  six  feet,  was  discovered  a  "slipper- 
coffin  "  of  the  type  so  common  at  Warka,  bearing  em- 
bossed figures  on  its  upper  surface  of  a  type  generally 
regarded  as  Parthian.  The  building  would  thus  seem 
to  have  been  a  sepulchral  chamber  erected  over  a 
tomb,  such  as  is  found  so  frequently  in  Phoenicia  and 
Egypt. 

The  decorative  and  fictile  art  of  the  Parthians  has 
also  received  considerable  illustration  from  the  re- 
mains discovered  at  Warka.  These  included  several 
statuettes  modelled  in  terra-cotta  ;  a  vast  number  of 
slipper-coffins  ;  many  jars,  jugs,  vases,  and  lamps  in 
earthenware  ;  some  small  glass  bottles  ;  and  various 
personal  ornaments,  such  as  armlets,  bangles,  beads  for 
necklaces  and  fillets,  finger-rings,  ear-rings,  and  toe- 

*  Compare  above,  p.  378. 


386      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

rings.  Of  the  statuettes  the  most  interesting  is  one 
representing  a  Parthian  warrior,  recumbent, and  leaning 
upon  his  left  arm,  wearing  a  coat-of-mail  or  padded 
tunic  reaching  to  the  knees,  greaves,  and  a  helmet  orna- 
mented in  front.  Others  represented  females  :  these 
had  lofty  head-dresses,  which  sometimes  rose  into 
two  peaks  or  horns,  recalling  the  costume  of  English 
ladies  in  the  time  of  Henry  IV.  These  figures  were 
veiled,  and  carefully  draped  about  the  upper  part  of 


PARTHIAN    JUGS    AND   JARS. 

the  person,  but  showed  the  face,  and  had  the  legs  bare 
from  the  knee  downwards. 

The  jars,  jugs,  vases,  and  lamps  in  earthenware 
greatly  resembled  those  of  the  Assyrian  and  Babylo- 
nian periods,  but  were  on  the  whole  more  elegant  and 
artistic.  The  influence  of  Greek  models  is  apparent 
in  them.  One  jug,  the  central  one  of  the  engraving, 
is  of  "  extremely  artistic  form,"1  and  was  placed  in 
a  recess,  within  arm's  length  of  a  coffin,  probably  for 

1  Loftus,  "  Chaldaea  and  Susiana,"  p.  213. 


PARTHIAN   FICTILE   ART 


3*7 


388      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

the  refreshment  of  the  deceased.  The  lamps  repro- 
duce well-known  Greek  types. 

The  "  slipper-coffins "  found  at  Warka  possess  a 
peculiar  interest.  They  are  of  a  very  beautiful  green 
glazed  ware,  and  vary  in  length  from  three  feet  to  six. 
Great  skill  in  pottery  must  have  been  required  for 
their  construction.  The  upper  surface  presents  at  one 
end  a  large  oval  aperture,  by  means  of  which  the  body 
was  passed  into  the  interior — an  aperture  which  is 
furnished  with  a  depressed  ledge  for  the  reception  of 
a  lid,  which  exactly  fitted  it,  and  was  firmly  fixed  in 
its  place  by  a  layer  of  lime  cement.  At  the  lower  ex- 
tremity was  a  semicircular  hole,  to  prevent  the  burst- 
ing of  the  coffin  by  the  gases  disengaged  during 
decomposition.  Both  the  lid  which  closed  the  large 
aperture,  and  the  remainder  of  the  upper  surface  of 
the  coffin,  were  ordinarily  divided  by  elevated  ridges 
into  small  rectangular  compartments,  each  containing 
an  embossed  figure  of  a  man,  standing  with  his  arms 
akimbo  and  his  legs  astride,  with  a  short  sword  hang- 
ing from  his  belt,  and  on  his  head  an  enormous 
coiffure  of  a  very  curious  appearance. 

The  personal  ornaments  were  in  many  cases  of 
tasteful  and  elegant  design.  Tall  pointed  head- 
dresses in  thin  gold  are  said  to  have  been  not  uncom- 
mon, and  one  or  two  broad  ribbons  of  thin  gold  not 
unfrequently  occurred  in  the  tombs,  depending  on 
either  side  of  the  head.  Gold  and  silver  finger-rings 
abounded,  and  some  had  stones  set  in  them.  Bead- 
necklaces  were  found,  together  with  armlets,  bangles, 
and  toe-rings  of  silver,  brass,  and  copper.  Many  of 
the    ear-rings    were    exceedingly    elegant,  and    small 


PARTHIAN    JESTHETIC    ART. 


389 


gold  plates,  which  seem  to  have  been  strung  together 
for  necklaces  or  fillets,  were  very  delicately  modelled. 

The  glass  bottles  were  perhaps  lachrymatories. 
They  closely  resemble  glass-work  of  the  Assyrian 
and  Babylonian  periods,  and  exhibit  the  same  irides- 
cent hues  which  are  the  result  of  slow  decomposition. 
The  commonest  shape  is  a  rounded  belly,  surmounted 
by  a  short,  round  neck,  having  a  small  handle  on 
either  side  of  it,  but  flattened  so  that  the  smaller 
diameter  of  the  bottle  is  less  than  one-third  of  the 
greater  one. 

In  purely  aesthetic  art — art,  that  is,  into  which  the 
idea  of  the  useful  does  not  enter  at  all — the  Parthians 


PARTHIAN   PERSONAL   ORNAMENTS. 

appear  to  have  been  very  deficient.  Beyond  the 
statuettes,  in  clay  and  terra-cotta,  which  have  been 
already  described,1  no  figures  "  in  the  round  "  can  be 
ascribed  to  them.  Nor  are  there  more  than  three  or 
four  reliefs  which  have  much  claim  to  be  pronounced 
Parthian.  One  alone  is  undisputable.  At  the  foot  of 
the  great  rock  of  Behistun,  which  exhibits  at  the  height 
of  many  feet  above  the  plain  the  long  inscription,  and 
remarkable  sculpture,  of  Darius,  the  son  of  Hystaspes, 
is  a  much-worn  sculpture  in  alto  relievo,  which  is 
proved  by  the  inscription  accompanying  it  to  belong  to 

1  See  above,  p.  386. 


390      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

the  second  reign  of  Gotarzes  (A.D.  46-51),  and  which 
was  almost  certainly  set  up  by  that  monarch  after  his 
defeat  of  the  pretender,  Meherdates.1  It  seems  to 
have  contained  a  series  of  tall  figures,  looking  towards 
the  right,  and  apparently  engaged  in  a  march  or  pro- 
cession, while  above  and  between  them  were  smaller 
figures  of  men  on  horseback,  armed  with  lances,  and 
galloping  in  the  same  direction.  One  of  these  was 
attended  by  a  Nike,  or  figure  of  Victory,  floating  in 
the  air,  and  about  to  place  a  diadem  around  the  rider's 
brow.  The  present  condition  of  the  sculpture  is  ex- 
ceedingly bad.  Time  and  atmospheric  influences  have 
almost  completely  worn  away  the  larger  figures,  which 
the  latest  travellers  appear  not  even  to  have  perceived  ; 
and  a  recent  governor  of  Kirmanshah  has  barbarously 
inserted  into  the  middle  of  the  relief  an  arched  niche, 
in  which  he  has  placed  a  wholly  worthless  Arabic 
inscription.  Under  these  circumstances,  there  is  a 
difficulty  in  forming  any  opinion  on  the  original 
artistic  merit  of  the  work  ;  but  the  best  judges  are 
agreed  in  pronouncing  that,  even  at  its  best,  it  must 
have  been  a  work  of  inferior  quality,  falling  consider- 
ably below  the  level  attained  by  the  Assyrian  and  even 
the  Achaemenian  artists.  The  resemblance  is  rather 
to  the  productions  of  the  Sassanian,  or  New-Persian, 
period.  The  human  figures  have  aheaviness  and  clumsi- 
ness about  them  which  it  is  painful  to  contemplate  ;  the 
horses  are  rudely  outlined,  and  are  too  small  for  the 
men  who  ride  them  ;  the  figure  of  Victory  is  out  of  all 
proportion  to  that  of  the  hero  whom  she  crowns, 
and   the  diadem  which   she  places  upon  his  head  is 

1  Supra,  p.  267. 


PARTHIAN  RELIEFS.  39 1 

ridiculously  large,  being  almost  as  big  as  herself!  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  spirit  in  the  attitude  both  of 
men  and  horses  ;  the  Victory  floats  well  in  mid-air; 
and  the  relief  is  free  from  the  coarse  grotesqueness 
which  is  so  offensive  in  the  greater  part  of  the  Sassa- 
nian  sculptures. 

•  Another  relief,  belonging  probably  to  a  later 
period,  after  the  Parthians  had  adopted  a  Semitic 
instead  of  the  Greek  character,  has  the  Sassanian 
defects  still  more  accentuated.  It  represents  a  king 
mounted  on  horseback,  and  receiving  a  chaplet  at  the 
hands  of  a  subject.  The  king  wears  a  low  cap  bound 
round  with  the  diadem,  the  two  long  ends  of  which 
depend  over  his  shoulder.  He  is  dressed  in  a  closely 
fitting  tunic  and  loose  trousers,  and  wears  also  a  short 
cloak,  fastened  under  his  chin,  and  reaching  nearly  to 
the  knee.  On  his  right  arm  he  seems  to  carry  a 
bracelet  ;  and  his  feet  are  encased  in  boots.  The 
horse  which  he  bestrides  is  small  but  strongly  made  ; 
the  tail  is  long  ;  the  ears  seem  to  be  cropped,  and  the 
mane  plaited.  The  whole  representation  is  rude  and 
clumsy,  the  forepart  of  the  horse,  and  the  Parthian 
who  offers  the  chaplet,  being  particularly  ill  drawn. 
The  relief  is  accompanied  by  an  inscription  in  the 
Parthian  (Semitic)  character. 

A  series  of  reliefs,  discovered  by  the  Baron  de  Bode 
in  the  Bakhtyari  mountains  in  the  year  1841,  is  also 
generally  regarded  by  those  best  acquainted  with 
the  subject  as  Parthian.  In  one  of  these  a  hunter, 
mounted  on  horseback,  and  armed  with  a  bow  and 
arrows  and  a  sword,  or  short  spear,  is  engaged  in 
combat   with    a   bear.     The  bear  raises  itself  on  its 


392      PARTHIAN   ART,    RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS.      . 

hind  legs  to  a  level  with  the  horse's  head,  and 
advances  boldly  to  the  attack.  The  hunter,  who  is 
clothed  simply  in  a  long  flowing  robe,  like  a  dressing- 
gown,  and  a  rounded  cap,  leans  forward  on  his  horse 
to  meet  the  angry  animal,  and  thrusts  his  sword,  or 
spear,  whichever  it  may  be,  into  its  neck.  The  horse 
shows  no  alarm,  but  ambles  gently  to  the  encounter. 
The  execution  is  somewhat  rude,  but  the  figures  are 
fairly  well  drawn,  if  we  except  the  head  of  the  house. 
Another  relief  on  the  same  rock  shows  a  female 
figure  reclining  on  a  couch,  and  guarded  by  three 
male  attendants,  one  at  the  head  of  the  couch, 
unarmed,  and  the  remaining  two  at  its  foot,  seated, 
and  armed  with  spears.  The  female  has  puffed-out 
hair,  and  carries  in  her  right  hand,  which  is  out- 
stretched, a  chaplet  or  wreath.  One  of  the  spearmen 
has  a  curious  rayed  head-dress  ;  the  other  has  a  short 
streamer  attached  to  the  head  of  his  spear.  Below 
the  main  group  are  three  rudely  carved  standing 
figures,  which  represent  probably  other  attendants. 
The  third  relief  of  the  series  is  the  largest  and  most 
elaborate.  It  shows  us  a  personage  of  importance, 
perhaps  a  Magus,  engaged  in  what  seems  to  be  a 
religious  ceremonial,  standing  with  his  right  arm 
elevated  by  the  side  of  a  cippus,  adorned  with 
wreaths  or  chaplets,  and  mounted  upon  a  threefold 
pedestal.  Fifteen  spectators  are  present,  arranged  in 
two  rows,  one  above  the  other,  and  all  of  them,  except 
the  first  in  each  row,  standing.  The  first  in  each  row 
sits  upon  a  rudely  designed  chair  or  stool.  A 
religious  function  is  probably  represented.  We  can 
scarcely  fail  to  recognise  in  the  principal  figure,  who 


GENERAL   ESTIMATE   OF   THEIR   ART.  393 

wears  a  conical  cap,  has  his  hair  puffed  out  in 
enormous  masses  on  either  side  of  the  head,  like  the 
kings  upon  the  later  coins,  and  is  altogether  richly 
costumed,  a  priest  of  the  Parthian  religion,  probably 
a  great  hierarch,  engaged  in  one  of  the  duties  of  his 
office.  Perhaps  we  may  best  regard  the  set  of  reliefs 
as  forming  a  connected  series,  No.  I.  representing  the 
Parthian  monarch  occupied  in  the  chase  of  the  bear ; 
No.  II.  the  queen  awaiting  his  return  on  her  couch  in 
the  midst  of  her  attendants  ;  and  No.  III.  exhibiting 
the  chief  Magus  attached  to  the  Court  making  prayer 
for  the  monarch's  safety. 

Altogether,  the  Parthians  cannot  be  said  to  have 
shown  more  than  a  very  moderate  degree  of  artistic 
or  aesthetic  talent.  Their  architecture  is  their  best 
point  ;  and  even  that  falls  far  below  the  architecture 
of  the  other  dominant  races  of  Western  Asia,  whether 
before  or  after  them,  whether  Assyrians,  Babylonians, 
Achaemenian  Persians,  Sassanian  Persians,  Mongols, 
or  Arabs.  Their  glyptic  art  is  even  worse,  and,  con- 
sidering that  they  had  access,  not  only  to  Assyrian 
and  Achaemenian,  but  also,  in  some  degree,  to  Greek 
models,  must  be  regarded  as  possessing  a  very  low 
amount  of  merit.  A  certain  number  of  their  coins  are 
fairly  good,  and  one  or  two  of  their  reliefs,  though  rude 
and  clumsy,  have  spirit.  But,  speaking  generally,  we 
must  admit  that  the  vocation  of  the  people  was  not 
towards  the  artistic,  and  that  they  were  probably  well- 
advised  to  employ  their  energies  in  other  directions. 
The  scant  remains  of  their*art  are  an  indication  that 
they  recognised  their  own  deficiencies,  and,  conscious 
that  it  was  not  in  their  power  to  excel  in  the  aesthetic 


394      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,   AND   CUSTOMS. 

field,  preferred  to  occupy  themselves  in  pursuits  for 
which  they  were  better  fitted,  as  war,  hunting,  and 
government. 

Not  much  can  be  said  on  the  subject  of  the 
Parthian  religion.  It  seems  probable  that,  under 
the  Achaemenian  Persians,  they  submitted  to  the 
Zoroastrian  system,  as  maintained  by  the  princes  of 
the  house  of  Cyrus  from  Xerxes  downwards  ;  but,  as 
this  was  certainly  not  their  own  ancestral  religion, 
they  cannot  be  supposed  to  have  been  at  any  time 
very  zealous  followers  of  the  Bactrian  prophet.  As 
age  succeeded  age,  they  naturally  became  more  luke- 
warm in  their  feelings,  and  more  lax  in  their  religious 
observance.  The  main  characteristic — the  essence,  if 
we  may  so  call  it — of  the  Zoroastrian  belief,  was 
Dualism — recognition  of  Two  Great  Principles  of 
good  and  evil,  called  respectively  Ormazd  and  Ahri- 
man.  We  need  not  doubt  that,  with  their  lips,  the 
Parthians  from  first  to  last  admitted  this  antagonism, 
and  professed  a  belief  in  Ormazd  as  the  supreme  god, 
and  a  dread  of  Ahriman  and  his  ministers.  But,  prac- 
tically, their  religious  aspirations  rested,  not  on  these 
dim  abstractions,  but  on  beings  whose  existence  they 
could  better  realise,  and  whom  they  could  feel  to  be 
less  remote  from  themselves.  The  actual  devotions  of 
the  Parthians  were  rendered  to  the  Sun  and  Moon,  to 
deities  which  were  supposed  to  preside  over  the  Royal 
House,  and  to  ancestral  idols,  which  each  family 
possessed,  and  conveyed  with  it  from  place  to  place 
with  every  change  of  habitation.  The  Sun  was 
saluted  at  his  rising,  was  worshipped  in  temples, 
probably    under    the    Arian    name    of    Mithra,    with 


POSITION   OF    THE    MAGI   IN   PARTHIA.         395 

sacrifices  and  offerings  ;  had  statues  erected  in  his 
honour,  and  was  usually  associated  with  the  lesser 
luminary.1  The  deities  of  the  Royal  House  were 
probably  either  genii,  ministers  of  Ormazd,  like  the 
bagdha  vithiya  of  the  Persians,  or  else  the  ancestors 
of  the  reigning  monarch,  to  whom  a  qualified  divinity 
seems  to  have  been  assigned  in  the  later  times  of  the 
empire.  The  Parthian  kings  usually  swore  by  these 
deities  on  solemn  occasions,  and  other  members  of  the 
royal  family  made  use  of  the  same  oath.  The  main 
worship,  however,  of  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
even  when  they  were  of  the  royal  stock,  was  con- 
centrated upon  ancestral  images,  which  had  a  place 
sacred  to  them  in  each  house,  and  received  the 
constant  adoration  of  the  household. 

In    the   early  times  of  the  empire  the  Magi  were 

held  in  high  repute,  and  most  of  the  peculiar  tenets 

and  rites  of  the  Magian  religion  were  professed  and 

followed  by  the  Parthians.     Elemental  worship  was 

practised.     Fire  was   held   sacred,  and   there  was  an 

especial  reverence  for  rivers.     Dead  bodies  were  not 

burned,  but  were  exposed   to  be  devoured  by  birds 

and   beasts  of  prey,  after  which   the  dry  bones  were 

collected  and  placed  in  tombs.     The  Magi  formed  a 

large   portion  of  the  great   national   council,2    which 

elected,  and,  if  need  were,  deposed  the  kings.     But,  in 

course  of  time,  much  laxity   was    introduced.       The 

Arsacid    monarchs   of  Armenia  allowed  the  Sacred 

Fire    of   Ormazd,    which   ought    to    have   been    kept 

continually  burning,  to  go  out  ;  and  we  can  scarcely 

1  See  the  "  Armenian  History  "  of  Moses  of  Chorene,  ii.  74. 

2  Compare  above,  Chap.  V.  p.  78. 


396      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,    AND    CUSTOMS. 

suppose  but  that  the  Parthian  Arsacidas  were  equally 
negligent.  Religious  respect  for  the  element  of  fire 
so  entirely  passed  away,  that  we  hear  of  the  later 
Parthians  burning  their  dead.1  The  Magi  fell  into 
disrepute,  and,  if  not  expelled  from  their  place  in  the 
national  council,  at  any  rate  found  themselves  despised 
and  deprived  of  influence.2  The  later  Parthian 
religion  can  have  been  little  more  than  a  worship 
of  the  Sun  and  Moon,  together  with  a  cult  of  the 
terapliim,  or  sacred  images,  which  were  the  most 
precious  possessions  of  each  household. 

The  manners  and  customs  of  the  Parthians  may  be 
most  conveniently  considered  under  the  two  heads  of 
their  customs  in  war  and  in  peace.  As  they  were 
essentially  a  warlike  people,  the  chief  interest  must 
attach  to  their  military  customs,  and  to  these  will 
therefore  be  assigned  the  foremost  place.  It  appears 
that,  like  the  European  monarchs  of  the  feudal  times, 
they  did  not  regard  it  as  necessary  to  maintain  any 
standing  army.  When  hostilities  threatened,  and 
war  seemed  likely  to  break  out,  the  king  made  his 
immediate  vassals  acquainted  with  the  fact,  and 
demanded  from  each  of  them  a  contingent.  A  certain 
rendezvous  was  named,  and  all  were  required  to  meet 
together  on  a  certain  day.  The  troops  thus  summoned 
were  of  two  kinds,  native  and  foreign.  The  governors 
of  the  provinces,  whether  tributary  kings  or  satraps, 
called  out  the  military  strength  of  their  respective 
districts,  saw  to  their  arming  and  provisioning,  and, 
marching  each  at  the  head  of  his  contingent,  brought 
a  foreign  auxiliary  force  to  the  assistance  of  their 
'  Herodian,  iv.  30.  2  Agathias,  ii.  26. 


CUSTOMS   IN    WAR.  397 

suzerain.  But  the  backbone  of  the  army,  the 
portion  on  which  alone  much  reliance  was  placed, 
consisted  of  Parthians.  Each  Parthian  noble  was 
bound  to  call  out  his  slaves  and  his  retainers,  to  arm 
and  equip  them  at  his  own  expense,  and  bring  them 
to  the  general  rendezvous  by  the  time  fixed  upon. 
The  number  of  troops  brought  into  the  field  by  each 
noble  varied  according  to  his  position  and  his  means  ; 
we  hear  in  one  instance  of  their  amounting  to  ten 
thousand,1  while  in  another  recorded  case2  the  average 
number  which  each  of  them  provided  did  not  exceed 
125.  The  various  contingents  had  their  own  baggage 
trains,  consisting  ordinarily  of  camels,  in  the  propor- 
tion (as  it  would  seem)  of  one  to  every  ten  fighting 
men. 

The  Parthian  armies,  like  most  others,  consisted 
usually  of  both  horse  and  foot,  but  in  proportions 
which  were  not  common  elsewhere.  The  foot 
soldiers  were  comparatively  few  in  number,  and 
were  but  very  little  esteemed.  Every  effort,  on  the 
contrary,  was  made  to  increase  the  number  and 
improve  the  equipment  of  the  horsemen  who  bore  the 
brunt  of  every  conflict,  and  from  whose  exertions 
alone  victory  was  expected.  Sometimes  armies  con- 
sisted of  horsemen  only,  or  rather  of  horsemen 
followed  by  a  baggage  train  composed  of  camels  and 
chariots  ;  but  this  only  happened  under  special 
circumstances. 

The  horse  was  of  two  kinds,  heavy  and  light.  The 
heavy  horsemen  (tcardtypcucToi)  wore  coats  of  mail 
reaching  to  the  knee,  composed  of  raw  hide  covered 

1  Plutarch,  "  Vit.  Crass.,:'  i.  §  21.  2  Justin,  xli.  2. 


PARTHIAN    HELMET. 


CUSTOMS   IN    WAR.  399 

«■ 
with  plates  or  scales  of  iron  or  steel,  very  bright, 
and  capable  of  resisting  a  strong  blow.  They  had 
their  heads  protected  by  burnished  helmets  of  Mar- 
gian  steel,  whose  glitter  dazzled  the  spectator.  A 
specimen  in  the  British  Museum,  figured  by  Professor 
Gardner,  will  best  convey  the  shape.  They  do  not 
seem  to  have  ordinarily  worn  greaves,  but  had  their 
legs  encased  in  a  loose  trouser,  which  hung  about  the 
ankles  and  embarrassed  the  feet,  if  by  any  chance  the 
horseman  was  induced  or  forced  to  dismount.  They 
carried  no  targe  or  shield,  being  sufficiently  defended 
by  their  coats  of  mail.  Their  chief  offensive  arms 
were  a  spear  (kovtos),  which  was  of  great  strength 
and  thickness,  and  a  bow  and  arrows  of  unusual 
dimensions.  They  likewise  carried  in  their  girdle  a 
short  sword  or  knife  (nu^capa),  which  was  intended 
to  be  used  in  close  combat.  Their  horses  were,  like 
themselves,  protected  by  a  defence  of  scale-armour, 
which  was  either  of  steel  or  of  bronze,  polished  like 
the  armour  of  the  men. 

The  light  horse  appears  to  have  been  armed  with 
the  same  sort  of  bows  and  arrows  as  the  heavy 
cavalry,  but  carried  no  spear,  and  was  not  encumbered 
with  armour.  It  was  carefully  trained  to  the  deft 
management  of  the  horse  and  bow,  and  was  unequalled 
in  the  rapidity  and  dexterity  of  its  movements.  The 
archer  delivered  his  arrows  with  as  much  precision  and 
force  in  retreat  as  in  advance,  and  was  almost  more 
feared  when  he  retired  than  when  he  charged  his  foe. 
Besides  his  bow  and  arrows,  the  light  horseman 
seems  to  have  carried  a  sword,  and  he  no  doubt  wore 
also  the  customary  knife  in  his  belt  ;  but  it  was  as  an 
archer  that  he  was  chiefly  formidable. 


400      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

During  the  later  period  of  the  monarchy,  the 
Parthians,  who  had  always  employed  camels  largely 
in  the  conveyance  of  stores  and  baggage,  are  said  to 
have  introduced  a  camel  corps  into  the  army  itself, 
and  to  have  derived  considerable  advantage  from  the 
new  arm.  The  camels  could  bear  the  weight  of  the 
mailed  riders  and  of  their  own  armour  better  than 
horses  ;  and  their  riders  were  at  once  less  accessible 
in  their  elevated  position,  and  more  capable  of  dealing 
effective  blows  upon  the  enemy.  As  a  set  off,  how- 
ever, against  these  advantages,  the  spongy  feet  of  the 
camel  were  found  to  be  more  readily  injured  by  the 
tribulus  or  caltrop  than  the  harder  feet  of  the  horse, 
and  the  corps  was  thus  more  easily  disabled  than 
an  equal  force  of  cavalry,  if  it  could  be  tempted  or 
forced  to  pass  over  ground  on  which  these  obstacles 
had  previously  been  scattered. 

We  do  not  hear  of  any  use  of  chariots  by  the 
Parthians,  except  for  the  conveyance  of  the  females 
who  commonly  accompanied  the  nobles  on  their 
warlike  expeditions.  The  wives  and  concubines  of 
the  chiefs  followed  the  camp  in  great  numbers,  and 
women  of  a  less  reputable  class— singers,  dancers,  and 
musicians — swelled  the  ranks  of  the  supernumeraries. 
Many  of  these  were  Greeks  from  Seleucia,  Nice- 
phorium,  and  other  Macedonian  settlements.  The 
commissariat  and  baggage  departments  are  said  to 
have  been  badly  organised,1  but  some  thousands  of 
baggage  camels  always  accompanied  an  army  for  the 
conveyance  of  stores  and  provisions.  Of  these  a 
considerable  portion  were  laden  with  arrows,  of  which 

1  Dio  Cassius,  xl.  15. 


PARTHIAN    TACTICS.  4OI 

the  supply  was  in  this  way  rendered  practically 
inexhaustible.  The  employment  of  the  elephant  in 
war  was  even  more  rare  in  Parthia  than  that  of 
the  chariot.  Parthian  coins  occasionally  exhibit  the 
creature x  ;  so  that  it  was  certainly  known  to  the 
people,  but  its  actual  employment  in  warefare  is 
mentioned  on  one  occasion  only,2  and  then  we  hear 
of  only  a  single  animal,  which  is  ridden  by  the 
monarch.  As  both  the  Seleucid  princes  and  the 
Sassanidae  made  large  use  of  the  elephant  in  their 
campaigns,  its  entire  neglect  by  the  Parthians  is 
somewhat  remarkable.  Probably  the  unwieldy 
creature  was  regarded  by  them  as  too  heavy  and 
clumsy  to  suit  the  light  and  rapid  movements  of 
their  armies,  and  was  therefore  almost  wholly  disused 
during  the  period  of  their  supremacy. 

The  Parthian  tactics  appear  to  have  been  of  a 
simple  kind,  and  to  have  differed  but  little  from 
those  of  other  nations  in  the  same  region  which  have 
depended  mainly  on  their  cavalry.  To  surround 
their  foe,  to  entangle  him  and  involve  him  in  diffi- 
culties, to  cut  of  his  supplies  and  his  stragglers, 
and  ultimately  to  bring  him  into  a  position  where 
he  might  be  overwhelmed  by  missiles,  was  the  aim 
of  all  Parthian  commanders  of  any  military  ability. 
Their  warfare  was  suited  for  defence  rather  than  for 
attack,  unless  against  contemptible  enemies.  They 
were  particularly  inefficient  in  sieges,  and  avoided 
engaging  in   them  as  far  as  possible  ;  but  when  cir- 

1  Lindsay,  "  History  and  Coinage  of  the  Parthians,"  pi.  vii.,  No.  II  ; 
pi.  viii.,  No.  30:   Matkoff,  "  Arsac.  Monet."  Tab.  iii.,  No.  2. 

2  Tacit.,  "Ann.,"  xv.  15. 


402      PARTHIAN  ART,   RELIGION,  AND    CUSTOMS. 

cumstances  made  it  necessary,  they  did  not  shrink 
from  undertaking  the  uncongenial  operation.  Long 
wars  were  very  distasteful  to  them  ;  and,  if  they  did 
not  find  victory  tolerably  easy  they  were  apt  to  retire 
and  allow  their  foe  to  escape,  or  to  baffle  him  by 
withdrawing  their  forces  into  a  distant  and  inaccessible 
region.  After  their  early  victories  over  Crassus  and 
Antony,  they  never  succeeded  in  preventing  the 
steady  advance  of  a  Roman  force  into  their  territory, 
or  in  repulsing  a  determined  attack  upon  their 
principal  capital.  Still  they  generally  had  their 
revenge  after  a  little  time.  It  was  easy  for  the 
Romans  to  overrun  Mesopotamia,  but  it  was  not 
so  easy  for  them  to  hold  it ;  and  it  was  scarcely 
possible  for  them  to  retire  from  it  after  an  occupation 
without  incurring  disaster.  The  clouds  of  Parthian 
horse  hung  upon  their  retrea  ting  columns,  straitened 
them  for  provisions,  galled  them  with  missiles,  and 
destroyed  those  who  could  not  keep  up  with  the 
main  body.  The  towns,  upon  the  line  of  their  retreat, 
revolted  and  shut  their  gates,  defying  even  such  com- 
manders as  Severus  and  Trajan.  Of  the  six  great 
expeditions  of  Rome  against  Parthia,  one  only,  that 
of  Avidius  Cassius,  was  altogether  successful.  In 
every  other  case  either  the  failure  of  the  expedition 
was  complete,  or  the  glory  of  the  advance  was 
tarnished  by  suffering  and  calamity  during  the 
retreat.  Other  enemies  they  usually  repulsed  with  but 
little  difficulty. 

When  the  Parthians  entered  into  battle  it  was  with 
much  noise  and  shouting.  They  made  no  use  of 
trumpets  or  horns,  but  employed  in  their  place  the 


PARTHIAN    TACTICS.  403 

kettledrum,  which  resounded  from  all  parts  of  the 
field  when  they  made  their  onset.  Their  attack  was — 
for  the  most  part — furious.  The  mailed  horsemen 
charged  at  speed,  and  (we  are  told)  often  drove 
their  spears  through  the  bodies  of  two  enemies  at 
a  blow.  The  light  horse,  and  the  foot  (when  any 
were  present),  delivered  their  arrows  with  precision, 
and  with  extraordinary  force.  43ut  if  the  assailants 
were  met  with  a  stout  and  firm  resistance,  the  first 
vigour  of  the  attack  was  rarely  long  maintained.  The 
Parthian  warriors  very  quickly  grew  weary  of  an 
equal  contest,  and,  if  they  could  not  force  their  enemy 
to  give  way,  soon  changed  their  tactics.  Pretending 
panic,  beating  a  hasty  retreat,  and  scattering  in  their 
flight,  they  endeavoured  to  induce  their  foe  to  pursue 
hurriedly  and  in  disorder,  being  themselves  ready  at 
any  moment  to  turn  and  take  advantage  of  the  least 
appearance  of  confusion.  If  these  tactics  failed,  as 
they  generally  did  after  they  came  to  be  known,  then 
the  simulated  flight  was  commonly  converted  into 
a  real  one  ;  further  conflict  was  for  the  time  avoided, 
and  the  army  withdrew  itself  into  a  distant  region. 

If  the  Parthians  wanted  to  parley  with  an  enemy, 
they  unstrung  their  bows  and,  advancing  with  the 
right  arm  outstretched,  asked  for  a  conference.  They 
are  accused  by  the  Romans  of  sometimes  using 
treachery  on  such  occasions ;  but,  except  in  the  single 
instance  of  Crassus,  the  charge  of  bad  faith  breaks 
down  when  it  is  examined  into.  On  solemn  occasions, 
when  the  intention  was  seriously  to  discuss  grounds 
of  complaint  likely  to  lead  to  war,  or  to  bring  an 
actual  war  to  an  end  by  the  arrangement  of  terms 


404      PARTHIAN   ART,    RELIGION,   AND   CUSTOMS. 

of  peace,  a  formal  meeting  was  ordinarily  held  by 
appointment  between  the  representatives  of  either 
side,  generally  on  neutral  ground,  as  on  an  island  in  the 
Euphrates,  or  on  a  bridge  newly  constructed  across 
it.  Here  the  chiefs  or  envoys  of  the  respective  nations 
met,  accompanied  by  an  equal  number  of  guards, 
while  the  remainder  of  their  forces  occupied  the  two 
opposite  banks  of  the  river.  Matters  were  discussed 
in  friendly  fashion,  some  language  known  to  both 
parties  being  employed  as  a  means  of  communication  ; 
after  which  festivities  usually  took  place,  the  two 
chiefs  mutually  entertaining  each  other,  or  accepting 
in  common  the  hospitalities  of  a  third  party.  The 
terms  of  peace  agreed  upon  were  reduced  to  writing  ; 
hands  were  grasped  as  a  sign  that  faith  was  pledged  ; 
and  oaths  having  been  interchanged  the  conference 
broke  up,  and  the  chiefs  with  their  armies  set  out  on 
their  return  to  their  respective  countries. 

The  wonderful  splendour  of  the  Parthian  Court  is 
celebrated  in  general  terms  by  several  writers,  but  not 
many  particulars  have  come  down  to  us  respecting  it. 
We  are  told  that  it  was  migratory,  moving  from  one 
of  the  chief  cities  of  the  empire  to  another  at  different 
seasons  of  the  year;  and  that,  owing  to  the  vast  numbers 
of  the  persons  composing  it,  there  was  sometimes  a  diffi- 
culty in  providing  for  their  subsistence  while  they  were 
upon  the  road.  The  Court  comprised,  of  course,  the 
usual  extensive  harem  of  an  Oriental  sovereign,  con- 
sisting of  a  single  recognised  queen,  and  a  multitude 
of  secondary  wives  or  concubines.  The  legitimate 
wife  of  the  prince  was  with  rare  exceptions  a  native, 
and  in  most  cases  was  a  member  of  the  royal  race 


CUSTOMS   IN   PEACE.  405 

of  the  Arsacidae  ;  but  sometimes  she  was  the  daughter 
of  a  dependant  monarch,  and  she  might  even  be  a 
slave,  whom  the  royal  favour  had  elevated  from  that 
position.  Both  wives  and  concubines  remained 
ordinarily  in  the  closest  seclusion,  and  we  have  but 
little  mention  of  them  in  the  Parthian  annals.  In  one 
instance  however,  at  any  rate,  a  queen,  educated  in 
the  notions  of  the  West,  succeeded  in  setting  Oriental 
etiquette  at  defiance  ;  she  boldly  asserted  herself, 
took  the  direction  of  affairs  out  of  the  hands  of 
her  husband  and  subsequently  ruled  the  empire  in 
conjunction  with  her  son.1  Her  name  and  image 
were  even  placed  upon  the  coins.2  Generally,  how- 
ever, the  Parthian  kings  were  remarkably  free  from 
the  weakness  of  subservience  to  women  and  managed 
their  kingdom  with  a  firm  hand,  without  allowing 
either  wives  or  ministers  to  exercise  any  undue  ascen- 
dency over  them.  In  particular,  we  may  note  that  they 
never,  so  far  as  appears,  fell  under  the  baleful  influence 
of  eunuchs,  who,  from  first  to  last,  play  a  very  subor- 
dinate part  in  the  Parthian  history.  Here  the  contrast 
is  striking  between  the  Parthian  and  the  early  Persian 
monarchy. 

The  ordinary  dress  of  the  monarch  was  the  long 
loose  "Median  robe"  which  had  been  adopted  from 
the  Medes  by  the  Achaemenian  Persians.  This  robe 
flowed  down  to  the  feet  in  numerous  folds,  enveloping 
and  concealing  almost  the  entire  figure.  Trousers 
and  a  tunicwere  ordinarily,  it  is  probable,  worn  beneath 

1  See  above,  p.  226. 

2  Gardner,   "Parthian    Coinage,"    pi.    iv.,   Nos.  27,    28;    Lindsay, 
"  History  an>l  Coinage  of  the  Parthians,"  pi.  hi.,  Nos.  62.  63. 


406      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

it,  the  latter  of  linen,  the  former  made  of  silk  or  wool. 
As  head-dress,  the  king  wore  either  the 
4iB  simple    diadem,    which    was   a  band    or 

fV\)  ribbon  passed  once  or  oftener  round  the 

jl|JP=3  head  and  terminating  in  two  long  ends 
(]§i^s»j  which  fell  down  behind,  or  else  a  more 
<jp  vl^l  pretentious  cap,  which  in  the  earlier  times 
was  a  sort  of  Scythian  pointed  helmet 
and  in  the  later  a  rounded  tiara,  sometimes  adorned 
with  pearls  or  gems.  His  neck  appears  to  have 
been  generally  encircled  with  two  or  more  collars 
or  necklaces,  and  he  frequently  wore  ear-rings  in  his 
ears.  The  beard  was  almost  always  cultivated,  and, 
with  the  hair,  was  worn  variously.  Generally, 
both  hair  and  beard  were  carefully  curled,  but  some- 
times they  hung  down  in  long  straight  locks.  Mostly 
the  beard  was  pointed,  but  occasionally  it  was 
worn  square.  In  later  times  a  fashion  grew  up  of 
puffing  out  the  hair  extravagantly  on  either  side  of 
the  head — a  practice  continued  by  the  Sassanians. 
When  he  went  out  to  war,  the  monarch  seems  to 
have  exchanged  his  "  Median  robe  " 
for  a  short  cloak,  reaching  halfway 
down  the  thigh.  His  head  was  pro- 
tected by  a  pointed  helmet,  without 
crest  or  plume,  and  he  carried  the 
national  arm  of  offence,  the  bow. 
Under  his  cloak  he  wore  a  coat  of 
mail.  He  usually  took  the  field  on  horseback,  but  was 
occasionally  mounted  on  an  elephant  trained  to  en- 
counter the  shock  of  battle.  Gold  and  silver  were 
lavishly  employed  in  the  trappings  of  his  charger  and 


SECLUSION   OF    WOMEN.  407 

on  his  arms.  For  the  most  part  he  took  the  command, 
and  freely  exposed  his  person  in  the  fight,  though  it 
was  regarded  as  no  disgrace  if  he  preferred  to  avoid 
the  perils  of  the  actual  encounter.  A  bodyguard 
protected  his  person,  surrounding  him  on  ordinary 
occasions,  and  interposing  themselves  between  him 
and  his  assailants  :  he  had  also  attendants,  whose 
duty  it  was  to  assist  him  in  mounting  on  horseback, 
and  in  dismounting,  which  the  armour  that  he  wore 
made  no  easy  business. 

It  has  been  already  observed  that  the  queen  lived, 
ordinarily,  in  seclusion.  When,  however,  under 
peculiar  circumstances,  she  emerged  from  privacy, 
her  status  and  dignity  were  not  much  below  those  of 
the  monarch.  She  wore  a  tiara  far  more  elaborate 
than  his,  and  one  which,  like  his,  was  encircled  with 
the  diadem.  Her  neck  was  adorned  with  a  necklace 
or  necklaces.  In  the  typical  instance  of  Musa  or 
Thermusa,  we  find  her  allowed  the  title  of 
"Heavenly  Goddess"  (9EA  OYPANIA).  Separate 
apartments  were  of  course  assigned  to  the  queen  and 
to  the  royal  concubines  in  the  various  palaces,  which 
were  buildings  on  a  magnificent  scale  and  decorated 
with  the  utmost  richness.  Philostratus,  who  wrote  in 
Parthian  times  (a.d.  172-244),  and  had  a  good  know- 
ledge of  the  East,  thus  describes  the  royal  palace  at 
Babylon  :  "  The  palace  is  roofed  with  brass,  and  a 
bright  light  flashes  from  it.  It  has  chambers  for  the 
women  and  chambers  for  the  men,  and  porticoes, 
partly  glittering  with  silver,  partly  with  cloth-of-gold 
embroideries,  partly  with  solid  slabs  of  gold,  let  into 
the  walls    like    pictures.       The  subjects  of  the  em- 


408      PARTHIAN   ART,    RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

broideries  are  taken  from  the  Greek  mythology,  and 
include  representations  of  Andromeda,  of  Amymone, 
and  of  Orpheus,  who  is  frequently  repeated.  Datis 
is,  moreover,  represented,  destroying  Naxos  with  his 
fleet,  and  Artaphemes  besieging  Eretria,  and  Xerxes 
gaining  his  famous  victories.  You  behold  the  occu- 
pation of  Athens  and  the  battle  of  Thermopylae,  and 
other  things  still  more  characteristic  of  the  great 
Persian  War,  rivers  drunk  up  and  disappearing  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  a  bridge  stretched  across 
the  sea,  and  a  canal  cut  through  Athos,  and  the  like. 
One  chamber  for  the  men  has  a  ceiling  fashioned 
into  a  vault  like  the  heaven,  composed  entirely  of 
sapphires,  which  are  the  bluest  of  stones,  and 
resemble  the  sky  in  colour.  Golden  images  of  the 
gods  whom  they  worship  are  set  up  about  the  vault, 
and  show  like  stars  in  the  firmament.  This  is  the 
chamber  in  which  the  king  delivers  his  judgments. 
Four  golden  magic  wheels  hang  from  the  roof,  and 
threaten  the  monarch  with  the  Divine  Nemesis,  if  he 
exalts  himself  above  the  condition  of  man.  These 
wheels  are  called  '  the  tongues  of  the  gods,'  and  are 
set  in  their  places  by  the  Magi  who  frequent  the 
palace." J  This  description  must  not  be  taken  as 
altogether  exact.  The  tapestries  may  have  repre- 
sented other  scenes  than  those  which  Philostratus 
imagined  ;  the  ceiling  was  certainly  not  "  composed 
entirely  of  sapphires,"  but  either  of  enamelled  bricks 
or  plaster  painted  blue  ;  and  the  "  magic  wheels  "  are 
questionable ;  but  the  general  effect  was  probably 
very    much   that    which    the    philosopher   of   Tyana 

1  See  Philostratus,  "  Vit.  Apoll.  Tyan.,"  i.  25. 


STATE   AND   POMP   OF    THE    KING.  409 

portrays,  and  presented  an  ensemble  that  was  curious, 
striking,  and  magnificent. 

It  is  probable  that  the  state  and  pomp  which 
surrounded  the  monarch  fell  little  short  of  the  Achae- 
menian  standard.  Considered  as  in  some  sort  divine 
during  his  life,  and  always  an  object  of  national 
worship  after  his  death,  the  "  Brother  of  the  Sun  and 
Moon  " *  occupied  a  position  far  above  that  of  the 
most  exalted  of  his  subjects.  Tributary  monarchs 
were  shocked,  when,  in  times  of  calamity,  the  "Great 
King"  stooped  to  solicit  their  aid,  and  appeared 
before  them  in  the  guise  of  a  suppliant,  shorn  of  his 
customary  splendour.  Nobles  coveted  the  dignity  of 
"  King's  Friend,"  and  were  content  to  submit  to  blows 
and  buffets  at  the  caprice  of  their  royal  master, 
before  whom  they  prostrated  themselves  in  humble 
adoration  after  each  such  castigation.  The  Parthian 
monarch  dined  in  solitary  grandeur,  extended  on  his 
own  special  couch,  and  eating  from  his  own  special 
table,  which  was  placed  at  a  higher  elevation  than 
those  prepared  for  his  guests  and  retinue.  His 
"  friend  "  sat  on  the  ground  at  his  feet,  and  was  fed 
by  scraps  from  his  master's  board.  Guards,  ministers, 
and  attendants  of  various  kinds  surrounded  him,  and 
were  ready  at  a  word,  or  at  a  sign,  to  do  his  bidding. 
Throughout  the  empire  he  had  numerous  "  Eyes " 
and  "  Ears  " — officers  who  watched  his  interests,  and 
sent  him  timely  notice  of  whatever  touched  his  safety. 
The  bed  on  which  the  monarch  slept  was  of  gold, 
and  subjects  were  forbidden  to  take  their  repose  on 
couches  of  the  same  material.      No  stranger  could 

1  Ammian.  Marcellin. ,  xxiii.  6. 


4IO      PARTHIAN    ART,   RELIGION,   AND   CUSTOMS. 

obtain  access  to  him  unless  introduced  by  the  proper 
officer  :  and  it  was  expected  that  whoever  asked  an 
audience  should  be  prepared  with  a  present  of  con- 
siderable value.  For  the  gifts  which  he  received  the 
monarch  made  a  suitable  return,  allowing  such 
persons  as  he  especially  favoured  to  choose  the 
presents  that  they  most  desired. 

The  Parthian  nobles  enjoyed  a  power  and  dignity 
greater  than  that  which  is  usually  possessed  by  any 
subjects  of  an  Oriental  king.  Rank  in  Parthia  being 
hereditary  and  not  simply  official,  the  Megistanes 
were  no  mere  creatures  of  the  monarch,  but  a  class 
which  stood  on  its  own  indefeasible  rights.  As  they 
had  the  privilege  of  electing  to  the  throne  upon  a 
vacancy,  and  even  the  further  privilege  of  deposing 
a  duly  elected  monarch,  the  king  could  not  but  stand 
in  wholesome  awe  of  them,  and  feel  compelled  to 
treat  them  with  considerable  respect  and  deference. 
It  is  to  be  remembered,  moreover,  that  they  were  not 
without  a  material  force  calculated  to  give  powerful 
support  to  their  constitutional  rights  and  privileges. 
Each  stood  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  retainers 
accustomed  to  bear  arms,  and  to  serve  in  the  wars  of 
the  empire.  Together  these  bodies  constituted  the 
strength  of  the  army;  and  though  the  royal  body- 
guard might  perhaps  have  been  capable  of  dealing 
successfully  with  each  group  of  retainers  separately, 
yet  such  an  esprit  de  cori>s  was  sure  to  animate  the 
nobles  generally,  that  in  almost  every  case  they 
would  make  common  cause  with  any  one  of  their 
number  who  was  attacked,  and  would  support  him 
against    the   Crown  with  the   zeal    inspired    by   self- 


POWER    OF   THE   NOBLES.  4II 

interest.  Thus  the  Parthian  nobility  were  far  more 
powerful  and  independent  than  any  similar  class 
under  the  Achaemenian,  Sassanian,  Modern  Persian, 
or  Turkish  sovereignties.  They  exercised  a  real 
control  over  the  monarch,  and  had  a  voice  in  the 
direction  of  the  empire.  Like  the  great  feudal 
vassals  of  the  Middle  Ages,  they  from  time  to  time 
quarrelled  with  their  liege  lord,  and  disturbed  the 
tranquillity  of  the  kingdom  by  prolonged  and 
dangerous  civil  wars  ;  but  these  contentions  served 
to  keep  alive  a  vigour,  a  life,  and  a  spirit  of  sturdy 
independence  very  unusual  in  the  East,  and  gave  a 
stubborn  strength  to  the  Parthian  Monarchy,  in  which 
Oriental  states  and  governments  have  for  the  most 
part  been  remarkably  deficient. 

There  appear  to  have  been  several  grades  of  rank 
among  the  Parthian  nobles.  The  highest  dignity  in 
the  kingdom,  next  to  the  Crown,  was  that  of  the 
Surena,  or  "  Field-Marshal "  ;  and  this  position  was 
hereditary  in  a  particular  family,  which  can  have 
stood  but  a  little  below  the  royal  house  in  wealth  and 
consequence.  The  head  of  this  noble  house  is  said 
to  have  at  one  time  brought  into  the  field  as  many  as 
ten  thousand  retainers  and  slaves,  of  whom  a  thou- 
sand were  heavy-armed.1  It  was  his  right  to  place 
the  diadem  on  the  king's  brow  at  his  coronation. 
The  other  nobles  lived  for  the  most  part  on  their 
domains,  but  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  their 
retainers  in  case  of  war,  and  in  peace  might  some- 
times serve  the  offices  of  satrap,  vizier,  or  royal 
councillor.     The  wealth  of  the  class  was  great ; 2  its 

1  Plutarch,  "  Vit.  Crass.,"  §  21.  2  See  above,  pp.  80  and  397. 


412      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,    AND    CUSTOMS. 

members  were  inclined  to  be  turbulent,  and,  like  the 
barons  of  the  European  kingdoms,  acted  as  a  constant 
check  and  counterpoise  to  the  royal  authority,  which 
they  often  resisted,  and  occasionally  even  overthrew. 

After  war,  the  employment  in  which  the  king  and 
the  nobles  took  most  delight,  was  hunting.  The  lion 
continued  in  the  wild  state  an  occupant  of  the  Meso- 
potamian  river  banks  and  marshes  ;  and  in  other 
parts  of  the  empire  bears,  leopards,  and  even  tigers 
abounded.  Thus  the  higher  kinds  of  sport  were 
constantly  and  readily  obtainable.  But  the  ordinary 
practice  of  the  monarch  and  his  courtiers  seems  to 
have  fallen  short  of  the  true  sportsman's  ideal. 
Instead  of  seeking  the  more  dangerous  kinds  of 
beasts  in  their  native  haunts,  and  engaging  with 
them  under  the  conditions  designed  by  Nature,  the 
Parthians  were  generally  content  with  a  poorer  and 
tamer  method.  They  kept  lions,  leopards,  and  bears 
in  enclosed  parks,  or  "  paradises,"  and  found  pleasure 
in  the  pursuit  and  slaughter  of  these  denaturalised 
and  half-domesticated  animals.  The  employment 
may  still,  even  under  these  circumstances,  have  con- 
tained an  element  of  danger  which  rendered  it 
exciting  ;  but  it  was  a  poor  substitute  for  the  true 
sport  which  the  "  mighty  hunter  before  the  Lord  " 
had  been  the  first  to  practise  in  these  regions 
(Gen.  x.  9). 

The  ordinary  dress  of  the  Parthian  noble  was,  like 
that  of  the  monarch,  a  long  loose  robe  reaching  to 
the  feet,  under  which  he  wore  a  vest  and  trousers. 
Bright  and  varied  colours  were  commonly  affected, 
and    sometimes    dresses    were    interwoven     or    em- 


ORDINARY   PARTHIAN   FOOD.  413 

broidered  with  threads  of  gold.  In  seasons  of 
festivity  it  was  usual  for  garlands  of  fresh  flowers  to 
be  worn  upon  the  head.  A  long  knife  or  dagger  was 
carried  at  all  times,  and  by  all  classes,  suited  for  use 
either  as  an  implement  or  as  a  weapon. 

In  the  earlier  and  simpler  period  of  the  empire — 
when  the  nation  was  just  emerging  from  barbarism — 
the  Parthian  was  noted  as  a  spare  liver  ;  but,  as  time 
went  on,  he  aped  the  vices  of  more  civilized  people, 
and  became  an  indiscriminate  eater  and  a  hard 
drinker.  Game  formed  a  main  portion  of  his  diet  ; 
but  he  indulged  also  in  pork,  and  probably  in  other 
sorts  of  butcher's  meat.  He  ate  leavened  bread  with 
his  meat,  and  various  kinds  of  vegetables.  The 
bread,  which  was  particularly  light  and  porous,  seems 
to  have  been  sometimes  imported  by  the  Romans, 
who  knew  it  as  panis  aquaticus  or  panis  Parthicus. 
Dates  were  also  consumed  largely  by  the  Parthians, 
and  the  fruit  grew  in  some  parts  of  the  country  to 
an  extraordinary  size.  A  kind  of  wine  was  made 
from  it  ;  and  this  seems  to  have  been  the  intoxica- 
ting drink  in  which  the  nation  generally  indulged  over- 
much. The  liquor  made  from  the  dates  of  Babylon 
was  the  most  highly  esteemed,  and  was  reserved  for 
the  use  of  the  king,  and  the  higher  order  of  satraps. 
The  vulgar  herd  had  to  content  themselves  with 
drink  of  an  inferior  quality.  Of  the  Parthian  enter- 
tainments music  was  commonly  an  accompaniment. 
The  flute,  the  pipe,  the  drum,  and  the  instrument 
called  the  sambitca,  appear  to  have  been  known  to 
them  ;  and  they  understood  how  to  combine  these 
instruments   in   concerted  harmony.      They  are  said 


414      PARTHIAN  ART,    RELIGION,  AND    CUSTOMS. 

to  have  concluded  all  their  feasts  with  dancing,1  an 
amusement  of  which  they  were  inordinately  fond  ;  but 
this  was  probably  the  case  only  with  the  lower  orders 
of  the  people.  Dancing  in  the  East,  unless  associated 
with  religion,  is  viewed  as  degrading,  and  is  not 
indulged  in  by  those  who  wish  to  be  considered 
respectable. 

The  Parthians  were  jealous  of  their  women,  and 
the  separation  of  the  sexes  was  very  decided  among 
them.  The  women  took  their  meals,  and  passed  the 
greater  portion  of  their  lives,  apart  from  the  men. 
Veils  were  commonly  worn,  as  in  modern  Moham- 
medan countries  ;  and  it  was  regarded  as  essential 
to  female  delicacy  that  women,  whether  married  or 
single,  should  converse  freely  with  no  males  who  were 
not  either  their  near  relations  or  else  eunuchs.  Adul- 
tery was  punished  with  extreme  severity  ;  but  divorce 
was  obtained  without  much  difficulty,  and  women  of 
rank  released  themselves  from  the  nuptial  tie  on  light 
grounds  of  complaint,  and  with  little  loss  of  reputa- 
tion. Polygamy  was  the  established  rule  ;  and  every 
Parthian  was  entitled,  besides  his  chief  wife,  to  main- 
tain as  many  concubines  as  he  pleased.  Some  of  the 
nobles  supported  an  excessive  number  ;  but  the  ex- 
penses of  the  seraglio  prevented  the  generality  from 
taking  very  much  advantage  of  the  indulgence  which 
the  law  permitted.  It  is  probable  that  the  bulk  of  the 
population,  as  is  the  case  now  in  Mohammedan  coun- 
tries, was  monogamous. 

As  to  the  degree  of  refinement  and  civilisation 
whereto  the  Parthians  attained,  it  is  difficult  to  judge 

1  Philostratus,  "  Vit.  ApoW.  Tyan.,"  i.  21, 


DEGREE    OF   CIVILISATION.  415 

and  determine  with  accuracy.  In  mimetic  art  their 
remains  (as  we  have  already  seen)  do  not  show  much 
taste  or  sense  of  beauty.  There  is  perhaps  sufficient 
ground  to  believe  that  their  architecture  possessed  a 
certain  amount  of  merit ;  but  the  existing  monuments 
can  scarcely  be  taken  as  representations  of  pure  Par- 
thian work,  since  they  may  have  owed  their  excellence 
— in  some  measure — to  foreign  artists,  or  at  any  rate 
to  foreign  influence.  Still  the  following  particulars, 
for  which  there  is  good  evidence,  seem  to  imply  that 
the  nation  had  risen  in  reality  far  above  that  "  bar- 
barism," which  it  was  the  fashion  for  the  Greek  and 
Roman  writers  to  impute  to  it.  In  the  first  place,  the 
Parthians  had  a  considerable  knowledge  of  foreign 
languages.  Plutarch  tells  us,1  that  Orodes,  the  op- 
ponent of  Crassus,  was  so  far  conversant  with  the 
Greek  language  and  literature,  that  he  could  enjoy  the 
representation  of  a  play  of  Euripides.  The  general 
possession  of  some  knowledge  of  Greek — at  any  rate 
by  the  kings  and  upper  classes — seems  to  be  implied 
by  the  use  of  the  Greek  letters  and  language  in  the 
legends  upon  coins,  and  in  inscriptions.  Other  lan- 
guages were  also  to  a  certain  extent  studied  and 
understood.  The  later  kings  almost  invariably  placed 
a  Semitic  legend  upon  their  coins  ;  and  there  is  at 
least  one  instance  of  a  Parthian  prince  adopting  an 
Arian  legend  of  the  type  known  as  Bactrian.2  Jose- 
phus,  moreover,  regarded  the  Parthians  as  familiar 
with  Hebrew,  or  Syro-Chaldee,  since  he  wrote  his 
history  of  the  Jewish  War  in  his  own  native  tongue, 

1  Plutarch,  "  Vit.  Crassi."  §  32. 

2  "Numismatic  Chronicle,"  No.  vi.  p.  104. 


416      PARTHIAN   ART,    RELIGION,   AND    CUSTOMS. 

before  he  put  out  his  Greek  version,  for  the  benefit 
especially  of  the  Parthians,  among  whom  he  declares 
that  he  had  a  large  number  of  readers.1 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  Parthians  had  any- 
native  literature ;  writing,  however,  was  familiar  to 
them,  and  was  widely  employed  by  them  in  matters 
of  business.  Not  only  were  negotiations  carried  on 
with  foreign  powers  by  means  of  written  despatches, 
but  the  affairs  of  the  empire  generally  were  transacted 
by  means  of  writing.  A  custom-house  system  was, 
we  are  told,  established  along  the  frontier,  and  all 
commodities  liable  to  duty  that  entered  the  country 
were  registered  in  a  book  at  the  time  of  entry  by  the 
custom-house  officer.  In  the  great  cities  where  the 
Court  passed  a  portion  of  the  year,  account  was  kept 
o(  the  arrival  of  strangers,  whose  names  and  descrip- 
tions were  placed  upon  record  by  the  keepers  of  the 
gates.  The  orders  of  the  Crown  were  signified  in 
writing  to  the  satraps  ;  and  they  doubtless  corres- 
sponded  with  the  Court  in  the  same  way.  In  the 
earlier  times  the  writing  material  commonly  used  was 
linen  ;  but,  shortly  before  the  date  of  Pliny,  the  Par- 
thians began  to  make  paper  from  papyrus,  which  grew 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Babylon,  though  they  still 
continued  also  to  employ,  and  gave  the  preference  to, 
the  material  to  which  use  had  accustomed  them. 

The  Parthians  had  many  usages  which  seem  to 
imply  a  fairly  advanced  civilisation.  There  was  a 
considerable  trade  between  Rome  and  Parthia,  carried 
on  by  means  of  travelling  merchants.  Parthia  im- 
ported from  Rome  various  metals,  and  a  multitude  of 

1  Joseph.,  "Bell.  Jud.,"  Proem,  §  i  and  §  2. 


DEGREE    OF   CIVILISATION.  417 

manufactured  articles  of  a  high  class.  Her  principal 
exports  were  textile  fabrics  and  spices.  The  textile 
fabrics  seem  to  have  been  produced  chiefly  in  Baby- 
lonia, and  to  have  consisted  principally  of  silks, 
carpets,  and  coverlets.  The  silks  were  largely  used 
by  the  Roman  fashionable  ladies.  The  coverlets, 
which  were  patterned  with  a  variety  of  colours,  fetched 
enormous  prices,  and  were  regarded  as  fit  adornments 
of  the  Imperial  palace.  Among  the  spices  exported, 
the  most  celebrated  were  bdellium,  and  Xhejuncus  odo- 
ratus,  or  sweet-scented  bulrush.  Advanced  civilisation 
is  also  implied  in  the  Parthian  tolerance  of  varieties  in 
religion,  which  has  been  already  mentioned.1  Even 
in  political  matters  they  appear  to  have  been  free 
from  the  narrowness  which  generally  characterises 
barbarous  nations.  They  behaved  mercifully  to 
prisoners,  admitted  foreigners  freely  to  offices  of  high 
trust,  gave  an  asylum  to  refugees,  and  treated  them 
with  respect  and  kindness,  were  scrupulous  observers 
of  their  pledged  word,  and  eminently  faithful  to  their 
treaty  obligations.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  they  had  some  customs  which  imply 
that  they  retained  a  tinge  of  barbarism.  They  used 
torture  for  the  extraction  of  replies  from  accused 
persons,  employed  the  scourge  to  punish  trifling 
offences,  and,  in  certain  cases,  condescended  to  muti- 
late and  insult  the  bodies  of  their  dead  enemies. 
Their  addiction  to  intemperance  is  also  a  barbaric  trait. 
They  were  no  doubt,  on  the  whole,  considerably  less 
civilised  than  the  contemporary  Greeks  and  Romans  ; 
but  the  difference  does  not  appear  to  have   been  so 

1  Supra,  p.   360. 


418      PARTHIAN   ART,   RELIGION,    AND    CUSTOMS. 

great  as  the  classical  writers  would  have  us  imagine 
it. 

We  cannot,  however,  deny,  and  we  do  not  wish 
to  conceal  the  fact,  that  the  Parthians  exhibited, 
especially  during  the  later  period  of  the  empire, 
a  strong  tendency  to  degenerate.  They  lost  their 
primitive  virtues  of  simplicity  and  abstemiousness. 
They  became  luxurious,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
effeminate.  The  dash  or  elan,  which  characterised 
their  warfare  in  the  earlier  times  is  "  conspicuous  by 
its  absence  "  in  the  campaigns  of  the  later  monarchs. 
A  decline  in  art  and  letters  is  also  observable  in  the 
Parthian  remains  that  have  come  down  to  us,  especially 
in  the  coins,  which,  after  the  reign  of  Gotarzes,  pro- 
ceed from  bad  to  worse,  and  end  with  presenting  to 
us  effigies  that  have  neither  force  nor  character,  and 
legends  that  are  absolutely  illegible.  A  knowledge 
of  Greek  is  still  possessed,  the  Greek  letters  being 
employed,  and  the  words,  when  they  can  be  de- 
ciphered, being  clearly  intended  to  be  Greek.  But 
they  are  often  misspelt  ;  the  forms  used  are  ungram- 
matical  ;  while,  at  the  last,  the  letters  merely  straggle 
over  the  field  of  the  coin,  and  are  not  really  formed 
into  words.  Further,  the  anomaly  is  introduced  of  a 
second  legend,  which  is  Semitic  both  in  language  and 
character,  and  reads  from  right  to  left. 

Still,  to  judge  fairly  of  the  Parthians,  we  must  view 
them,  not  in  their  decline,  but  rather  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  their  career,  before  decline  had  set  in. 
Speaking  broadly,  the  position  which  they  occupied 
among  the  nations  of  the  old  world  was  not  very  dis- 
similar to   that   which   is  held   by  the   Turks   in    the 


GENERAL   SURVEY.  4I9 

system  of  Modern  Europe.  They  possessed  a  military 
strength  which  caused  them  to  be  both  respected  and 
feared,  while  they  were  further  noted  for  a  vigour  of 
administration  rarely  seen  among  Orientals.  It  is 
true  that  a  certain  coarseness  and  rudeness  attached 
to  them  which  they  found  it  impossible  to  shake  off, 
and  this  gave  their  enemies  a  plausible  ground  for 
representing  them  as  absolute  barbarians.  But  we 
must  not  be  led  away  by  the  exaggerations  of  pre- 
judiced writers,  who  sought  to  elevate  the  fame  and 
reputation  of  their  own  countrymen  by  blackening  the 
character  of  their  chief  rivals.  Except  in  respect  of 
their  military  prowess,  it  is  doubtful  if  justice  is  done 
to  the  Parthians  by  any  classical  author.  They  occu- 
pied the  position  of  the  second  nation  in  the  world 
from  about  B.C.  150  to  A.D.  226.  They  were  a  check 
and  a  counterpoise  to  Rome,  preserving  a  "  balance 
of  power,"  and  preventing  the  absorption  of  all  other 
nations  into  the  Tyrant  Empire.  They  afforded  a 
refuge  to  those  whom  Rome  would  fain  have  hunted 
down,  allowed  a  freedom  to  their  subjects  which  no 
Roman  Emperor  ever  permitted,  excelled  the  Romans 
in  toleration  and  in  a  liberal  treatment  of  foreigners, 
and  gave  the  East  a  protection  from  foreign  foes,  and 
a  government  well  suited  to  its  needs,  for  a  period  of 
nearly  four  cen'uries. 


THE   END. 


APPENDIX. 

(See  p.   132.) 

Tin-;  king  alluded  to  has  been  called  Mnascires  or 
Mnasciras,  and  was  formerly  admitted  into  his  list 
of  Parthian  monarchs  by  the  author,  who  followed 
Lindsay  and  others.  But  Professor  Gardner  has 
shown  that  the  name,  which  occurs  in  no  author  but 
Lucian,  should  probably  be  read  as  Kamnascires,  and 
not  Mnascires  (koi  Mvaatciprj'i  he  being  a  manifest 
corruption  from  KafivaaKiprjq  8e),  and  that  the  king 
intended  is  probably  a  tributary  monarch  of  the 
Parthian  period,  well  known  to  numismatologists, 
whose  coins  bear  the  legend  of  BASIAEQS 
KAMXASKIPOY. 


COIN    OF    KAMN  ASCI  HAS. 


The  probable  date  of  the  monarch  is  about  that  of 
Mithridates  I.  of  Parthia.     (See  Professor  Gardner's 

"  Parthian  Coinage,"  pp.  8  and  61.) 

420 


INDEX. 


Abdageses,  244 

Abgarus  I.,  makes  alliance  with 
Pompey,  151  ;  joins  Crassus, 
164  ;  treachery  of,  166 

Abgarus  II.,  joins  Meherdates, 
265 

Achnemenian  period,  Parthia  in 
the,  27 

Achxus,  adversary  of  Antiochus 
the  Great,  59 

Adiabene,  governed  by  a  Yitaxa, 
80 ;  conquered  by  Tigranes, 
133  ;  inhabitants  of,  placed  in 
Tigrano-certa,  134  ;  made  a 
Roman  province  by  Trajan, 
308 ;  relinquished  by  Hadrian, 
313  ;  overrun  by  Severus,  335  ; 
and  made  into  a  Roman  pro- 
vince, 345 

Agathias,  quoted,  90 

Ak-su,  river,  109 

Alani,  wild  tribes  of,  26,  294,  296 

Alarodii,  122 

Alatagh  Range,  5 

Albanians,  239,  305 

Albinus,  his  contest  with  Severus, 
336 

Alexander  Balas,  74 

Alexander  the  Great,  II,  36 

Amu  Daria,  river,  22 

Andragoras,  49 

Anilai,  brother  of  Asinai,  248  ; 
succeeds  him,  250;  his  battles 
with  Mithridates,  251  ;  his 
death,  252 


Antigonus  of  Jerusalem,  193 

Antioch,  Parthian  capital  trans- 
ferred to,  39,  40 

Antiochus  Hierax,  brother  to 
Seleucus  Callinicus,  54  ;  wars 
with  Callinicus,  56 

Antiochus  of  Commagene,  196, 
198 

Antiochus  I.,  43 

Antiochus  II.,  takes  the  title  of 
"  Theos,"  44  ;  his  character, 
ibid.  ;  revolt  of  Bactria from,  45, 
46 

Antiochus  III.,  the  Great,  his  war 
with  Achseus,  59  ;  attacked  by 
Artabanus  I.,  ibid.  ;  invades 
Parthia,  60;  his  Bactrian  expe- 
dition, 61  ;  his  death,  62 

Antiochus  IV.  (Epiphanes),  h's 
unwise  policy  towards  the  Jews, 
66  ;  his  death,  67 

Antiochus  V.,  surnamed  Eupator, 
his  accession,  67  ;  dethroned  by 
his  brother,  Demetrius  I.,  68 

Antiochus  Sidetes,  successor  to 
Demetrius  II.,  94  ;  his  war  with 
Tryphon,  ibid.  ;  his  Parthian 
war,  95-100;  defeated  and 
killed  by  Phraates  II.,  101 

Anti-Semitic  disturbances,  253 

Antoninus,  320  ;  death  of,  322 

Antony,  his  war  with  the  "  Libe- 
rators," 189,  190;  his  quarrel 
with  Octavian,  194,  293  ;  his 
support  of  Herod  the  Great, 
196  ;  his  Parthian  expedition, 
206-210  ;  repulsed  from  Praaspa 


422 


INDEX. 


by  the  Medians,    209 ;    retreat 
of,    21 1 1    212;   great  losses  of, 
213  ;  sei/.ureof  Artavasdes,  215  ; 
arrangement  of  the  East,  216  ; 
return  to  Italy,  and  war   with 
Octavian,  217 
Apameia,  192,  198 
Aparni  or  Parni,  no 
Arachosia,    subjugation    of,     18 : 
account  of,    21  ;   conquered  by 
Mithridates  I.,  74 
Arachotus,  river,  21 
Araxes  (Aras),  river,  24,  305 
Arbela,  87,  352 
Arbelitis,  133 
Ardashes,  125 

Aria,  subjugation  of,   18;  account 
of,    20 ;    conquered   by  Mithri- 
dates I.,  74 
Arians  of  Herat,  27,  28  ;  attacked 

by  Scythic  tribes,  109 
Arians,  tribes  of  the,  28 
Ariarathes  of  Cappadocia,  45 
Ariobarzanes  of  Cappadocia,  129 
Aristonicus  of  Cappadocia,  127 
Arius,  river,  64 

Armenia,  description  of,  24,  25, 
119:  early  history  of,  122-126; 
held  as  a  Roman  province  by 
Pompey,  215  ;  becomes  a 
Parthian  subject-ally,  225  ; 
yielded  by  Parthia  to  the 
Romans,  229  ;  annexed  by 
Artabanus  III.,  237  ;  again 
becomes  Roman,  240 ;  Tiri- 
dates,  king  of,  272-279  ;  inva- 
sion of  by  Pretus,  28;  ;  Tiridates 
established  in,  by  arrangement 
between  Parthia  and  Rome, 
285  ;  made  by  Trajan  into  a 
Roman  province,  305 ;  seized 
by  Vologases  III.,  323  ; 
wrested  from  Vologases  by  the 
Romans,  324  ;  claims  indepen- 
dence, 333  ;  but  submits  to 
Severus,  337 
Armenia     Minor,     conquered    by 

Mithridates  of  Pontus,  128 
Armenians,    personal  characteris- 
tics of,    121  ;    become  allies  of 
Mithridates    of    Pontus,     128; 


defeated    by    Sulla,     129 ;    at- 
tacked by  I'hraates  III.,  138 
Armies,   Parthian,  description  of, 

397 
Arrian,  quoted,  48 
Arsaces    I.,    establishes    Parthian 

independence,  48,  49,  90 
Arsacid  intrigues,  366 
Arshag,  second  king  of  Armenia, 

124 
Art,  general  estimate  of  Parthian, 

393 
Artabanus  I.,  appearance  of,   58  ; 

reign  of,  59-61 
Artabanus    II.,  Scythian  war  of, 

115  ;  death  of,  1 16 
Artabanus  III.,  Parthian  crown 
offered  to,  232 ;  accepted  by, 
233  ;  defeats  and  expels 
Vonones,  233  ;  proclaimed 
king,  ibid.  ;  annexes  Armenia, 
237 ;  attacked  by  Scythians, 
239  ;  loses  Armenia,  ibid.  ; 
attempt  to  regain  it,  fails,  240 ; 
flight  of,  241  ;  return  of,  244  ; 
submission  to  Vitellius,  245  ; 
death  of,  258 
Artabanus     IV.,      pretender      to 

Parthian  throne,  298 
Artabanus  V. ,  accession  of,  346 ; 
overture  made  to  him  by  Cara- 
callus,  348,  349  ;  his  reply,  350  ; 
he  receives  Caracallus  at  Ctesi- 
phon,  351  ;  treachery  of  Cara- 
callus, 352  ;  his  death,  354 ; 
war  with  Rome,  ibid.  ;  defeat  of 
Macrinus  at  Nisibis,  355—357 
Artanes  of  Armenia,  133 
Artavasdesof  Armenia,  155;  makes 
alliance  with  Antony,  207  ;  con- 
ducts him  to  Praaspa,  208  ; 
withdraws  his  troops,  209  ;  and 
offends  Antony,  214  ;  seized 
and  put  in  chains  by  Antony, 

215 

Artavasdes   of    Parthia,    the   last 

king,  367 
Artaxata,  124,  236 
Artaxerxes  of  Persia,  his  war  with 

Artabanus  V.,  366,  367 
Artaxias  I.,  first  king  of  Armenia, 


INDEX. 


423 


124;  his  war  with  Antiochus 
Epiphanes,  67,  124,  125 

Artaxias  III.,  ruler  of  Armenia, 
236 

Ashkabad,  19 

Asia  Minor,  wars  in,  43 

Asia,  Western,  the  tiger  in,  9 

Asinai  and  Anilai,  Semitic  high- 
waymen, 248 

Asinai,  robber  chief,  248  ;  made 
satrap  of  Babylon,  249  ;  poison- 
ing of,  250 

Aspasiacse,  the,  54,  69 

Aspionus,  province  of,  10,  69 

Assyria,  description  of,  17  ;  con- 
quered by  Mithridates  I.,  73  ; 
occupied  by  Tigranes  of 
Armenia,  133 ;  recovered  by 
the  Parthians,  140 ;  see  Adia- 
bene 

Atak,  the,  5 

Atergatis,  Syrian  goddess,  temple 
of,  152 

Athenaeus,  general  of  Sidetes,  101 

Atropatene,  a  part  of  Media, 
description  of,  24,  25  ;  absorbed 
into  Parthia,  24  ;  established  as 
a  separate  state  by  Atropates,  45 

Attains,  56 

Augustus,  221-234 

Aurelius,  323 

Avidius  Cassius,  expedition  of, 
325,  327  ;  revolt  of,  329 

B 

Babylon,  troubles  in,  252 
Babylonia,  description  of,  14,  15  ; 

submission  of,  to   Parthia,   72  ; 

revolt  of,  under  Hymerus,  119 
Bactria,  description  of,  18;  makes 

itself     independent,     45,     47  ; 

attacked  by  Mithridates  I.,  69  ; 

conquered  by  him,  73  ;  Scythic 

invasion    of,    109 ;     occasional 

detachment  from  Parthia,  359 
Balas,  Syrian  king,  74 
Bambyce,  temple  at,  152 
Barsemius,  king  of  Hatra,  333 
Behistun,    Parthian    sculpture   at, 

267,  268 
Belik,  battle  of  the,  167 


Berenice,  sister  of  Ptolemy  Euer- 

getes,  52 
Bokhara,  19 
Bolor,  mountains,  25 


Cabul,  65,  69,  109 

Cheilitis         Bassus,        Pompeian 

general,  189 
Caesar    and    Pompey,    rivals    for 

power,   14  x  ;    contest  between, 

185;     Caesar    in    Syria,     187; 

murder  of,  189 
Csesennius  Partus,  Roman  general, 

282  ;  intrigues  of,  292-294 
Caius,  eldest  grandson  of  Augus- 
tus, sent  to  the  East,  225,  227  ; 

holds   conference    with    Phraa- 

taces,  229  ;  dies,  ibid. 
Caligula,  245 
Callinicus,  see  Seleucus 
Candahar,  21,  65 
Canidius  Crassus,  Roman  general, 

206 
Cape  Jask,  15 
Cappadocia,  26,  y],  45,  129,  237, 

276,  283, 318 
Caracallus,     ambition     of,     347  ; 

Abgarus  made  prisoner  by,  348 ; 

his  oveitures  to  Artabanus  V., 

348  ;    mad    proposal    of,    349  ; 

arrival  in  Parthia,  351 ;  treachery 

of,  352  ;  his  insult  to  dead  kings, 

352  ;  death  of,  354 
Caria,  country  of,  overrun  by  the 

Parthians,  194 
Carmania,  country  of,  366 
Carrhse,  city  of,  169,  170 
Carrhenes,  general  of  Meherdates, 

267 
Carthage,  destruction  of,  127 
Caspian  Gates,  II,  62 
Caspian  Sea,  the,   1,  4,  7,  8,  24, 

25>  3°.  274  . 
Cassius  (Avidius),  expedition   of, 

326  ;  strange  pestilence   in  his 

army,  328 
Cassius,  Caius,   prefect  of  Syria, 

265 
Cassius  Longinus,  Roman  general, 

sent  by  Julius  Caesar  to  Crassus, 


424 


INDEX. 


153;  his  prudent  advice,   158; 

his  successful  retreat,  171  ;  his 

later  successes,  180,  181 
Cassius,     the     "  Liberator,"     his 

dealings    with    the    Parthians, 

189- 191 
Caucasus,  mountains,  30,  31,  120, 

206 
Celtic  cavalry.  167,  212 
Chandragupta,    Indian    monarch, 

65 
Charax,  city  of,  10,  62,  64 

Chinese  historians,  quoted,  107 

Chorasmia,      country      of,       18  ; 

described,   22 ;   people   of,  27, 

28,  no 

Chosroes,  Farthian  general,  323 

Chosroes,  Parthian  king,  accession 

of,  298 ;  his  affront  to  Trojan, 

302  ;  his  Roman  war,  306-313  ; 

his      friendly      relations     with 

Hadrian,  313-316;    his  death, 

317 
Chosroes,  uncle  of  last  Parthian 

king,  367 
Cicero  alarmed   at   the   Parthian 

victory  over  Crassus,  182 
Cilicia,    country    of,     133,     134  ; 

invaded  by  Parthians,  182,  194, 

198  ;  death  of  Trajan  in,  313 
Cimmerians,  105 
Cinnamus,  Parthian  noble,  258 
Civilisation  of  the  Parthians,  415 

et  seq. 
Claudius,    Roman    emperor,   263, 

292 
Cleopatra,  wife  of  Demetrius  II., 

74,  94,  98 
Cleopatra,  wife  of  Mithridates  of 

Pontus,  128 
Cleopatra,    mistress    of    Antony, 

192,  215 
Climate  of  Parthia,  5 
Clodius  Albinus,  332 
Colchi,  305 

Colchis,  country  of,  29,  128 
Comans,  people,  105 
Commagene,  country  of,  195,  196, 

197,  279 
Commodus,  reign  of,  329;  assassi- 
nation of,  332 


Corbulo,  Armenian  campaign  of, 

278  ;    Armenia    conquered    by, 

279  ;  his  relations  with  Psetus, 
283-286 ;  his  peaceful  arrange- 
ment with  Tiridates,  287 

Corma,  river,  266 

Cornelia,  wife  of  Pompey,  186 

Crassus,  expedition  of,  against 
Parthia,  147-173  ;  wealth  of, 
148 ;  career  and  character  of, 
148,  149;  hesitation  of,  153- 
155  ;  advance  through  Mesopo- 
tamia, 158 ;  his  army,  162  ; 
his  battle  with  Surenas,  166; 
his  retreat,  169,  171  ;  his  death, 
173  ;  treatment  of  his  body,  177 

Crassus,  Publius,  sent  to  his  father 
by  Julius  Caesar,  153  ;  leads 
charge  on  the  Parthians,  167; 
slain,  168 

Creticus  Silanus,  Roman  governor 
of  Syria,  234 

Ctesiphon,  city  of,  34 ;  building 
°f'  57  >  Jews  in,  83  ;  chief  city 
of  Parthia,  86  ;  taken  by  Trajan, 
309  ;  by  Avidius  Cassius,  326  ; 
by  Severus,  338  ;  approached 
by  Caiacallus,  351 

Cyaxares,  Median  king,  108 

Cyrus,  river,  25,  120 

Cyrus  the  Great,  Persian  king,  39, 
46,  108,  no,  363 

D 

Dacia  made  a  Roman   province, 

297 
Dahae,  people,  48,  112,  243,  260, 

273 
Damaghan,  city,  2,  8 
Daman-i-Koh,  mountains,  4 
Dara,    city    of,     57  ;    called    also 

Dareium,  ibid. 
Darius      Codomannus,      Persian 

king,   157 
Darius,  Persian  king,  inscription 

of,   27  ;  expedition  against  the 

European   Scyths,    108  ;  revolt 

of  Armenia  from  him,  123 
Decebalus  of  Dacia,  adversary  of 

Trajan,  297 
Deiotarus  of  Galatia,  182 


INDEX. 


425 


Demavend,  Mount,  4,  8 

Demetrius  of  Bactria,  65 

Demetrius  I.  of  Syria,  67,  68 

Demetrius  II. ,  ol  Syria,  his 
struggle  with  Tryphon,  74  ; 
defeated  by  Mithridates  III. 
and  made  prisoner,  75 ;  his 
attempts  to  escape  fail,  93  ;  he 
is  sent  into  Syria  to  provoke  a 
revolt,  67,  68 

Derketo,  Syrian  goddess,  152 

Diala,  river,  13 

Didius  Julianus,  Roman  emperor, 

33i>  332 

Dio   Cassius,    quoted,    237,    350, 

400 
Diodotus,     first   king  of   Bactria, 

46,  54,  64 
Djuvein,  mountains,  5 
Dniestr,  river,  128 
Domitian,  Roman  Emperor,  295- 

297. 
Drangiana,  account  of,  20 
Dress,    Parthian,    description   of, 

405 

E 

Ecbatana,  capital  of  Media,   59, 

70 
Edessa,  city,  151,  265,  305,  311 
El  Hadhr,  modern  name  of  Hatra, 

373 

Elam,  country  of,  13-17  ;  con- 
quered by  Mithridates  I.,  72 

Elburz,  mountains,  I,  4,  8,  9 

Elegeia,  city,  302,  323 

Eleuts,  wild  tribes,  35 

El  wand,  Mount,  70 

Epiphaneia,  city,  192 

Erucius   Clarus,   Roman  general, 

311 

Ettrek,  valley  of,  2,  7 

Eucratidas  of  Bactria,  attacked  by 

Mithridates  I.,  69  ;  murder  of, 

by  his  son,  73 
Euemerus,      made      Viceroy      of 

Babylon,  1 1 3  ;  rebellion  of,  1 19 
Euergetes,  expedition  of,  52 
Eupator,  Syrian  king,  67 
Euphrates,  The,  14,  25,  26,  &c. 
Euthydemus  of  Bactria,  65 


Exedares,    son    of    Pacorus    II., 
299,  300 


Ferghana,  107 

Fergusson,    quoted,    372,    377-9, 

382 
Foods,    Parthian,    description  of, 

413 
Forum  Romanum,  289 
Fronto,  quoted,  312 

G 

Gabinius,  governor  of  Syria,  144, 

145 >  149 

Galatia,  country  of,  128,  275 

Gallus,  Roman  general,  212 

Gedrosia,  country  of,  21 

Georgia,  country  of,  120,  239 

Germanicus,  character  and  ap- 
pointment of,  235  ;  his  arrange- 
ment of  affairs  in  the  East,  236 

Ghermsir,  or  "  warm  country,"  15 

Gibbon,  quoted,  t,^ 

Gordyene,  country  of,  130,  1 33, 
140,  306 

Gotarzes,  accession  of,  263  ;  brutal 
nature  of,  264 ;  his  war  with 
Meherdates,  265 ;  rock  tablet 
of,  267  ;  death  of,  268 ;  ill 
effects  of  his  reign,  269 

Goths,  105 

"  Great  King,"  title  of,  84 

Great  Salt  Desert  of  Iran,  1 

Greater  Zab,  river,  96 

Greek  art,  33 

Greek  towns  in  Parthia,  75,  81 

Gurghan  river,  valley  of  the,  2,  7 

H 

Hadrian  relinquishes  Trajan's 
conquests,  313  ;  sagacity  of, 
314  ;  his  relations  with  Chos- 
roes,  315,  316  ;  his  quarrel  with 
Pharasmanes,  318  ;  his  death, 
320 

Hafiz,  Persian  port,  364 

Halus,  Persian  city,  242 

Hamun,  Lake,  20,  21 


426 


INDEX. 


Hatra,    revolt   of,    from    Trajan, 
310;    unsuccessful   attacks   on, 

312,341 
Ilatreni,  people  of  Hatra,  343 
Hazaret  Sultan  range,  25 
Hecatompylos,     city    of,    50,    57, 

58,  60 
Helena,  mother  of  Izates,  257 
Heliocles,  Bactrian  king,  73 
Helmend,  river,  3,  20,  09 
Heniochi,  people,  305 
Herat,  city,  20,  28 
Heri-rud,  river,  3,  20,  69 
Herod  the  Great,  196 
Herodian  quoted,  350,  396 
Herodotus  quoted,  m,  123 
Heruli,  people,  113 
Hierapolis,  city,  152,  205 
"  Hills  of  the  Kurds,"  3 
Hindu- Kush,  mountains,  19,  74 
Hissar,  mountains,  19,  25 
Hit,  on  the  Euphrates,  14 
Horace  quoted,  190,  204 
Hormuz,  plain  of,  367 
Hydaspes,  river,  73 
Hymerus,  113,  359 
Hyrcania,  2  ;  description  of,  6,  7 ; 

conquered  by  Tiridates  I.,  53  ; 

invaded  by  Antiochus  III.,  60  ; 

revolts  from  Mithridates  I.,  and 

is  reduced,  71  ;  breaks  off  from 

the  Parthian  Empire,  296,  359 
Hyrcanus,   John,  Maccabee  king, 

96 
Hyrcanus  II.,  193 
Hystaspes,  Persian  king,  27 

I 

Iberia,  country  of,  25 

Ichnas,    Greek    town    in    Parthia, 

152,  168 
Indates,  Parthian  general,  96 
Indo-Scyths,  people  of,  26 
Indus,  valley  of,  26 
Ipsus,  battle  of,  37 
Iran,  Salt  Desert  of,  1,  10,  II 
Iranian  family,  the,  28 
Isidore  of  Charax,  quoted,  87 
Ispahan,  city,  15 
Istakr,  city,  33 


Izates,  king  of  Adiabene\  receives 
Artabanus  II.,  257  ;  sends  relief 
to  Jerusalem,  ibid.  ;  opposes 
Gotarzes,  262  ;  joins  Meher- 
dates,  266;  deserts  him,  ibid.  ; 
quarrels  with  Vologases  I.,  273 

J 

Jaghetai,  mountains,  5 
Jerahi,  river,  13,  367 
Jerusalem,     revolution    in,     193 ; 
receives  offerings  from  Parthia, 

Jewish  element  in  Parthia,  26 
Jezireh,  towns  on  Tigris,  266,  307 
Josephus  quoted,  240,  257,  416 
Judaea,  revolt  of,  from  Syria,  102; 

overrun  by  Parthians,   193 
Julius  Alexander,  Roman  general, 

311 
Julius  Caesar,  185,  187,  189 
Julius  Martialis,  354 
Julius  Pelignus,  272 
Justin  quoted,  29,  1 15,  119,  397 


Kalmucks,  wild  tribes  of,  35 

Kamnasciras,  135,  420 

Kanats,  system  of,  12 

Karun,  river,  13 

Kasvin,  city  of,  10 

Kavir,  salt  efflorescence,  22 

Kerkhah,  river,  13 

Kerman,    country    of,    61,    366 ; 

desert  of,  15,  16 
Khabour,  river,  265 
Kharesmian  desert,  64 
Khiva,  desert  of,  1 
Khorasan,   desert  of,  I  ;  province 

of,  2 
King  of  Kings,  title  of,  81,  84,  228 
Kissia,  country  of,  13-17 
Romans,  wild  tribe,  35 
Kum,  city  of,  10 
Kurdish  tribes,  rudeness  of,  4 
"  Kurds,  Hills  of  the,"  3 


Labienus,   successes  of,    193  ;  as- 
sumption    of     title     of     "  Im- 


INDEX. 


427 


perator,"     194 ;     capture     and 

death  of,  195 
Labus,  or  Labuta,  mountain,  3 
Laetus,  officer  of  Severus,  335,  341 
Lindsay  quoted,  112,  401,  405 
Longinus,     C.      Cassius,    Roman 

general,  153,  158,  171 
JLucullus,    Roman    general,     136, 

278 
Lycus  river,  96 

Lysanias,  tetrarch  of  Iturasa,  196 
Lysias,  regent  of  Syria,  67 

M 

Macedonian  Empire,  division  of, 

37 
Macheloni,  people,  305 
Macrabea  range,  5 
Macrinus,  elected  emperor,  354  ; 

defeated  by  Artabanus  V.,  356 
Magnesia,  battle  of,  124 
Magi,  position  of,  78,  365,  395 
Manicheism,  365 
Mannai,  or  Minni,  people,  122 
Manners     and     customs    of    the 

Parthians,  33,  396  et  seq. 
Marcellinus  quoted,  85,  373,  409 
Mardi,  country  of,  8,  9;  conquest 

of,  62 
Markoff  quoted,  401 
Margiana,  account  of,  19 
Margians,  people,  28 
Mark  Antony,  145  ;  see  Antony 
Mashur,  15 
Massagetse,  wild  tribes  of,  25,  108, 

no 
Maximus,  Roman  officer,  311 
Mazanderan,  country  of,  8 
Media   Atropatene,    II,    24,  45  ; 

see  Atropatene 
Media  Magna,  description  of,  n- 

17  ;  conquered   by    Mithridates 

I.,  70,  71  ;  placed  under  Mithri- 
dates II.,  144 
Media    Rhagiana,  description  of, 

9  ;  conquest  of,  10,  62 
Megistanes,  Parthian  nobles,   78, 

79,  201 
Meherdates,    attempts    to    depose 

Gotarzes,  265 


Merivale,  Dean,  quoted,  88,  290, 

297,  314,  328 
Merv,  oasis  of,  19,  38,  174 
Mesopotamia,  17,  22,  39,  52,  59, 

&c. 
Mithridates  of  Armenia,  271 
Mithridates    I.,    appointed    king, 
63  ;  attack  on  Bactria,  69 ;  con- 
quest of  Media,  70  ;  submission 
of    Babylonia    to,    72;    second 
attack  on  Bactria,  73 ;  defeat  of 
Demetrius    II.,    74;   death   of, 
76  ;  his  system  of  government, 
78  ;   "  King  of  Kings,"  84 
Mithridates   II.,  the  Great,  117; 
defeat  of  Scythian  tribes,  118; 
personal    description    of,    130; 
death  of,  130 
Mithridates    111.,    accession     of, 
143  ;   reign  of,    144 ;  death  of, 
146 
Mithridates  IV.  of  Pontus,  127 
Mithridates    V.    of    Pontus,   vast 

empire  of,  128 
Mithridates,  Parthian  sntrap,  250 
Mnasciras,      supposed      Parthian 

kmg.  I35>  420 
Monaeses,        pretender,        revolts 

against  Phraates  IV.,  204 
Monaeses,  Parthian  noble,  281 
Monarchy,     second     Persian,    or 

Sassanian,  26 
Mongols,  nation  of,  34,  105 
Monobazus,    king    of    Adiabene, 

274,  281,  287 
Mons  Masius,  23 
Mount  Amanus,  195 
Musa,  queen  of  Parthia,  226,  227 
Music  girls,  Parthian,  178 

N 

Nearda,  city  of,  248 

Nero,    Tiridates'   audience    with, 

289 
Nicephorium,  city  of,  326 
Nicomedes  of  Bithynia,  128 
Niger,      Pescennius,     prefect     of 

Syria,  332  ;  a  rival  of  Severus, 

333  ;  death  of,  334 
Nishapur,  city,  2  ;  river  of,  3 


428 


INDEX. 


Nisibis,    city,    307  ;    revolts  from 

Trajnn,    310  ;    recovered    311  ; 

made   a    Roman    colony,    335  ; 

battle  of,  355 
Nomads,    northern,  barbarity   of, 

105 

O 

Ochus,  river,  48 

Octavian,  rival  of  Antony,  190, 
203,  217  ;  becomes  emperor, 
and  takes  the  name  of  Augustus, 
221  ;  his  dealings  with  Phraates 
IV.,  221-225  !  w'tn  Phraataces, 
226-229  >  with  Vonones,  231 

Octavius,  general  under  Crassus, 

171,  173 
Ornaments,      personal,     of      the 

Parthians,  388,  389 
Onones,     variant     form     of    the 

name  Vonones,  233 
Ornodapantes,  Parthian  noble,  183 
Ornospades,  Mesopotamian  satrap, 

241 
Orobazus,  129,  130 
Orodes  I.,  brother  of  Mithridates 

III.,  143  ;  his  plan  of  defence, 

160-162  ;  jealousy  of   Surenas, 

180;  death  of,  201 
Orodes    II.,  accession  and  death 

of,  230 
Orodes,  son  of  Artabanus  III.,  239 
Orontes,  river,  192 
Orosius,  quoted,  94 
Ortoadistus,  king  of  Armenia,  125 
Osrhoene,       tributary       kingdom 

under  Parthia,  80;  king  of,  joins 

Crassus,     151  ;     occupied      by 

Crassus,  154  ;  joins  Meherdates, 

265 
Oxus,  river,  valley  of,  i8_;  modern 

name  of,  22 


Pacorus  I.,  son  of  Orodes,  181  ; 

associated  by  his  father,   183  ; 

victories  of,  192-194  ;  death  of, 

197 
Pacorus    II.,   accession    of,    296; 

negotiates    with    Decebalus    of 

Dacia,  297  ;  his  death,  298 


Psetus,  campaign  of,  282-285  5 
machinations  of,  292,  293 

Pamir,  the,  19,  25 

Paropamisus,  mountains,  1,  11, 
&c. 

Parthamasiris,  son  of  Pacorus  II., 
299  ;  Trajan's  seizure  of,  303  ; 
death  of,  304 

Parthamaspates,  made  king  of 
Parthia  by  Trajan,  311  ;  de- 
posed by  Chosroes,  313  ;  made 
king  of  Armenia  by  Hadrian, 
315  ;  his  death,  321 

Parthia,  description  of,  1-5  ;  cli- 
mate of,  5  ;  productions  of,  6  ; 
establishes  her  independence, 
47-49  ;  becomes  a  Roman  ally, 
138 ;  wars  with  Rome,  140, 
152-198,  &c.  ;  attacked  by 
Antony,  207  ;  architecture  and 
art  of,  373,  et  seq. ;  degree  of 
civilisation,  415,  et  seq.  ;  des- 
cription of  its  armies,  397 ; 
doubtful  period  of  its  history, 
292  ;  duration  of  its  monarchy, 
368  ;  general  survey  of,  419  ; 
golden  throne  of,  316  ;  Jewish 
communities  in,  83,  246  ;  pomp 
of  its  kings,  409  ;  limits  of  its 
dominion,  4,  23,  368  ;  loss  of 
power,  345  ;  Magi  in,  395  ; 
military  sysiem  of,  199;  tactics 
of,  401,  et  seq.  ;  nobles, 
power  of,  411  ;  nomadic  pres- 
sure on,  104  ;  organisation  of 
its  army,  89  ;  religion  of,  394  ; 
splendour  of  Court  of,  87  ;  pre- 
tenders to  throne  of,  298,  317; 
320  ;  titles  of  monarcjis  of,  85  ; 
empire,  character  of,  369 ;  ten- 
dency to  break  up,  358  ;  causes 
of  discontent  in,  361  ;  downfall 
of,  362,  367 

Parthians  defeated  by  Scyths, 
114  ;  governing  faculty  of,  34  ; 
manners  and  customs  of,  396, 
405  ;  personal  ornaments  of, 
388  ;  savagery  of,  364 

Pergamus,  kings  of,  42,  56,  66 

Persia,  description  of,  14,  17,  25 

Persian  Empire,  collapse  of,  28 


INDEX. 


429 


Persian  Gulf,  14,  15,  26 

Fersian,    Second,    or    Sassanian, 

monarchy,  26  ;  names,  28  ;  rule, 

fidelity  of,  28 
Persians,   religious  zeal  of,    365  ; 

special     grievances     of,     363  ; 

characteristics  of,  364 
Pertinax,  Roman  Emperor,  331 
Pescennius,  see  Niger 
1'harasmanes  I.,  of  Iberia,  239,279 
Pharasmanes    II.,    of   Iberia,    his 

quarrel  with  Hadrian,  318 
Pharnaces  of  Pontus,  187 
Pharnapates,     Parthian     general, 

195 
Pharsalus,  battle  of,  186 
Philippi,  battle  of,  191 
Philostratus,  quoted,  408,  414 
Phraataces   and    Musa,    reign  of, 

226 ;     embassy     to     Augustus, 

227  ;  meeting  with  Caius,  229  ; 

deposition  and  death  of,  230 
Phraates    I.,    accession    of,    61  ; 

conquests  of,  62 
Phraates    II.,   accession   of,    91  ; 

reign     of,     93 ;     attacked     by 

Antiochus  Sidetes,   96 ;    clever 

stratagem  of,  97  ;  plot  of,  99 ; 

massacre   of  Syrians  by,    100 ; 

war  with  the  Scyths,  113;  death 

of,  1 14 
Phraates  III.,  accession  of,   137  ; 

alliance    with    Pompey,     138  ; 

attack  on   Armenia,   138,   139  ; 

quarrel  with  Pompey,  140-142; 

murder  of,  143 
Phraates  IV.,  accession  of,  203  ; 

wholesale    murders    by,     204 ; 

attack     of    Antony    on,    208  ; 

quarrel     of    Median    monarch 

with,    213  ;    quarrel    arranged, 

216  ;  insurrection  against,  219  ; 

poisoning  of,  226 
Pliny,  quoted,  297 
Plutarch,  quoted,   136,   397,  41 1, 

415 
Polemo  of  Pontus,  236,  279 
Polytimetus,  river,  109 
Pompredius  Silo,  Roman  general, 

195  . 

Pompeiopolis,  city  of,  236 


Pompey,    Roman   general,    137- 
142 ;    and    Casar,    contest    be- 
tween, 185 
Priapatius,  Parthian  king,  61 
Ptolemy  Auletes,    king  of  Egypt, 

145 

Ptolemy  Euergetes.kingof  Egypt, 

34 
Ptolemy    Philadelphia,     king    of 
Egypt,  46,  49 

Q 
Quadratus,  Roman  general,  276 
Quietus,  Lucius,  officer  of  Trajan, 
3" 

R 

Registan,  desert  of,  21 

Rhadamistus,  of  Iberia,  his  murder 
of  Mithridates  of  Armenia,  272  ; 
ascent  of  throne  of  Armenia, 
272  ;  driven  out  by  Vologases 

I..  275. 

Rhages,  city  of,  9 

Rhagiana,  country  of,  9,  10,  62 

Rhodaspes,  223 

Rhodogune,  76 

Roman   Emperor,  the  post    sold 

by  auction,  332 
Roman  invasions  of  Parthia,  1 52- 

176,    208-218,   306-312;    326, 

327 ;  3357344 ;  350-354 

Romans,  military  system  of  the, 
199 

Rome,  Armenia  a  province  of, 
305  ;  Armenian  compromise 
with,  287 ;  at  peace  with 
Parthia,  291  ;  first  Parthian 
contact  with,  127;  la<-t  Parthian 
war  with,  354 ;  Parthia  seeks 
aid  of,  295  ;  Parthia  an  ally  of, 
138 

Ross  quoted,  381 


Sacarauli,  tribe  of  Scyths,  110 
Sacastana,  account  of,  21,  74,  109, 

118 
Sagartia,  account  of,  21,  22 
Salt  Desert  Great,  of  Iran,  1,  11 
Samarah,  city  on  Tigris,  14 


430 


INDEX. 


Sanatrceces,  reign  of,  135-137 

Sarangia,  account  of,  20,  21 

Sarrakhs,  fort,  3 

Sassanian  monarchy,  26 

Satraps,  revolts  of,  44 

Sauromatae,  nation  of,  305 

Saxa,  Decidius,  Roman  general, 
192,  194 

Scythia,  wild  tribes  of,  26 ;  at 
war  with  Artabanus  II.,  115  ; 
settle  in  Affghanistan,  109 

Scythic  characteristics,  31 

Scyths,  26,  29 ;  description  of, 
1 10;  barbarity  of,  11 1  ;  at  war 
with  Phraates  II.,  113;  defeat 
him,  114;  at  war  with  Arta- 
banus II.,  115 

Second  Persian,  or  Sassanian, 
monarchy,  26 

Sebzawur,  city  of,  2 

Seleucia,  city  of,  81  ;  Jews  in,  83  ; 
position  of,  86  ;  inclined  towards 
Rome,  154;  Surenas  at,  177, 
178  ;  massacre  of  Jews  at,  253 ; 
submits  to  Trajan,  309  ;  taken 
by  Avidius  Cassius,  326 ;  by 
Severus,  338 

Seleucid  kingdom,  organisation 
of,  41 

Seleucid  princes,  42-47 

Seleucus  I.  (Nicator),  37-41 

Seleucus  II.,  53,  54,  56 

Seleucus  IV.,  reign  of,  62  ;  son  of, 

67 

Selinus,  city  of,  Trajan's  death 
there,  313 

Seraspadanes,  Parthian  prince, 
223 

Severus,  Roman  Emperor,  331  ; 
rival  of  Niger,  333  ;  crushes 
him,  334 ;  crushes  his  other 
rival,  Albinus,  336  ;  first  ex- 
pedition of  against  Parthia, 
335  ;  second  expedition  of,  337— 
339 ;  unsuccessful  siege  of  1 1  atra, 
341-344 :  conquests  of,  345  ; 
death  of,  347 

Shah-rud,  river,  2 

Shebri-No,  town,  3 

Silanus,  Governor  of  Syria,  234 

Sillaces,  Parthian  general,  180 


Sinnaca,  battle  of,  171 
Sogdians,  people,  27 
Sophagasenus,  65 
Statianus,  Roman  general,  209 
Statius    Priscus,    Roman   general, 

324 

Strabo  quoted,  6  ;  doubtful  his- 
torian, 30 

Su,  a  nomadic  race,  107 

Sulla,  defeat  of  Armenians  by, 
129  ;  embassy  of  Mithridates 
II.  to,  ibid. 

Sura,  city  of,  326 

Surena,  Parthian  name  for  com- 
mander-in-chief, 89,  411 

Surenas,  general  of  Orodes  I., 
159  ;  character  of,  160  ;  Army 
of,  164  ;  his  battle  with  Crassus, 
166  ;  stratagem  of,  172  ;  farcical 
ceremony  of,  177,  178;  death 
of,  180 

Susiana,  country  of,  13-17,  37 

Sutlej,  river,  67 

Syria,  Parthian  invasion  of,  192- 
195  ;  recovered  by  the  Romans, 
196 

Syrian  gates,  195 

Syrian  troops,  massacre  of,  100 

Syro-Macedonian  Empire,  37-44 


Tacitus,    quoted,    82,    259,    268, 

277,  401 
Tactics,  Parthian,  401  et  seq. 
Tadjiks,  people,  34 
Takht-i-Suleiman,  city,  21 1 
Tanyoxares,  Persian  prince,  46 
Tatar  races,  104 
Taurus,  mountains,  29 
Tejend,  river,  3,  18,  20 
Tersheez,  town,  2,  3 
Theocritus,  Roman  general,  348 
Theos,    title  taken  by   Antiochus 

II.,  44  ;  by  Parthian  kings,  85 
Tiberius,  relations  with  Augustus, 

223 ;    retreat  to   Rhodes,   224 ; 

relations  with  Artabanus  III., 

234-245 
Tigranes    I.,    king    of    Armenia, 
129  ;  attack   on    Parthia,   130  ; 


INDEX. 


431 


capture  of  Parthian  provinces, 
x33;  flight  of,  138;  victory 
over  his  son,  139 ;  relations 
with  Pompey,  138-142 

Tigranes  II.,  son  of  Tigranes  I., 
ally  of  Phraates  III.  and  Pom- 
pey, 138-140  ;  carried  to  Rome, 
140 

Tigranes  III.,  brother  of  Artaxias, 
made  king  of  Armenia  by 
Tiberius,  223  ;  dies,  ibid. 

Tigranes  IV.,  made  king  by  the 
Armenians,  224 

Tigranes  V.,  make  king  by  Nero, 
279;  attacks  Adiabene,  180 

Tigrano-certa,  city,  built  by  Ti- 
granes I.,  134  ;  great  strength 
of,  281 

Tigris,  river,  13,  81,  120,  153; 
Trajan's  fleet  on,  309  ;  his 
pleasure  voyage  on,  310 ; 
Severus's  fleet  on,  340 

Tiridates  I. ,  coin  of,  50  ;  reign  of, 
50-58 

Tiridates  II.,  short  reign  of,  219, 
220 

Tiridates    III.,    pretender,    239, 

241  ;  crowned  King  of  Parthia, 

242  ;  flight  of,  244 
Tiridates,  established  as  king  of 

Armenia  by  Vologases  I.,  275  ; 
driven  out,  279  ;  re-established, 
285  ;      his     compromise     with 
Rome,    287 ;     his    journey    to 
Rome,  287  ;  his  audience  with 
Nero,    289 ;    defeated    by   the 
Alani,  295  ;  death  of,  300 
Tiger,  in  Western  Asia,  9 
Titus,  Roman  Emperor,  295,  296 
Tochari,  people,  no,  112,  115 
Trajan,   his  march   on  Armenia, 
302  ;  his  seizure  of  Parthama- 
siris,     303 ;     his     invasion     of 
Parthia,    306;    his  retreat    and 
death,  313 
Trogus  Pompeius,  Roman  writer, 

56 
Tryphon,  Syrian  pretender,  74 
Turanian   characteristics,   31,    32, 

104 
Turiua,  province  of,  10,  69 


Turks,    resemblance    of    to    Par- 
tisans, 35,  254 
Tyre,  city  of,  193 

U 

Urarda,  people,  122 
Urumiyeh,  lake  of,  24,  121 

V 

Val-arsaces,  Armenian  king,  125 

Van,  lake  of,  121,  122 

Vardanes  I.,  accession  of,  260 ; 
war  with  Gotarzes,  260 ;  de- 
signs on  Armenia,  261  ;  murder 
of,  263 

Vardanes  II.,  revolt  and  reign  of, 
277 

Ventidius,  Roman  general,  194, 
206 

Verus,  Roman  Emperor,  expedi- 
tion to  the  East,  323 

Vespasian,  his  relations  with 
Vologases  I.,  292,  294-296  ; 
his  relations  with  Caesennius 
Partus,  292-294 

Vitaxre,  the,  81,  249,  273 

Vitellius,  governor  of  Syria  under 
Tiberius,  238 ;  his  war  with 
Artabanus  III.,  240  ;  introduces 
Tiridates  III.  into  his  kingdom, 
241  ;  crosses  Euphrates  into 
Parthia,  244 ;  has  interview  with 
Artabanus  III.,  and  receives 
concessions,  245 

Vologases  I. ,  accession  of,  270  ; 
first  invasion  of  Armenia,  272  ; 
dispute  with  Izates,  273,  274  ; 
second  invasion  of  Armenia, 
274  ;  war  with  Rome,  276- 
279;  attempt  to  recover  Ar- 
menia, 281  ;  truce  with  Corbulo, 
282  ;  victory  over  Psetus,  284  ; 
arrangement  with  Corbulo,  287 ; 
attacked  by  the  Alani,  294 ; 
asks  aid  of  Rome,  295  ;  death 
of,  296 

Vologases  II.,  pretender  under 
Chosroes,  316,  317  ;  reign  of, 
318;   mistaken  policy  of,  319; 


432 


INDEX. 


his  dealings  with  Antoninus 
Pius,  320,  321  ;  his  death,  321 

Vologases  III.,  accession  of,  321  ; 
Armenia  seized  by,  323  ;  de- 
feated by  Avidius  Cassius,  324  ; 
further  victories  of  Cassius,  326  ; 
dealings  of  Vologases  with  Corn- 
modus,  329  ;  his  death,  ibid. 

Vologases  IV.,  accession  of,  331  ; 
relations  with  Pescennius  Niger, 
332,  333;  war  wiih  Seveius, 
336-345  ;  later  years  of,  345  ; 
death  of,  346 

Vologases  V.,  disputes  succes- 
sion with  Artabanus  V.,  347  ; 
reigns  in  Eastern  Parthia,  347 

Vonones  I.,  accession  of,  231  ; 
attempted  deposition  of,  232  ; 
defeated    by    Artabanus     III., 

233  ;    made  king  of  Armenia, 

234  ;  death  of,  236 
Vonones   II.,  accession   of,   270; 

children  of,  ibid. 


W 

Wagises,  Parthian  envoy  to  Cras- 

sus,  155 
Wagharshag,       early       Armenian 

king,  125 
Western  Asia,  the  tiger  in,  9 
Wilson    H.  II.,  quoted,  107 
Women,    seclusion  of,  in  Parthia, 

405,  407,  414 

X 

Xenophon,  213 

Y 

Yezd,  country  of,  16 
Yue-ehi,   wild  tribes  of,  26,  107, 
112 

Z 
Zab,  rivers,  273,  345 
Zagros,  mount,  II,  13,  17,  59,  339, 

345 
Zela,  battle  of,  187,  189 
Zendavesta,  27 
Zoroaster,  365,  394 


The  Story  of  the  Nations. 


In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  National  life 
is  distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and  note- 
worthy periods  and  episodes  are  presented  for  the 
reader  in  their  philosophical  relation  to  each  other 
as  well  as  to  universal  history. 

It  is  the  plan  of  the  writers  of  the  different  volumes 
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and  struggled — as  they  studied  and  wrote,  and  as 
they  amused  themselves.  In  carrying  out  this  plan, 
the  myths,  with  which  the  history  of  all  lands  begins, 
will  not  be  overlooked,  though  these  will  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  actual  history,  so  far  as  the 
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consecutive  epochs  or  periods,  so  that  the  set  when 
completed  will  present  in  a  comprehensive  narrative 
the  chief  events  in  the  great  Story  of  the  Nations; 
but  it  is,  of  course,  not  always  practicable  to  issue 
the  several  volumes  in  their  chronological  order. 

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For  list  of  volumes  see  next  page. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS. 


GREECE.     Prof.  Jas.  A.  Harrison. 
ROME.     Arthur  Gilman. 

THE  JEWS.     Prof.  James  K.  Hos- 
mer. 

CHALDEA.     Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
GERMANY.     S.  Baring-Gould. 
NORWAY.     Hjalmar  H.  Boyesen. 
SPAIN.     Rev.    E.    E.    and    Susan 

Hale. 
HUNGARY.     Prof.  A.  Vambery. 
CARTHAGE.       Prof.      Alfred     J. 

Church . 

THE     SARACENS.     Arthur     Gil- 
man. 

THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN.     Stanley 
Lane-Poole. 

THE      NORMANS.     Sarah      Orne 

Jewett. 
PERSIA.     S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 
ANCIENT     EGYPT.     Prof.     Geo. 

Rawlinson. 

ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE.     Prof. 

J.  P.  Mahaffy. 
ASSYRIA.     Z.  A.   Ragozin. 
THE  GOTHS.     Henry  Bradley. 
IRELAND.     Hon.  Emily  Lawless. 
TURKEY.     Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
MEDIA,   BABYLON,  AND    PER- 
SIA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
MEDIAEVAL  FRANCE.    Prof.  Gus- 

tave  Masson. 
HOLLAND.        Prof.     J.     Thorold 

Rogers. 
MEXICO.     Susan  Hale. 
PHCENICIA.     George   Rawlinson. 
THE      HANSA     TOWNS.     Helen 

Zimmern. 
EARLY   BRITAIN.     Prof.   Alfred 

J.  Church. 
THE    BARBARY    CORSAIRS. 

Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
RUSSIA.     W.  R.  Morrill. 
THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME.     W. 

D.  Morrison. 
SCOTLAND.     John  Mackintosh. 
SWITZERLAND.     R.    Stead    and 

Mrs.  A.  Hug. 
PORTUGAL.     H.  Morse-Stephens. 
THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE.     C. 

W.  C.  Oman. 
SICILY.     E.  A.  Freeman. 


THE       TUSCAN       REPUBLICS. 

Bella  Duffy. 
POLAND.     W.  R.  Morfill. 
PARTHIA.     Geo.  Rawlinson. 
JAPAN.     David  Murray. 
THE    CHRISTIAN    RECOVERY 

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AUSTRALASIA.     Greville  Tregar- 

then. 
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Bon. 
THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE.     Alfred 

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Fiske. 

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CHINA.     Robt.    K.    Douglass. 

MODERN  SPAIN.  Major  Martin 
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MODERN  ITALY.     Pietro  Orsi. 

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THE  PAPAL  MONARCHY.  Wm. 
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BUDDHIST  INDIA.  T.  W.  Rhys- 
Davids. 

THE  SOUTH  AMERICAN  RE- 
PUBLICS. Thomas  G.  Daw- 
son.    Two  vols. 

PARLIAMENTARY  ENGLAND. 
Edward  Jenks. 


Heroes  of  the  Nations. 


A  Series  of  biographical  studies  of  the  lives  and 
work  of  a  number  of  representative  historical  char- 
acters about  whom  have  gathered  the  great  traditions 
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For  full  list  of  volumes  see  next  page. 


HEROES  OF  THE  NATIONS. 


NELSON.     By  W.  Clark  Russell 
GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS.     By  C. 

R.  L.  Fletcher. 
PERICLES.     By  Evelyn  Abbott. 
THEODORIC    THE    GOTH.     By 

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Fowler. 
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Morris. 
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F.  Willert. 
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Davidson. 
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Brooks. 
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GAL)     THE      NAVIGATOR. 

By  C.  R.  Beazley. 
JULIAN    THE    PHILOSOPHER. 

By  Alice  Gardner. 
LOUIS  XIV.     By  Arthur  Hassall. 
CHARLES    XII.     By    R.    Nisbet 

Bain. 
LORENZO  DE'  MEDICI.     By  Ed- 
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JEANNE    D'ARC.     By    Mrs.    Oli- 

phant. 
CHRISTOPHERCOLUMBUS.    By 

Washington  Irving. 
ROBERT  THE  BRUCE.     By  Sir 

Herbert  Maxwell. 


By     W.     O'Connor 


By  William 


By 


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Lane- 


By 


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Charles  Firth. 
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kins. 
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By 


Other  volumes  in  preparation  are: 


MOLTKE      By  Spencer  Wilkinson. 
JUDAS  MACCABEUS.     By  Israel 

Abrahams. 
SOBIESKI.     By  F.   A.   Pollard. 
ALFRED  THE  TRUTHTELLER. 

By  Frederick  Perry. 
FREDERICK  II.     By  A.  L.  Smith. 


MARLBOROUGH.     By  C.  W.  C. 

Oman. 
RICHARDTHELION-HEARTED 

By  T.  A.  Archer. 
WILLIAM     THE     SILENT.     By 

Ruth  Putnam. 


G.  P    PUTNAM'S   SONS,  Publishers, 
Mew  York  London 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 

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